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Preface 
   THE story of Australian money is peculiarly fascinating for it is possible to trace 
its development from the primitive beginnings in a penal colony with no initial 
monetary arrangements through to a fully fledged modern system. This has more 
than its individual interest, for the opportunity to study in detail an economy built 
up from its earliest beginnings should throw light on the general theory of 
economic development. That theory, in its various presentations, presupposes a 
fully developed economy, of a capitalist type, and neither of its two most 
impressive contributions (by Marx and Schumpeter) is an exception.  
   For the present study the year 1851 was chosen in advance as a halting point, as 
being the year of the separation of Victoria from New South Wales and of the 
discovery of gold, closely followed by the coming of responsible government. It 
has proved fully justified after the event, for, as the story will show, one finds 
development pausing in the late 'forties, different sections of the monetary system 
reflecting the temporary stability of the economy as a whole. In due course I hope 
to complete the study by tracing the development of later decades.  
   On many points of detail material is available for a fuller investigation, and at 
any time lost records of individual banks may turn up to correct and fill out the 
account given here, but even the most relentless researcher must stop. I have 
elected to give my version in full detail, partly to make it unnecessary for others to 
rediscover the facts, but mainly because my object has been to display a set of 
institutions coming into being and in operation, and, on first telling, that story 
requires detail. The chief defect of the present narrative, if an author may give 
reviewers a text, is that the threads of monetary development are imperfectly 
woven into the fabric of the growth of the Australian economy. The explanation 
lies in the inadequacy of the literature. It has been necessary to search out from 
original sources many matters not part of the present study, but essential for its 
writing: the emergence of a government treasury organization; the functioning of 
the commissariat; the growth and changing forms of external trade; the beginnings 
of joint-stock enterprise generally and in insurance and pastoral companies; some 
specialized aspects of British colonial policy; and others on which I have learned 
enough to know that I do not know enough to justify facile generalizations and 
“interpretations”. Interpretation I have in general sought to embody in the 
narrative rather than present it self-consciously apart.  
   Citations of secondary sources are mostly limited to correction of errors and 
then to those works whose authority and standing warrant the trouble. In 
particular, the frequency with which Fitzpatrick's mistakes are noted reflects my 
view that, while he is often inaccurate in his narrative and I cannot accept many of 
his interpretations, his two volumes are the most substantial economic history of 
Australia yet available. No doubt every researcher feels that he has found out how 
wrong everyone else is, but the literature in this field is so unreliable that a record 
of sources is especially necessary, and I have given detailed references to the 
material.  
   My debts are so many that for most one general acknowledgment of inability to 
pay must suffice; to officers of libraries, state archives, government departments, 
and banks in all states I offer thanks for courtesy and ungrudging help. Some 
obligations must be specially mentioned. Mr A. R. Wiltshire of the Bank of 
Australasia obtained for my use, at the bank's expense, some 1,400 feet of 
microfilm covering the invaluable records of the London office. Direct access to 
the records of the Bank of New South Wales was not permitted but Mr R. F. 
Holder was empowered to supply extracts which he selected with discretion and 
understanding of my needs. (It is proper to note that no bank of all those who 
made records available has sought in any way to control my use of the material.) 
The Research Committee of the University of Sydney assisted the final stages of 
the work, while the interest of the Commonwealth Bank made publication 
possible. For permission to use revised versions of material appearing in articles I 
have to thank the editors of Historical Studies—Australia and New Zealand (two 
articles) and the Journal of the Royal Australian Historical Society. My publishers 
join me in gratitude to Miss Joyce Fisher for the skill and care she has devoted to 
preparing the manuscript and the index.  
            S. J. BUTLIN  
   THE writing of this book was completed twenty years ago. Since then little has 
been published on its central subject, other than my own account of British 
banking in Australia and New Zealand (Australia and New Zealand Bank, 1961) 
but a very great deal has appeared in the general field of Australian history. To 
take account in detail of this work would require extensive re-writing and it has 
seemed to me better to let the book stand as a work of its time. It has been 
reproduced by offset photo-lithography so that the reader has an exact 
reproduction of the original text.  
   London         S. J. BUTLIN  
   May 1968  
Note on Terminology and Abbreviations 
   H.R.A., Historical Records of Australia, followed by series number, volume 
number and page.  
   H.R.N.S.W., Historical Records of New South Wales.  
   V.P.N.S.W., Votes and Proceedings of the Legislative Council of New South 
Wales. Where this is followed by a year the reference is to a volume (the volumes 
are not continuously paged). A more precise date refers to minutes of proceedings 
of that date.  
   Tasmania is used on occasions although it is, in official use, anachronistic 
before 1853. But it was used in the period unofficially, and pedantic adherence to 
“Van Diemen's Land” gives an unnecessary air of remoteness.  
   Port Phillip District is used throughout not only because there is no justification 
for using Victoria before 1851 but also to serve as a constant reminder that the 
District was part of New South Wales for the period covered. The same was true 
under the name Moreton Bay District of what became Queensland in 1859.  
   Treasury bill is never used in its modern sense. Meaning bill of exchange drawn 
on the British Treasury it occurs in quotations and occasionally is used in the 
narrative.  
   Currency and Sterling between quotation marks are used in special 
contemporary senses explained briefly in Chapter 1 and more precisely in Chapter 
3.  
   Bank names are often shortened to avoid repetition of long titles. No confusion 
can arise except in the case of the Commercial Bank of Tasmania and the 
Commercial Banking Company of Sydney. Wherever this is likely a geographical 
reference is added to the short title.  
   Commissary is not, strictly, correctly used after 1813 when the officer in charge 
of each colonial Commissariat became “Deputy Commissary General”. This title 
is abbreviated as D.-C.-G. but the old short title is occasionally used loosely.  
   Dollar if unqualified means the Spanish dollar. The various other dollars are 
distinguished either by context or qualifying phrase.  
   Bigge's Evidence. No complete printing of this is available. That printed in 
H.R.A., Series III, is cited as Tasmanian Evidence; while that in Series IV is called 
Judicial Evidence; the Bonwick MSS. copy in the Mitchell Library is described as 
Manuscript Evidence.  
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Fig. 5 Notes of Ann Mash (1812) Three different forms in use in a single year, the serial numbers of the first and third 
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Fig. 6 Notes of Ann Mash (1812). (Dixson Collection) 
 
64
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Fig. 8 John Hutchinson's 1813 issues of copper coin notes. Denominations of 1s. and 2s.6d. has been amended to read 
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Fig. 9 John Hutchinson's 1813 issues of copper coin notes. Denominations of 1s. and 2s.6d. has been amended to read 
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Fig. 10 Booklet of D'Arcy Wentworth's Police Notes (1813) Denominations of 2s. 6d. and 5s. were also printed 
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(Dixson Collection) 
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Fig. 11 Note printed on sheepskin (1824?) A permanence most issuers avoided. (Dixson Collection) 
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Fig. 12 A “sterling” note payable in dollars (1826) (Dixson Collection) 
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Fig. 13 Form of note for threepence (c. 1825) The same design was also used for notes for sixpence and one shilling. 
(Dixson Collection) 
 
 
Fig. 14 Notes of a cabinet-maker, flour-miller, wine and spirit merchant (1823) The first is for ten shillings “payable in 
dollars at 5s. each”; the second is for one shilling “or one-fifth of a dollar”; the third is simply for “half-a-dollar”. The 
fractions do not imply cut coins of these amounts. (Dixson Collection) 
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Fig. 15 Notes of a cabinet-maker, flour-miller, wine and spirit merchant (1823) The first is for ten shillings “payable in 
dollars at 5s. each”; the second is for one shilling “or one-fifth of a dollar”; the third is simply for “half-a-dollar”. The 
fractions do not imply cut coins of these amounts. (Dixson Collection) 
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Fig. 16 Notes of a cabinet-maker, flour-miller, wine and spirit merchant (1823) The first is for ten shillings “payable in 
dollars at 5s. each”; the second is for one shilling “or one-fifth of a dollar”; the third is simply for “half-a-dollar”. The 
fractions do not imply cut coins of these amounts. (Dixson Collection) 
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Fig. 17 Notes of Lempriere & Co., Hobart (1823) Denominations of one and four dollars were also used. The clerk is 
C. Boucher, and the notes were printed in Sydney. (Mitchell Library) 
 
 
Fig. 18 Notes of J. Weavell. (Dixson Collection) 
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Fig. 19 Notes of J. Weavell. (Dixson Collection) 
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Fig. 20 Note substitution of “currency” for “in Spanish dollars at 5s. each” as the result of abolition of the dollar 
“system”. Similar notes for 3d. exist. (Dixson Collection) 
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Fig. 21 Notes of F. Bradley (1824) Issue by the same man within a few days of such different forms illustrates the 
diversity of note issues and difficulty of detecting forgery. (Dixson Collection) 
 
 
Fig. 22 Notes of F. Bradley (1824) Issue by the same man within a few days of such different forms illustrates the 
diversity of note issues and difficulty of detecting forgery. (Dixson Collection) 
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Figs. 23 Conversion to “sterling” in 1826 Later notes of this firm were headed variously, e.g. “Waterloo Company”. 
The dollar note indicates the increasing elaboration of note forms as banking emerged as a separate and relatively 
permanent and large-scale activity. (Dixson Collection) 
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Fig. 24 Conversion to “sterling” in 1826 Later notes of this firm were headed variously, e.g. “Waterloo Company”. The 
dollar note indicates the increasing elaboration of note forms as banking emerged as a separate and relatively 
permanent and large-scale activity. (Dixson Collection) 
 
 
Fig. 25 A country store note of 1836 Bungonia is modern Goulburn. (Dixson Collection) 
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Fig. 26 Royal Bank 5s. note issued in 1847 (Mitchell Library) 
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Fig. 27 Country “order” in typical standardized form (1851) i.e. printed amount, addressed to Sydney agent of station. 
(Mitchell Library) 
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   Since these illustrations were prepared, the collection of the late Sir William 
Dixson has passed into the possession of the Mitchell Library. Coins are not 
illustrated since they are exhaustively covered by A. Andrews, Australasian 
Tokens and Coins (Sydney, 1921).  
   South-Eastern Australia to 1851  
 
Fig. 28 A hand-written bearer order as late as 1851 (Mitchell Library) 
 
 
Fig. 29 One of Peter Brown's notes (1833) Despite its being numbered “one”, notes of higher serial number but slightly 
earlier date exist. Note the name is Brown; he did not affect the “u” form until ten years later. (Public Library of 
Western Australia) 
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Fig. 30 A South Australian storekeeper's note (1836) A similar form was used for the 2s. note. (Mitchell Library) 
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Foundations of the Australian Monetary 
System 1788–1851 
Chapter 1 The Story in Brief 
   AUSTRALIAN economic history is the major part of all Australian 
history; from the beginning economic factors have dominated development 
in a way that should gladden the heart of any Marxist. What is true of any 
particular strand of economic growth—land settlement, labour relations 
and labour organization, immigration, secondary industry—is also true of 
each major stage in the development of the community as a whole: each is 
characterized by economic changes which conditioned political, social and 
cultural changes. On a less significant level it is also true, and more 
obviously, that the monetary organization varied and grew to fit each phase 
in the emergence and growth of Australian capitalism. The period covered 
by this study may be summarized as one in which a penal settlement was 
created containing within it the seeds of a capitalist development; in the 
first twenty years the seeds were germinating, it was becoming clear that 
Australia was not merely a gaol with an odd mixture of private enterprise 
but a society organized on two contradictory principles. For the next ten 
years or so (the governorship of Macquarie) the two were reconciled 
simply because private enterprise was sufficiently employed in feeding the 
gaol. But in that time were developments, notably the establishment of 
wool-growing and exploration which opened up new resources along with 
new horizons, from which followed in the 'twenties open conflict between 
the two principles—and the gaol lost. With the 'thirties Australia was a 
field for migration and for British investment; it was being developed in a 
capitalist way. That process entailed a boom which ended calamitously, but 
destroyed the gaol. The 'forties were a period of consolidation of victory: 
political (the New South Wales constitution of 1842) and economic (the 
1847 land regulations).  
   At each stage monetary organization repeated in miniature the larger 
story, changing its structure and technique in consonance with the 
developing structure of the immature Australian capitalism. On the eve of 
the discovery of gold in 1851, Australia was fully organized as a capitalist 
community on the British model, with a monetary system diverging in 
details but in all its main principles faithful to its British pattern.  
   Study of the earliest quarter century of economic foundations, which is in 
some ways the most important of all just because it concerns foundations, 
has been bedevilled by the application of stereotype concepts. Rogers1 
finds it to be “State Socialism”; Shann2 “the economic last ditch, 
communism”; Fitzpatrick, finding a Marxist contradiction, declares, “every 
Governor was required to maintain a prison and plant a peasantry, and . . . 
this could not be done because of the development of a special local 
interest during the period of uncontrolled military rule 1793–95. There is 
the common economic contradiction of New South Wales from 1795 to 
1821”.3  
   Consideration of this last is a convenient way of examining the birth of 
the new economy. The importance of the special “local interest” may not 
merely be conceded but should be emphasized; the doubts must concern 
the tracing of this local interest to the brief episode of 1793–95. Fitzpatrick 
finds the “principal internal factor of difficulty” to be “the creation of an 
officers' monopoly of trade and production”. Examination of the basis of 
this “monopoly” yields more fruits than a rejection of the stress on 1793–
95. There were virtually no others available to act as entrepreneurs in the 
settlement which could only survive and function if someone assumed that 
role. For the requirements were that they should be free, at least in the 
beginning; ex-convicts like Simeon Lord who met the other requirements 
were admitted for trade purposes later when time produced emancipists. 
They had to possess some capital and be worthy of credit and have a 
minimum of education and organizing ability. Officers and officials were 
the only group who qualified; not for years could there have been many 
free immigrants or ex-convicts to play the role, and when they did appear 
the “monopoly” broke down despite resistance.  
   The “monopoly” can only be so described with a loose use of words; 
some degree of combination was inevitable as a retort to the monopoly of 
the captain of the infrequent ship; in a small community vigorous 
competition never flourishes since it conflicts with good social relations; 
and in this case the traders were, if not all gentlemen, at least all officers 
together. The basis of that monopoly was that officers and officials 
received the lion's share of the land grants, assigned convict labour and 
opportunities of sale to the government to feed the convicts; the officers 
were more efficient than ex-convicts since they could afford to operate on a 
relatively large scale, were better educated and better equipped to discover 
the new techniques of farming required in the colony. They came, 
therefore, to get the larger part of foreign exchange in the form of bills on 
the Treasury because, in default of positive policy to the contrary, they 
were naturally the government's chief suppliers, and through these bills 
they “monopolized” imports. With the maximum allowance for lack of 
scruple, the use of official positions to secure privilege and destroy 
competitors, and to sabotage the policies of governors who sought to 
intervene, it is still not necessary to attribute the source of “monopoly” to a 
brief interlude of military government, although this strengthened the 
monopolists' position, gave them a flying start and selected the individuals 
who should be favoured. Nor is it reasonable to expect that governors 
could break this position by fiat. They failed so long as officers were 
administering rules designed to destroy their own lucrative privileges; they 
were forced to compromise because food had to be produced; and they had 
in any case no alternative to turn to. When a new group of non-official 
capitalists appeared, officers and officials soon took second place.  
   That local interest groups dominated economic development is true, but 
except for the very first years they were not only officials. Wentworth, 
Macarthur, Piper and their colleagues were joined by free immigrants like 
Robert Campbell or the Blaxlands, or by ex-convicts such as Simeon Lord 
and Redfern. Such groups must have achieved dominance in the absence of 
persistent and consistent promotion of an alternative system. The claim that 
this was pursued in the form of a peasant economy rests on nothing more 
secure than instructions to governors. These appear to represent spur-of-
the-moment thinking as to how to dispose of convicts who were freed, not 
a design for an economic system. There were two possibilities, that 
convicts should become free peasants or that they should become 
employees, and at a stage when free settlers were not considered the former 
was more obvious. Someone said: let them grow their own food on land 
provided by the Crown and look after themselves; and as is the way with 
departmental memoranda, phrases and ideas were perpetuated without 
thought or understanding. The test of how far the phrases meant policy is 
the action taken to implement them.  
   If a contradiction must be formulated it lies here. The British government 
planned a remote penal settlement, but thought about it in terms 
appropriate to a local gaol, except in the more obvious Robinson Crusoe-
ish aspects. When necessity dictated arrangements for private and 
government imports on a commercial basis, or some other mode of 
organizing food supply than turning convicts into peasants, the growth of 
private enterprise was rarely restricted, usually permitted, and often 
promoted. Capitalist solutions, such as private production of food for sale; 
local proposals which were self-interested but offered immediate help, 
such as land grants to officers or assignment of convict labour for private 
profit; these were accepted by harassed governors or a British government 
embroiled in continental war without any consideration of the way they 
implied the emergence of a private enterprise economy which could only 
briefly be consistent with a gaol.  
   The monetary arrangements which grew up in this milieu reflected it 
accurately enough. In origin they were almost all ad hoc temporary 
makeshifts. Foreign coins, arriving haphazardly in trade or in officers' 
purses and convicts' pockets, acquired local acceptability and brief legal 
recognition. But they did not suffice, and from the simple expedient of 
settling debts with promissory notes grew, in the first decade of the 
nineteenth century, the practice of regular issue by all and sundry of small 
notes, heterogeneous in form and often disreputable, defying spasmodic 
efforts of governors to enforce some minimum standards. The government 
store which initially had the multifarious but restricted functions of an 
army commissariat adapted to provide for a prison population, came to be 
the chief market for colonial produce which it paid for in the first instance 
with Store receipts which thus became a kind of generally circulating 
government note issue. They were especially attractive because regularly 
withdrawn in exchange for bills of exchange on the British Treasury, 
nearly the sole kind of money with which imports might be bought. The 
same need to procure from private sources local food for convicts led the 
store to become the colony's chief source of capital advances in the form of 
stock, equipment and rations. It became for a short period in effect and in 
functions the colony's bank.  
   Makeshifts and ad hoc expedients to provide for payments between 
government and individuals and amongst individuals thus merged into a 
pattern, conforming to the larger pattern of a gaol which depended on 
private enterprise for its food supply, and which steadily built up, in the 
form of a body of officials permitted to develop large private economic 
interests and a growing number of ex-prisoners, a private economy with its 
own needs to finance production, imports and trade. The core of the 
monetary system was the Commissariat store with its Treasury bill for 
public and private external payments, its Store receipt, its loans in kind; 
outside its range private local transactions were fulfilled by supplementing 
its Store receipts with barter and a variety of private note issues. Thus there 
came into being a dual monetary standard, “sterling” meaning any form of 
money roughly equal in value and acceptability to bills on the Treasury, 
and “currency” meaning forms of money of purely local acceptability and 
normally at a substantial discount in terms of “sterling”. The failure of 
King, Bligh and Macquarie in turn to suppress or control “currency” was 
evidence of the vitality with which private enterprise was growing.  
   The second stage of economic growth coincides roughly with the 
governorship of Macquarie, 1810–21. It was the period which finally 
determined that the ultimate destiny of the colony of New South Wales and 
its Tasmanian appendage should be a free capitalist society, not a gaol. 
Had Macquarie been a different person—a Colonel George Arthur for 
example—the issue might have been delayed, but in fact the trends 
discernible by 1810 worked themselves out under Macquarie because they 
were consistent with his policy. Macquarie as governor thought in the 
mould of a Scottish chieftain; his policy was to promote, by persuasion if 
possible, by authoritarian methods if necessary, and with as little 
interference as could be managed from the Colonial Office, the welfare of 
convicts and colonists as he saw it. That programme assumed in his 
emancipist policy the emergence of a free society, with the gaol of 
declining relative importance. On the economic front it involved schemes 
of what later generations were to call “development”, to serve the needs 
and promote the activities of a free economy.  
   So Macquarie became the great builder not only of ambitious public 
buildings but also of roads, local communications in the coastal area as 
well as the western artery across the mountains, the piercing of whose 
secret he had promoted. Once the mountains were crossed and a convict 
station established at Bathurst the way was open to the later pastoral 
expansion on the plains. Here, too, Macquarie fostered developments that 
were to lead to big things. He secured free export of wool to the English 
market and lent aid to the establishment of the industry in Van Diemen's 
Land by organizing the shipping of sheep there. Whatever may have been 
his later conflicts with Macarthur they did not affect his interest in the 
infant industry. Nor did his early coldness towards free immigrants imply 
hostility to private enterprise. Rather his interest in the “rehabilitation” of 
emancipists socially and economically pushed him more and more to 
favour capitalist development, and in so doing to promote the interests of 
the more wealthy, whether they were free settlers or emancipists.  
   The expansion of farming, whaling and wool-growing found its 
capitalists in Macarthurs, Marsdens, Wentworths, Blaxlands, Blaxcells and 
Lords, and its labour force in assigned convicts and emancipists whose 
numbers grew rapidly as the numbers transported rose. There was a steady 
rise in imports, reflecting the flow of capital from England, and if exports 
were still small, consisting, apart from wool and whale oil, of casual 
shipments of timber or coal, local entrepreneurs were freely talking of new 
and varied local industries and, significantly, seeking in local distilling a 
market for the grain which already threatened to exceed what the gaol 
would demand.  
   Macquarie arrived imbued with the idea that a rebellious colony must be 
firmly if tactfully disciplined, and accepting his instructions which 
permitted but did not encourage free settlers; to the end he did not free 
himself of the conviction that the growth of the colony as something over 
and above the gaol, ultimately to replace it, dictated that he should promote 
the interests of emancipists. In the monetary field, therefore, his first, 
radical, approach was a scheme for a government bank and, when it was 
firmly disapproved in England, he turned to vain efforts to regulate, 
suppress or replace the multifarious and disreputable private note issues. 
He imported dollars and secured their retention in the colony by the simple 
and tried device of stamping them, as “holey” dollars, into a purely local 
over-valued coinage, exportable only for their lower-valued silver content. 
Repeatedly he sought by decree to limit private note issues and to ensure 
their being issued in terms of “sterling”.  
   When he failed, he returned to his original scheme and engineered the 
formation of the Bank of New South Wales in 1816–17. Quantitatively its 
operations made no great impact on the economy. Its note issue was small, 
never rivalling those of the Commissariat made at this period and, 
contemporary and later claims notwithstanding, making little impression 
on the private issues which suffered more from the Commissariat notes and 
the dollars which replaced them after 1822. Its loans were modest, and 
once a second bank appeared in Sydney it fell behind to a junior position 
from which it did not rise until well into the second half of the century.  
   But by other tests its creation was of the first importance. Macquarie 
chose to deal with the monetary question by entrusting its solution to a 
group of the wealthier entrepreneurs, just as after 1818 he restricted free 
settlers' land grants to those possessing £500 capital. It symbolized the 
acceptance of an economic development which was to be guided and 
controlled by a relatively few capitalists who would provide the labour 
market for the great majority of emancipists. It meant also that those same 
entrepreneurs were confident that the private economy had so far outgrown 
the gaol that a normal banking institution could succeed, and its modest 
success confirmed both their confidence and the line of growth of the 
economy.  
   The manner of Macquarie's going underlined the trend. For the reports of 
Bigge were hostile to Macquarie because he was swayed by those whose 
enmity towards the governor sprang from demands that their interests be 
served more fully and more rapidly in large-scale capitalist exploitation of 
the colony. The complete acceptance of his recommendations marked, 
definitely, British endorsement of the ultimate supersession of the gaol by 
the private economy. Thereafter events moved rapidly in the erection of a 
free society and a free economy.  
   The creation of a Legislative Council in 1823 and its extension in 1828; 
trial by jury; freedom of the press; large free immigration; the emergence 
of a coherent organized opposition to the local government; the separation 
of Van Diemen's Land and, under Governor Arthur, the growing 
concentration on it as the primary penal settlement—these marked the 
decline of the gaol as the primary purpose of British settlement.  
   Free immigration, much of it state-aided, grew rapidly and land grants 
rose to high levels, leading in 1831 to easy British acquiescence in the 
Systematic Colonizers' doctrine of sale in place of grant; sheep (and cattle) 
multiplied in numbers and the appearance of the Australian Agricultural 
Company in 1826, with its southern rival the Van Diemen's Land 
Company, as the leaders of an inflow of British capital, was the signal for a 
shortlived pastoral boom which ended in financial crisis in 1826 and more 
prolonged depression from 1828 to 1830.  
   On the monetary front there were three main groups of events. For the 
last time the convict administration was able to make an important decision 
on monetary policy when, in 1822 under Governor Brisbane, the attempt 
was made to establish the Spanish dollar as the legal unit of account and 
the basic circulating coin. The effort was well on the way to success when 
in 1825 the British government imposed its general policy for the empire, 
newly-adopted as the corollary of British legislation for the gold standard, 
of a sterling-exchange standard, with British units of monetary accounting 
and the circulation of British coins. The full implementing of the policy 
was protracted, especially in Tasmania, but thus was born the pound 
Australian. The third important strand was the multiplication of banks: in 
New South Wales the Waterloo Company in 1822, the Bank of Australia in 
1826; in Tasmania the Bank of Van Diemen's Land in 1823, the Tasmanian 
Bank in 1826, the Derwent and Cornwall Banks in 1828 and the 
Commercial Bank in 1829. All were small exclusive partnerships, adhering 
as cautiously to localized unit banking in the fields familiar to their English 
models as they were adventurous in their methods of exploiting those fields 
to the full. But all were note-issuers, and with them died at last, in the 
metropolitan centres but not in the country, miscellaneous issues by 
individuals and stores. In the country such issues were progressively 
pushed further and further outback as banks advanced, to be (virtually) 
eliminated only after a full century. What the Bank of New South Wales 
had heralded they made commonplace, “the ordinary banking business of 
deposit, discount and exchange”.  
   The lifting of depression after 1830 saw the stage set for the great 
pastoral boom of the next ten years. Financed in the main by a rising flood 
of British capital, there developed a wild scramble for land to occupy for a 
trivial licence fee and for sheep to depasture there. Official limits of 
settlement were swept aside as the squatters went west, south and north, 
and in ten years occupied half a continent. Tasmanian adventurers, 
disregarding government policy as to its reservation, forced the opening of 
the Port Phillip District. Behind the squatters the metropolitan bases for 
their advance grew; shops, wharves, merchants' warehouses multiplied. 
Labour and still more labour was sought by expanding and varying 
schemes for assisted immigration, financed from the proceeds of land 
sales; and, significant of the chronic labour shortage, unions of workmen 
first became important. Wages and prices rose and a bourgeois urban 
culture flourished.  
   In Tasmania the limits of its exploitable land and the still powerful 
demands of the gaol turned energies into participation in the mainland 
boom. Within the island itself the decade was marked by mild ups and 
downs and no great boom, of which one consequence was the continued 
use of Spanish dollars and experiments in the legalizing of rupees and 
South American dollars. But on the mainland the boom continued. Western 
Australia, an unsuccessful experiment in company colonization in 1829, as 
a Crown colony shared remotely and mildly in the prosperity of the East. 
South Australia was born of the union of the moralizings of the Systematic 
Colonizers on the errors in the West and the anxiety of British investors to 
find yet other ways of profiting from the Australian boom.  
   The financial basis was British capital which created its own channels in 
new bank formations. The only important new colonial bank was the 
Commercial Banking Company of Sydney, for the colonists preferred to 
profit directly from wool rather than indirectly in the high interest rates. Of 
the colonial banks only the Derwent was enterprising enough to become an 
agent for distributing British capital. The Bank of Australasia, the Union 
Bank, the Bank of South Australia and three mortgage companies were the 
answer to the search by British investors for ways of transferring funds. 
Only as the boom reached its turbulent crest was there a flurry of colonial 
bank formations and projects and, like the parallel outburst of joint-stock 
companies for various purposes, they were unable to survive the inevitable 
crash.  
   There was more than a mere multiplication of banks; the banking system 
was transformed. In place of a few localized unit banks relying on capital 
for loanable funds, content with a restricted business and averse to serious 
competition, there were a number of large banks—all the important 
colonial banks had greatly expanded—engaged in aggressive competition. 
A scramble for deposits which had pushed deposit interest rates to high 
levels had established deposit-banking as the general practice. Competition 
for business as settlement spread had caused abandonment of unit for 
branch banking. The greater size, overseas links and more aggressive 
outlook of the English banks had produced a new pattern of power and 
interest in the banking field. One aspect was the rapid growth of a 
systematic foreign exchange market, primarily constituted by the English 
banks, outside and independent of the Commissariat.  
   The slump which followed, 1841–3, was as severe as the boom had been 
extreme. Prices, wages, land values fell abruptly; land sales and capital 
import became negligible; assisted immigration was suspended; 
unemployment on a large scale appeared for the first time in Australian 
history; there was a great reckoning of debts and a painful and protracted 
clearing away of insolvencies. Through it all the output of wool continued 
to rise and the second half of the decade saw in the East a stable pastoral 
economy expanding still in more sober fashion. South Australia was 
exceptional in enjoying a boom in non-ferrous metal mining.  
   The impact of the slump on the banks was dramatic but episodic. All the 
banks suffered severe curtailment of business and for the first time 
Australians knew the meaning of bank failure as the Bank of Australia, the 
Port Phillip Bank and the Sydney Bank collapsed. But reduced business 
and fewer banks were not accompanied by any more basic changes in the 
nature or practice of the banking system. It continued to be what it had 
become, a semi-competitive system, accepting branch banking as its mode 
of expansion and otherwise closely modelled on the structure and practice 
of English banking and, like it, subject only to a minimum of legislative 
control. Even this control could have been escaped: on the one hand 
refusing government deposits or abandoning note issue would have 
brought freedom from publicity; on the other, in the only colony (New 
South Wales) which obeyed British instructions for mild conditions 
concerning capitalization, note issue and total loans, operation as a simple 
partnership would have brought freedom even from these. Nor did the 
slump produce any major change in currency. The final elimination of 
dollars in Tasmania in 1842 was followed in 1852 by extension to the 
colonies (by Order-in-Council) of British legal tender law, but neither was 
a major change.  
   It was, however, a far cry from 1788. The blank space of that year had 
been filled by a currency expressed in British units and closely linked with 
it in the well-developed exchange market. The banking system was, for its 
time, mature and sophisticated.  
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1907, vi, 53. 
2 Shann, Economic History of Australia, Cambridge 1930, p. 12. 
3 Fitzpatrick, British Imperialism and Australia, London 1939, p. 17. 
Chapter 2 “This Country has no Treasury” (1788–
1803) 
   THE equipment of the First Fleet did not include money. It was a natural 
omission since the new colony was planned on the assumption that it 
would be populated by convicts who would prove self-supporting almost at 
once under a rather hazily planned kind of authoritarian economy. In a 
settlement in which what was required after the initial stores were 
exhausted would be produced by convicts working under detailed 
direction, and in which the distribution of that output would be determined 
by the same authority, the need for money for internal purposes was not 
apparent. The colony was to be a special kind of prison and prisons do not 
require a monetary system. So far as the pay of the military and civil 
officers was concerned, no one appears to have thought that any special 
arrangements other than normal army and navy routine were necessary.  
   Phillip was given only two directions for defraying the expenses of the 
settlement. En route he was to purchase wine, grain and livestock for 
which payment was to be made by bills drawn on the Lords of the 
Treasury.1 As a general guide on his expenditure his Commission declared 
that “Our will and pleasure is that all public monies which shall be raised 
be issued out by warrant from you and disposed of by you for the support 
of the Government or for such other purpose as shall be particularly 
directed and not otherwise.”2 Later governors who received the same 
instruction took over an established financial administration and received 
additional orders, but Phillip was given no other initial assistance and was 
presently to find his instructions inadequate because the limiting word 
“particularly” seemed to exclude, or at any rate not to include, payments 
which had to be made, and because the moneys which Phillip was to issue 
out and dispose of were retained in England. For some purposes they were 
more useful there and the bill of exchange drawn on London would serve, 
but such bills were clumsy instruments for executing petty payments 
13,000 miles from England and Phillip had been given no petty cash and 
no instructions for such expenditure. The lack of a local cash revenue for 
purely local expenditure was Phillip's first monetary problem, and the 
expedients which he and succeeding governors adopted—government bills, 
Store receipts, the barter store—provided the framework for the earliest 
systematic monetary arrangements. The growth of a local market, partly 
with the government and partly outside the field of government finance, 
gave rise to private contributions to a monetary system which took the 
form of barter and the circulation of promissory notes together with some 
incidental accessions of coin, developments which would have occurred in 
any case but which, in the event, grew up in intimate relation to 
government finance. The story of Australian money in the first fifteen 
years is the story of the introduction of forms of money and money-
substitutes, conditioned primarily by the absence of a local Treasury and 
only secondarily by the emergence of a market economy.  
First Expedients 
(a) Early Imports of Coin 
   Some money presumably came in the First Fleet in the pockets of 
military and civil officers and men and of the convicts. Daley, the convict 
who pretended to discover gold in August 1788, sweated a guinea to 
provide local “colour”.3 As early as December of that first year Collins 
records that a convict died of starvation having continually sold his rations 
for money with the idea of purchasing a passage home to England.4 A few 
years later there is direct evidence of money brought in by convicts in the 
course of inquiries into events on convict transports,5 and much later still 
the accounts of the first Savings Bank, in which convicts' money was 
deposited compulsorily after 1819, show significant sums which were only 
that part of convicts' money which did not escape detection. It is probable 
that some successfully transferred to New South Wales the proceeds of the 
crimes for which they were convicted. So far as civil and military officers 
and other non-convicts are concerned, direct evidence of money imports is 
lacking but is scarcely necessary. The military may have contributed to the 
very early circulation of the Spanish dollar which was then the nearest 
approach to an international money and the currency of most British 
colonies.6  
   A further source of currency was the ships that were presently calling 
with “investments” for sale. Whether these took away more coin than they 
left is beyond discovery. They sold only for money which was good in 
their estimation, English and foreign coins being taken, though to much 
smaller amounts than were government bills on the English Treasury or 
Navy Board, or paymaster's bills on the regimental agents in London.7 If 
these trading ships did not add to the amount of the colony's coinage they 
certainly gave it variety. From England, India, the United States of 
America they came, to leave behind them guineas, shillings, pence, 
Johannas, Spanish dollars, ducats, pagodas, rupees, Dutch guilders and 
perhaps other coins.8 Bank notes, Irish as well as English, were soon to be 
recorded.9 In the first four or five years, however, currency obtained in 
these haphazard ways was of negligible amount and could play no 
significant part in the shaping of a monetary system. The drain of coin for 
imports was a constant complaint.10  
(b) Phillip's Bills and Dollars 
   The first monetary problem which confronted Phillip was the payment of 
carpenters and sawyers of the Sirius and Supply for work done ashore.11 
Even this contingency had not been foreseen and the governor had to 
prescribe tentative rates of pay subject to approval.12 Phillip solved the 
problem by paying them with bills on the British Treasury, for drawing 
which he held a general authority, adding apologetically, “These small bills 
will give the Treasury some trouble, but this country has no Treasury.”13 
Phillip may have been exceeding the letter of his Instructions but not the 
spirit of them; there is at no time any suggestion in the records that the 
home authorities did not intend him to have discretion in minor details of 
expenditure.14 In using this method of payment he was extending his 
general power to draw bills to cover an unforeseen item of expenditure.  
   Presently a similar problem was to arise. The officers of marines found 
that although the Supply was going to Batavia in 1790 they could not seize 
the opportunity to buy the “many necessaries” of which they were in want 
because their private bills would not serve. So Phillip gave them a bill for 
£182 drawn on the Treasury to be repaid by deductions from their pay in 
England.15 Thus began the practice of meeting internal as well as external 
payments by bills on the British Treasury which soon developed into the 
colony's standard money, little used internally but the ultimate standard of 
reference for all other forms.  
   The case of the carpenters, however, initiated a new development. By 
November of 1788 Phillip was writing on their behalf to ask that money be 
sent out “as bills would be of little service to them in this part of the 
world”.16 The reasonableness of this request was obvious and a remittance 
of money was at once promised.17 Delays occurred and Phillip had to 
remind Nepean of the need and the promise.18 Eventually he was informed 
of a remittance to be sent for rewarding services “and other purposes” by 
the Kitty;19 this Phillip promised to expend “with the strictest economy”.20 
Seven weeks behind the promise came the remittance. The Kitty brought 
Spanish dollars amounting to 3,870 ounces.21 Assuming this to be troy 
measure and to refer to gross weight rather than the pure silver content, 
there should have been 4,466 dollars.22 Some of these may have been cut 
dollars, that is, halves, quarters or smaller fractions. Cutting was quite 
usual23 and the uniformity with which all official references are to ounces 
of silver rather than tale of dollars suggests that a good many cut dollars 
were included.24  
   The supply of dollars was not long retained since they were too valuable 
in buying from ships. On the other hand, visiting ships also left behind a 
residuum of coin as change from Commissary's and Paymaster's bills. For 
instance, J. W.Lancashire claimed in 1799 to have bought a piece of calico 
valued at 12 dollars from a Lascar from a ship, paying with a £5 
government bill and receiving in change two half-dollars, two rupees and a 
bill for £1 10s.25 Thus there would seem to have been always a small stock 
of dollars, rupees and other miscellaneous coins in the colony. Writing of 
January 1794 Collins describes convicts gambling for dollars.26 But they 
were always scarce. In 1803 King chose to pay 6s. per dollar for 500 
dollars to be used in buying cattle “among the islands”, although the 
conventional valuation was 5s.27 Later in the same year King was able to 
buy 7,500 dollars at 5s. (for a bill on the Treasury) which were used in 
Commissariat purchases28 within the colony. But in 1806 King bluntly 
declared “Government has no dollars” and “few individuals . . . possess 
them”.29 The lack of dollars for internal use is indicated by the fact that 
there is no mention of them in the Sydney Gazette until six months after its 
commencement30 and the first advertisement offering to accept them in 
payment occurs five months later.31  
   After the first despatch of dollars to Phillip neither home nor colonial 
government made any effort to increase the supply of dollars for internal 
circulation, apart from King's isolated purchase of 7,500 in 1803. When, 
the following year, the commander of the privateer Policy offered to sell to 
King the fifteen chests of Spanish dollars valued at £20,000 which he had 
captured in the Dutch Swift, King refused.32 Again in 1806 he refused to 
buy dollars for the reason that the then current value was 6s.33  
   Thus, while the coinage available to the new colony may have been 
varied, it was completely inadequate to meet monetary needs. Barter and 
the promissory notes of government and individuals filled the gap.  
A “Rum” Currency 
(a) Barter 
   One of the most important articles of barter was rum, but its significance 
has been exaggerated and the manner of its use thereby obscured. Shann, 
for instance, says that for “twenty years or more . . . it remained the 
customary means of paying wages”,34 a statement which has been widely 
accepted35 although it is incredible that the most numerous section of the 
population lived entirely on a diet of rum and equally incredible that rum 
should have been used quite so widely when other means of payment were 
available, less potable but more portable, less liquid but more convertible.36 
The truth is that rum occupied a privileged position as an article of barter 
and for nearer forty than twenty years was a part of the wages received by 
a considerable section of the population. But it was never more than an 
article of barter, was the whole of wages only for particular individuals at 
certain times, and rarely changed hands more than a very few times. Its use 
in barter can be explained more reasonably than by an insatiable Australian 
thirst and an insatiable military greed.  
   Keeping spirits from the convicts was a problem which faced the 
governors from Phillip onwards, a problem whose solution was made 
impossible so long as the rum sellers, “those assassins of public liberty and 
destroyers of individual industry”,37 were identical with the officers who 
were supposed to administer the “repeated orders”38 against the practice. 
The position of the convicts in the early years, in relation to rum, 
contributes to an understanding of the place of rum in wages at a later date. 
Convict rations gave no place to petty luxuries which acquired a great 
importance as a means of relieving a dreary existence, and of which rum 
was the most desired but not the sole object of desire. Phillip makes it quite 
clear that rum was only one among many articles for which a convict 
would barter his rations, or even his clothes. Money was perhaps more 
highly prized, and tobacco only a little less, convict dealers establishing 
themselves to swap a bottle of rum for ten pounds of flour, and a pound of 
tobacco for thirty pounds of flour.39 It is significant that Phillip offered a 
reward of thirty pounds of flour for the detection of anyone trading with a 
convict,40 and that the charge against Lieut. Dawes was of selling not rum 
but sugar and pease to the convicts.41 But there can be no doubt that rum 
was more highly desired than such minor luxuries.42  
   When convicts became free or were assigned during the term of their 
sentences, much the same conditions applied. Employers of assigned 
servants or expirees or of the few free immigrants, alike found it necessary 
to provide rations, quarters and slop clothing and most of the early 
references to “wages” and payments for labour are to what was given in 
addition.  
   These labourers are such as have been convicts and whose time of 
transportation has expired. They then cease to be fed at the expense of 
Government, and employ themselves as they please. Some endeavour to 
procure a passage home to England; some become settlers, and others hire 
themselves out for labour. They demand an enormous price, seldom less 
than 4s. or 5s. a day. For such as have many in their employment it 
becomes necessary to keep on hand large supplies of such articles as are 
most needed by these people, for shops there are none.43  
   Hunter, who complained that he could not prevent “every little hut” 
being used for retailing spirits, said: “Much work will be done by 
labourers, artificers and others for a small reward in this article, and 
(without any injury to health) which money could not purchase”.44 But this 
was not the whole of what was received by labourers, merely an additional 
inducement. Hunter went on to explain that tea, sugar and tobacco were 
also useful incentives, adding: “In the hire of artificers when wanted on the 
public account much expense would be saved, as well as more satisfaction 
given to the workmen, were we in possession of many of these little 
luxuries so much sought after”.45  
   It is in this light that we should interpret such statements as Collins' 
“more labour could be obtained for spirits than for any other mode of 
payment”,46 or the directions of King to Major Foveaux at Norfolk Island: 
“a quantity of spirits and wine are sent by the Commissary, which is to be 
at your disposal, in payment for such free people as you may judge 
necessary to employ”.47 Convicts who were obliged to work for a defined 
length of time for a prescribed and dull ration could be induced to work 
much better by the offer of luxuries such as rum. They could also be 
persuaded to work in their own time, “extra labour” as it was officially 
called.  
   The convicts after labouring six hours at the public works at the barracks, 
the formation of high roads, or burning bricks, are hired by the honest 
settler, or estates-men, during the other part of the day, to toil for wages; 
the pay is a mode of barter, and is given in rum— without which the 
dispirited, indolent convict cannot be excited to exertions—in sugar, and in 
tea, the necessaries and the luxuries of the infant society.48  
   Collins in 1793 found that “while spirits were to be had, those who did 
any extra labour refused to be paid in money, or any other article than 
spirits”.49 In this sense, of a part of a wage in kind, and an inducement to 
extra exertions, rum was still widely used in paying “wages” in the early 
1820's.  
   It is undoubtedly true that wages were occasionally paid entirely in rum 
but there is no reason to believe that these were more than isolated 
instances, and it is more accurate to look at the system of wage-payments 
as a whole. King's summary of Norfolk Island in 1796 is supported by 
much other evidence: The mode of paying for labour is various, and 
entirely depends upon the employers' circumstances; but is in general made 
by what arises from the grain or fresh pork put into the stores by settlers, 
etc., sometimes (but very rarely from its scarcity) in cash; and often by 
equal labour or by produce.50 
 
   Money was rarely used because it was rarely available. The Rev. Richard 
Johnson's payments to the men he employed to build the first church seem 
to have been exceptional for the period. The total cost he estimated at £67 
12s. 111/2d., of which £59 18s. was paid in dollars, all the men employed 
receiving some in this form, the timber carters, wattlers, plasterers, 
blacksmith, glazier and men who levelled the ground being paid entirely in 
dollars. The remaining £7 14s. 111/2d. was paid in kind—201/2 gallons 
spirits, 116 pounds flour, 183/4 pounds pork, 331/2 pounds beef, 3 pounds 
tobacco and 5 pounds tea.51  
   Wheat, as the staple crop of a number of settlers, was also used, as is 
testified by King in 1796, by Hunter in 179852 and by Bligh in 1809.53 In 
fact, in 1806 certain agricultural wages (piecerates) were fixed by 
proclamation and made payable either in “sterling” or in wheat at 10s. per 
bushel “at the option of the labourer”.54 The labourer who took more wheat 
than he would consume himself needed, of course, to sell or barter part of 
it and might be well fleeced in the process.55 Other means of paying wages 
would be adopted to suit the occasion. For a number of years the public 
executioner “had two people allowed to his farm for his services, he being 
a free man”.56 The only general rule is that wages were paid mainly in kind 
and rum was very often a highly desired part of such wages.  
   The importance of rum as a part of wages partly accounts for its use in 
barter for other things, although here, too, allowance must be made for the 
desire of the seller for rum to drink rather than to pay in wages, and for the 
cozening of the befuddled or those with low sales resistance. Boats for use 
on Sydney harbour cost five or six gallons in 1793,57 and from a very early 
date rum was bartered for settlers' crops,58 and for sheep and cattle.59 Rum 
was exchanged on occasions for almost anything, including the payment of 
duties on the import of spirits, although the evidence for this is not 
unequivocal until 1803.60  
   As in the case of wages, however, it should not be assumed that rum was 
anything more than the most conspicuous article of barter, or that it was 
universally accepted in exchange for all goods. Were that true, it would be 
reasonable to describe it as a substitute for money. Anything, however, 
might be used in barter and wheat had a place at least as important as that 
of rum; what was used depended entirely on the circumstances of each 
case, with no conventions as to some article of general acceptability. There 
is simply no evidence for the widely held view adopted by Coghlan:  
   It is not to be supposed that the payment in spirits was merely a form of 
drink traffic—much rum was undoubtedly consumed by its recipients, but 
the labourer paid the storekeeper in rum, and the storekeeper paid the 
settler, and so the rum circulated—a veritable currency.61 
 
   In the preparations for establishing the colony the nearest approach to 
realizing that there would be exchange and a need of money appears in “a 
scheme of Sir George Young” (the naval officer), where suggestions were 
made of articles which might be bartered in the islands for supplies.62 
Nothing came of this scheme although later pork was obtained from Tahiti 
by barter,63 and later still the first settlements in North Australia were 
intended as trading posts at which Malay products might be obtained in 
barter, a hope which was disappointed.64 Within the settlement, however, 
barter flourished inevitably. The market amongst the convicts has already 
been described, but a system of swaps was quite general. Thomas Muir 
could write to a friend in London in 1794:  
   When any money is transmitted, cause a considerable part of it to be laid 
out at the Cape, or at Rio Janeiro, in rum, tobacco, sugar, etc. etc., which 
are invaluable, and the only medium of exchange. We bought some rum at 
Oris for 18d. the gallon, and can sell it for 30 shillings. In a country like 
this, where money is really of no value, and rum everything, you must 
perceive the necessity of my having a supply by every vessel. For a goat I 
should pay in money £10 sterling; now, for less than eight gallons of 
spirits, at 18d. the gallon, I can make the same purchase. Tobacco at Rio 
sells for 3d. per pound, here at 3s. 6d. That too is an article to be 
considered.65  
   Even the early bushrangers varied their diet by bartering kangaroo meat 
with settlers for grain and sugar.66  
   Wheat was particularly widely used, sometimes in the form of flour. In 
1790 the Parramatta bakery under government supervision exchanged 
“with every person bread for flour, on stipulated terms”.67 In 1804 price of 
bread was fixed as “21/2 lb. wheat, or fourpence in money”.68 Rent or 
freight might be paid in wheat, either alone or in combination,69 as might 
wages,70 or the price of almost any commodity as the advertisements of the 
Sydney Gazette testify from the first issue onwards. If the special position 
of rum is to be explained by an Australian thirst and the virtues of rum in 
inducing “extra” labour, that of wheat (and to a lesser extent meat) is due 
to the Commissariat demand for those commodities. What the 
Commissariat would buy was the source of Store receipts, the basic 
internal currency, of bills on the Treasury, which represented power to 
import, and of the right to purchase from the Commissariat itself. Wheat 
and meat, if they were of a quality that could be turned into the 
Commissariat store, were thus particularly acceptable commodities in 
private exchange. In the early years of the Sydney Gazette sellers specified 
“storeable wheat” in payment as often as money. King was therefore 
giving legal sanction to an established practice by his General Order in 
1801: “It is to be understood that wheat and all kinds of livestock is a legal 
tender for all debts contracted in this Colony, provided the price sued for 
does not exceed that given by Government when purchased from settlers or 
other private cultivators”.71 No one took the doctrine of legal tender 
seriously, but at this time the economic incentive to accept wheat did not 
raise the issue.  
   It is important, however, to realize that while many commodities might 
be bartered, reckoning was carried on in money terms. The evidence of 
Collins is quite clear on this point. “Spirits in exchange were estimated at 
from twelve to twenty shillings per gallon” in 1792, and exchanges of 
livestock between officers involved valuations in money.72 At the end of 
1793 he recorded prices as “wheat per bushel, for cash, 10s.; wheat in 
payment of labour, 14s.; maize per bushel, for cash, 7s.; maize in payment 
for labour, 12s. 6d.; . . . flour of the country, for cash, 3d.; flour, for labour, 
4d.”.73 When the first (convict) theatre was opened in January 1796 “a seat 
in their gallery . . . was to be procured for one shilling; and, as much flour, 
or as much meat or spirits, as the manager would take for that sum, was 
often paid at the gallery door”.74 Collins' evidence is supported by most of 
the recorded cases of barter, to a few of which reference has already been 
made in other contexts.75 To the general rule there were exceptions, as 
when King swapped government supplies of old corn for new season's crop 
at Norfolk Island,76 or recorded the price of threshing wheat in 1794 as ten 
pounds of wheat per bushel.77 Later King let the government brewery at 
Sydney for a rent of 200 gallons of beer a month and the salt works for a 
rent in salt.78 These illustrations are obviously special, since the 
commodities on each side of the bargains are closely related. There are 
many other instances of swaps where no prices are mentioned, but where it 
would seem that ratios of exchange were arrived at on the basis of money 
valuations. It is a safe generalization that anything might serve as a means 
of payment, but that, except in isolated cases, the reckoning scale was 
money, and almost always pounds, shillings and pence. For commodities 
such as wheat and meat it was the Commissariat which fixed the market 
price and thereby indirectly influenced the value of other goods taken in 
barter.  
(b) Promissory Notes 
   Private promissory notes provided some sort of substitute for an internal 
currency, and were probably issued almost from the beginning of 
settlement although direct evidence is lacking.79 But the almost complete 
lack of money made their use inevitable, and, with the example of the 
Commissariat to follow, everyone, Governor and Judge-Advocate as well 
as private and convict, settled his debts with promises. King might well 
complain of “the indiscriminate manner in which convicts and every other 
description of persons have circulated their promissory notes”.80 That was 
in 1800, when the practice was well established,81 when forgery was “a 
crime in too much practice here”.82 Imprisonment for petty debt held up 
public works to such an extent that Hunter prohibited imprisonment of 
government employees.83  
   These promissory notes were written on any handy scrap of paper and 
accepted in the most casual manner. Samples which have survived indicate 
how roughly the notes were drawn, as do the forgeries which were 
recorded. In 1799, for instance, a convict clerk cut signatures off a number 
of letters and inserted promises to pay in the small space above the 
signature, and for a time successfully negotiated the notes.84 Dirty notes 
were accepted, as were torn ones pasted together,85 a fact which led 
unscrupulous persons to tear up a number of notes drawn by the same 
person and paste them together to make more than at first, without arousing 
suspicion in recipients.86 Even when individuals had printed forms stamped 
with their initials to ensure forgery of at least no other name, notes with 
these initials cut away were accepted in spite of the note itself advertising 
forgery.87 Notes once issued remained in circulation for great lengths of 
time88 and many were never presented. This in turn encouraged drawers to 
use ink that would fade.89  
   Such notes were issued for very small amounts. Hyman says the smallest 
sum was threepence, although he quotes no instances; the smallest note he 
reproduces is for one shilling.90 This is also the earliest of his examples 
(1812) and throws little light on the state of affairs before 1800, since it 
was not until some years afterwards that there developed the practice of 
issuing notes for round amounts and as a business distinct from writing a 
promissory note for a particular payment. Bligh reported in 1807 that notes 
went as low as 2s. 6d.,91 and there may have been smaller. But in the early 
years promissory notes were characteristically issued in respect of, and for 
the precise amount of, a particular debt. Hence they were usually for 
broken amounts and, while nevertheless circulating, were clumsy. 
Convenience to the general public explains why the most disreputable 
“bankers” could later make a profitable business of the issue of notes of 
small amounts and for whole numbers of shillings.  
   Notes were generally drawn in terms of money (pounds, shillings and 
pence) but might specify a mode of payment not necessarily in money. A 
note of 1798 promises payment of “five pounds ten shillings in a 
government bill”,92 while the introduction of copper coin led to the custom 
of promising payment in that despised currency. Notes payable in wheat or 
maize were also common but seem to have specified the value in money as 
well, although this does not appear to have been the invariable rule.93 At a 
later date (especially 1807) the practice of making notes payable in wheat 
or copper coin occasioned difficulties and litigation which belong to the 
next chapter.  
   Promissory notes circulated widely. For instance, the “Piper Papers” 
contain accounts of Captain Piper with D'Arcy Wentworth in 1804–5, and 
with Simeon Lord from 1803 to 1810, in which payments are recorded in 
the “orders” or notes of various people as well as in goods and 
Commissariat bills.94 Not unnaturally the acceptability of promissory notes 
depended on an estimate of their genuineness and of the worth of the 
drawer, and frequently they were accepted only at a discount. This was the 
foundation of the local idiomatic usage of “sterling” and “currency” and of 
the agio between them.  
   As a form of money, then, such notes were very inefficient but they 
served for lack of a better for many years. In 1800 King optimistically 
promised that “when a sufficient quantity of copper coin is received in the 
Colony, of which notice will be given, no private notes or goods will be 
allowed to circulate”.95 Two months earlier he had attempted to restrict the 
issue of worthless notes by ordering that written notes be withdrawn and 
replaced by ones on printed forms. The courts were not to admit the written 
notes as evidence nor to enforce their payment. The government had a 
monopoly of printing through its possession of the press on which later the 
first Sydney Gazettes were printed, and King sought to confine the 
necessary printed forms “to those alone whom the Governor may approve 
of”. King promised that “from the precaution that will be used [in the issue 
of forms], it is expected that no forgeries can be practised, and this mode of 
circulating private notes be attended with much public benefit”.96  
   Unfortunately for King's good intentions no one took much notice of his 
order. Even the courts virtually ignored it and neither drawers, endorsers 
nor holders paid any attention in spite of its repetition by King in 1801.97 
Occasionally individuals called in their written notes, but they were in no 
hurry to do so, substituting printed notes only when it suited their 
convenience. Not till 1803 did Simeon Lord call in his and announce his 
intention of issuing only printed notes. Edward Wills delayed till 1806, and 
Lord & Williams until 1810.98 There may have been others who at some 
date obeyed the order but the majority did not, contenting themselves with 
the comfortable interpretation that it was no longer an offence to forge a 
written promissory note, a doctrine which King failed to explode.99 He had 
tackled an impossible task; notes on printed forms might be restricted to 
approved persons, but the issue of the proscribed written ones could not be 
prevented without a much more efficient system, administered by 
magistrates and other officials who did not have a direct personal interest 
in such notes. Written promissory notes, scraps of paper both literally and 
figuratively, remained to plague both Bligh and Macquarie and to outlive 
both.  
Government Finance 
(a) Commissary's Store Receipts and Bills of Exchange 
   The Commissariat was an ad hoc organization from the foundation of the 
colony until 1813. An official Commissary, competent to draw bills under 
the governor's directions, was recognized in Phillip's Instructions,100 and on 
arrival in Sydney, Miller, the first Commissary, managed the stores and 
supplies, arranging for their issue and replacement and drawing bills in 
payment,101 subject in all details to the direct control of the governor. This 
arrangement continued until 1813 when the Commissariat was reorganized 
as a branch of the army commissariat in London, a sub-department of the 
English Treasury.102 The change was made when Deputy Commissary-
General Allan arrived,103 and thereafter the Commissariat was controlled by 
the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury whose instructions were superior 
to those which the governor might give in his capacity as Captain-
General.104  
   Until these changes, however, the governors directed the Commissary, 
dealing with each situation as it arose. There was no full and complete set 
of rules for procedure. Hunter found it necessary to give instructions as late 
as 1798 for the proper cancellation of Store receipts which had been 
exchanged for bills on the Treasury,105 and in 1802 Hobart called attention 
to the haphazard methods of reporting to London the bills drawn.106  
   The practice of issuing bills for minor internal payments appears to have 
been dropped as soon as the new colony was producing supplies for the 
Commissary to buy for the maintenance of convicts and troops, because a 
more convenient procedure then presented itself and became customary. 
Lacking cash to pay, instead of a formal bill of exchange the Commissary 
gave a receipt universally known as a Store receipt, specifying the amount 
due and the nature of the goods supplied, on the understanding that it 
would presently be “consolidated”, that is, exchanged for a bill on London. 
These Store receipts became acceptable as internal currency, passing from 
hand to hand in exchange, usually ending in the possession of the officer-
merchants or masters of ships with “investments” for sale, by whom they 
were then presented for consolidation in large amounts. In this way the 
colonial government provided the first satisfactory money for internal 
circulation, as well as a supply of foreign exchange. The Store receipt 
continued to be of basic importance until the early 1820's and the bill on 
the Treasury even longer.107  
   It is not clear how early this system developed. Not until the colony was 
producing some of its own supplies could it have commenced—1790 or 
1791 at the earliest.108 By 1795, however, it was fully established, as Mrs 
Macarthur describes.109  
   In payment for [grain] the Commissary issues a receipt, approved of by 
the Government; and these receipts pass current here as coin and are taken 
by masters of ships and adventurers who come to these parts with 
merchandise for sale. When any number of these have been accumulated in 
the hands of individuals they are returned to the Commissary, who gives a 
bill on the Treasury in England for them . . . Pigs are bought upon the same 
system, as would also sheep and cattle if their numbers would admit of 
their being killed.  
   A reduction in Commissariat purchases meant that sellers were unable to 
meet their debts to officers and other dealers since there was no significant 
market within the colony for local produce, apart from the Commissariat.110  
   During the first ten years or so these receipts were nominally promissory 
notes, payable on demand, but by 1803 if not earlier they were expressed 
as receipts.111 So far as the sequence of events can be reconstructed, it 
would seem that Hunter, a few months after assuming the governorship, 
discovered that the receipts which storekeepers gave and which served 
merely as notations for the Commissary's promissory note (the Store 
receipt proper) were themselves being used as currency. He forbade the 
practice by an order of 15 June 1796 and required Store receipts to be 
approved and signed by him. The holder could bring them forward for 
consolidation “at any convenient time”.112 Later this cumbersome 
procedure was abandoned, a receipt rather than a promissory note being 
immediately issued, while consolidation was effected at specified times. It 
was not until 1800 that a minimum amount of £100 for consolidation was 
required.113  
   This system was duplicated in each of the subsequent settlements in 
Norfolk Island, Tasmania and Port Phillip. The substore at Norfolk Island 
sometimes forwarded receipts to Sydney, sometimes drew bills on the 
Sydney Commissary, either of which was then exchangeable for bills on 
London.114 In Tasmania in addition to local issues of Store receipts retired 
by bills on Sydney there developed under Collins a degree of monetary 
autonomy.115 
 
   The conversion of Store receipts into bills appears to have been always at 
face value. In 1798 Commissary Palmer was instructed to advertise his 
intention to draw bills on England and to accept the most advantageous 
offer.116 This may have been an attempt to convert Store receipts at a 
discount, but such an interpretation is improbable. It seems more likely that 
it was an offer of bills for outright sale, and that its lapsing was due to the 
reluctance of colonists to use their scarce money, so precious for buying 
from ships, when they could obtain bills for Store receipts at face value. At 
any rate the offer lapsed and an open market in bills was not to reappear for 
over twenty years.  
(b) Paymaster's Bills and Notes 
   The methods by which the military and civil officers and marines were 
paid before 1800 are not quite clear. After that date it is possible to 
reconstruct the mode of remuneration. In the beginning these payments, 
which were chargeable against special votes in England, appear to have 
been paid there to agents of the men concerned to whom was left the 
disposal of the money. Marines who came with the First Fleet do not 
appear to have been paid until they were repatriated or discharged on 
becoming settlers in December 1791,117 and even those who settled had to 
make their own arrangements for collecting the amounts due in England.118 
Officers were treated in the same way and in the early days found it 
difficult to draw bills against their pay.119 Where, however, payments were 
due for services contracted for in the colony (as in the case of Phillip's 
carpenters) they were made either by bills or barter.  
   From this system, or lack of system, a change was made to one whereby 
non-commissioned officers and others received “paymaster's notes” which 
were exchanged for “paymaster's bills” and at a later date for hard cash. 
Officers were paid by paymaster's bills directly. This change over seems to 
have coincided with the replacement of the First Fleet marines by the 
specially recruited New South Wales Corps at the end of 1791. Little is 
heard of paymaster's notes until after 1800. Generally, however, “the 
committee of paymastership” would seem to have made a good thing out 
of them. Acting individually the paymaster of each company paid his men 
with promissory notes which were readily accepted as money. The officers, 
however, took care of their interests as merchants by advancing men their 
pay in goods at enhanced prices so that pay notes were only required for 
the balance. To the men this system was better than nothing, for they could 
hope to get a little real money by re-selling the goods.120 These notes 
circulated in the same manner as Store receipts, being eventually 
consolidated by paymaster's bills on the regimental agents in London, in 
which manner also the officers themselves were paid. Visiting masters of 
ships preferred paymaster's to Commissary's bills since the former were 
paid on presentation and the latter after some delay.121  
   Civil officers were treated less kindly. By 1793 “the super-intendents and 
others in the employ of government not being able to receive their salaries 
in this country has long been a subject of representation and complaint”,122 
since they were paid in England and, on drawing private bills, found them 
negotiable only at a stiff discount if at all. Grose, on his own initiative, 
tried to help them by using the money obtained from the sale of spirits 
purchased by the Commissary from the American ship Hope to meet these 
salaries,123 and requested that money should be remitted from time to time 
“as it will tend very much to the benefit of those people to receive their 
salaries in this country”.124 Soon afterwards developed the practice by 
which all salaries charged on United Kingdom estimates for New South 
Wales were paid locally by the Commissary drawing bills on the Treasury, 
a practice prohibited in 1800.125  
   Apart from Commissary's and Paymaster's bills the available foreign 
exchange was limited to the scanty coin and few private bills. Private bills 
could only be drawn by those who had credit balances in London, that is, 
mainly the military and civil officers, and the rare settlers who had left 
balances behind them. Judge-Advocate Atkins drew bills on London as 
early as 1797,126 although as has been seen, in earlier years ship-masters 
had been chary of taking individuals' bills. Gregory Blaxland was specially 
permitted to buy stock and other goods on settling, paying with private 
bills on London instead of by barter,127 he having arrived with a letter of 
credit on a London agent for £7,225, representing “bills and a mortgage 
bond left in his hands”,128 and there may have been a few similar cases 
earlier. One other piece of evidence of the use of private bills deserves 
quoting as a sample of commercial morality of the day. William Balmain 
wrote to D'Arcy Wentworth from London: “Beware of Cox's bills—
Treasury ones are good, send as many of Cox's to pay merchants as you 
like, but none on private account”.129 After the prohibition in 1800 of the 
Commissary drawing salary bills on London, private bills increased, but 
before that date they are negligible, and after it unimportant until many 
years later the colony's exports assumed significant size.  
(c) Copper Coin 
   When King was about to be appointed to succeed Hunter, before sailing 
from England, he suggested that “a few tons of copper coin” might be sent 
out to circulate at “a greater value . . . than its intrinsic worth”,130 and found 
his scheme immediately accepted. The matter being referred to the 
Committee (of the Privy Council) on Trade and Plantations, £550 worth of 
pence was taken from a shipment intended for the Cape of Good Hope, and 
a promise given of £350 worth of halfpennies and £300 worth of farthings 
as soon as they could be coined.131 The pennies were forwarded to Hunter 
by the Porpoise with instructions to use them for public service payments 
and to “frame a suitable ordinance” to prevent their export.132 The £350 
worth of halfpennies and £300 worth of farthings arrived over a year later 
in the Royal Admiral making a total of £1,200 worth of coin (face value).133  
   King took the opportunity to proclaim local values “for all the specie 
legally circulating in this colony . . . at which they shall be considered and 
be a legal tender in all payments or transactions in this colony”. The copper 
coins were to circulate at twice their face value, and the export or import of 
more than five pounds of them (whether face or nominal value is not 
stated) was prohibited under penalty of forfeiture of the amount imported 
or exported and a fine of three times the amount. To prevent anyone 
accumulating large amounts, the offer of more than £5 in copper was not to 
be a legal tender.134  
   In the same order the governor announced his intention of getting the 
new coin into circulation by using it in payment for Commissariat supplies. 
At first the locals were reluctant to accept the new coin, “having been so 
long accustomed to the convenience of government bills, and the worth of 
money so much depreciated that shillings and pence have never been 
considered of any value till lately”.135 A further reason was the 
cumbersomeness of large payments in such coin. The penny was the “cart-
wheel” of George III, weighing an ounce, so that paper rolls of these coins 
were passed from hand to hand—the wise counting the number in a roll136  
   Gradually, however, the coin was issued.137 In spite of its being legal 
tender up to £5, creditors exercised the right of acceptance or rejection. The 
first number of the Sydney Gazette,138 for instance, advertises a cargo of 
goods from the Cape of Good Hope for which “to accommodate the 
inhabitants, copper coin will be received in small sums, and wheat receipts 
for the current quarter”. A year later Simeon Lord advertised that “he 
cannot take copper coin after the 1st day of March next for any part of 
Capt. Eastwick's investment imported in the Betsey”.139 This attitude was 
not due entirely to any special disapproval of copper coin; all sellers 
successfully asserted the right to prescribe what they would accept in 
payment at any time. Even the courts did not always insist on the law.140  
   Apart from the inconveniences of size and weight, the public attitude to 
copper was dictated by the attitude of the government itself. King refused 
to accept copper in exchange for bills on the Treasury, except at face value, 
that is, at half the local legal tender value,141 which meant that masters of 
ships would also refuse them since they could not, even if it were worth 
while, carry them away, and could not exchange them for bills. The 
Commissary was also directed to accept copper only “from those who have 
the Governor's permission for that mode of payment”,142 and at various 
times to accept only specified amounts, and for special purchases, the 
acceptance being dependent on government need for small change for such 
purposes as “paying the crews of the Colonial vessels”.143  
   It is therefore understandable that little of the coin was exported, as 
Macquarie reported in 1812,144 but it is not so easy to explain why the 
device of a local token with a low metallic value was not extended to silver 
coin, and why, in fact, the “holey” dollar of Macquarie was not anticipated 
by an early revaluation of the Spanish dollar. King more than once urged 
the advantages of additional copper coin to be issued at the same local 
value,145 and explained the advantages of a silver coinage issued on the 
same basis. In asking for £2,000 worth more copper in May 1803 he 
suggested “a peculiar coin of the intrinsic value of sixpence, but to pass 
here for a shilling, to the amount of another £1,000”, but feared that it 
“might set the people at Birmingham to work”.146 Nothing, however, was 
done about silver coinage although King had asked in addition for 4,000 or 
5,000 Spanish dollars, and had more than once complained of the difficulty 
of retaining any silver coin in a community so immediately dependent on 
imports.147 But he contented himself with thrusting the problem on to a 
home government harassed by more important affairs, and with 
proclaiming enhanced local values for the miscellaneous coins which came 
to Sydney in the giving of change, to leave soon after in buying imports. 
By his General Order of 19 November 1800 the coins listed and their local 
values were:148  
     
£ s. d.
A guinea .. 1 2 0
A half-Johanna .. 2 0 0
A gold mohur .. 1 17 6
A Spanish dollar .. 5 0
A Johanna .. 4 0 0
A ducat .. 9 6
A pagoda .. 8 0
A rupee .. 2 6
A Dutch guilder .. 2 0
An English shilling .. 1 8
   The fact that even these valuations—the shilling at 1s. 8d. for instance—
did not prevent export, indicates why an experimental silver coinage had 
little chance of success whether King realized it or not.149 Sydney prices 
were increased correspondingly and ship-masters took coins at depreciated 
rates by selling goods at inflated prices.150 The over-valuation of the copper 
did not explain its retention; rather the not very potent threat of penalties 
for export, combined with the disadvantages of small value in large weight 
and the uselessness of export except to England meant that the small 
quantity of copper was neglected, preference going to more convenient 
coins of a wider acceptability.  
   In these circumstances any extensive stock of coin depended either on 
adequate penalties on export, which Macquarie was able to achieve for his 
“holey” dollars and dumps, or on the growth of local production. So long 
as the colony had a large adverse balance of payments from lack of 
exports, and settlers had to import almost all immediate necessities, so long 
did the colony stand in continuous danger of losing its coinage.  
(d) The Commissariat Store 
   The Commissariat started as an organization to control the issue of stores 
and went on naturally to buy local supplies, thereby providing an internal 
currency and a supply of foreign exchange. It developed still further 
functions of monetary significance when it commenced to sell and lend 
goods of various kinds. It is a little difficult to allot credit for what was in 
any case an obvious invention. Lang attributes it to Bligh's fatherly concern 
for the small settler, although it was then ten years old.151 Fitzpatrick 
attributes it to King, giving inaccurate detail.152 The genesis of the idea 
must, however, be sought much earlier.  
   In the light of later developments it is appropriate to see the first 
beginnings in the despatch in July 1792 of “a certain quantity of port wine 
and tobacco, to be disposed of by the Governor for the time being to the 
civil and military officers, and to others, at prime cost, according to his 
discretion”.153 This was followed by the proposal of William Richards who 
offered in return for a grant of land to settle in New South Wales, “keeping 
a store at Port Jackson for supplying the officers and others with 
necessaries such as tea, sugar, soap, etc., as a return for the articles of the 
country”.154 Although this plan was not accepted, as the earliest formulation 
of the idea it may have contributed to Portland's decision in 1797.  
A copper coin of 1 oz. .. 2
A copper coin of 1/2 oz. .. 1
A copper coin of 1/4 oz. .. 1/2
   Meanwhile Grose, before the arrival of the Bellona's spirits and tobacco, 
had taken the initiative and bought spirits from the American Hope, an 
action which Hunter was permitted to repeat, selling on the same terms as 
for the Bellona's cargo and using the proceeds either for salaries of civil 
officers or for the purchase of cattle.155  
   Presumably developing out of these first steps a plan for a government 
store was discussed in the colony in 1796,156 while King, describing 
Norfolk Island in the same year, made two alternative proposals, one for a 
private monopoly under licence, the other for  
   Government sending a yearly assortment of such requisite articles as may 
be pointed out by the Governor as useful and necessary for the use of the 
inhabitants; to be consigned to the Commissary or storekeeper for the use 
of such officers and inhabitants as the Governor may approve of, in 
payment of articles of food supplied by individuals for the use of those 
victualled from the public stores, or for money in good bills on the 
paymaster of the corps or on England.157  
   The next to come forward was Macarthur who asked to be supplied with 
“tools, clothes, nails, ironwork for buildings and the usual ration of salt 
meat” for assigned convicts, offering a future supply of grain, “valuing 
both what I receive and what I return at the English market prices”. His 
plan was rejected by Hunter, but only because the supplies were 
inadequate.158  
   Possibly stimulated by Macarthur's persistence in asking for an extension 
of what the government was already doing on a small scale, Hunter sent to 
England a plan for a government barter store in a despatch which crossed 
Portland's instructions for such a store. Hunter's scheme was “to establish a 
public store for the retail sale of a variety of articles—such as clothing, 
hardware, tools of every kind, sugar, soap, tea, tobacco and, in short, every 
article which labouring people require . . . Payment might be made in such 
articles as the settler may raise—either grain or stock”. The chief 
advantages urged were a lowering of prices and prevention of 
profiteering.159 Portland was not at first so precise, and envisaged the 
settlers paying by “bestowing a certain portion of their labour on the lands 
cultivated for the Crown”,160 but a few months later was directing Hunter to 
charge the settler for “the provisions, clothing and implements of 
husbandry which he receives from the public store, for the convicts he 
employs”, and informed him of a shipment of goods for sale “to such 
individuals as you shall judge proper”, at prices, reckoned in money, but to 
be collected in “grain or livestock”, sufficient to cover freight.161  
   The nominal price at which goods were to be retailed was not finally 
settled for some time. A year after these instructions Portland ordered an 
addition to the cost price of “ten or fifteen per cent”, but after Hunter had 
urged that a margin of twenty-five per cent was necessary the governor 
(King by this time) was given instructions “for thirty per cent addition to 
be charged on perishable articles to indemnify government for freight, 
losses and issuing the same in small quantities”.162 The first shipments were 
specially arranged163 and were occasionally supplemented by governor's 
purchases on the spot,164 but by 1802 a regular annual supply of goods to be 
bartered or sold by the Commissary was arranged, the sale price to be fifty 
per cent above cost.165  
   It would obviously be risky to impute motives for a system to the making 
of which so many diverse suggestions went. Hunter, as has been seen, 
made some reference to reducing prices and profiteering and he gave some 
approval to the settlers who exclaimed, “if settlers had articles to pay for 
labour in lieu of grain”.166 But this is scant evidence to support Fitzpatrick's 
interpretation of the Store as “a measure against monopoly”.167 The 
proximate monetary basis of the monopoly of the local market by the 
officers of the New South Wales Corps was access to foreign exchange—
that is, to Store receipts and bills of exchange arising from the supply of 
grain, etc., to the Commissariat. In its turn this depended on ability to 
produce or purchase such “storeable” commodities—and it is to the 
engrossing of the best land and of the majority of the assigned convicts by 
the officers, and to the bias of the Commissariat in its purchases, that the 
monopolizing of import and resale must be attributed. Sales by the 
Commissariat in themselves would not alter that situation. Commissary 
John Palmer, whose only interest in this matter which touched him so 
closely would have been to understate the extent to which officers 
monopolized the purchase of the Store's supplies, told the 1812 Committee 
on Transportation that the officers received “a larger proportion than 
anybody else” of the goods sent out for barter, which they retailed, or used 
in paying for labour, at prices that “were very extravagant”.168  
   King, it is true, made two half-hearted attempts to make the Store work 
against officers' monopoly. He directed the Commissary to give preference 
to the grower rather than the reseller of supplies,169 an order which appears 
to have been neglected and which would, in any case, have done little to 
give any large section of the population a credit at the Store. He attempted, 
with little effect, to prevent those who bought at the Store retailing those 
goods, under penalty of losing the privilege of buying.170 It seems more 
accurate, therefore, to regard the Store's retail activities as the easy 
extension and generalization of established practice to remove technical 
inefficiencies in the market with no fundamental social significance. A 
scheme which Macarthur was prepared to support was hardly an attack on 
the monopoly of the New South Wales Corps. To local settlers and 
government it was just a convenience, while to the Colonial Office it 
represented a way of reducing the cost of the colony. Instead of buying all 
the colonial produce needed at high prices for bills on the Treasury, it 
bought goods at English prices to barter at Sydney prices against grain and 
meat at Sydney prices.  
   The Store soon found itself not only selling but lending. The beginnings 
occurred before the practice of import for sale and expanded later 
undesignedly. The first persons to settle were supplied with equipment for 
which the later comers were required to give receipts undertaking 
subsequent repayment. By 1796 Hunter found it necessary to insist on the 
prior claim of the government for settlement of these debts.171 King tried to 
prohibit the issue of articles from the Store (at Norfolk Island) without 
prior payment but had to allow “indulgence to any family that may be 
distressed until their crops are ripe, or stock in a marketable state”.172 The 
officers, civil and military, were reluctant to pay at all, and had to be 
convinced that times had changed and the days of free supply to the 
officers were over.173 It was, however, inevitable that goods should be 
issued, both from the ordinary stores and from the new supplies for barter, 
deferring payment until the settler had grain or other produce to offer. 
Between July 1801 and June 1804 one-third of the “Annual Supplies” were 
disposed of on credit, as were half the “Extra Supplies” between 
September 1800 and June 1804.174 Debts to the Crown in respect of such 
goods rose steadily, to provide a problem for King, Bligh and Macquarie in 
turn.175  
   From lending of this type the government went on to formal, deliberate 
loans in kind. In 1803 King lent salt beef to settlers with hogs, as an 
inducement to preserve stock for breeding, the loan to be repaid a year later 
in fresh pork, and at the same time arranged similar loans of flour 
repayable in wheat a year later.176 A more elaborate scheme, which 
Macquarie later177 stigmatized as “a bad practice . . . liable to many strong 
objections”, provided for loans of cattle.178 The settler who had a plough 
(the iron for which he might buy at the Store for wheat) might obtain oxen 
by paying ten bushels of wheat a year for two years; he was then to buy the 
animal outright for seventy bushels or return it. Cows were available on 
similar terms which were widely accepted.179  
   By this date, 1803, the sale of goods against a later deposit of settlers' 
produce was an established practice.180 It remains to consider the method 
by which the Store received payment for its sales and loans. The Store's 
methods did not involve true barter since nearly all reckoning was in terms 
of pounds, shillings and pence.181 The method by which the Store received 
goods and added a percentage to the price has already been described. 
Correspondingly, what the Commissariat received in kind was valued in 
money, prices being declared from time to time.182 But the concrete things 
which were accepted varied, depending on what settlers had to offer and 
what the government required, and inducements in the form of preferential 
treatment were offered to debtors.  
   Instructions from England spoke mainly of payment in goods or money, 
with one reference to labour,183 but left detail to the governors. Hence the 
Commissariat declared from time to time what it would accept. Money was 
sometimes admitted, usually either to meet the needs of a section who 
could pay most easily that way, or because the government wanted cash for 
some purpose. Thus regimental bills were accepted from the officers at 
Norfolk Island in 1800184 while in 1803 the Commissariat, needing £600 to 
pay the crews of some boats, offered to accept copper coin to this 
amount.185 But the main requirements of the Commissariat were food for 
the convicts and others “on the store”, and the continuous demand for grain 
and meat determined the colony's early production of wheat, maize and 
pork.186 There were frequent changes in the produce which the Store would 
accept. After 3 December 1800 debts to the Store might be paid in wheat or 
maize, but after 12 January 1801 maize was no longer acceptable but 
“animal food” and money, in addition to wheat, were.187 Preferential 
treatment was given to debtors to the government, and to officers, who 
were also considerable debtors. Such preference might take the form of 
acceptance of goods not taken from “cash” purchasers,188 or a higher 
valuation of goods taken from debtors.189 But occasionally debtors were 
threatened with lower prices.190  
   When the activities of the Commissariat as they had developed by 1803 
are surveyed as a whole, it is apparent that it was something more than an 
organization for administering supplies in a penal colony. It may 
reasonably be called Australia's first bank, a little peculiar perhaps in doing 
so much of its business in kind, but nevertheless a bank.  
   Store receipts constituted the colony's nearest approach to banknotes, 
from which they differed in being for broken amounts and in being issued 
in return for a deposit of local produce. Perhaps they are more reasonably 
compared with a transferable deposit receipt. The Commissariat provided 
the major part of the English sterling needed to purchase imports, other 
than those retailed by the Store itself, by the issue of bills of exchange on 
the Treasury in London. It made loans and kept accounts which may fairly 
be described as current accounts. Such accounts recorded deposits and 
withdrawals and might be overdrawn, and a credit balance might be 
transferred by the simple delivery of Store receipts. An excellent example 
is the account of W. Sladden with the Van Diemen's Land Commissariat, 
covering the period from 22 November 1804 to 8 July 1806.191 Sladden 
turned into the Store pork and kangaroo meat valued at £507 19s., two 
“orders” on Lieutenant Lord for £25 9s. 6d. and “cash” for £208 15s. 6d. 
The Commissary paid £415 17s. “cash” in a form not stated but probably 
Store receipts or bills, and supplied rum and wine to the value of £176 1s. 
8d. and £150 5s. 4d. worth of goods comprising soap, tape, blue, cloth, 
shoes, thread, pins, sugar, flour, buttons and cows.  
   When, therefore, in 1805 Sir Joseph Banks from afar in Soho prescribed 
“the establishment of a Government Bank of Exchange upon a principle 
somewhat similar to that of Amsterdam” he was a little behind the times.192 
Starting from false premises, that “spirituous liquors are the real measure 
of property there, and the notes of individuals almost the only circulating 
medium” and that the over-valuation of the copper coin “has given an 
opportunity to the Birmingham coiners to exercise their ingenuity, who 
have already much increased the amount of these pieces in circulation”, 
Banks offers a confused plan for currency reform. His memorandum really 
contains more than one plan. The first is to call in the over-valued pennies, 
and reissue them at face value together with a special silver coinage of 
sixpences, shillings and half-crowns. This is followed by a different 
scheme, not very clearly distinguished, for a special decimal coinage with 
the farthing as the unit, and the coins of 20, 50 and 100 farthings. 
Immediately after this there is a reference to “if the dollar standard is 
assumed”, which goes on to discuss the proposed coins, leaving the reader 
in doubt whether a third plan is being proposed or not.  
   To this coinage he would add his Government Bank which would not 
issue notes but accept deposits transferable by cheque and payable in the 
proposed token coinage.193 Depositors might also be allowed to buy 
government bills on the Treasury.  
   The execution of this plan would at once establish an abundant 
circulating medium, effectually prevent the depreciation of paper money by 
restraining the excessive issue of it, check the circulation of the personal 
notes of individuals, soon reduce the money price of all articles to its 
natural level, and establish a depository of unquestionable security for 
monied property, a matter of no small importance in a colony chiefly 
peopled by dishonest persons . . .  
   Nothing came of this optimistic plan. Banks seems to have been very 
badly informed about the economic affairs of New South Wales and his 
proposals are completely out of touch with the practical problems 
confronting King in 1805. King would have found laughable Banks' simple 
plan for solving the rum problem —just prohibiting it. Nor was his 
insistence on a coinage with a face value near its metal value so as not “to 
tempt the Birmingham artists to supply the Colony with counterfeits” any 
more realistic. The colony had its own artists capable of counterfeiting 
anything, while no “full-bodied” coin could long be retained in the country. 
To remain in circulation it would have to have a purely local value much 
above its metallic value. As for his bank, it already existed in the 
Commissariat, in a form which was much better adjusted to local economic 
problems than Banks' idealized institution.  
1 Phillip's Instructions, 25 April 1787, H.R.A., I, i, 10. 
2H.R.A., I, i, 7, Phillip's second Commission, 2 April 1787. Subsequent governors 
were instructed in the same words: H.R.A., I, i, 518 (Hunter); I, iii, 389 (King); I, vi, 
6–7 (Bligh); I, vii, 188 (Macquarie); I, x, 595 (Brisbane); I, xii, 105–6 (Darling); I, 
xvi, 843 (Bourke); I, xix, 299 (Gipps). 
3 Hunter, Historical Journal of the Transactions at Port Jackson and Norfolk Island 
(1793), p. 86. 
4 The English Colony in New South Wales (Collier ed.), pp. 40–1. 
5 For instance in the inquiry into the conduct of Captain Dennott of the Brittania, 
evidence showed that convicts on board bought food and liquor from the stewards 
for money and also, before sailing, from vendors in bum boats. In the circumstances 
these transactions must have been for hard cash. Hunter to Portland, 6 July 1797, 
Enclosure 1, H.R.A., I, ii, 54, 56, 63. 
6 For the use of the dollar in other colonies see Chalmers, History of Currency in the 
British Colonies (1893). Collins, op. cit., p. 128, writing as at September 1791, says: 
“The Spanish dollar was the current coin of the Colony, which some of the masters 
[of vessels] taking at 5s., others at 4s. 6d., the Governor in consideration of the 
officers having been obliged to receive it at 5s. sterling when given for bills in the 
settlement issued a proclamation fixing the currency of the Spanish dollar at that 
sum”. 
7 Some of the earliest ships sold relatively large amounts of goods. Collins, op. cit., 
p. 162, records the departure in November 1792 of the Royal Admiral, after 
disposing of £3,600 worth and leaving £750 worth for subsequent sale. It was not 
until 18 November 1792 that Phillip received the dollars referred to below. 
8 The coins mentioned were sufficiently common by 1800 for King to proclaim 
local values in £ s. d. King to Portland, 10 March 1801, Enclosure 10 (General Order 
of 1 November 1800), H.R.A., I, iii, 39. 
9 Sydney Gazette, 26 June 1803. 
10 E.g., John Black to his father, 8 September 1798, H.R.N.S.W., iii, 129; Collins, 
op. cit., p. 162 (1792); Hunter to Portland, 15 January 1800, H.R.A., I, ii, 437; John 
Blaxland to (Sir George Shee?), 16 October 1807, H.R.N.S.W., vi, 309. 
11 Phillip to Nepean, 28 September 1788, H.R.A., I, i, 86. 
12 Ibid., pp. 87–8. 
13 Ibid., p. 86. The amount of bills for these purposes totalled £192 17s. 6d. by the 
end of September 1788. Some idea of the smallness of the bills can be obtained from 
H.R.N.S.W., ii, 41 (copy of Treasury Account of Bills drawn . . . to 13 April 1793). 
The earliest identifiable amount for carpenters' work comprised more than one bill, 
the total being £8 2s. 
14 Fitzpatrick, British Imperialism and Australia (1939), p. 141, writes: “The 
Colonial branch of the Home Department had doubtless been taken aback somewhat 
to learn that the Commissary at Sydney had been forced to issue his own notes; . . . ” 
The misleading use of “notes” apart, there is no foundation for this statement; Phillip 
was empowered to draw bills although not specifically for wage payments. Later he 
was authorized to keep a “contingent account”. See Grenville to Phillip, 19 June 
1789, and Phillip to Grenville, 14 July 1790, H.R.A., I, i, 121, 189–190. 
15 Phillip to Stephens, 12 April 1790, H.R.A., I, i, 68. The enclosure shows that the 
highest amount for an individual was £40 for Second Lieut. Long. 
16 Phillip to Nepean, 17 November 1788, H.R.A., I, i, 104. 
17 Nepean to Phillip, 20 June 1789, H.R.A., I, i, 123. 
18 Phillip to Nepean, 16 June 1790 and 18 November 1791, H.R.A., I, i, 104, 310. 
19 Dundas to Phillip, 10 January 1792, H.R.A. I, i, 330; King to Phillip, 10 January 
1792, ibid., p. 334. The discretion in expenditure left to Phillip should be noticed. 
20 Phillip to Dundas, 2 October 1792, H.R.A., I, i, 375. 
21 The bill of lading is enclosed in Dundas to Phillip, 10 February 1792, H.R.A., I, i, 
335. Cf. Collins, op. cit., p. 162. 
22 Since the standard weight of the Spanish dollar was 416 grains troy of which the 
pure silver content was 370 grains. 
23 For instances in other colonies see Chalmers, op. cit. Hyman, Account of the 
Coins, Coinages and Currency of Australasia (1893), p. 62, doubts whether cut 
dollars ever circulated in Australia, but his only argument is that, as a collector, he 
had never met them. Direct evidence of their use is available, e.g., in King to Hobart, 
20 December 1804, H.R.A., I, v, 206; Sydney Herald 4 February 1833; and for the 
intervening period in the reports of robberies in the Sydney Gazette. 
24 Shann, Economic History of Australia, p. 37, follows Coghlan, Labour and 
Industry in Australia, i, 67–8, in speaking of “a thousand pounds in English silver”, 
which appears to be a misreading of some of the precarious calculations of the 
sterling value of the dollars sent. Fitzpatrick, op. cit., p. 141, accepts the widely 
quoted valuation of £1,001. I have been unable to locate the original author; it is 
given without authority by Hyman, op. cit., p. 7, and by others as far back as O'Hara, 
The History of New South Wales (1817). The valuation appears to be based on some 
contemporary English price of silver but such calculations have little meaning. For 
instance, as early as 1790, Collins (p. 128) records valuation of the dollar at 4s. 6d. 
and 5s. at the same time; other cases of fluctuating and conflicting exchange rates 
will be mentioned below. 
25 Hunter to Portland, 21 February 1799, Enclosure 8, H.R.A., I, ii, 318. This was 
part of Lancashire's defence to a charge of forging the bill for £1 10s., but is none 
the less acceptable evidence here since a minority of the Court believed his story 
which must have had a certain plausibility. 
26 Op. cit., pp. 209–10. The games were cribbage and all-fours, “and those who 
were not expert at these, instead of pence, tossed up for dollars”. 
27 King to Hobart, 9 May 1803, H.R.A., I, iv, 121; Enclosure 12, ibid., 142. This is a 
rather questionable transaction since these documents show Commissary John 
Palmer buying the dollars from E. H. Palmer without complying with the governor's 
instruction to advertise for them. There is no advertisement in the Sydney Gazette 
and the whole business was completed in less than 36 hours from King's 
instructions. The price of 6s. conflicts with King's own legal tender order. It is 
quoted only as evidence of shortage of dollars. 
28 King to Hobart, 24 October 1803 and 1 March 1804, H.R.A., I, iv, 417, 466; 
Sydney Gazette, 1, 29 January 1804. 
29 King to Camden, 7 April 1806, Enclosure 5, H.R.A., I, v, 708. 
30 In a report of a robbery, 28 August 1803. 
31 5 February 1804 (Simeon Lord). 
32 King to Hobart, 20 December 1804 and 12 January 1805, Enclosure 1, H.R.A., I, 
v, 172–3, 264. 
33 King to Camden, 7 April 1806, H.R.A., I, v, 708. Hyman, op. cit., p. 52, seems to 
be drawing on his imagination when he says “special efforts were sometimes made 
by the Governors to obtain amounts which, while of exceptional utility for the 
purposes of general currency, would also be a practical aid in ridding the colony of 
the fractional paper currency”. 
34 Economic History of Australia, p. 22. Almost all of Shann's account of monetary 
development prior to 1850 is inaccurate. Cf. Ernest Scott, in Cambridge History of 
British Empire, vii (pt. 1), 100, “labourers were paid in liquor”; or Cramp, A Story of 
the Australian People, p. 116, “wages were paid in rum for owing to the shortage of 
money rum was used in the place of coin”. 
35 E.g., Mills and Walker, Money, editions 1 to 5, corrected in edition 6. 
36 Incidentally if wages had been paid mainly in rum, failing a consumption equal 
to the (rum) wages bill, there must have been either a large re-export or a continually 
increasing quantity in circulation—neither of which occurred. 
37 King to Portland, 28 September 1800, enclosing King to Hunter, 24 June 1800, 
H.R.A., I, ii, 652. 
38 Phillip to Grenville, 7 November 1791, H.R.A., I, i, 291; phrase also occurs in 
General Order of 11 February 1791, H.R.N.S.W., i, (pt. 2), 450. 
39 H.R.N.S.W., i, (pt. 2), 450–1, General Order of 11 February 1794; Phillip to 
Grenville, 7 November 1791, Further Enclosure, H.R.A., I, i, 292–3. 
40 In the General Order cited above. 
41 Phillip to Grenville, 7 November 1791, loc. cit. 
42 Phillip to Nepean, 18 November 1791, H.R.A., I, i, 308; King to Portland, 10 
March 1801, Enclosure 10 (General Order 1 December 1800), H.R.A., I, iii, 45. 
43 Mrs John Macarthur to Miss Kingdon, 1 September 1795, Early Records of the 
Macarthurs of Camden, pp. 50–1. 
44 Hunter to Portland, 20 August 1796, H.R.A., I, i, 593. 
45 Ibid., 594. 
46 Op. cit., p. 435 (January 1800). Cf. p. 410 (March 1799). 
47 King to Portland, 27 June 1800, Enclosure 5, H.R.A., I, ii, 523. 
48 Letter from Sydney, 14 September 1798, attributed to Rev. S. Marsden, 
H.R.N.S.W., iii, 486. 
49 Op. cit., p. 203 (December 1793), present author's italics. Cf. General and 
Garrison Orders, Hobart, 22 September 1804, H.R.A., III, i, 525, and Evidence of 
Maurice Margarot before Select Committee on Transportation, Report, etc., p. 54. 
50 Condition of Norfolk Island, 18 October 1796, H.R.N.S.W., iii, 155–6. 
51 Johnson to (Dundas), 3 September 1796, Enclosure, H.R.N.S.W., ii, 66. 
52 Hunter to Portland, 2 March 1798, H.R.A., I, ii, 138, 139. 
53 Bligh to Castlereagh, 10 June 1809, H.R.A., I, vii, 150. 
54 Sydney Gazette, 7 December 1806. Cf. the case Sherwin v. McCarthy, reported 
ibid., 2 April 1803. McCarthy had agreed to reap and thresh Sherwin's wheat for half 
the crop. 
55 See the protest of certain settlers enclosed in Hunter to Portland, 2 March 1798, 
H.R.A., I, ii, 138–9. 
56 Returns of Labour at Sydney. H.R.N.S.W., iii, 339 (1797); 523 (1798), 752 
(1799); iv, 282 (1800). 
57 Collins, op. cit., p. 205 (end of 1793). 
58 Hunter to Portland, 12 November 1796, Enclosure (General Order of 18 June 
1796), H.R.A., I, i, 693; Letter of a Soldier from Sydney, 13 December 1794, 
H.R.N.S.W., ii, 817; Collins, op. cit., p. 278 (May-June 1796). 
59 King to Portland, 1 March 1802, Enclosure 1, H.R.A., I, iii, 428–9, referring to 
ewes given away by Phillip on his departure, bartered by recipients for rum. 
60 Sydney Gazette, 24 July 1803. Cf. King to Windham, 12 August 1806, Enclosure 
(Accounts of Gaol and Orphan Funds, 1 January to 31 December 1805), H.R.A., I, v, 
762. 
61 Labour and Industry in Australia, i, 75. 
62 Attorney-General to Lord Sydney, 13 January 1785, H.R.N.S.W., i, (pt. 2), 15. 
63 King to Portland, 14 November 1801, H.R.A., I, iii, 326–332. Curios were 
obtained from the aboriginals by barter (Tench, Complete Account of the Settlement 
at Port Jackson (1793), pp. 67, 68) but this is irrelevant. 
64 Darling to Bathurst, 21 May 1827, and to Huskisson, 25 February 1828, H.R.A., 
I, xiii, 316, 795. 
65 Thomas Muir to a Friend, 13 December 1794, H.R.N.S.W., ii, 870. 
66 Bligh to Castlereagh, 8 July 1809, H.R.A., I, vii, 161–2. 
67 Tench, op. cit., p. 79 (November 1790). 
68 King to Hobart, 14 August 1804, Enclosure (General Order of 28 April 1804), 
H.R.A., I, v, 81. 
69 King to Camden, 30 April 1805, H.R.A., I, v, 453; Sydney Gazette, 4 November 
1804, “The rent of the premises will be received one half in pork; one fourth in 
wheat and corn; and the remaining fourth in money”. For an example of freight in 
kind, mainly wheat, see King to Hobart, 20 December 1804, Enclosure 5, H.R.A., I, 
v, 196. 
70 See above and cf. Collins, op. cit., p. 207 (1793). 
71 King to Portland, 10 March 1801, Enclosure 10 (General Order of 7 January 
1801), H.R.A., I, iii, 46. 
72 Collins, op, cit., pp. 169, 208. Stock was imported by the officers in the First 
Fleet (Hunter, op. cit., p. 31), including Phillip. 
73 Collins, op. cit., p. 207; cf. p. 208 on the high prices at which goods were 
reckoned in paying wages. 
74 Ibid., p. 264. 
75 Further clear illustrations will be found in the payment of liquor licence fees of 
£2 in meat, King to Hobart, 13 January 1805, Enclosure (General Order of 14 
October 1804), H.R.A., I, v, 275; Macarthur's purchase of government sheep at £2 a 
head payable in grain, King to Camden, 20 July 1805, Ibid., 511, and elsewhere in 
H.R.A. and the Sydney Gazette advertisements. 
76 King to Grose, 20 July 1794, Enclosure, H.R.N.S.W., ii, 244. 
77 King to Dundas, 5 November 1794, H.R.N.S.W., ii, 262. 
78 King to Camden, 15 March 1806, Enclosures 8 and 9, H.R.A., I, v, 654. 
79 Tench, op. cit., p. 135, may be referring to promissory notes when he quotes a 
request by Phillip in July 1791 that expirees leaving the colony should do so “free of 
all encumbrances of a public nature”. 
80 King to Portland, 28 September 1800, H.R.A., I, ii, 607. 
81 The first official reference would appear to be in Hunter to Portland, 26 August 
1796, H.R.A., I, i, 609. In the “Piper Papers”, (Mitchell Library) vol. i there is a 
private note dated 1 July 1798. 
82 Hunter to Portland, 2 January 1800, H.R.A., I, ii, 403. Hunter to Portland, 20 
August 1798, Enclosure (General Order of 14 October 1797), H.R.A., I, ii, 204, 
refers to frequent forgeries of bills and notes. 
83 Hunter to Portland, 1 May 1799, Enclosure 3 (General Order of 4 October 1798), 
H.R.A., I, ii, 358–9; Report &c. Select Committee on Transportation, 1812, Evidence 
of Hunter, p. 48. 
84 Hunter to Portland, 2 January 1800, Enclosure 3, H.R.A., I, ii, 424–5. 
85 E.g., Sydney Gazette, 13 January 1805: “Lost on Friday a £10 bill of John Palmer 
Esq. drawn in favour of Matthew Kearns, dated March 1803. It is a printed bill, very 
dirty, pasted together with a piece of paper on the back . . . Simeon Lord”. 
86 See warning in Sydney Gazette, 11 June 1809. 
87 Sydney Gazette, 1 December 1810. 
88 Macarthur in December 1807 held a note drawn by Judge-Advocate Atkins on 4 
February 1793, fifteen years earlier (Bligh to Castlereagh, 30 April 1808, H.R.A., I, 
vi, 423). In 1805 some of Hunter's notes were still unpresented (Sydney Gazette, 20 
January 1805). Hunter, on his departure, had given King a bill on the Treasury to 
cover these (Acting Governor) King to (Under Secretary) King, 12 October 1800, 
H.R.A., I, ii, 687. There are many examples of notes circulating for three, four or 
five years. 
89 See the whimsical complaint of “Mercator” in Sydney Gazette, 26 November 
1809. This letter provides one of the earliest uses of “banker” to describe the issuer 
of promissory notes, the word being printed in italics as if it were then a neologism. 
90 Op. cit., p. 44. 
91 Bligh to Windham, 31 October 1807, H.R.A., I, vi, 158. 
92 From the note, dated 1 June 1798, by Thomas Mayner in favour of Charles 
Wood, preserved in “Piper Papers” (Mitchell Library), vol. i. 
93 E.g., Sydney Gazette, 1 May 1803, advertises a lost note which promised “the 
payment of £20 in storeable wheat and £,5 in storeable maize”. In this and similar 
contexts “storeable” means “of a kind acceptable to the Commissariat”. 
94 This is one instance of many. 
95 King to Portland, 10 March 1807, Enclosure 10 (General Order of 19 November 
1800), H.R.A., I, iii, 39. 
96 King to Portland, 28 September 1800, Enclosure 5 (General Order of 1 October 
1800), H.R.A., I, ii, 623. The confusion of dates appears in the original. 
97 King to Portland, 1 March 1802, Enclosure 2 (General Order of 24 October 
1801), H.R.A., I, iii, 465. 
98 Sydney Gazette, 23 October 1803, 18 May 1806, 30 June 1810. 
99 Warning notice dated 3 August, in Sydney Gazette, 7 August 1803, enclosed as a 
General Order in King to Hobart, 7 August 1803, Enclosure 7, H.R.A., I, iv, 346. 
100 H.R.A., I, i, 10. 
101 Later the Colonial Office required the governor's own signature (Long to 
Phillip, 14 July 1792, H.R.A., I, i, 364; Dundas to Hunter, 1 July 1794, ibid., 477). In 
practice the governors complied by countersigning bills. 
102 Liverpool to Macquarie, 5 May 1812, H.R.A., I, vii, 483. 
103 On 11 June 1813 (Macquarie to Bathurst, 28 June 1813, H.R.A., I, vii, 723–4). 
“The Commissary” then became “Deputy-Commissary-General”, hereafter 
abbreviated to D.-C.-G. 
104 This point was important in the conflict between Macquarie and D.-C.-G. 
Drennan. 
105 Hunter to Portland, 10 January 1798, Enclosure 1, H.R.A., I, ii, 125. 
106 Hobart to King, 30 August 1802, H.R.A., I, iii, 575. Hobart required a statement 
of number of bill, date, amount, name of payee, and details of service being paid for. 
107 Government finance dominated the local foreign exchange market for forty 
years. 
108 Collins, op. cit., records purchases of poultry from convicts in March 1790 but 
does not describe the method of payment. 
109 Early Records of the Macarthurs of Camden, p. 50, Mrs John Macarthur to Miss 
Kingdon, 1 September 1795. Cf. H.R.N.S.W., iii, 729, John Black to his father, 8 
September 1798, describing the system from the ship-master's point of view: “The 
farmers who raise corn, pork, etc., deliver it into the Government storehouses, and 
receive a promissory note for the amount of each delivery; these notes circulate till 
they fall into the hands of the officers and other traders (for an officer in this fifth 
division of the globe is nothing more than a dealer); these people pay them again to 
the captains and officers of the ships who bring investments, who carry these bills to 
the Commissary who gives them bills upon the Treasury for the whole amount”. Cf. 
also Hunter to Portland, 25 May 1798 and 4 July 1799, H.R.A., I, ii, 150, 367; King 
to Hobart, 9 May 1803, H.R.A., I, iv, 120. 
110 King to Hobart, 20 December 1804, H.R.A., I, v, 201. King's solution (p. 202) 
was to urge settlers to develop other industries, since no export market for grain and 
meat was available. 
111 King to Hobart, 7 August 1803, Enclosure 7 (General Orders 16 and 28 March 
1803), H.R.A., I, iv, 336, 337. 
112 Hunter to Portland, 25 May 1798, H.R.A., I, ii, 150. An example of the 
promissory note form can be seen in H.R.A., I, ii, 370, dated 22 October 1798. 
113 King to Portland, 28 September 1800, Enclosure 11 (Instructions to 
Commissary, undated), H.R.A., I, ii, 633. 
114 Hunter to Portland, 10 January 1798, Enclosure 1, H.R.A., I, ii, 125. Compare 
with this period when bills or Store receipts were forwarded indifferently, the earlier 
reliance on bills on Sydney Commissary only; King to Grose, 20 July 1794, 
Enclosure (King's Instructions to Deputy Commissary Clarke at Norfolk Island, 3 
April 1794), H.R.N.S.W., ii, 243. 
115 See below. 
116 King to Portland, 10 March 1801, Enclosure 2 (Instructions to Commissary 
Palmer, 1 November 1798), H.R.A., I, iii, 19–20. 
117 Tench, op. cit., pp. 139–40. 
118 Tench, op. cit., p. 156, refers to two brothers, seamen from the Sirius, one of 
whom returned to England to collect their wages which they proposed to use in 
setting up a farm. 
119 Phillip to Nepean, 12 April 1790, H.R.A., I, i, 168; King to Hobart, 12 January 
1805, H.R.A., I, v, 267–8. 
120 Bligh to Castlereagh, 30 June 1808, H.R.A., I, vi, 583, describes the use of pay 
notes in this way at that date, but evidently similar practices occurred as soon as pay 
notes were first used. 
121 John Black to his father, 8 September 1798, H.R.N.S.W., iii, 729. Black says 
Commissary's notes were paid “about six months after they are presented”. The 
usual tenor was 90 days after sight (Phillip to Grenville, 5 November 1791, H.R.A., 
I, i, 277). 
122 Grose to Dundas, 30 May 1793, H.R.A., I, i, 433. 
123 Ibid. For an account of the purchase of spirits from the Hope and its sale to the 
soldiers, see Grose to Dundas, 9 January and 16 February 1793, H.R.A., I, i, 414, 
415. In the latter despatch Grose refers to the Commissary receiving £405 “cash” for 
spirits, but the word must be interpreted warily in the early records. In King to 
Hobart, 9 May 1803, Enclosure 9 (Cashbook of Orphan Fund 9 August 1801 to 23 
December 1802), the “cash” receipts include “241/2 yards black serge” valued at £1 
16s. 41/2d. (H.R.A., I, iv, 102). Cf. similar confusing accounts in King to Sullivan, 
15 March 1804, H.R.A.,I,iv,600 (where oil is “cash”). 
124 Grose to Nepean, 31 May 1793, H.R.A., I, i, 439. 
125 Portland to Governor of N.S.W., 19 March 1800, H.R.A., I, ii, 471; Long to 
King, 7 August 1800, ibid., 531. 
126 Portland to Hunter, 30 August 1797, Enclosure 9 to Sub-enclosure 10, H.R.A., I, 
ii, 105; Hunter to Portland 25 July 1798, Enclosure 6, ibid., 190, refer to one of 
Atkins' bills for £13 2s. 2d. 
127 Castlereagh to King, 13 July 1805, H.R.A.,I, v, 490; King to Castlereagh, 27 
July 1806, ibid., 748–9. 
128 Macquarie to Liverpool, 17 November 1812, Enclosures 1 and 2, H.R.A., I, vii, 
563. 
129 W. Balmain to D. Wentworth, 10 April 1802, “D'Arcy Wentworth 
Correspondence” (Mitchell Library), i, folio 89. 
130(Lieut-Governor) King to (Under-Secretary) King, 8 March 1799, H.R.N.S.W., 
iii, 641–2. 
131(Under-Secretary) King to Sir S. Cottrell, 14 March 1799, H.R.N.S.W., iii, 648; 
same, 29 April 1799, ibid., 657–8; (Under-Secretary) King to (Lieut-Governor) 
King, 8 May 1799, ibid., 671. 
132 Portland to Hunter, 12 April 1799, H.R.A., I, ii, 341–2. 
133 There is a very slight doubt as to the actual amount. King's General Order of 19 
November 1800 (H.R.A., I, iii, 39–40) refers to copper coin by the Royal Admiral, 
but there is no mention of coin by this ship in Transport Commissioners to Hunter, 1 
April 1800, H.R.A., I, ii, 483; or same, 9 May 1800, ibid., 508, (both despatches 
advising of stores on board); or in King to Portland, 30 November 1800, ibid., 697, 
announcing the ship's arrival. King to Hobart, 9 May 1803, H.R.A., I, iv, 123, says 
£1,200 was sent “in 1800”, repeated 20 December 1804, H.R.A., I, v, 206. It is 
reasonable to assume therefore that there was no deviation from the original plan. 
But Bligh to Windham, 31 October 1807, H.R.A., I, vi, 158, says, “Government have 
kindly allowed copper coin to the amount of two thousand five hundred pounds to be 
sent here, and it was thought proper to affix a double value to it, by which means it 
remains in circulation as five thousand”. There is no record of additional quantities 
being sent, and Liverpool to Macquarie, 5 May 1812, H.R.A., I, vii, 480, and 
Macquarie to Liverpool, 17 November 1812, ibid., 605–6, make it clear that the only 
shipments were while King was governor. The probable explanation is that Bligh 
made a mistake and doubled the amount twice. This evidence is recited in detail 
since Coghlan, Labour and Industry in Australia, i, 68, and Shann, Economic 
History of Australia, p. 37, both give Bligh's figure without comment. Both say the 
whole amount was in pennies. 
134 King to Portland, 10 March 1801, Enclosure 10 (General Order, 19 November 
1800), H.R.A., I, iii, 39–40. 
135 King to Portland, 21 August 1801, H.R.A., I, iii, 151. 
136 Sydney Gazette, 7 April 1805. 
137 For illustrations see King to Hobart, 9 November 1802, H.R.A., I, iii, 607; same, 
17 September 1803, H.R.A., I, iv, 398. 
138 5 March 1803. 
139 Sydney Gazette, 5 February 1804. For further illustrations see other 
advertisements, e.g., in issues of 24 April 1803, 28 July 1805, 28 September 1806. 
In the last Campbell & Co. refuse to accept copper coin for more than one-quarter of 
any purchase. 
140 Sydney Gazette, 15 September 1810. One Mrs Muckall sued a debtor, having 
refused an offer of more than £5 in copper coin. This was treated as a good tender, 
apparently on the grounds of hardship to the debtor and the captiousness of the 
refusal. 
141 King to Hobart, 9 May 1803, H.R.A., I, iv, 84, 123 (two despatches), and 20 
December 1804, H.R.A., I, v, 206. 
142 King to Camden, 15 March 1806, Enclosure 13, H.R.A., I, v, 671. 
143 King to Hobart, 14 August 1804, Enclosure (General Orders, 10 September 
1803), H.R.A., I, v, 66. Cf. King to Camden, 15 March 1806, Enclosure B, ibid., 
678–9; Commissariat notice, Sydney Gazette, 11 September 1803; General Order of 
3 July 1809, Sydney Gazette, 9 July 1809. 
144 Macquarie to Liverpool, 17 November 1812, H.R.A., I, vii, 606. The low 
estimate of copper detracts from the force of the charge against the insurrectionary 
government that they conferred special favours by paying selected individuals in 
copper. See Palmer to Bligh, enclosed in Bligh to Castlereagh, 8 June 1809, H.R.A., 
I, vii, 112. 
145 King to Hobart, 9 May and 17 September 1803, and 1 March 1804, H.R.A., I, iv, 
123, 390–1, 508. The last curiously duplicates the wording of his original 1799 
proposal. 
146 King to Hobart, 9 May 1803, H.R.A., I, iv, 123. Hunter to Portland, 10 
November 1799, H.R.A., I, ii, 394, had made a similar proposal for a token silver 
coinage. Collins, op. cit., p. 432, under date November 1799 duplicates the wording 
of Hunter's despatch and may have been the author of the proposal. 
147 King to Hobart, 7 August 1803, H.R.A., I, iv, 356. Cf. same, 20 December 1804, 
H.R.A., I, v, 206: “The fallacy of endeavouring to keep Spanish dollars or any 
sterling coin in circulation within the colony has long been proved, even when the 
former has been cut into eight or ten parts, as these coins are never seen after they 
are paid away.” 
148 The Johanna was a Portuguese coin, the pagoda a gold coin from Southern 
India, the rupee was the Sicca rupee from Bengal, the mohur from either Bombay or 
Bengal or both (they differed in weight). The dollars were Spanish dollars, but 
minted in Mexico. 
149 King to Hobart, 17 September 1803, H.R.A., I, iv, 391, attributes the retention of 
copper to its “increased value”. 
150 For the adjustment of prices to the kind of money see chapter 3. 
151 J. D. Lang, An Historical and Statistical Account of New South Wales (1834), i, 
92–3. He describes Bligh carefully inquiring into settlers' needs and, finding that 
“His Majesty's stores at that time contained almost every article that was required in 
a family”, arranging for barter at “a very moderate price”. The stores contained such 
goods for a very obvious reason. This is typical of the unreliability of Lang. Lang's 
account is substantially accepted by a number of later writers. 
152 British Imperialism and Australia, p. 144. He gives as the motive, “a measure 
against monopoly”, and says grain was the acceptable currency in purchases. 
153 Dundas to Phillip, 15 May 1792, H.R.A., I, i, 355. Same, 14 July 1792, ibid., 
366, records the consignment by the Bellona. 
154 Wm. Richards, jun. to Dundas, 20 September 1792, H.R.N.S.W., i, (pt. 2), 637. 
155 Grose to Dundas, 9 January 1793, H.R.A., I, i, 414; Dundas to Hunter 1 July 
1794, ibid., 47. 
156 Collins, op. cit., p. 285 (August 1796). Collins preferred private enterprise with 
government aid. 
157 The Condition of Norfolk Island, 18 October 1796, H.R.N.S.W., iii, 156. Note 
that King at this date did not object to monopoly. 
158 Macarthur to Hunter, 15 August 1796, H.R.N.S.W., iii, 68; Hunter to Macarthur, 
18 August 1796, ibid., 70–1; Macarthur to Hunter, 19 August 1796, ibid., 71. 
159 Hunter to Portland, 10 June 1797, H.R.A., I, ii, 19. 
160 Portland to Hunter, 31 January 1797, H.R.A., I, ii, 2. 
161 Portland to Hunter, 31 August 1797, H.R.A., I, ii, 108, 110. 
162 Portland to Hunter, 18 September 1798, H.R.A., I, ii, 227; Hunter to Portland, 10 
July 1799, ibid., 372; Under-Secretary King to Governor of New South Wales, 23 
September 1800, ibid., 551. 
163 See Portland to Hunter, 6 February 1798 (H.M.S. Buffalo), H.R.A., I, ii, 127, 
Under-Secretary King to Governor of N.S.W., 23 September 1800 (Earl 
Cornwallis), ibid., 551. 
164 For instance, King to Portland, 28 September 1800, Enclosure 5 (General 
Orders), H.R.A., I, ii, 623, purchase of tobacco from American ship John Jay. 
165 Portland to Treasury Commissioners, 29 May 1801, H.R.A., I, iii, 103, gives 
directions for annual supply at a margin of thirty per cent; the orders for fifty per 
cent addition are in two despatches from Hobart to King, 30 January 1802, ibid., 
370, 373. 
166 Hunter to Portland, 2 March 1798, Enclosure I, H.R.A., I, ii, 139. 
167 Op. cit., pp. 112, 144. 
168 Report &c. Select Committee on Transportation, 1812, Evidence, p. 64; 
compare the charges of Maurice Margarot (one of the Scotch Martyrs), p. 53. 
169 General Order of 10 July 1800, H.R.A., I, ii, 595. 
170 (P. G.) King to (John) King, 21 August 1801, Enclosure I (General Order of 20 
June 1801), H.R.A., I, iii, 256. 
171 Hunter to Portland, 6 July 1797, Enclosure 3 (Government and General Order of 
21 December 1796), H.R.A., I, ii, 71. 
172 King to Portland, 27 June 1800, Enclosure 3 (Regulations for Government Store 
at Norfolk Island), H.R.A., I, ii, 520. 
173(Acting Governor) King to (Under-Secretary) King, 18 October 1800, H.R.A., I, 
ii, 688–9; King to Portland, 10 March 1801, Enclosure 10 (General Orders), H.R.A., 
I, iii, 34. 
174 Detailed figures in King to Hobart, 14 August 1804, Enclosures 4 and 5, H.R.A., 
I, v, 109, 110. 
   175 King to Hobart, 14 August 1804, Enclosure 3, H.R.A., I, v, 
104, gives debts due to the Crown at 31 July 1804 as £10,396; King 
to Castlereagh, 11 December 1807, Enclosure 3, ibid., 794, gives 
the debts at the following dates:  
 
   Not much weight should be attached to the absolute figures but the increase is 
striking. 
176 King to Hobart, 7 August 1803, H.R.A., I, iv, 309. 
177 Macquarie to Gordon, 12 June 1812, H.R.A., III, 1, 720. His objections were to 
the loan, not to the sale of cattle, since he directed sales himself (e.g., Macquarie to 
Geils, 8 February 1812, ibid., 463. 
178 This was suggested by Hobart to King, 29 August 1802, H.R.A., I, iii, 563. 
31 December 1801 £2,510
31 December 1802 3,234
31 December 1803 9,129
31 December 1804 £14,158
31 December 1805 10,758
12 August 1806 10,615
179 King to Hobart, 7 August 1803, Enclosure 7 (General Orders of 7 May 1803), 
H.R.A., I, iv, 340. King to Hobart, 17 September 1803, ibid., 392, records wide 
adoption of the scheme. King to Paterson, 20 November 1805, H.R.A., III, i, 648–9 
advised the extension of the plan to Tasmania, where its adoption was the occasion 
for Macquarie's strictures. 
180 The Commissary's advertisement in Sydney Gazette, 3 July 1803, of goods for 
sale, “security to be given for payment in wheat, to be paid into the stores at Sydney 
between 1st February and 31st March 1804”, represents the typical procedure. 
181 The insurrectionary government introduced reckoning in wheat, but this was an 
isolated episode. See the Commissariat Accounts in Early Records of the 
Macarthurs of Camden, pp. 154–60. Certain examples of true barter by the 
government are cited in the section on barter. 
182 Portland to Hunter, 31 August 1797, H.R.A., I, ii, 108, directed valuation “at the 
market price”, but the Commissariat very nearly was the market and fixed the 
“market price”. 
183 Portland to Hunter, 31 January 1797 (grain or labour), H.R.A., I, ii, 2; 31 August 
1797 (grain or livestock), ibid., 110; 6 February 1798 (grain or livestock), ibid., 127; 
Under-Secretary King to Governor of N.S.W., 23 September 1800 (money, grain or 
meat), ibid., 551; Hobart to King, 30 January 1802, No. 2 (money or barter), iii, 373. 
The instructions were permissive rather than mandatory. 
184 King to Portland, 27 June 1800, Enclosure 3, H.R.A., I, ii, 520. Cf. same, 10 
March 1801, Enclosure 10 (General Order of 26 November 1800), ibid., 40. 
185 King to Hobart, 14 August 1804, Enclosure (General Order of 10 September 
1803), H.R.A., I, v, 66. Store receipts were occasionally taken, see King to Hobart, 7 
August 1803, Enclosure 7 (General Orders), H.R.A., I, iv, 336, 337. 
186 As illustrations only see King to Portland, 10 March 1801 (several despatches), 
H.R.A., I, iii, 12, 13, 41, 46, 51–2; King to Hobart, 7 August 1803, H.R.A., I, iv, 330, 
332, 335, 336, 337; Sydney Gazette, 18, 25 August 1805. Hence the “pipe” 
complained of by King to Hobart, 9 May 1803, H.R.A., I, iv, 168–9: 
“Horned cattle now may settlers take for grain, 
Save drawing bills, to Government a gain; 
And save th' expense of sending flour here, 
At eighteen pence a pound—so very dear. 
And those who swine per pound for sixpence put in store, 
Shall have what cows and calves and bulls, or more, 
Than will them thrice repay, provide the vouchers state 
To Ministers at Home, how much reduced is meat.” 
   Evatt, Rum Rebellion, p. 317, note, quotes this without date, in a 
context relating to events five years afterwards. 
187 King to Portland, 10 March 1801, Enclosure 10 (General Orders), H.R.A., I, iii, 
41, 46. Cf. notices in Sydney Gazette of 18 August 1805 and 22 December 1805. At 
the earlier date debtors could pay in wheat or a restricted amount of maize; at the 
latter in wheat, barley, maize, pork or copper coin. 
188 E.g., King to Hobart, 7 August 1803, Enclosure 7 (General Orders, 9 March 
1803 for debtors, 16 March 1803 for officers), H.R.A., I, iv, 335, 336. At this date 
wheat was accepted from debtors and officers, but not from others; King to Hobart, 
14 August 1804, Enclosure (General Orders, 3 March 1804), H.R.A., I, v, 78; wheat 
from debtors only. 
189 E.g., King to Hobart, 13 January 1805, Enclosure 2 (General Orders, 3 
November 1804), differential prices for barley paid for debts, H.R.A., I, v, 276. Cf. 
Bligh to Windham, 7 February 1807, H.R.A., I, vi, 121; Sydney Gazette, 13 January 
1805. 
190 E.g., General and Garrison Orders (in Tasmania), 29 February 1808, H.R.A., III, 
i, 563 
191 Printed in H.R.A., III, i, 498–9. 
192“A project for supplying New South Wales with a circulating Medium” (dated 
10 May 1805), “Banks Papers” (Mitchell Library), vol. iv. The entire document is 
reprinted, with very brief complimentary comment, in Mackaness, Sir Joseph Banks, 
section 10, where, however, there is no recognition of the inappropriateness of the 
project or of the extent of Banks' errors of fact. Apart from those noted above, 
Banks, who evidently did not read the advertisements in his Sydney Gazette, 
assumed there were no shops in Sydney and that governors had made no attempt to 
control the sale of liquor. 
193 George Chalmers, to whom Banks submitted his plan, suggested empowering 
the bank to issue notes instead of paying deposits in token coins, “Banks Papers”, 
vol. iv. 
Chapter 3 The Working of the System (1803–1810) 
   BY THE MIDDLE of King's governorship in 1803 the main lines of a 
monetary system had taken shape and from 1803 to 1816 its evolution was 
mainly determined by the growth of a private market economy and by the 
relatively ineffectual attempts of King, Bligh and Macquarie to regulate 
monetary transactions between private individuals. Government finance 
continued to be of great importance and the Commissariat remained as the 
core of the system, but no vital new developments were initiated from that 
side; the significant changes were the development of a commercial code 
relating to acceptable means of payment and legal tender, the full 
emergence of a “petty banking” system, and the growth of a dual monetary 
standard expressed in terms of “currency” and “sterling”.1  
Government Finance 
(a) Foreign Exchange 
   Government bills on the British Treasury continued to provide the main 
means of paying for imports. The practice of barter by the Store reduced 
the amount for which it was necessary to draw2 , but this still remained 
large. At the end of 1807 King reported the total bills drawn during his 
administration as £87,478 and the total amount received for “Annual” and 
“Extra” Supplies, exclusive of that part for which settlers were still in debt, 
as £48,894.3 King's figures for bills are, however, unreliable and much too 
low, probably including only Commissary's bills for New South Wales 
exclusive of Norfolk Island and Tasmania.4 But for what they are worth 
they indicate the great importance of government bills in payment for 
imports and the extent to which government itself, through the Store, acted 
as importing agent.  
   The same system of bills of exchange on London was extended to 
Tasmania in 1803, Collins being empowered to draw such bills as 
Lieutenant-Governor “in Bass's Streights.”5 Until February 1811 the bills 
in respect of Tasmania were drawn direct on London but after that date 
were drawn by the Tasmanian Commissary on the Sydney Commissariat, 
there to be exchanged for bills on London,6 a practice which Macquarie 
enforced.7  
   Collins, however, was expected to meet the pay of superintendents and 
overseers from the proceeds of goods sent to the Hobart Commissariat for 
barter, and finding this impossible, ventured to issue “Colonial notes”, at 
some date between 4 March and 3 August 1804, for their salaries.8 He was 
induced to take this step by the inability of these officials to buy 
necessaries from ships and by the reflection that these notes of “not less 
than one pound sterling” would serve as a temporary substitute for the coin 
for which he asked.9 King, as Collins' superior, approved while expressing 
fears of forgery and Collins “had no longer any hesitation” in continuing 
and extending the practice,10 the more so since his request for coin was 
refused, apparently under the misapprehension that it was the pay of 
marines that was in question. (For this Collins was directed to draw bills on 
the Paymaster of the Royal Marines.11 ) From paying salaries in these notes 
he went on to make loans to the officers so that they might purchase stock 
and other articles,12 and to buy kangaroo meat for his colonial notes.13 As a 
result these notes to some extent took the place in Tasmania of Store 
receipts, being issued and circulating in much the same way and being 
finally consolidated by bills on the Treasury in London, until Macquarie 
altered the system in 1810.14 But Store receipts were issued for most goods 
bought by the Store and the colonial notes seem to have been insignificant 
after 1809.15  
   As has been explained earlier, the methods by which the men of the New 
South Wales Corps were paid before 1803 are obscure; after that date the 
precise details are uncertain but the main lines are clear enough. Until 1808 
a paymaster for each company, and after that year one for the whole 
regiment, issued “pay notes” each month.16 These were small promissory 
notes which circulated in the same manner as Store receipts and were 
“consolidated” periodically for cash or bills on the regimental agents in 
London.17 This system appears to have been initiated very early and 
paymasters' bills were then especially attractive since they were payable at 
sight; and although after 1803 these bills were payable ninety days after 
sight,18 they were still more convenient than Commissariat bills.19 Until the 
end of 1805 consolidation occurred each month, but beginning in 1806 a 
quarterly period was substituted,20 although pay notes continued to be 
drawn monthly. In this manner payment of the troops added both to the 
internal circulation of “sterling” and to the supply of foreign exchange 
wherewith imports might be purchased.  
   The men were very much at the mercy of the officers; in fact it is certain 
that they received only part of their pay in this form, being compelled to 
accept goods from the trader-officers or payment in “currency” for a 
considerable part of their pay.21 It is clear enough that some pay notes, 
though issued, remained in the hands of the officers who could dispose of 
them at a premium for “currency” or use them in paying for imports.22 It 
was too much to expect that the gentlemen of the New South Wales Corps 
would be over-scrupulous in paying their men when retention of the pay 
notes ensured their monopoly of one important supply of foreign exchange. 
As chief suppliers to the Commissariat store, as has been seen, they had a 
large share in the only other important source—Commissariat bills. Bligh's 
efforts to enforce the actual delivery of pay notes in full failed as 
completely as the rest of his monetary reforms.23  
   With the arrest of Bligh two changes were made. In November 1808 
Foveaux ordered that men were to receive their pay or “their balances” in 
the notes of a single paymaster, the issue of notes by the company 
paymasters being abandoned.24 Somewhat earlier, in September, the 
paymasters began to advertise fairly regularly for coin in exchange for bills 
on the regimental agents. The amount involved was originally £1,400 and 
rose gradually to £1,700, an amount which was required each month.25 This 
practice continued even after the New South Wales Corps was replaced by 
the 73rd Regiment. That the cash was required to take up pay notes is fairly 
clear, since the call for cash was followed a few days later by an offer to 
consolidate paymasters' notes for either cash or bills,26 but the reason for 
the change is not clear. A possible explanation is that small holdings of 
notes were exchanged for cash and larger ones for bills. Whatever the 
explanation, the change made it possible for a wider range of individuals to 
obtain bills on London at a time when the insurrectionary government did 
not dare to draw on behalf of the Commissariat.  
   In New South Wales civil officers as well as military continued to 
receive their pay in England, whence they could obtain it only by drawing 
bills on their private agents in London. D'Arcy Wentworth, for instance, 
had an agent, Charles Cookney, who accepted and paid bills on his behalf, 
collected his pay, bought him goods and supervised the education of his 
sons.27 The officers had addressed a memorial to King complaining of the 
expense, risk and delay involved in employing private agents in London, 
but King's suggestion of reverting to the practice of the Commissary 
drawing bills for salaries drew no reply.28 On a few occasions salary bills 
seem to have been drawn by the Commissary in special circumstances,29 
but the general rule that officers must draw their own bills applied until 
1813 when salaries were again paid by the Commissary giving bills half-
yearly.30 The bills of private individuals in general were not readily 
acceptable to ship-masters unless endorsed by someone well known. Hence 
the two ways by which most salaries were collected in New South Wales 
were to pay them to local importers for goods and to discount them with 
local merchants or others. By 1806 at the latest the second practice was 
well established. Robert Campbell took salary bills for goods and money in 
the colony, undertaking the collection of the bills from officers' London 
agents at least as early as 1806.31 D'Arcy Wentworth acted as intermediary 
on a large scale. For a number of years William Redfern at Norfolk Island 
bought the bills of officials, remitted them to Wentworth in Sydney, 
whence they were remitted to William Balmain in London for collection.32  
   But while the refusal to permit the Commissary at this period to give bills 
on the Treasury direct in payment of salaries forced the officials to this 
roundabout and expensive method of collection, it did not change the basic 
character of the supply of foreign exchange. Whether this took the form of 
Commissariat bills, paymasters' bills or private salary bills, the ultimate 
source was British government expenditure on the colony. Save for a 
trifling amount from negligible exports and a small import of private 
capital the only supply of foreign currency, and hence the only means of 
paying for imports, was this expenditure.  
   Private bills, other than for salaries, were very rare since they could only 
be drawn as a result of exports which were of no account or of private 
import of capital.33 Most of the few free immigrants in this period, 
however, appear to have transferred their capital in goods for sale in the 
colony.34 Some few private bills there were, but the frequency with which 
they were dishonoured in England and the problem of enforcing payment 
by the drawer, when the drawee proved too elusive for acceptance, made 
them unimportant as a means of paying for imports.35 Bills drawn in 
England on Sydney were even rarer but not entirely absent.36  
(b) Commissariat Store 
   Purchase by government of food for convicts was still the basic internal 
market.37 The Store receipt, copper coin and dollars in small quantities and 
barter, especially, as the government herds increased, barter of cattle, were 
to constitute for many years yet the methods by which the local 
administration disbursed money voted in England.  
   The issue of Store receipts in payment for goods supplied to the 
Commissariat and their internal circulation continued, interrupted not even 
partially or temporarily by the insurrectionary government's greater 
reliance on barter, especially of cattle.38 Some small quantities of copper 
coin returned periodically to the Store in payment for goods, but it was of 
little importance in such transactions. Between June 1801 and December 
1803 of £9,120 worth of goods sold by the Store only £750 worth was paid 
for in copper.39 Of this amount £86 was received from civil officers, £42 
from military officers and £621 from “settlers and others”. The value at 
which the Store accepted copper is not recorded. King had declined to 
accept it at the value at which he had issued it; but in 1812 Macquarie 
reported that copper was “received into the public offices or exchanged for 
Government bills at the same rate at which it was originally issued”.40 The 
small amounts received by the Store in these early years suggest that the 
change had not yet been made. In private transactions, however, copper 
was used, probably because of its convenience as small change.41  
   Dollars were even rarer in purchases from the Commissariat and not very 
usual in private circulation. King in 1805 declaimed against “the usurious 
and ruinous traffic of dollars by the few who possess them to individuals at 
eight, nine and even ten shillings each”, and against “those who have 
accumulated dollars” to buy spirits, etc., from ships,42 much as Bligh darkly 
referred to dollars being “hoarded up for sinister purposes”.43 But in small 
quantities dollars continued in circulation as even Bligh admitted, being 
normally valued at five shillings.44  
   With small receipts in copper or dollars the Commissariat continued to 
make its own payments primarily by the issue of Store receipts 
consolidated by bills of exchange and by barter. The accounts for the first 
quarter of 1804 are typical, showing £1,003 worth of grain purchased by 
the first method and £1,833 by barter from a total of £4,017.45 A similar 
state of affairs is shown by the accounts of Bligh's first year. Grain worth 
£16,200 was obtained, £10,027 for Store receipts and bills, £504 worth for 
livestock, £1,603 bartered against “Annual” and “Extra” Supplies, £2,228 
received in payment of debts for earlier shipments of these supplies, £109 
worth as toll on grain ground by the government mill and £25 swapped for 
salt.46  
   The exchange of goods for grain and meat by the Commissariat has 
already been described and no more need be said than that it continued.47 
The Store, however, developed a wide range of transactions in barter. In 
1804 beer from the government brewery was sold for promissory notes 
promising payment, not of money, but of “wheat, barley, hops, casks or 
iron hoops”.48 Goods from the Store were used in paying for soldiers' 
extraroutine services, especially in Tasmania.49 Freight was often paid in 
kind50 and for a number of years goods sold in execution of judgments for 
debts might be disposed of similarly.51 The instruction to pay a year's 
profits from the sale of “Annual” Supplies to the Orphan Fund was obeyed 
by transferring goods and breeding stock.52  
   The significant new development was that, as the government herds 
increased, livestock was increasingly given in exchange for settlers' grain 
and meat. The nascent capitalism of Australia was almost entirely the 
creation of government which provided the land by grants, the labour in the 
form of assigned convicts and the market in the Commissariat store. It 
facilitated the acquisition of equipment by its “Annual” and “Extra” 
supplies of tools and other goods which were often available on credit. At 
every stage the lusty infant was carefully nursed. The latest support was the 
supply of stock.  
   The practice of outright barter of cattle, as well as loan on terms by 
which the settler might later buy, was initiated by King in the latter part of 
his administration. In 1804 he reported giving 37 cattle, 3 horses and 9 
sheep for grain,53 while in Norfolk Island goats were exchanged for grain, 
“some of them being of the oldest and worst quality at rather a low rate”.54 
Even more government stock was bartered in 1805, John Macarthur 
receiving “one hundred of the finest woolled ewes from government stock” 
for £2 a head payable in grain.55 Quite complicated transactions were 
carried out in stock. King accepted 182 pigs in payment for goods 
advanced to settlers, and sent a third of them to Tasmania to be consumed 
or bartered by the government there.56 Bligh continued barter as well as the 
regular hiring of cattle when he succeeded King.57  
King's Efforts at Regulation 
   King's later contributions to the monetary system were mainly confined 
to ineffectual attempts to regulate financial transactions between 
individuals. After his prohibition of written promissory notes he made no 
further efforts to control this type of circulation so that unchecked 
developments in his last years as governor handed on to Bligh and 
Macquarie problems arising from the drawing of promissory notes payable 
in wheat or copper coin and the existence of a dual standard of reckoning, 
“currency” and “sterling”.  
(a) Interest Rates 
   In July 1804 King was stirred to action by the “much litigation and many 
vexatious suits at law” which he believed to be due to the “want of an 
established and fixed rate of interest” and by the “exorbitant demands” for 
interest made by creditors. He proceeded to issue an order restricting the 
rate of interest for the loan of either money or goods to 8 per cent per 
annum.58 It was intended to be a complete restriction, enforced by the same 
penalties as the English usury laws, “any custom or usage to the contrary 
notwithstanding”. But it was not observed. In litigation it was interpreted to 
apply only to cases where no interest was agreed upon in the contract. In 
1811 in Loane v. Collins 12 per cent was awarded, as again in 1813 in 
Riley v. Kable.59 Those who feared that the order might be interpreted 
literally evaded specifying any interest, either deducting it from the amount 
lent or adding it to the principal amount specified in the contract. Interest 
rates continued to be high, 8 per cent being at best the minimum rate on 
safe loans and with other rates ranging upwards to limits set by the 
borrower's need or the lender's conscience.  
(b) Legal Tender 
   King was equally unsuccessful in attempting to enforce legal tender 
rules. His order declaring wheat and livestock legal tender was 
occasionally insisted upon in court decisions,60 but in general it was not 
questioned because these commodities, since they could be sold to the 
Commissariat, were widely accepted. In October 1804 the order 
prescribing legal tender values for coins was repeated.61 But contemporary 
ideas of the meaning of legal tender were extremely hazy as the evidence 
given before the Select Committee on Transportation in 1812 shows. 
Bligh, after declaring that “the legal tender was in dollars”, hovered 
between an interpretation of what was in general acceptable and what he 
would enforce in Court of Appeal.62 Commissary John Palmer said the 
legal tender was “grain receipts and copper coin”,63 evidently thinking of 
what was commonly accepted, while Judge-Advocate Bent said that, since 
there was a right of appeal to the King in Council in respect of debts over 
£300 “all debts above the sum of £300 are now looked upon as debts of 
honour”.64  
   In practice commercial custom built up its own code which paid scant 
respect to governors' orders and a study of advertisements in the Sydney 
Gazette is illuminating. No notion of legal tender entered into current 
business procedure; it was the privilege of every seller to specify what he 
would receive. Money, in the sense of copper coin, dollars, Store receipts, 
paymaster's or government bills, was frequently specified, sometimes 
simply as “ready money”, sometimes in detail.65 At times the acceptability 
of types of money was narrowly circumscribed, only certain quantities of 
some kinds being wanted.66 Next to money in this sense came “storeable” 
wheat or meat at or below the price at which the Commissariat store would 
accept them.67 An 18-ton sloop was offered for storable wheat and for 50 
acres of land “swine's flesh and grain will be taken in payment at the 
market price”.68 This practice of specifying acceptable means of payment 
continued to be the rule rather than the exception until 1814. From that 
year onward such advertisements became rarer although payment in kind 
was still widespread.  
   Wages may stand as a sample of other payments. These were still mainly 
in kind, with spirits of special importance. In 1804 Collins in Tasmania 
forbade payment of spirits for the “extra labour” of convicts and others,69 
but a year later, with King's approval, he allowed its use, “for the convicts 
when working for the public study only how little they shall perform, but 
when employed in their extra hours proportion their exertions to their 
recompense”.70 But in Tasmania as on the mainland, other goods were 
more usual, and the typical state of affairs is represented by Collins' 
General Order of 22 June 1804 in which money-rates of wages are 
prescribed for various types of work, payable in foodstuffs at fixed prices.71  
Bligh's Programme of Reform 
   Bligh did nothing to disturb the system of government finance which he 
had inherited. He continued the practice of government purchases by 
means of Store receipts and bills and barter of goods against grain turned 
into the Store, as well as of exchanging government cattle for grain.72 He 
approved of the use of copper coin and asked for a special silver coinage, 
to be 25 per cent over-valued.73 On the other hand, he attempted to 
suppress the use of rum in barter and to regulate the issue of private 
promissory notes.  
(a) Barter of Spirits 
   Touring through the colony Bligh discovered how widespread was the 
practice of bartering spirits. In his General Order of 14 February 1807 he 
prohibited it, explaining that he “feels it his duty to put a total stop to this 
barter in future, and prohibit the exchange of spirits or other liquors for 
grain, animal food, labour, wearing apparel or any other commodity 
whatever, to all descriptions of persons in the Colony and its 
dependencies”.74 Six weeks later the order was published in Tasmania 
where it was added that “all officers, civil and military, are requested to be 
aiding and assisting in carrying the said order into execution according to 
the full meaning and intent thereof”.75 The Lieutenant-Governor's 
optimistic request was as quaint as his English, addressed as it was to the 
chief offenders.  
(b) “Petty Banking” 
   More important financially was Bligh's attack on “currency”. To explain 
this involves going back somewhat earlier to trace certain developments in 
the issue of private promissory notes. The manner in which these notes 
were issued by all and sundry has already been described, but by the 
opening of the nineteenth century there were the beginnings of “petty 
banking” as Macquarie called it,76 that is, of the issue of notes as a business 
in itself. This appears to have started with the officers, both in the issue of 
pay notes and of other private notes,77 but others joined in when they could.  
   A special idiomatic usage of the words “sterling” and “currency” grew 
up, based at first on a distinction between concrete media of exchange. In 
the early nineteenth century “sterling” very rarely means English money. 
Occasionally it means pounds, shillings and pence, as opposed to 
reckoning in, say, dollars or rupees. But in general it referred to Australian 
money, expressed in £ s. d. of a kind distinguished from “currency”. 
“Colonial currency”, which by an easy transition became simply 
“currency”, meant media of exchange having a purely local circulation and 
often of a very limited acceptability. Before 1810 it meant primarily copper 
coin, promissory notes and at times wheat. Under Macquarie it was 
perhaps more restricted, usually signifying promissory notes, while by the 
middle 1820's it had come to include dollars when these were reckoned as 
equivalent to 5s. John Palmer spoke, for example, of “grain, copper coin 
and other Colonial currency”,78 and Macquarie referred to private 
promissory notes as “base Colonial currency”.79  
   These concrete forms of money were of little use except in internal 
transactions and there was no certainty that a seller or creditor would 
accept them. In the case of promissory notes there was always the risk of 
forgery or default and naturally such promissory notes were not treated as 
of a value equal to that of bills on the British Treasury or of forms of 
money, such as Store receipts, which could be exchanged for Treasury bills 
at face value. Thus there arose the practice of quoting prices which varied 
according to the form of payment. A tender of promissory notes or copper 
coin or other “currency” would be met by specifying a price in “currency” 
higher than that for “sterling” for which Treasury bills, paymasters' bills, 
Store receipts or Spanish dollars would be taken.  
   The premium on “sterling” varied from time to time and in any case 
depended upon the drawer of the particular promissory note. In 1809 a 
shopkeeper gave 4s. in the pound discount to those who would pay 
“sterling”,80 while another announced “the lowest prices fixed for 
consolidated money”,81 and a few weeks later 10 per cent discount was 
given on payments of government bills.82 Such notes as were offered would 
be taken at a value depending on the recipient's estimate of the worth of the 
drawer, and the frequency with which “approved currency” or “approved” 
or “good” notes were specified as acceptable indicates the selection of 
notes which sellers practised.83 This depreciated valuation in which notes 
circulated at less than face value and with uncertain acceptability was the 
subject of a petition to Bligh in August 1806 by a number of Hawkesbury 
settlers who asked him to cause “payment to be made in such money or 
Government orders as will pass current in the purchase of every article of 
merchandise without drawback or discount”.84 Their resentment was 
intensified by the fact that drawers of “currency” notes made a deliberate 
practice of depreciation. Bligh claimed that drawers of notes demanded a 
premium of 25 to 40 per cent for converting their notes into “sterling”,85 a 
charge which was later confirmed by Macquarie.  
   It was to government and paymasters' bills, Store receipts and pay notes, 
coins other than copper coin and similar media of payment that the term 
“sterling” was applied. The primary implication was good reliable money 
(King even referred to the Spanish dollar as a “sterling coin”86 ) with a 
secondary reference to English money since the test of good money was its 
being equivalent, or nearly equivalent, to English money, a dual 
significance that has not yet quite disappeared. It was not, however, the 
material form of the money or its notation but its valuation which made it 
“sterling”.  
   In origin the “sterling”—“currency” distinction depended upon the 
different qualities of concrete forms of money but it followed inevitably 
from those differences. When a bill of exchange on the British Treasury, 
countersigned by the governor, circulated side by side with the dirty, 
scribbled promissory note of a convict, there had to be separate scales of 
reckoning to express the divergent valuations of such money. It was, 
therefore, futile for King or Bligh or Macquarie to proscribe “currency” 
reckoning until sufficient “sterling” had been provided to serve all 
monetary needs. When Macquarie explained that the Bank of New South 
Wales had to be created because he had abolished “currency”, his theory 
was as inaccurate as his statement of fact. “Currency” was not abolished 
and the Bank's notes did not fill the vacuum created, although they did help 
in the long process of extinguishing “currency”. Not until the thing itself 
was reduced to negligible amount, surviving only in country districts in 
“orders” for wages, did “currency” reckoning disappear. That was not until 
the 1830's, when bank notes and English coins were in common use and 
cheque payments an everyday experience.  
   A further complication facing Bligh was that the notes themselves 
commonly specified a particular mode of payment. Occasionally this might 
be “sterling”,87 but this could not ensure acceptance by everyone at face 
value, even though it might be enforceable in a court, a fact which Bligh 
overlooked when he thought it enough to require notes to specify payment 
in “sterling”. More usually, however, the mode of payment promised was 
“currency” simply or, in many cases, wheat or copper coin. The rawing of 
notes in terms of wheat was quite well established by Bligh's time, arising 
from the inability of many small settlers to pay anything else and from the 
wide use of wheat itself as money.88 Notes promising payment in copper 
coin were less frequent but still common.89  
   In November 1806 Bligh by General Order warned of his intention to 
outlaw “currency” and on 3 January 1807 he issued the promised 
proclamation.90 He began by declaring that all promissory notes, 
irrespective of the mode of payment specified, should be settled in money. 
From the issue of the proclamation all notes were to “be drawn payable in 
sterling money” and thereafter “all outstanding notes payable in copper 
coin or colonial currency shall or may be sued for as if the said term 
‘Copper Coin’ or ‘Colonial Currency’ had not been expressed”. As an 
afterthought he added “The value of coins already established to be in full 
force”, which is of some importance not only as continuing King's order, 
but as indicating the wide scope of “sterling” in Bligh's mind. When his 
prohibition was extended to Tasmania in February 1808 “sterling” was 
“through the want of specie in this place . . . to be considered as Military 
and Colonial Notes”.91  
   Little heed was paid to the ban. Bligh made the mistake, common to most 
of the early governors, of assuming that the intentions of an order were at 
once realized. He repeatedly said that he had abolished “currency”,92 
although advertisements continued to offer to accept “Colonial 
Currency”,93 and in 1807 more direct evidence of his failure appeared. The 
Sydney Gazette in July described how “the extraordinary fluctuations that 
have taken place in the price of wheat since the flood in March 1806 have 
given rise to many litigations”.94 Disputes arose from the practice of 
drawing notes in terms of wheat which had risen from a “normal” level of 
7s. 6d. per bushel to 30s. per bushel at this period. Creditors holding such 
notes were, according to the Gazette, generally insisting upon payment of 
the promised number of bushels and successfully enforcing payment in 
defiance of Bligh's proclamation. The Gazette's cure was an appeal to the 
text of that proclamation: “the orders admit not of misconstruction—the 
sterling value of the note when drawn in justice should be demanded, 
whatever be the mode of payment, and any excess upon that just demand is 
unquestionably an invasion of another's right.” The argument was disputed 
by a correspondent, “Oculist”, who claimed that a contract for wheat 
payment should be met in wheat, and asking whether the Gazette would 
maintain its attitude if the price of wheat fell.95 Many holders of wheat 
notes had taken the same point of view and enforced their “rights” as the 
Gazette complained.  
   The week following the Gazette's first article Bligh gave judgment in the 
appeal of Macarthur against the Court's decision that the wheat note signed 
by Andrew Thompson and held by him was payable in money at the price 
of wheat existing when the note was drawn.96 Bligh upheld the Court but it 
does not appear that there was any serious decline in the use of wheat 
notes, although it is likely that for the next few months specific 
performance of promises to pay wheat was not insisted upon.97  
   What further attack Bligh would have made on “currency” is a matter of 
speculation. The 1807 harvest was adequate and the wheat note problem 
faded away, while Bligh's arrest in January 1808 prevented any further 
efforts at enforcement of “sterling”. The next phase belonged to the 
military officers who governed during the interregnum and they took no 
action in relation to the practice of reckoning in “currency”.  
The Insurrectionary Government 
   The interlude between the arrest of Bligh and the arrival of Macquarie at 
the end of 1809 made surprisingly little difference to monetary affairs. No 
doubt individuals seized the golden opportunity to enrich themselves and 
especially to obtain the coveted government cattle, but the technique of 
government finance remained basically unchanged. No new factors were 
introduced, simply the old machinery was operated in the interests of the 
military clique. In one direction the officers made a change: fear of 
consequences to their own pockets made them chary of drawing bills on 
the Treasury which might be repudiated. For some months no bills at all 
were drawn. “There is no money,” Captain Abbott wrote to King, “no 
government bills have been drawn since the Governor's arrest, except about 
£400,”98 and Bligh jeered: “It is said that the present rulers pride 
themselves much in not drawing bills on the Treasury, when the fact is no 
person will receive them.”99 Some bills were, however, drawn.100  
   With a reduced volume of bills the officers turned to other methods of 
financing the government which also offered more opportunities for private 
profit. Store receipts continued to be given and accepted and a considerable 
part of these was left to be redeemed by Macquarie. But the principal 
resource was an extension of barter. The exchange of goods from the Store 
against grain and meat helped somewhat. Paterson naively glossed over 
settlers' reluctance to take wheat receipts of doubtful validity by reporting 
that their chief reason for supplying grain to the Store was to enable them 
“to purchase goods from the investment sent here for barter”.101 Since 
wheat was necessary, payment of debts to the government was required in 
wheat102 and condemned stores were offered for the same commodity.103 At 
the same time favoured individuals were given goods on credit, involving 
debts Macquarie found it difficult to enforce.104 Officers newly appointed 
to the rank were paid in “cattle, articles of investment, stores and copper 
coin”.105  
   It would be a mistake to accept the sweeping charges that the temporary 
government squandered stores in this manner. They did not hand on to 
Macquarie “a beggarly account of empty boxes”,106 since he was able to 
maintain barter for three years in spite of receiving no further government 
“investments”.107 As a source of revenue the goods in the Store were 
supplemented in other ways of which the most important was the barter of 
cattle. Johnston and Foveaux in turn announced their intention to continue 
this well established practice,108 although according to Bligh they sold large 
numbers to a few on credit whereas he had restricted barter to one or two 
head to each settler.109 Cattle were exchanged for Store receipts to obviate 
the necessity for bills on the Treasury,110 and the Deputy Commissary even 
received his travelling allowance in cattle.111 Another resource was the 
barter of timber cut by convicts for supplies of rice, the charter of a ship 
and other purposes.112 So completely was barter used that for a brief period 
the Commissariat accounts were kept in wheat, cattle being valued at 56 
bushels each, and other goods, even maize and barley, being converted into 
wheat (2 bushels of maize equalled 1 bushel of wheat).113 But this was an 
isolated episode, most reckoning being in money.  
   For the officers it was a good racket while it lasted. They got the lion's 
share of the cattle,114 monopolized the right to obtain goods from the Store 
by barter,115 and, government bills being in short supply, took the major 
part of imports of spirits using paymasters' bills. Palmer claimed that they 
sold the spirits at £2 10s. to £3 per gallon for grain at 2s. 6d. to 3s. per 
bushel which they then sold to the Store at 5s. per bushel for cattle at £28 
per head, a nominal profit, he estimated, of £23 19s. per cow.116 But again 
it is necessary to beware of exaggeration and not to accept wild statements 
such as Palmer's claim that the rebels made all their private payments, even 
freight on ships, in spirits.117 In fact there is no reason to believe that barter 
of spirits was much more common after than before Bligh's arrest. It was 
the complaint of the Hawkesbury settlers that the officers paid for 
everything, including labour, with promissory notes and goods drawn from 
the Store, whereas settlers had to pay wages in grain.118 Nor is it necessary 
to assume that the General Order of 26 February 1809, calling on the 
magistrates to prevent a revival of the barter of spirits for crops, was 
insincere.119  
   Private transactions were little modified by the insurrection. “Currency” 
continued unchecked, advertisements offering to accept “colonial 
currency”, wheat, dollars, Store receipts, copper coin or “good bills”.120 
“Currency” was even accepted in payment of customs duties until it was 
directed in July 1809 that “all duties arising from the importation of goods 
for sale shall be paid in money which can be consolidated, viz., in 
paymasters' bills, government receipts for meat or grain, or in cash”.121 
Notes continued to be drawn in wheat,122 and promissory notes of all kinds 
were widely used as means of payment.123 In consequence sellers still 
distinguished the kinds of money which they would accept, giving 
preference to government Store receipts, paymasters' bills or wheat.124  
   The monetary system which Macquarie took over was thus not 
fundamentally different from what King left. Systematic government barter 
had been somewhat battered, private monetary arrangements were less 
subordinate to and dependent on government finance, and the business of 
issuing promissory notes had come to be more specialized, with petty 
bankers providing the larger part of the “currency” and everyone adding 
whatever little bit he could. But these were developments of trends already 
defined in 1803; it was still in all essentials the same monetary system. It 
was to be almost completely replaced by the end of Macquarie's 
administration.  
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Chapter 4 Colonial Currency 
(1810–1817) 
   THE ARRIVAL of Macquarie at the end of 1809 marked in monetary 
affairs, as in so many other directions, the beginning of a new stage of 
development. Looking back in 1822 over his handiwork he wrote: “I found 
the Colony barely emerging from infantile imbecility and suffering from 
various privations and disabilities; the country impenetrable 40 miles from 
Sydney; agriculture in a yet languishing state; commerce in its early dawn; 
revenue unknown; threatened by famine; distracted by faction; the public 
buildings in a state of dilapidation and mouldering to decay; the few roads 
and bridges formerly constructed rendered almost impassable; the 
population in general depressed by poverty; no public credit nor private 
confidence . . . The credit of the Colony was also very low when I arrived 
on account of the base paper currency which was then the only circulating 
medium, the lowest and most profligate persons issuing their notes of hand 
in payment of goods purchased without having the means of redeeming 
them when due. This terrified traders and prevented them from having any 
regular intercourse with Port Jackson . . . ”1  
   The exaggeration was pardonable for Macquarie had left his imprint 
everywhere, as clearly in the colony's monetary system as in his 
innumerable inscriptions in stone. The foundation of the Bank of New 
South Wales he regarded as his major financial achievement, “the saving 
of the Colony from ruin”,2 but he had also been concerned with the 
regulation and restriction of private promissory notes, had defended the 
Store receipt system from predatory Commissariat officers, had transferred 
government finance from a mainly barter to a mainly cash basis, adopted 
the “holey” dollar and created the first Savings Bank. If some of his 
achievement should be credited to the mere growth and development of the 
colony, he might still claim much for the results of his benevolent but 
autocratic administration.  
Macquarie's Ideas on Banking 
   A number of diverse influences planted and fostered the idea of a 
government-aided bank in Macquarie's mind. To the specific suggestions 
of T. W. Plummer and Lord Caledon were added the association with his 
secretary, J. T. Campbell, and the impression created by the state of affairs 
in New South Wales in 1810 which was compounded of a sense of the 
need for reform and a feeling that this should come by replacing the “petty 
bankers”, an impression which was confirmed by the failure of the 
governor's prohibitions of “currency” and by the success of more or less 
legal note issues by private individuals and firms and by government 
officials.  
   Plummer's plan was amongst some administrative suggestions which he 
sent to Macquarie before the latter sailed from England.3 He proposed a 
Colonial Distilling Company, the main purpose of which was to facilitate 
local production of spirits and thereby eliminate the constant drain of coin 
from the colony which Plummer assumed to be entirely due to imports of 
spirits, neglecting other imports. Since the colonists could not be prevented 
from drinking they should produce their own liquor. But a further 
advantage presented itself. Let the government “permit the issue of 
promissory or, more properly, Colonial bank notes, payable on demand, to 
the value of the stock of grain which by stipulation the Distillery Company 
must always have in store. Independently of the large capital otherwise 
embarked in this concern, the grain in depot would be an ample pledge for 
the paper in circulation and give it that general preference as a Colonial 
Currency over the mere promissory notes of private individuals . . . ” The 
litigation and loss associated with excessive issues by men of straw would 
disappear as would notes drawn payable in wheat.  
   Macquarie adopted both ideas, for a distillery and for a bank, but 
separated them. He urged a distillery as providing a market for local grain 
and ensuring “the detention by that means of the greatest part of the money 
in the colony”,4 and throughout his term of office continued to insist on its 
desirability, perhaps because he saw in it a back-door route to his favourite 
plan for a bank. By the time he converted Bigge and could go ahead with a 
distillery,5 however, his bank had been attained by a more devious route.  
   The second suggestion for a bank came from Macquarie's call en route at 
Capetown where Lord Caledon had just completed the reorganization of 
the Lombard Bank and established a Discount Bank.6 At the time 
Macquarie recorded in his Memoranda nothing of any discussion on 
banking nor any mention of J. T. Campbell, but this means little since he 
dismisses his call in Capetown with a few sentences.7 There is no reason to 
doubt his later statement that a bank in New South Wales “was suggested 
to me and strongly recommended by Lord Caledon”.8 Caledon was so 
pleased with himself that it was just what he would have done. In any case 
Macquarie acquired at the Cape a reasonably accurate notion of how the 
bank there was organized and used it as the model for his first scheme.  
   Macquarie also carried with him from Capetown, as his official secretary, 
John Thomas Campbell who, according to Macquarie, “had been for some 
years employed in various departments of the Bank of Ireland and had a 
principal part in the establishment and conduct of the Bank at the Cape of 
Good Hope”.9 Whether Macquarie or his secretary invented the fiction of 
Campbell's capacity as a banker or whether Campbell had been a banker is 
immaterial; the new secretary was out to make his way in the new world 
and ready to face any role.10 Whatever his banking experience really 
amounted to he was not likely to be backward in urging an institution 
which could bring profit and prestige to himself.  
   Less than three months after his arrival Macquarie foreshadowed his plan 
for a bank on the South African model, as a “remedy” to be “speedily 
applied to this growing evil” of private promissory notes. With some 
exaggeration he explained that there was “no other circulating medium in 
this colony than the notes of hand of private individuals”, which, as he 
fairly said, had “already been productive of infinite frauds, abuses and 
litigation”. He accordingly announced his intention to “strongly 
recommend the adoption here of the same system of banking and 
circulating medium as is now so successfully and beneficially pursued at 
the Cape of Good Hope”.11  
   Six weeks later he propounded his plan for “The New South Wales Loan 
Bank” as a government institution “as nearly as possible on the same 
system and principles as the Government Loan Bank at the Cape of Good 
Hope”. There, he explained, the government issued notes by way of loan 
on the security of mortgages at 6 per cent per annum. Praising its beneficial 
effects he pointed out that in England the government borrowed on 
Exchequer bills at 5 per cent, so that the Cape government was 11 per cent 
better off. “It appears to me,” was his conclusion, “the most perfect model 
in all its parts that could be possibly adopted here.”12 In reiterating his 
request for authority to establish a bank, in October 1810, he was willing to 
accept any alternative form of bank which Liverpool might believe to be 
“better calculated to effect the desired object”.13  
   His suggestion made, Macquarie turned meanwhile to other reforms. In 
1812 in the midst of these efforts to control the “petty bankers” he was 
curtly informed that both the Colonial Office and the Committee of the 
Privy Council on Trade and Foreign Plantations saw “many objections to 
the establishment of a Bank in New South Wales” which were not 
specified.14 Macquarie regretfully accepted the refusal but was still quite 
convinced of the necessity of a bank; not for another four years, however, 
was he able to carry through his plan.  
Copper Coin and “Holey” Dollars 
   At the same time as he made his first proposal for a bank Macquarie 
asked for £5,000 in copper to be issued at double value, as in King's time, 
to circulate in “the lower branches of trade” and relieve “the lower classes” 
of the need to accept depreciated promissory notes.15 Liverpool demurred, 
fearing that a premium of 100 per cent would cause a large private export 
of copper from England, and in spite of Macquarie's assurance that King's 
expedient had “answered very well”, nothing more was done in the 
matter.16  
   Macquarie had meanwhile repeated by proclamation that copper was 
legal tender up to £5 and permitted the tender of copper to any amount in 
payment of bills which specified copper as the mode of payment. This 
latter concession arose out of litigation during May 1812 over the tender of 
copper in payment of copper coin bills.17 A year later, on the occasion of 
the issue of “holey” dollars, it was proclaimed that copper should be legal 
tender up to 1s. 3d. only after 30 September 1813.18 In spite of this official 
recognition of a right to specify copper coin it continued to rank as 
“currency” and both the coin itself and the bills drawn in terms of it 
remained at a discount in relation to “sterling”. Consequently when in 1816 
Macquarie once again prohibited “currency” the meeting of “magistrates, 
gentlemen, settlers and merchants” which advised him on the necessary 
steps to introduce effectively “a sterling circulation in all payments, 
dealings and transactions” recommended the withdrawal of copper and its 
reissue at face value. Macquarie acted at once, requiring all copper coin to 
be exchanged between 7 December 1816 and 1 January 1817 for Store 
receipts or colonial (i.e., “holey”) dollars. The current valuation of copper 
took the penny as 11/2d., and the exchange was to be at this rate, confined 
to pence dated earlier than 1800. Thereafter they should be issued and 
circulate at face value.19 There was a delay of some months in extending 
the revised valuation to Tasmania where it appears to have taken effect 
after March 1817.20  
   By way of consolation for the rejection of the plan for a bank, Liverpool 
promised a shipment from India of £10,000 in Spanish dollars, the shortage 
of specie in England making it impossible to send the coin from there.21 It 
took nine months to arrange the business with the East India Company but 
eventually Liverpool informed Macquarie that the dollars were on the way 
and urged him to take the necessary steps to prevent re-export. He believed 
American ships bound for China were chiefly responsible for taking dollars 
from the colony and wavered between a hope that trade between England 
and New South Wales “will henceforth be retained in its natural and proper 
channel”, thus obviating loss of coin, and a belief in the need to prohibit 
export of dollars which he half empowered Macquarie to do.22 Some 
months later Bathurst authorized Macquarie to take over, in exchange for 
bills on the Treasury, coin or bullion which might be captured from 
American vessels by privateers in local waters.23  
   By November 1812 Macquarie had received the “seasonable supply of 
specie”,24 and proceeded to publish the “very strong Colonial Law” which 
he believed “absolutely necessary” to prevent export of dollars.25 The 
device of the “holey” dollar was adapted from the practice of “cutting” 
coins which was very widespread at the period.26 At least two other 
colonies used “ring” dollars before New South Wales—Dominica in 1798 
and Trinidad in 1811.27 The machine used in New South Wales was at first 
defective but eventually it was working, stamping out of the centre of each 
dollar a “dump” equal to about one-quarter of the coin and given a local 
valuation of 1s. 3d., leaving a “ring” valued at 5s.28 The valuation of a coin, 
elsewhere reckoned at 5s., at 6s. 3d. was not intended to restrict export by 
over-valuing it; had that been all that was relied upon the expedient must 
have failed since “currency” prices would have been revised upwards to 
offset the new valuation, as they were. Macquarie spoke of it as “only 25 
per cent” and explained that the addition being so small should prevent 
counterfeiting or import.29 For retaining the coin in the colony he relied 
upon stiff penalties.  
   In July 1813 he issued his proclamation defining the conditions on which 
the new coins were to circulate.30 They were to be paid out by the 
Commissary at their new values from 30 September and were to be legal 
tender for any amount, although parties might contract for other means of 
payment. Debts due to the Crown might be discharged in the new currency, 
the circulation of which was to be assisted by the prohibition of promissory 
notes for less than 2s. 6d.,31 and an undertaking to exchange the coins for 
bills on the Treasury. Anyone counterfeiting ring dollars or dumps was 
liable to seven years' transportation, the same penalty as for melting down. 
(Jewellers were especially suspect, being required in addition to enter into 
a bond for £200 neither to melt nor to counterfeit.) To prevent export 
masters of ships were to enter into a bond of £200 not to carry the new coin 
away, while if nevertheless a captain sought to take it abroad he risked loss 
of his £200, the dollars and his ship, while every person concerned in such 
smuggling was liable to a fine of £200 plus double the value of the coin. 
These prohibitions, which proved successful, applied only to “holey” 
dollars and dumps; not till 1819 was there a general ban on the export of all 
silver and copper.32  
   The new coin began to be used late in January 1814 and between then 
and August was steadily issued from the Commissariat.33 Macquarie then 
found it necessary to amend his original plan for consolidation of the coin 
for bills on the Treasury every two years. Originally he did not intend to 
give even this privilege, but local protests changed his mind and he agreed 
to accept the dollars at their local value for the bills.34 Immediately after the 
expenditure of the first instalment by the Commissariat captains of ships 
complained of the “inconvenience and difficulty” of the two-year period 
and Macquarie “being anxious to remove all difficulties in the way of fair 
open commerce” altered the interval to three months to be advertised in the 
Sydney Gazette.35 No such advertisement appeared for over a year,36 and it 
is probable in view of D.-C.-G. Allan's record that no consolidations 
occurred in the interval. In July 1815 Macquarie stepped in, stirred by 
complaints of “inconvenience and unnecessary delay” in consolidating 
dollars and ordered that thereafter colonial dollars should be consolidated 
monthly.37  
   In spite of the penalties for counterfeiting, many people took to making 
their own rings and dumps and continued to do so until these coins had 
disappeared—which was not till after 1830.38 Counterfeits might be either 
of base metal or genuine Spanish dollars punched privately. The crude 
manufacture of the rings also encouraged sweating. High hopes were 
originally entertained for the new coinage. Macquarie expected it to 
replace “currency notes of hand” and prematurely described them as “a 
most useful and valuable circulating medium”.39 The Sydney Gazette hailed 
the announcement of their issue with enthusiasm, anticipating that all 
depreciation of “currency” would disappear, copper coin and promissory 
notes circulate “at par” with “sterling” while worthless notes would not 
circulate (since people would insist on the new coin), and the long shortage 
of small change would be over.40  
   But more far-reaching measures were required before “currency” would 
vanish. Macquarie had effectively prevented export, but he could not 
ensure that a mere 40,000 dollars would suffice for all payments other than 
those made by Store receipts or Commissariat notes. Ring dollars and 
dumps were too good for their purpose, since they were legal tender for 
any amount and could buy bills on England, which was nearly as good as 
being exportable. So they were treasured by those who could come by 
them or held by the Bank of New South Wales as a reserve, so that 
presently even the Commissariat found it difficult to maintain an adequate 
supply for paying the troops.41 Not until the abolition of the “dollar system” 
after 1825 were colonial dollars and dumps in really general circulation 
and “currency” outlasted them into the early 'thirties.  
Barter 
   Macquarie was instructed to investigate on arrival the desirability of 
continuing the shipping of goods for barter by the government Store.42 He 
found that there were “no regular supplies imported by private merchants 
sufficient to answer the demands of the inhabitants”, and prices of such 
imports were too high for the poor. Accordingly he opposed immediate 
abolition of government imports, “but by encouraging the free importation 
of all sorts of merchandise I am of opinion that in a few years the practice 
of sending out supplies on account of government might cease without 
prejudice to the Colony”.43  
   Three years later he imposed a limit on barter by the Store, requiring that 
all applications by settlers should be accompanied by the Commissary's 
certificate “that such articles can be conveniently spared”.44 At the end of 
1814, on the opening of the ports of Port Jackson, Hobart and Port 
Dalrymple to all imports Macquarie took the opportunity “for abolishing 
totally the bad custom of supplying settlers and other persons with various 
articles for payment from the King's Stores”.45 He explained that everyone 
could now be assured of supplies from private merchants, while 
government barter on credit had been found “from long experience to be 
extremely prejudicial to government, the collecting the debts being 
attended with great difficulty and many of them being never recovered at 
all”.46 The public were notified that henceforth they must look elsewhere 
for supplies since Macquarie intended to have the order “enforced and 
most strictly obeyed”.47 By this time it was relatively easy to deprive 
settlers of what had in the past been a convenient source of supply. Imports 
were increasing, as was the number of merchants doing business in the 
colony, while the growing expenditure of government meant a greater 
supply of money of a type acceptable to overseas suppliers. Delays in 
making goods available had occurred and the Store generally had come 
into disrepute during the insurrectionary period, while the Colonial Office 
sent Macquarie no new supplies during his first three years to make good 
the large reduction in stocks which then occurred.48 His decision was thus 
more one not to re-establish the system than to abandon it.  
   In the next few years further restrictions were imposed on government 
payments in kind. Supplying rations to Commissariat officers' families was 
abandoned in 1817,49 as also was the temporary victualling and other 
assistance to free settlers,50 while the commuting for money of the services 
of convicts assigned to subordinate civil officers and of the rations allowed 
to military as well as civil officers was foreshadowed.51 Government barter, 
however, by no means disappeared. Payments of wages and salaries partly 
in kind continued and the barter of goods by the Store was not wholly 
abandoned, especially at outlying settlements.52 The two important forms 
of barter under Macquarie were cattle and rum.  
   Macquarie, as has been seen, objected to government loans of cattle, but 
he strongly favoured the sale of government cattle in exchange either for 
money or for goods or services. He directed such sales on eighteen months' 
credit with grain as the most acceptable mode of payment.53 In addition to 
these regular sales cattle were used as a means of government payment in a 
variety of other ways. Macquarie gave the Norfolk Island settlers who were 
transferred to Tasmania compensation mainly in cattle.54 The road from 
Launceston to Norfolk Plains cost the government one cow,55 and cattle 
were largely used to pay contractors on the Great Western road,56 while a 
windmill in Launceston cost four cows in 1818.57 Later Macquarie took a 
less favourable view of bartering cattle and proposed to abolish it,58 
although it finally fell to Brisbane to do so.59  
   In his early administration Macquarie made more use of rum in payment 
than did any other governor. He employed both direct barter of spirits and 
import preferences of which the best-known is the Sydney Hospital 
contract. In 1811 he made a contract for the erection of the hospital, the 
builders to receive the use of 20 working bullocks, the services of 20 male 
convicts, 80 oxen for slaughter and a monopoly of the import of spirits for 
three years (to a maximum of 45,000 gallons) with six months to pay duty 
on such imports.60 This monopoly was subject to the right of the 
government to import for its own use and since the “governor at that time 
was in the habit of employing people by contract and paying them partly in 
money and partly in spirits from the stores”,61 Commissariat officers 
imported large quantities. Eventually Macquarie yielded to the protests of 
the contractors, permitting them to import a further 15,000 gallons and 
extending their monopoly for a further six months.62  
   Remissions of duty on spirits were also an occasional means of 
payment,63 but rum itself was much more commonly used. Macquarie 
reported in November 1812 “the only purchases I ever made on account of 
the Crown and which were paid for in spirits” as a small piece of ground 
and three houses.64 This was a blunt lie for he was paying in rum 
extensively. In March 1810 building labour was paid in rum65 and an 
official return66 shows that 1,641.5 gallons were bartered during 1812 for 
houses and fences, the building and repair of bridges and streets, for rent, 
and for keeping tool-bars. In 1813 the twelve-mile road to Liverpool cost 
400 gallons.67 Macquarie paid no attention to Bathurst's instructions that 
payment in spirits was to be “at all times avoided however advantageous 
such a mode of sale may be”.68 In 1815 he reported reimbursing Judge-
Advocate Bent, for building his own official residence, with 1,000 gallons 
of spirits and £300.69 Four tons of hay cost 25 gallons in 1817,70 while 
payments of all kinds continued to be made in rum, the Police Fund 
borrowing 3,951 gallons for the purpose from the Commissariat in 1816.71  
   Paralleling barter by the government went private payments in kind. 
Spirits were still widely used for a variety of payments including wages,72 
the purchase of cattle,73 and even of houses.74 But as in the earlier period 
anything might be accepted and money was more widely used. Tobacco 
was offered for sale in 1813, “payment to be made in pigs, wheat and 
maize”,75 and wheat was very widely accepted, especially in Tasmania.76 
Cattle were also used.77 Nor was there any serious change in the methods of 
paying wages. A typical example may be quoted, relating to the latter part 
of 1816:  
   Mr Cox [at Bathurst] allowed me a quart of milk per day when I worked 
for him in making shoes for his men, but I had no milk when I did not 
work. I charged Mr Cox four shillings currency per pair for the shoes I 
made for him and he paid me at first in money. Afterwards he sent me to 
his clerk, one King at Clarendon. I received three bottles of spirits at 16 
shillings per bottle, sixteen squares of leather at three shillings a square, 
tobacco at fifteen shillings per pound, and tea at £1 5s. I don't know what 
the current prices of these articles were.78  
   Privates of the 73rd Regiment were allowed to accept rural work for pay 
in either money or grain at rates fixed in money.79 What a labourer received 
depended very much on what his employer had to offer, and many resorted 
to giving their assigned convicts free time to cultivate land for themselves 
instead of paying the prescribed wages, a practice which Macquarie sought 
to prevent in 1814.80  
Petty Banking 
   Macquarie justified his first bank plan by a description of the issuing of 
private promissory notes which deserves quotation in full:  
   The people have been in some degree forced on the expedient of issuing 
and receiving notes of hand to supply the place of real money, and this 
petty banking has thrown open a door to frauds and impositions of a most 
grievous nature to the country at large. The persons principally concerned 
in this nefarious practice are to be found amongst the lower orders of 
society, and not infrequently among the convicts themselves, such being 
the credulity of the people that the notes of hand issued by these wretches 
are taken and passed into as free a circulation as if guaranteed by the best 
securities. When a considerable quantity has been thus disposed of, the 
issuers either become actually insolvent, or declare themselves so, in order 
to defraud their unwary creditors. Injurious, however, as this system is to 
the public, it cannot be totally laid aside until some other and better is 
substituted in its stead; at present the agricultural and commercial pursuits 
of the territory are much impeded and obstructed by the want of some 
adequately-secured circulating medium.81  
   Commissariat and military officers and former governors and judges, as 
well as settlers such as Gregory Blaxland, might object to being placed in 
“the lower orders of society”, but otherwise Macquarie's account is 
accurate, supported by all the available evidence. Everyone issued 
promissory notes as a matter of course, and as a matter of course these 
circulated; the petty bankers were those who issued notes not for specific 
payments, but as a business in itself. Typically, they were shopkeepers who 
made banking a department of their main business of trade, and note issue 
was the main part of banking for them. The easy acceptance of such notes 
has already been described,82 but is not easy to explain. Much can be 
attributed to the scarcity of other money, and to a belief in ability to detect 
worthless notes. Higher prices formed a sort of insurance premium for 
some loss on “currency” notes, while in such a small settlement many no 
doubt found themselves obliged to accept the notes of their neighbours if 
their own were to circulate,83 and others might take suspected notes secure 
in their ability to pass them on.84 Whatever the explanation, the fact 
remained, and Macquarie, like King and Bligh, sought to regulate what he 
could not replace and could not effectively prohibit until it was replaced.  
   In June 1810 he proceeded to proscribe written promissory notes for £5 
and under and notes drawn payable in “currency”.85 The justification 
recited in the preamble was the frequency of forgery “to the subversion of 
common truth and justice, the prejudice of trade and credit and to the 
manifest injury of industrious individuals”, and the number of persons who 
issued promissory notes “without possessing any apparent means of paying 
the same”. Issuers were required to use printed forms and to specify 
“sterling”. Amounts unpaid three days after demand were recoverable by 
summary process, and fines and imprisonment were provided for breaches. 
Three months later he required that “all duties to be collected on spirits, 
goods, wares or other merchandise on entry at Sydney are to be paid either 
in sterling money, dollars at five shillings, storekeeper's receipts or 
paymaster's bills”.86 This should have been an important restriction since 
duties were largely paid in promissory notes.87 Soon afterwards the 
restriction was generalized to cover fees paid to public departments, the 
order adding that “none of the base Colonial Currency shall be received in 
payments to be made into any of the Offices”.88 In October 1813 a further 
restriction was imposed. No convict, even with a ticket of leave, was to 
issue promissory notes and any free person who negotiated such notes 
knowingly was to be fined £20 for each note.89 
 
   Macquarie, however, recognized that he could not afford to attack petty 
banking as such, but only “currency” issues. In 1813 he was prepared to 
defend issuers against the monopolistic “Commercial Society”,90 arguing 
that “from the peculiar circumstances of this Colony, the internal trade and 
interests of the same depend on the free circulation of the promissory notes 
of respectable traders, merchants and landholders and others”.91 
Accordingly the bankers flourished, issuing promissory notes payable on 
demand,92 accepting deposits and making loans, including mortgage 
loans.93 The chief issuers appear to have been shopkeepers and 
Commissariat and military officers, but anyone who could issued notes,94 
so that those in circulation ranged from the isolated note given for a 
particular debt to the regular issues of round-figure notes.  
   Macquarie was led to reconsider his position and to attack petty banking 
as such as a means of enforcing “sterling” in place of “currency” by the 
combined impression of a number of developments—the continued 
existence of “currency” notes, the activities of the Commercial Society, the 
fluctuations in the rate of exchange between “currency” and “sterling” and 
the use by Hogan and Allan of their official positions for fraudulent or 
near-fraudulent note-issues.  
   A number of these note issues by officers were regarded as normal parts 
of their official duties, the profits being a perquisite attaching to their posts. 
In this category fall the issues of pay notes and of private notes by 
paymasters. James Gordon, Naval Officer in Tasmania from May 1814 to 
August 1815, was officially permitted to issue such notes,95 while the notes 
issued by Captain Murray at Hobart from 1810 onwards appear also to 
have been approved.96 In December 1810 John Birch issued promissory 
notes for 2s. 6d. which were highly regarded because as Regimental 
Paymaster Birch was a reliable “banker”97 Three years later D'Arcy 
Wentworth as Treasurer of the Police Fund had Macquarie's permission to 
issue “small Police notes” to a limited amount, which he claimed never 
exceeded £500 and which do not appear to have circulated for other than a 
short period.98  
   A number of officers, however, found the acceptability of their official 
notes too tempting and issued private notes purporting to be on government 
account. T. Walker, who was in charge of the Commissariat in Launceston 
in the latter part of Macquarie's administration, may have done so “by 
accident” as he claimed, since he issued few such notes,99 but there can be 
no such excuse for Hogan, while the case of Allan calls for extended 
discussion.  
   P. G. Hogan was in charge of the Hobart Commissariat as Allan's deputy 
in Tasmania until 1816. His handling of Store receipts, in which he was 
later convicted of fraud, was the source of much complaint since he 
disregarded Macquarie's instructions to convert them monthly, delaying for 
three or six months.100 He overstepped the mark when he issued for private 
payments receipts and promissory notes bearing the government arms and 
his official signature. The evidence for this is conclusive, including his 
own admission.101 Macquarie followed Davey, the Lieutenant-Governor of 
Van Diemen's Land, in prohibiting such issues by all Commissariat 
officers, pointing out that the public have been erroneously led to consider 
these notes as issued for Government purposes, and consequently that 
Government was responsible for their payment, under which idea much 
injury may be sustained to the public; it being well known that such notes 
have been put into private circulation for private purposes, totally 
unconnected with and altogether foreign to the public service.102  
   An examination of Hogan's activities brought him before a court martial 
which convicted him of various forms of fraud, including “having issued, 
given and circulated on his own private account, and to promote his own 
private interests and concerns”, promissory notes purporting to be 
government notes.103  
   D.-C.-G. Allan, on his arrival in June 1813, sought and obtained 
Macquarie's permission to issue Commissariat notes instead of Store 
receipts on condition that they were exchanged every two months for bills 
on the Treasury, and were not issued beyond the estimated monthly 
expenses of the colony.104 Allan had been given instructions to overhaul the 
New South Wales Commissariat, but was reminded that local 
circumstances might call for special treatment and he was to submit to the 
governor's decision all proposed innovations; he was at no time authorized 
by the Commissary-in-Chief to issue notes.105 He seems, however, to have 
been unable to distinguish between these instructions and a direction to 
abolish Store receipts by substituting his own notes,106 although he later 
admitted that he had no authority from London for his note issue.107 He 
appears to have convinced Macquarie of his authorization, for the latter 
“expressed his desire that the then existing system should be continued”,108 
but nevertheless gave his written approval for the change: “it meets with 
my entire concurrence and you have my full authority to adopt it”.109  
   Macquarie's approval was based upon the fact that Store receipts were for 
broken amounts, usually relatively large, while Allan's notes for £1, £2, £5, 
and £10 would provide smaller units replacing “currency” notes. The use 
of such notes in paying for goods supplied to the government was expected 
to “put it in the power of the poorest persons to go to market with the ready 
penny, without the necessity of changing at any one place a receipt for the 
full amount of such quantities of meat or grain as they may have 
furnished”.110 Store receipts were also a source of annoyance to the 
Commissariat, officers since they stayed in circulation for great lengths of 
time, partly because holders did not trouble to present them if they had 
come long distances with small amounts,111 partly because it was better to 
hold them if one had not enough to exchange for a bill on the Treasury,112 
partly because they were too useful circulating as money. Again and again 
both before and after Allan's note issue orders were published, requiring 
holders to present receipts quarterly (later monthly). Payment in copper 
coin was threatened for stale receipts.113 and on the restoration of receipts 
in place of Allan's notes in 1815 those who held receipts more than six 
months old would receive no payment.114 Even this threat was inadequate 
for “receipts of very old date being still in circulation” was a cause of 
“inconvenience and delay” in making up accounts even in 1816.115  
   From 24 July 1813 Allan made all Commissariat payments in his notes,116 
although he did not at first adhere to the arrangements for consolidation, 
offering instead to give bills on London at par, for “sterling money” in 
amounts of not less than £100.117 It was not until March 1814 that he 
specifically offered to accept Commissariat notes for bills on the Treasury, 
although these had no doubt been accepted earlier as “sterling money”.118 
He also neglected to supply notes to Tasmania, sending none at all to 
Launceston, and only £800 to Hobart, and that not till 1816,119 although this 
may have been a friendly arrangement not to compete with his subordinate, 
Hogan. Allan's mistake, however, was to yield to the temptation to use his 
official notes for private purposes, secure in the public conviction that they 
were backed by the government. Complaints of the impossibility of 
receiving payment for goods supplied to government at the out-stations led 
Macquarie to discover Allan's “various private speculations”. Advising 
Allan to call in and pay off his notes, he proceeded to order a reversion to 
the Store receipt system as from 24 April 1815, Store receipts to be 
consolidated every two months and to be void if not presented within six 
months.120  
   The result was a run on Allan who was forced to meet his creditors121 
persuading them, with a very doubtful balance sheet, of his solvency.122 
Undaunted, Allan, even while the run was in progress, proposed a new plan 
by which all government payments over £100 would be made by the 
immediate issue of a bill on the Treasury and all smaller amounts by 
dollars, a plan which Macquarie rejected. The dollar payments involved the 
risk and cost of maintaining specie supplies at the out-stations, while the 
immediate issue of bills would deprive the colony of its currency in the 
form of Store receipts, the use of which Macquarie insisted should 
continue.123 But Allan's course was run. Acting on Macquarie's report of his 
“having engaged in extensive farming and mercantile speculations”, the 
Treasury suspended him from office and instructed him to make up his 
accounts. After a good deal of delay Allan, whose conduct a subordinate 
described as “a compound of perfidy, hypocrisy and I may even add, 
dishonesty”,124 was relieved by a new Commissary who had even larger 
ideas of the privileges of the head of the Commissariat.  
Exchange Rates 
   “Currency” yielded to Macquarie's ban no more than it had done to that 
of King or Bligh. References in Sydney Gazette advertisements to the 
acceptability of “currency” are as common as before 1810, specifying 
“prompt payment in good colonial currency”,125 or the proportions in which 
“currency” would be accepted.126 The accounts of D'Arcy Wentworth with 
Alexander Riley in 1815 are probably typical: they are double-columned 
for “sterling” and “currency” and the two types of transactions were 
separately balanced.127 Prices were reckoned in either “sterling” or 
“currency”,128 although mostly in “sterling” with a note that “currency” 
would be taken at a discount.129 Nor did notes payable in wheat and copper 
coin disappear. Reference to “copper coin bills” continued until the local 
pence were restored to their “sterling” valuation by the General Order of 7 
December 1816.130 Wheat notes continued even longer,131 and written ones 
did not disappear.132 The circulation of the forbidden notes was facilitated 
by the failure of Judge-Advocate Bent to follow the proclamation against 
legal recognition of “currency”.133 So long as “currency” notes were 
admitted as evidence and could be sued for they were not likely to 
disappear, even were there no other reason for their hardihood. Both wheat 
and copper coin bills and other notes which simply specified “currency” 
circulated at a variable discount in relation to “sterling”, that is, 
government and paymasters' bills, Store receipts, dollars and other 
“sterling” coin, promissory notes issued in “sterling”, and the like.  
   A statement of “currency” expenditures by the contractors on the Sydney 
Hospital provides a list of the rates of exchange at which these were made 
which is of some interest since it is approximately confirmed by other 
evidence. The precise rates must not be pressed too far since there is 
evidence that these fluctuated and different rates might prevail at the same 
time, while two systems of reckoning, both in pounds, shillings and pence, 
meant that price adjustments could include “exchange”; but the rates 
quoted represent the rates at which well-known merchants were able to 
exchange “currency” in meeting “sterling” payments.134 Expressed as 
premiums on “sterling” in “currency” they were:  
    
   These rates, it must be repeated, are not the rate of exchange but the 
average rates at which the contractors made their payments. At particular 
dates the rate in some specific transaction may have been higher or lower, 
but the order of size is representative and the general direction of 
movement conforms to all the other evidence.135  
   The obvious explanations of the discount on “currency” may be adequate 
for the early years when “currency” was no more than a stop-gap, a 
substitute for money rather than a distinctively Australian money. There 
was always the risk of default or forgery, or of the issuer's refusal to fulfil 
his contract. Over-issue was a normal event and many “bankers” depended 
for their profit on the maximum depreciation in the interval between issue 
and redemption. These factors continued to operate so long as petty 
banking was important; they are the major reason for different exchange 
rates existing simultaneously and would justify some premium on 
“sterling”. But by Macquarie's time “currency” had become too regular and 
too widespread to be treated simply as an entertaining money-substitute; it 
must be regarded as a fully developed local money of which even the best 
issues were at a discount in terms of “sterling”. The pound “currency” was 
the pound Australian and its valuation in “sterling” calls for less superficial 
analysis of the relative supplies of “sterling” and “currency” in which the 
critical factors were the trade situation and the dependence of the colony on 
British government expenditure.  
Premiums per cent
1811 30 September 20
31 December 20
1812 1st Quarter 20
2nd Quarter 25
3rd Quarter 40
4th Quarter 50
1813 1st Quarter 50
2nd Quarter 50
3rd Quarter 50
4th Quarter 25
1814 1st Quarter 25
2nd Quarter 25
3rd Quarter 25
4th Quarter 25
1815 1st Quarter 25
2nd Quarter 50
3rd Quarter 50
4th Quarter 50
   The ultimate source of payment for imports was, of course, bills of 
exchange payable overseas (almost entirely in London) and the small 
amounts of coin. Private bills of exchange were of very minor significance, 
arising either from exports or from English assets of immigrants. Most 
immigrants at this period transferred their capital in goods but a significant 
if small amount was imported in English notes or coin, or in dollars, while 
some individuals transferred by means of bills. Exports were still of very 
small dimensions, consisting mainly of sealskins, whale-oil, timber and 
small amounts of wool and coal. W. C. Wentworth, evidently writing of 
1817, estimated the value of exports as follows:  
    
   which gives a total of £43,000. To these he adds an item of “sundries”, 
probably representing mainly immigrants' capital not imported in goods, of 
£20,000 and £2,000 respectively.136 The resulting total of £65,000 cannot 
be treated as more than a rough indication of the order of size, but the 
result is plausible and hardly likely to be a serious underestimate. In these 
circumstances private bills could not pay for more than a small proportion 
of imports.137  
   The major source of funds for imports continued to be government 
expenditure. A British Treasury return supplied to Bigge138 of expenditure 
in or upon New South Wales gives a total of £4 millions by the end of 
1817.139 This figure includes the cost of transporting and equipping 
convicts and is thus slightly too large for the present purpose. But for the 
relevant years the figures give approximate results of some interest: 
   The main difference between the two sets of figures is not the cost of 
transportation but of the maintenance of civil, military and marine 
For the mainland:
Money expended by shipping not belonging to the colonial merchants £12,000
Wool 8,000
Various exports 15,000
and for Tasmania:
Money expended by foreign shipping £3,000
Exports 5,000
(a) Total Expenditure (including (b)) (b) Governor's and Commissary's Bills
1809 £124,637 £49,921
1810 178,700 78,805
1811 214,696 92,128
1812 185,548 91,019
1813 218,735 57,948
1814 225,086 74,174
1815 181,590 86,021
1816 216,291 109,118
1817 232,585 101,163
establishments. Not all of this would be spent in New South Wales, but a 
large proportion would represent bills drawn by paymasters for the 
maintenance of troops and similar payments. From the beginning of 1814 
bills for the salaries of civil officers were also included.140 If then, for the 
years in the table, the annual supply of sterling for import payments be 
taken as of the order of £250,000, this is probably near enough for the 
present purpose.141 Local “sterling” derived its character and valuation from 
its convertibility into sterling proper and comprised Store receipts, Allan's 
and similar notes, such promissory notes as were payable in “sterling”, 
copper coin and “holey” dollars.142 The rate at which “currency” exchanged 
for “sterling” is a measure of the smallness of the funds available to pay for 
imports in relation to the desire for them.  
   The inadequacy of current local production for export is a constant 
theme. “Nothing”, said Macarthur, “can give a good value to land but a 
good market for produce, and until the Colony can find some extensive 
export, land and cattle will sink in value together.”143 “Our chief, indeed 
almost only export is bills upon the Treasury.”144 And his wife echoed him: 
“The want of exports keeps us like beggars and depending on the 
expenditure of Great Britain.”145 Local production of foodstuffs was 
expanding rapidly,146 and colonists resented their dependence on the 
Commissariat for a market.147 “My God”, exclaimed George Johnston, 
“how much longer, Wentworth, is the value of our property in this distant 
Colony to be determined by the scratch of a pen? If it is the intention of 
Ministers merely to keep the country to answer the purpose of an immense 
gaol for the reception of the vilest of the vile, the sooner they declare it the 
better, in order that the respectable industrious part of the community may 
have an opportunity afforded them of disposing of what they possess here, 
and of seeking a country in which they may find some other security for it 
than the mere will and caprice of a Governor or Secretary of State.”148 But 
while there was general agreement on the need to develop export 
production, local ideas on how this might be achieved were not far-
reaching. There were schemes for not very clearly defined assistance for 
wool, tobacco, hemp and other industries,149 and pleas for the removal of 
English duties on New South Wales products.150 But the same individuals 
were sometimes to be found advocating the removal of local import 
duties,151 and seeking to fence off importation from competitors by 
prohibiting imports on convict ships,152 and excluding aliens from trading 
in New South Wales.153 Beyond these ideas the colonists did not go; there 
was in particular no enthusiasm for a local tariff, since imports were felt to 
be quite inadequate and exports were desired as a means of international 
payment. A public meeting in Sydney in 1819 resolved “that a regular 
demand does exist in this colony for British manufactures of nearly all 
descriptions greater than the established mercantile houses here have 
supplied or are likely to supply regularly; and that from the rapid increase 
of our population this demand may be considered as yearly increasing”.154 
So long as this situation continued, with British expenditure, capital 
imports and local exports insufficient to meet the desire for imports, so 
long would “sterling” remain at a premium. It was scarce and hence its 
“currency” price was high.  
   Two efforts were made in 1813 to fix a stable rate of exchange between 
“currency” and “sterling”. The first must remain very obscure for lack of 
adequate records; in broad outline, what occurred was that a group of 
individuals arranged for the printing and restricted use of promissory note 
forms which provided for amounts in “currency” which would be 
redeemed in “sterling” at the rate of £1 5s. “currency” to £1 “sterling”, a 
rate popularly described by calling them “25 per cent bills”. Who this 
group were, and whether they were identical with the “Commercial 
Society” who late in 1813 issued “50 per cent bills” is not altogether clear, 
but that there were two separate issues is certain, and it is probable that the 
second issue was by an enlarged group which included some at least of the 
first.155 Although there is no direct evidence it is plausible to assume that 
the occasion for this first combination was the disorganization of the 
“sterling”—“currency” exchange between October 1812 and March 1813. 
In the first month “sterling” usually at a premium of 20 per cent was 
exchanging at a premium of 50 per cent, and continued to do so in spite of 
the Court of Civil Jurisdiction ruling in favour of 20 per cent in cases 
relating to copper coin bills.156 It was certainly early in 1813 that the first 
issue of “25 per cent bills” was made, printed in blue ink from a hot 
plate,157 but it failed to prevent a further appreciation of “sterling” to nearly 
100 per cent premium.158  
   Presumably because of this failure, in October 1813 a second issue 
appeared of “50 per cent bills” in denominations of 2s. 6d., 5s. and 10s.159 
The “Commercial Society” comprised, according to Macquarie, “divers 
victuallers, publicans and others” and according to another account 
“gentlemen of the very first mercantile and agricultural property”,160 and 
the agreement between them involved the issue to members of forms of 
notes to be signed by the individual member. Each undertook not to accept 
in payment promissory notes other than those issued by themselves and at 
the agreed rate of exchange of 50 per cent premium on “sterling”.161  
   Macquarie issued two proclamations against the system. In the first his 
grounds of objection were the “great confusion . . . introduced into all 
private dealings and transactions” and the fact that “from the peculiar 
circumstances of this Colony, the internal trade and interests of the same 
mainly depend on the free circulation of the promissory notes of 
respectable traders, merchants and landholders and others”. He prohibited 
all meetings of more than six persons without notice to the Provost-
Marshal, who was to convene such meetings by public advertisement. All 
other meetings were to be illegal and might be broken up, while it was 
deemed “unlawful combination and confederacy” to refuse by agreement 
the promissory notes of any individual or to attempt by agreement to 
“influence and affect the rate of exchange between the bills or notes issued 
for the public service, and those issued by private individuals”.162 This 
prohibition failed in its immediate object but remaining unrepealed it 
operated as a general restraint on the right of freedom of meeting for many 
years afterwards.163 The obvious loophole for the Commercial Society was 
that the prohibition was not retrospective but applied from 8 December 
1813.  
   Accordingly Macquarie issued a further proclamation,164 in which he 
recited the “embarrassment” caused by the Society's bills, declaring that 
“from its nature such rate of exchange is incapable of being permanently 
fixed” and that it was therefore “highly advisable that it should be left to 
the unbiased operations and influence of the various and temporary causes 
and circumstances by which it is or may be affected”. After 18 December 
1813 the issue or negotiation of “currency” notes which directly or 
indirectly expressed a rate of exchange with “sterling” would be illegal. 
The blue-ink bills were not, however, eliminated so easily. The law was 
satisfied by the withdrawal of the specific mention of a rate of exchange 
and the bills continued to circulate. In October 1815 the form was again 
changed to require that at least £15 worth must be presented before 
“sterling” would be given but, in practice, the amount of “sterling” which 
was given was still £10, smaller amounts being exchanged for copper 
coin.165 But by 1816 although the association continued to function it had 
commenced to break down. The removal of a specified rate of exchange 
paved the way for breaches of the agreement and soon the temptation was 
irresistible. The forms were issued indiscriminately and while the fixed rate 
of exchange was observed the (relatively) safe quality of the notes made 
them highly attractive to holders and especially to importers who presented 
large amounts immediately they were issued as an easy way of acquiring 
“sterling” bills. Inevitably the premium on “sterling” rose and throughout 
1816 was deliberately increased. Macquarie's prohibition of all “currency” 
notes in November 1816, although it failed ultimately, ended the activities 
of the association which by then was, like any other “petty banker”, trying 
to achieve the maximum possible depreciation of its notes.166  
“My Favourite Plan” 
   The necessity of doing something drastic about “currency” was forced on 
Macquarie's attention during the latter half of 1816. He had failed to 
eliminate the Commercial Society and “currency” continued to depreciate; 
in late July he was officially informed of Hogan's frauds; and in the third 
week of November167 Wylde reported to him the legal chaos created by his 
predecessor's, Bent's, non-observance of the law, and by the general failure 
to enforce “sterling”. Macquarie later put the entire blame on Bent for 
admitting “currency” notes in Court, insinuating that Bent himself was a 
prolific issuer.168 As a result the country was “over-flowing with the 
currency circulation” when Wylde arrived and to insist upon the law would 
have meant widespread bankruptcy.169 The fault was not entirely Bent's; 
Macquarie himself had condoned currency, for a significant proportion of 
his orders on the Police Fund were in “currency”,170 and he did not prevent 
Surveyor Meehan doing likewise.171 Wentworth as Treasurer of the Police 
Fund received tolls in “currency” in contravention of the order of 1811.172 
In any case Macquarie must have shared the common knowledge that 
“currency” had not been destroyed. Bent may have been culpable but so 
was Macquarie, so were Meehan and Wentworth and every other official if 
neglect to attempt a well-nigh impossible task be culpable.  
   There is enough information to reconstruct the discussion between 
Judge-Advocate and governor, the governor explaining “his decided 
opinion that the colonial currency was altogether prejudicial to the true 
interests of the colony and that he had therefore ever been, though hitherto 
in vain, desirous of its abolition”.173 “He further stated that all his attempts 
had hitherto proved unsuccessful”,174 and no doubt complained of the 
bureaucratic blindness of Whitehall which refused him permission to 
establish the bank which he knew would solve all the difficulties since it 
would provide the essential “sterling” substitute for “currency” which 
could not “be totally laid aside until some other and better is substituted in 
its stead”175 Wylde probably suggested a further plea for a bank which, 
however, involved too much delay.176 So he developed an ingenious legal 
argument to prove that Macquarie was empowered by implication to give 
the bank a charter.177 That some such argument occurred at this stage is 
certain, for Macquarie was convinced and “seemed to act entirely upon my 
opinion as to his power”.178 At last the great plan for a bank could go 
forward and the governor proceeded on 19 November 1816 to take the first 
step with “almost momentary promptitude and boldness of decision”.  
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Chapter 5 “One of the Most Venerated Institutions of 
the Country” 
The Founding of the Bank 
   1 
 
   MACQUARIE waited over four months after establishing the bank of 
New South Wales before reporting and justifying his action.2 He recited the 
evils of a petty banking system and the failure of his 1810 proclamation 
which he attributed to Bent's “irregular and inconsistent conduct”. When 
Wylde reported the legal position Macquarie published a new proclamation 
giving indemnity for all breaches of the old one but forbidding the issue of 
notes other than in “sterling” after 23 November 1816. The very success of 
the new attempt, according to Macquarie, was a source of acute temporary 
difficulty since the disappearance of “currency” notes while “sterling” was 
scarce left the colony without enough money. To meet this crisis the 
governor sought the advice of “a meeting of the magistrates, principal 
merchants and gentlemen of Sydney . . . at which my favourite measure of 
a bank was brought forward”. The meeting convinced Macquarie of the 
urgency with which a bank was needed “as the only means whereby the 
public distress could be fully averted” and accordingly he felt justified in 
lending his aid to the efforts of these public-spirited citizens. So the Bank 
of New South Wales was born.  
   This account is an artistic piece of fiction. The most obvious difficulty is 
one of dates: the meeting referred to took place on 22 November, following 
a preliminary conference on 20 November; the proclamation was issued on 
23 November and could scarcely have produced results to be considered by 
the meeting the day before. In view of this it is hardly necessary to collate 
this despatch in detail with the available information, none of which is 
consistent with Macquarie's version,3 which was no doubt invented after 
the event to explain away his disregard of the Colonial Office order that he 
was not to set up a bank. But it is of some importance to realize that there 
is no other authority for this widely accepted explanation of the bank's 
origin nor, in particular, for the disappearance of “currency” or the 
existence of a financial crisis to justify Macquarie.4 The sequence of events 
which led Macquarie to take the initiative has already been traced and 
provides an explanation consistent with the steps which he took to 
implement his plan.  
   Macquarie's first move, immediately following his interview with Wylde, 
was to call a select group of fourteen together for “a friendly consultation . 
. . on a subject of much interest and importance in a commercial point of 
view” in the Judge-Advocate's rooms on 20 November 1816.5 There is no 
evidence of what took place but it is certain that the meeting promised to 
support the bank plan. The second move was the meeting on 22 November 
which Macquarie reported in his despatch, but it was hardly a public 
meeting. No general invitation appeared in the Sydney Gazette and the 
short notice excluded, apparently intentionally, those who were absent 
from Sydney.6 The function of the meeting was “to take, by the direction of 
His Excellency the Governor, into consideration what would be the 
consequences of an immediate sterling circulation”,7 and “the persons who 
signed the resolutions were such as the Governor or his secretary had 
selected as fit for so important a consideration”.8 The meeting was dutifully 
“desirous that a sterling circulation should take place in this Colony” and 
urged the need for “a Public Colonial Bank” for which certain broad rules 
were laid down.9  
   It was the day after this meeting and a week before a report of it was 
published that Macquarie issued his proclamation dated 23 November 
1816.10 After reciting the persistent desire of governors for “a circulation 
only of sterling legal currency and value” and the manner in which 
previous prohibitions had been “unwarily, incautiously and negligently 
infringed upon, disregarded and violated”, he went on to give an indemnity 
to all responsible and to preserve their rights as if the previous orders had 
not been issued. But from 23 November 1816 none but “sterling” notes 
were to be issued or negotiated, under penalty of forfeiting (to the 
informer) three times the value of the note, the penalty to be payable within 
three days of conviction. Two days later a supplementary proclamation 
followed, intended “to put an end to the custom of making sale of goods, or 
articles, or barter, or any dealings whatever, or payment or satisfaction for 
work, labour, fees or charges, or agreements for the same, but at and after 
the rate of sterling prices and charges”. All reckoning, except in terms of 
“sterling” was prohibited, under threat of penalties not prescribed.11 A few 
days afterwards another meeting “in consequence of the recent abolition of 
all Colonial currency” urged the scaling down of all “currency” contracts 
by one-third, since the general premium on “sterling” was believed to be 
50 percent. A new scale of wages (piece-rates) was prescribed.12  
   Without waiting to see the failure of these prohibitions of “currency” the 
sponsors of the bank pushed on with its organization. A further meeting on 
29 November13 was followed by a public session on 5 December at which 
£5,000 was subscribed.14 A committee was appointed to frame rules and 
regulations15 which were approved in February when the first directors 
were elected16 . The directors formally solicited “a Charter of Incorporation 
with the accustomed rights, privileges and immunities as a banking 
company”, a request which “was most graciously received”, as well it 
might be.17 On 22 March 1817 the charter was delivered and the bank 
announced that it would open for business on 8 April.18 “That Roll of 
Sheepskins, Tape and Sealing Wax Called their Charter”19  
   The significance of the charter lay in the fact that it purported to give the 
coveted privilege of limited liability, obtainable only by Royal Charter or 
special act.20 There is no reason to doubt the view of Macquarie and Wylde 
that without such a guarantee the bank could not be formed.21 In fact it is 
tempting to infer that the first preliminary meeting told Macquarie that 
their support of his plan would depend upon such security for themselves.  
   The form of the charter, which incorporated the bank for seven years, 
was due to Wylde although specific details were not of his providing.22 
Wylde had convinced Macquarie, “who seemed to act entirely upon my 
opinion as to his power”,23 by an argument that although there was no 
specific clause the governor's Instructions allowed him by implication to 
give charters of incorporation. Wylde's argument was that the bank was in 
the public interest and could only succeed with limited liability which 
could only be given by charter. A charter was not “contrary to the letter or 
spirit of any existing act of parliament, or in conflict with any of those 
principles upon which such charters in the Mother Country at least have 
been granted”. The governor had collected various revenues, “regulated the 
value of the circulating medium”, fixed rates of interest and determined 
other financial measures which had been approved at home and were 
therefore within his authority. Moreover, he was specifically empowered to 
erect boroughs and cities which necessitated the power of incorporation. 
Finally, Wylde had “the strongest confidence that His Majesty's 
government would not deny their sanction to a measure that came so much 
recommended both by the governor and the public opinion of the whole 
colony”.24  
   Wylde, however, made it clear that this was inference and that the final 
authority rested with the British Government.25 Accordingly Macquarie 
asked for the approbation of the Prince Regent,26 and although this 
condition is not mentioned in the charter itself, that document was made 
dependent upon Macquarie's powers. The conditional nature of the 
protection granted gave rise to local doubts which were fostered by those 
petty bankers who feared the new competitor.27 Wylde reassured the 
subscribers in a public statement,28 the Sydney Gazette with a wealth of 
italics appealed to the dictionary meaning of “corporation” and refuted all 
doubters by quoting Adam Smith.29 The directors asserted their faith in the 
charter, being “solely actuated by a wish to do away those idle reports 
which have gone abroad as to its being incomplete in the principal point of 
securing and exempting the subscribers from personal liabilities”, to which 
Macquarie added a sweeping assertion that “all legal authorities have 
agreed in declaring there was not even a possibility” of the charter being 
defective in this respect.30 Under this fusillade of assurances public doubts 
disappeared and the validity of the charter was never questioned in the 
local courts31 nor otherwise disputed locally for nearly ten years.  
   In England, however, the charter obtained a different reception. Bathurst 
referred it for legal advice as to whether Macquarie was empowered to 
grant such a charter, adding, significantly, a question “whether there is any 
power in the Crown to alter the conditions under which it has been 
granted”. The succinct reply, giving no reasons, was that Macquarie was 
not empowered to grant such a charter “and that it is therefore null and 
void”.32 In transmitting this opinion to Macquarie Bathurst made it clear 
that no chartered bank would be approved, adding that the charter 
“appeared to me to contain some provisions of so objectionable a nature 
that I cannot regret its want of legal validity”. He directed the governor to 
explain to the shareholders in the bank that they were in the same position 
as the members of any other partnership and, while permitting him to give 
it “a due degree of support” so long as it was “conducted upon sound 
principles”, he sternly forbade Macquarie “incurring any responsibility on 
account of it, or in any degree implicating the faith of the colonial 
government in its pecuniary transactions”.33  
   Macquarie delayed replying as long as he could and then wrote a 
masterly despatch in which he deliberately misread these orders as a 
direction to abolish the bank. Expressing “much mortification” at 
Bathurst's attitude, he extolled the mythical achievements of the bank 
which ensured that “mercantile contracts and payments are as punctually 
observed and as promptly made as they could be among the most eminent 
merchants on the Royal Exchange”, and whose mortgage loans were 
exaggeratedly praised. He asserted, with doubtful accuracy, that “no one in 
this colony has been impressed with the idea that the bank was in any 
manner guaranteed by government”. A dismal picture of the sad state of 
the colony if the bank were dissolved, a state “little short of general 
bankruptcy”, he claimed justified a way out of his “embarrassing dilemma” 
by suspending action, and again asking that the charter be sanctioned.34 No 
reply was sent to this piece of sophistry for Bigge was already in the 
colony inquiring into its affairs and in particular into the operations of the 
bank. In his second Report he admitted the benefit derived from the bank 
and agreed that the limited liability protection had not been invoked, but he 
pointed out that the charter was invalid and that the bank could continue 
without it. He therefore proposed that the charter should be quietly dropped 
when it expired on 12 February 1824.35 Bathurst endorsed this suggestion, 
instructing Brisbane accordingly.36  
   But meanwhile the charter had been renewed in advance. Possibly in 
anticipation of Bigge's verdict the bank held meetings in March and July 
1823 to consider renewal and in the latter month the Sydney Gazette 
announced that with “some trifling emendation or additionary clause”, the 
extension of the charter had been granted.37 Formally it created a new bank 
in which the opportunity was taken to transfer to dollar reckoning, the old 
notes being called in, deposits transferred from the old to the new bank and 
new share certificates issued.38 When, therefore, Brisbane received his 
instructions he retorted brusquely and inaccurately “Charter renewed in 
1824”.39  
   There the matter rested until in 1826 it was desired to amend the charter 
to permit of the absorption of the proposed “Sydney Bank”. At this date the 
shareholders were still sure of the validity of their charter which they 
agreed to reprint40 and in March certain shareholders requisitioned a 
meeting to consider amendment of it to provide for increased capital41 at 
which Dr Douglas, W. C. Wentworth (a barrister) and Norton (a solicitor) 
insisted upon its validity.42 Wentworth's opinion “set the point at rest as to 
the legality of the charter”, which had been described by the Sydney 
Gazette a week before as “no more than waste paper”.43 A further meeting 
in April resolved to request the governor to vary the charter, increasing the 
number of shares from 300 to 1,000.44  
   Accordingly a deputation waited on the governor. Darling had, however, 
received by this time a general instruction that he was to avoid the practice 
of erecting corporations, of which his predecessors had been guilty, and to 
obtain “express authority” for such action.45 When the deputation called 
upon him he raised the issue of the charter's validity and promised a written 
reply.46 On looking up files of despatches he discovered the facts of 
Brisbane's renewal before he received contrary instructions and 
consequently declined acceding to the bank's request until he had received 
authority from England.47 Bathurst's reply was curt. Darling was told that 
Macquarie had been informed that the charter was null and void, that its 
renewal by Brisbane was therefore equally invalid, and the bank was a 
mere partnership. No objection was raised to the bank obtaining more 
capital provided this was clearly understood.48  
   In September 1827 the bank was informed of the verdict which was 
published with some misleading detail calculated to avoid any loss of 
confidence.49 The old bank was formally dissolved and reconstituted as a 
joint stock company in October.50 The completion of the change was 
delayed by internecine strife and violent public debates about other matters 
in the course of which the bank nearly came to an untimely end.51 At last, 
however, in March 1828 an act was passed empowering the new bank to 
sue and be sued in the name of its president,52 which, though it did little to 
save the bank from its then perilous position, finally settled the question of 
the charter. The preamble recited that the bank was “in contemplation of 
law only a joint stock company” and that “it has been agreed by the 
majority of the proprietors of old bank stock that the Charter of 
Incorporation . . . shall cease to be acted upon after the 31st day of 
December 1827”.  
   The charter was dead. But it had served its purpose better than 
Macquarie, fighting his delaying action with the Colonial Office, could 
have wished. Eleven years of supposed limited liability had carried the 
bank through to a period when the public was prepared to support not 
merely one but several banks with unlimited liability.  
The Bank's Operations Before the Dollar System 
   The fate of the charter, however, was not foreseen in 1817 and the bank 
was soon ready for business “for the general and customary purposes of 
discount, loan and deposit”.53 The nominal capital was £20,000 (“sterling”) 
in £100 shares.54 Management was vested in a president and six other 
directors, subject to the decisions of a general meeting which alone was 
supposed to authorize the incurring of debts by the bank.55 Macquarie was 
a little put out when it was decided that emancipists might not be directors, 
since “persons who had been convicts had the chief wealth of the 
colony”,56 a rule carried by the drafting committee which included three 
emancipists, on the casting vote of Wylde.57 The exclusion, however, 
appears to have been aimed at particular individuals, for Redfern, an 
emancipist, was several times elected director and one of the directors, 
Edward Riley, declared that it was generally believed that emancipists 
might be directors.58  
   Shares were transferable by endorsement and registration in the bank 
books59 and should the capital later be increased existing shareholders were 
to have the right of subscription in proportion to their then holding, a right 
which they might sell,60 but for some years yet dealings in shares were 
private sales. Subscriptions were adequate and with less than half the 
shares sold61 the bank opened for business in Macquarie Place, Sydney, 
having failed to obtain premises in George Street, on 8 April 1817.62  
   Notes for 2s. 6d., 5s., 10s., £1 and £5 were provided for in the rules,63 and 
were issued with the inscription: “Let us possess the public confidence so 
long only as, by a faithful discharge of the honourable trust reposed in us, 
we may show ourselves worthy of it. Whenever any one man can say with 
truth the Bank has broken faith, be then our ruin, and ours only, the 
immediate consequence.”64 Small bank tokens were also issued. The 
volume of notes in circulation at certain dates was:  
     
   The £1 and £5 notes were most important, while the tokens were 
insignificant, circulation apparently never exceeding £30 in all, and seem 
to have been abandoned early.65 Figures for the next few years are 
unfortunately unavailable, but probably showed a regular rise to the 
$115,940 outstanding in December 1825.66 The decline during 1819 and 
1820 was the joint result of the competitive note issue by D.-C.-G. 
Drennan which ceased in September 1820 and the defalcations of Cashier 
Williams and consequent run on the bank.  
   Williams appears to have gained nothing personally, but involved the 
bank in a loss of £6,000 by crediting his friends with amounts not 
deposited, or permitting overdrawing. He resigned in September 1820 and 
in December handed over certain bags supposed to cover the deficiency in 
his accounts. Rather strangely these were not opened until the end of 
January 1821 when they were found £12,100 short.67 The news leaked out 
and a run ensued which was stayed by the president in his capacity of 
Provost-Marshal undertaking to accept the bank's notes in official 
payments, and by some twenty merchants, most of them shareholders, 
advertising their willingness to take the notes, while the bank promised that 
all notes presented would be met in government bills, Store receipts or 
specie.68 There was no question of the bank being in peril for with only 
£5,902 outstanding in notes when the run began, the bank held £6,531 in 
coin, £16,111 in bills on the Treasury and £11,369 in Store receipts, while 
bills for £1,259 were due for payment in the next week.69 But if note issue 
was unimportant to the bank itself, so were the bank's notes to the 
community, contrary to one of the many baseless traditions of Australian 
history.70 Store receipts were still far more important, the bank itself 
holding, as was seen above, Store receipts to more than twice the value of 
its own note issue at the beginning of 1821. In 1819 Drennan's note issue 
of £49,200 was seven times that of the bank, while the petty bankers had 
by no means disappeared. There were fewer of them in the sense that a 
£ s. d.
1817 (date not given, but soon after opening) 5,608 2 6
1818 1 January 11,552 2 6
1819 1 January 7,187 2 6
1820 31 December 5,902 0 0
definite demarcation between promissory notes drawn for particular 
payments and regularly issued “bank notes” had developed,71 but there is 
no evidence that the volume of these notes had declined. In Sydney in this 
period a number of issuers can be identified with certainty. The firm of 
Jones & Riley issued £1 notes,72 T. H. Hart notes in dollars,73 as did Robert 
Howe, editor of the Sydney Gazette.74 There were a number of others who 
continued note issue for many years after the establishment of the bank, as 
did the Waterloo Company which ran a bank as part of its manifold 
activities all through the 'twenties.75 Hobart petty bankers included Mary 
Hayes, T. A. Lascelles, Mrs Lord, Kemp & Co. (£1 notes), Henry Davis 
(2s. 6d. and 5s.), Austin & Earle and J. Brown (notes for 6d.). The list is 
not comprehensive76 and, as in New South Wales, petty bankers flourished 
for years after the Bank of New South Wales began. This is not surprising 
so far as Tasmania is concerned, for, as might be expected, the bank's 
notes, while accepted, did not circulate widely there.77  
   The more important source of funds to the bank was deposits. These 
were receivable not only in coin but also in Store receipts or government 
bills, which were to be accepted in deposits without discount.78 When 
Drennan issued Commissariat notes, these also were accepted.79 Interest at 
8 per cent per annum was payable only on fixed deposits requiring three 
months' notice of withdrawal; on all other deposits no interest was paid. 
With the isolated exception of the special Police Fund deposit in 1820, on 
which 5 per cent was payable, it does not appear that the bank paid interest 
on any deposits until forced to do so by the competition of the Commercial 
Banking Company in the early' thirties.80 In 1818 the bank declined to pay 
cheques for less than £5,81 a rule which appears to have been enforced, for 
twenty-five years later it was generally believed that only cheques for £5 or 
over would be paid.82 The purpose was no doubt to encourage the use of 
the bank's notes.  
   The deposits of the bank, which were only £1,859 by the end of 1817, in 
December 1820 stood at £26,868 which included the special fixed deposit 
of £3,000 by the Police Fund and £2,900 from the Orphan Fund. Individual 
balances ranged from £1,723 belonging to Major Antill to 1s. 4d. for 
Thomas Wylde.83 Deposits would have been more important but for the 
surviving competition, not eliminated for many years, of merchants who 
accepted deposits. Until the balance of the Orphan Fund was transferred to 
the bank in 1818 it was deposited by Marsden, the Treasurer, with Jones & 
Riley who were prepared to pay 8 per cent interest to retain it.84 Most 
merchants appear to have been willing to accept deposits, allowing interest, 
and it is probable that many settlers maintained what were in effect current 
accounts with merchants, “overdrawing” by obtaining goods on credit and 
building up a balance at harvest time by selling to the same merchants. 
“Orders” on Sydney shopkeepers were the means by which settlers out of 
Sydney made many of their payments.85 Convicts who brought money with 
them often made deposits with private individuals or firms and continued 
to do so contrary to regulations after the savings bank was opened because 
the merchants offered better terms.86 The first savings bank itself was based 
upon the same type of deposit for it simply provided for government 
supervision of deposits made with four individuals who were free to use 
the money as they chose.  
   The bank's reserves against its deposit and note issue liabilities were held 
in coin, in Store receipts and government bills. The most important coin 
reserve was held in colonial dollars and dumps, valued by the bank at 5s. 
and 1s. 3d. respectively; the Spanish dollar was also important and copper 
negligible.87 Government bills and Store receipts were highly liquid since 
there was always a ready market for the former while the latter were 
normally treated as cash and had no more than a month to run before they 
were convertible into the government bills.  
   The most important source of profit to the bank was the discounting of 
bills of exchange which, with the coming of the bank, to a considerable 
extent took the place of promissory notes.88 The rules provided for 
mortgage loans and loans on the security of bullion or plate,89 but forbade 
loans on the security of bank stock and loans by way of overdraft, and 
limited loans to any individual or firm to £500.90 Securities discounted 
might include bills of exchange and promissory notes and other securities 
with not more than three months to run, with preference to two months' 
securities.91 One day a week was enough for the making of loans.92 The rule 
confining discounts to three months' bills appears to have been neglected 
for it was restated as if new in February 1818 when a further limit as to 
amount was introduced. Bills below £20 or above £500 would not be 
discounted.93 Renewals were frequent.94 In the beginning three names were 
required on bills or notes presented for discount but, this proving 
“inconvenient”, the number was reduced to two at the end of 1819.95  
   Interest on loans by the bank was fixed by Macquarie at 10 per cent per 
annum. This was a breach with the universal rule that “colonial interest” 
meant 8 per cent, which, although higher rates existed, was traditional as a 
result of King's order of 1804 as the standard interest on safe loans.96 The 
higher rate, which soon became the new colonial standard, was conceded 
by Macquarie because until this was granted in the charter there was 
“much difficulty to obtain subscribers”. He justified it by arguing that “the 
profits of trade [were] perfectly adequate to the bearing that advance or 
indeed a much greater”.97 The volume of discounts in the first four years 
was:98 a total of 2,715 bills and notes valued at £299,621. At 31 December 
1820 bills receivable held amounted to £19,405 compared with £5,693 at 
31 December 1817.99  
     
   Settlers who wished to borrow had before the foundation of the bank four 
ways open to them which in practice were not clearly distinguished and the 
legal force of which was uncertain. They might, like anyone else, issue 
promissory notes if these were acceptable. The commonest method was to 
receive goods from merchants on credit for which promissory notes were 
often given as security.100 Conditional assignments of crops were common 
although apparently without legal sanction.101 By the time the bank 
appeared this was common practice and appears to have merged with the 
second method.102 It came to be accepted procedure that a settler should 
obtain goods on credit from a merchant and then transfer his crop at 
harvest time to his creditor, often on unfavourable terms.103 Finally a settler 
might give a mortgage over his property as security for a loan. Such 
mortgages were of doubtful validity but nevertheless common104 and on 
occasions appear to have been quite informal, debtors unable to pay simply 
surrendering their property and at times remaining as tenants.105  
   The bank was empowered to make loans on the security of mortgages106 
and accordingly Macquarie provided that deeds of title to real estate should 
be registered since “many freeholders have frequent occasion to borrow 
money upon their estates”.107 Registration of mortgages began at the same 
time.108 Under the bank's original rules mortgage loans were limited to 
twelve months and must not exceed in all one-fifth of “the actual bank 
capital”,109 but in July 1818 this was increased to permit loans on 
mortgages up to an amount equal to half the capital although loans were to 
be confined to property in towns.110 Macquarie declared that the bank's 
mortgage loans had been “attended with the happiest results by enabling 
those persons to cultivate their land more effectually than their own limited 
means could possibly extend to”,111 while Bigge conceded that they had 
“afforded salutary aid”.112 But such loans could not be of very great 
importance while the restriction on their total amount continued. Moreover, 
individual loans were not large for the bank followed the custom amongst 
other lenders whose rule was “not above a dollar an acre”.113 The total 
amount so lent at 31 December 1817 was £1,381 and at 30 December 1820 
Number Amount
1817 (from 15 April) 147 £12,193
1818 784 81,673
1819 997 107,257
1820 787 98,498
it stood at £4,172.114 It is apparent that the importance of mortgage lending 
by the bank lay not in its amount but, as in so many other aspects of the 
bank's early operations, in the provision of systematic borrowing facilities 
as a model for later extensions.  
   The bank's dealings in foreign exchange were confined to being a retailer 
of Commissariat bills on London and a specialized type of forward trading 
which lasted only until the beginning of 1819. The bank accepted Store 
receipts as deposits (and reckoned them as cash) and when these fell due 
exchanged them for bills on the Treasury. These bills it then sold to those 
who held Store receipts which were not yet due for consolidation (which at 
this period occurred on the 24th of each month) and who wanted bills on 
London at once.115 For the service involved in this forward purchase of 
exchange the bank charged its customers a premium which was fixed from 
August 1817, when such dealings appear to have begun, until August 1818 
on a scale from 1 to 2 per cent according to the maturity of the receipts. 
These rates were fixed on the advice of D'Arcy Wentworth whom the bank 
presently found was privately undercutting the institution of which he was 
a director,116 a type of practice which was to be a source of complaint for 
nearly thirty years. Consequently the bank's premium was reduced to 1 per 
cent and in February 1819 Store receipts were accepted for bills on the 
Treasury at par. During this period dollars were accepted for bills on the 
same terms.117  
   Mindful of the reception of his plan for a government bank, Macquarie 
stopped short of government shareholding, “but I would certainly advise 
that, in the event of the bank being conducted for a year or two with 
discretion and success, that this government should either become a party 
in it or that it should at least make it the depository and medium of all 
government monies and payments”.118 Meanwhile he gave the organizers of 
the bank every assistance. He approved of his official secretary Campbell 
becoming president while the Lieut.-Governor, Molle, and Judge-
Advocate, Wylde, took a prominent part in its formation. The official 
offices of the Judge-Advocate and the Colonial Secretary were open to 
receive subscriptions; and not only the preliminary conferences but all the 
business of the bank was transacted in the courtroom of the Judge-
Advocate's chambers until the bank actually began trading on 8 April 
1817.119 With government officials so actively participating,120 the Judge-
Advocate presiding at meetings in his own courtroom and the Colonial 
Secretary president of a blank so obviously desired by Macquarie, it is little 
wonder that W. C. Wentworth listed it amongst government departments, 
after the police and coroners and before the government printer and the 
post office.121 No doubt only the attitude of the Colonial Office restrained 
Macquarie from direct government participation.  
   As soon as the bank commenced to issue notes the ever-thoughtful 
governor helped their circulation by specifying these notes as the medium 
for payment for various pieces of property being sold by the government;122 
customs duties were accepted in these notes and the accounts of the Police 
and Orphan Funds were kept at the bank,123 no interest being paid on these 
deposits. In 1820 Macquarie gave the bank yet further aid by ordering the 
deposit of the surplus of the Police Fund amounting to £3,000, the directors 
agreeing to pay 5 per cent interest for twelve months from the date of 
deposit in mid-1820. 124 There is Macquarie's own statement that this was 
done by his orders.125 The shareholders, however, refused to sanction the 
agreement and Macquarie, his fears sharpened by the defalcations of 
Cashier Williams, requested the repayment of the money in accents which 
did not conceal his fear that it might not be forthcoming.126 All in all, 
Macquarie took no chances about the success of his bank.  
Drennan's Notes 
   The most serious competitor of the bank in note issue was the new 
Commissary who replaced Allan, Frederick Drennan. He arrived in 
January 1819 and reported that his instructions, which had unfortunately 
been mislaid with part of his luggage on embarkation, were to abolish 
Store receipts as a means of payment, substituting his own notes, and to 
draw and negotiate bills on the Treasury without reference to the 
governor.127 With the exploits of Allan fresh in his mind it is no wonder 
that Macquarie “got into a violent rage” and “made use of such language as 
I decline repeating”.128 He suspected Drennan's good faith, for his 
complaint to the Treasury points out that the method of issue of these notes 
facilitated fraud by a dishonest Commissary,129 while the general order 
which he reluctantly published to implement the new system recited 
Drennan's report of his instructions in full and put them into force only 
until the Treasury should confirm them.130  
   Nevertheless he yielded to Drennan's insistence on his instructions 
although he exacted certain conditions. The general order laid down that in 
future Store receipts were receipts only and were not transferable but were 
to be exchanged by the first holder for coin or the new notes which in turn 
might be exchanged for bills on the Treasury “at any time within the hours 
of office”. Macquarie's main condition was that Commissariat officers at 
the out-stations should be supplied with notes to convert the new Store 
receipts.131  
   Trouble began almost at once through Drennan's neglect of this 
undertaking which meant that settlers living outside Sydney who supplied 
out-stations had to travel to Sydney to obtain notes for their Store receipts, 
“a most intolerable grievance”.132 Drennan announced in May 1819 that 
notes would be available once a week at Parramatta, Windsor and 
Liverpool,133 but this did not help settlers elsewhere. From as far away as 
Bathurst they had to come to Sydney for payment.134 The result was 
serious, especially in Tasmania, for Store receipts, while they were 
negotiable, were a universally acceptable money whereas Drennan had 
made his notes available only in Sydney or nearby. In Tasmania the 
situation was especially acute because the withdrawal of negotiable Store 
receipts took place months before any notes were sent there to replace 
them.135 Sorell at once protested, pointing out that this not only deprived 
Tasmania of most of its basic money (he said 15/16ths) but also of the 
means of paying for imports since the new receipts could not be directly 
exchanged for bills. Accordingly he authorized the local Commissariat 
officials to continue issuing transferable receipts although convertibility 
was suspended until Macquarie should approve.136 Macquarie referred the 
matter to Drennan whose request for his permission to ship £10,000 direct 
to Sorell drew a blunt refusal to intervene in Tasmania until instructions 
had been received from England, and an insistence that the whole 
responsibility for transmitting notes must rest with Drennan. Sorell must 
not be made Drennan's agent. To make quite sure, Macquarie asked Sorell 
to refuse all co-operation and gave him “full authority” to continue Store 
receipts, a “prudent conduct” which had his full approbation.137 When 
Sorell reported that meanwhile he had ordered the issue of bills in 
exchange for Store receipts this also was approved.138  
   Greatly relieved, Sorell continued the old system of transferable Store 
receipts convertible into bills.139 In September 1819 Drennan's notes began 
to arrive and the new system was introduced with Store receipts no longer 
transferable.140 Meanwhile events on the mainland had reached a crisis. 
Some £500 or £600 in 5s. and 10s. notes constituted the first issue and 
thefts of these led to their withdrawal in favour of notes for £10, £5, £2, 
£1.141 Theft and forgery of these next occurred because of the lax methods 
of issue and reissue. The Board of Investigation reported that “no entry is 
made in those books, or anywhere else, to whom each note is paid or from 
whom received. When the notes are returned in good preservation they are 
reissued, equally without entry; but when they are worn out they are 
destroyed so that it is impossible to know what notes are outstanding and 
what notes have come in, except at Van Diemen's Land.”142 Public gossip 
induced Bigge to propose a full inquiry into Drennan's administration,143 
which Macquarie was not loth to order.144  
   The report of the Board of Investigation gave Macquarie great 
satisfaction, a “very able and luminous Report” he called it.145 The first 
important fact it elicited was the nature of Drennan's instructions from the 
Treasury. The only instructions he had were very different from those he 
had alleged:  
   In conducting those duties you will be guided by the regular instructions 
of the Department and by any special instructions which may have been 
conveyed to your predecessor146 or which may hereafter be conveyed to 
you, and you will in no respect upon your authority only depart from these 
instructions; but should you consider any deviation therefrom to be 
necessary or expedient for the public service it will be your duty to 
represent the same to the Officer Commanding the Forces147 and to obtain 
his sanction thereto.  
   He was, moreover, to “implicitly obey” any instructions thus received 
even though they “may be inconsistent with the instructions received by 
you from this Board”.148 No wonder Drennan told Macquarie this letter had 
been mislaid.  
   Faced by this Drennan fell back upon a series of defences. First he 
invented an oral instruction from “Mr Hill of the Treasury . . . who stated 
his disapprobation of the system of Store receipts and I think I said I would 
issue my own notes. Mr Hill made no reply to that.” Pressed, Drennan 
admitted he could not be positive that any such conversation ever took 
place and certainly Hill never authorized his note issue.149 His alternative 
defence was equally unfortunate, a claim that he could not understand the 
system of accounting used by his predecessor Allan.150 On his arrival 
Drennan stayed with Allan and was “scarcely to be seen on any occasion 
apart from him”. His notes were printed from the same plates that Allan 
had used and he appointed Allan's son Andrew a Commissariat clerk.151 In 
these circumstances an explanation of the accounting should have been 
obtainable; in any case “both Mr Allan's accounts and the manner in which 
the business of the department has been conducted under the old Store 
receipt system [seemed] perfectly intelligible to your Committee”.152  
   The last feeble defence was an attack by Drennan on the Store receipt 
system as opening “a door to fraud and peculation”.153 With their 
discoveries of his lax administration fresh in mind the Board commented 
shortly: “the door to fraud and peculation seems to your Committee to have 
been actually taken off its hinges by Mr Drennan”.154  
   The Board recommended that the old transferable Store receipt should be 
substituted for Drennan's notes.155 Macquarie was fully in accord although 
his enthusiasm for the Store receipt was partly reaction against Drennan's 
hated innovation.156 Anticipating the Report, Drennan called up his notes a 
week earlier,157 and was thus fully prepared for Macquarie's direction that 
they should be withdrawn from 25 September 1820. In future all payments 
by the Commissariat were to be made in specie, Store receipts or bills on 
the Treasury, the last of which were to be issued only with the governor's 
countersignature.158 One variation on the old system was made. The new 
receipts were payable to “order” and not to bearer as a precaution against 
fraud.159  
   The maximum issue of Drennan's notes had been £49,200 of which 
£29,300 had been sent to Tasmania.160 The number in circulation at any 
time was, however, less by an amount which can only be guessed. The 
Board of Investigation was inclined to accept the estimate of one Rickards 
that in August 1820 notes outstanding were £10,000 in New South Wales 
and £20,000 in Tasmania.161 The withdrawal of such a large sum was not a 
simple matter and produced further difficulties in Tasmania. Sorell insisted 
upon delay until it should be clear that Store receipts would be 
exchangeable for coin or bills on the Treasury,162 and the final change-over 
was delayed until November 1820.163 Drennan's note issue was at an end.164  
   His adventure in banking was of some importance, not only in its 
immediate incidents, but in relations of the Commissariat and the Bank of 
New South Wales. Drennan was hostile to the bank from the start, 
attributing its establishment to unjustified rumours of Allan's insolvency,165 
and declaring that it would not accept Store receipts.166 This latter charge 
was not very well founded for not only was the bank able to rebut it but 
Bigge pointed out that Store receipts were attractive to the bank as a 
profitable means of obtaining bills on the Treasury.167 His further charge, 
that the bank sought to embarrass him by hoarding dollars which it refused 
to exchange for his notes, had rather more substance, for in spite of the 
denials of the bank it was feeling Drennan's competition and was holding a 
large proportion, nearly a third, of the “holey” dollars and dumps, far 
beyond any reasonable reserve requirements.168 Macquarie was quite 
satisfied to accept the view of the Board of Investigation that specie, Store 
receipts and the bank's notes would serve for all Commissariat payments.169 
Neither Bigge nor Brisbane, however, was so easily satisfied. Bigge, while 
not specifically basing his argument on the clash between Drennan and the 
bank, urged that “the introduction of a metallic local currency in the 
payments made from the commissariat department would diminish the 
chances of forgery, and would lead to an equally speedy and less 
complicated adjustment of the public accounts”.170 Independently Brisbane 
arrived at the same conclusion and, against the protests of the bank, 
introduced the “dollar system”.171  
The Monetary System in 1822 
   Macquarie's estimate of the importance of the Bank of New South Wales 
has been followed too faithfully by later historians. He predicted in 1817 
“more real benefit . . . to this colony than from any other public measure 
which has ever taken place in it”172 and he remained convinced of its great 
blessings.173 Bigge, on the other hand, conceded no more than that it had 
“added greatly to the facility of commercial transactions within the 
colony”, and that its notes “afforded a convenient circulating medium”.174 
He considered its loans to be excessive, a point which cannot be assessed, 
and, urging quite rightly that the bank's privilege of charging 10 per cent 
interest had raised rates all round, proposed that a statutory maximum of 7 
per cent should be introduced.175 “Currency” had not been superseded by 
the bank's notes,176 and, as has been seen, the operations of the bank were 
on a small scale.  
   Its dividends in the first few years were by no means princely. They 
were:177  
   These returns should be interpreted in the light of a current rate of 
interest on safe loans of 10 per cent and of business profits much higher. 
“No man in his senses would turn from sheep-shearing to bank sharing or 
relinquish the certain and enormous profits of the former for the 
comparatively minor advantages of the latter.”178  
   The significance of the bank did not lie in any vital change in the 
monetary system which its coming made. It had no monopoly of the 
business of banking and was, in fact, the first bank only in the sense that it 
was the first institution exclusively concerned with banking. Even that 
specialization was more formal than substantial. Its shareholders and 
directors, instead of making banking a part of their own shopkeeping and 
other businesses, gave a part of their time to the bank's affairs. The 
importance of the bank cannot be attributed to any consequences of its 
foundation but is found rather in the fact that the colony had reached a 
degree of economic development in which it could support a specialized 
banking firm. When Macquarie arrived the colony was primarily a penal 
settlement; when he left it was clearly going through a rapid transition to a 
free-market capitalist economy. The foundation of the Bank of New South 
Per cent per annum
April 1817—December 1818 12
August 1818—February 1819 12
February 1819—August 1819 12
August 1819—February 1820 18
February 1820—August 1820 12
August 1820—January 1821 12
Wales was a part of that process and the only phases which cannot be 
explained satisfactorily in those terms were the manner and precise date of 
its creation by Macquarie.  
   This view of the place of the bank in Australian economic history is 
confirmed by surveying the monetary system as it was at the beginning of 
1822 when Bigge's Reports were being completed and Brisbane was about 
to introduce the dollar standard.  
   Dollars were coming into more common use. The bank itself held large 
numbers, prices were occasionally given in dollars,179 and rewards were 
frequently offered in Spanish dollars as a special attraction.180 On the other 
hand neither dollars nor Bank of New South Wales notes replaced payment 
in kind. Wool,181 cattle182 and other goods were extensively used. Wheat 
was taken in payment for goods, for freight, land, wages, rent, shoeing 
horses and, in fact, almost anything.183 Wages were still customarily paid in 
“property” which included rum, but also by “orders” on merchants.184 
Payment in kind was soon to decline, persisting in the late 'twenties and 
early 'thirties in country districts but not, as a general rule, in more densely 
populated areas. For a brief space, nevertheless, it expanded until the large-
scale introduction of dollars curtailed payments other than in money. The 
new impetus to barter was itself the result of the growth of the economy 
and the widening of the internal market from its narrow dependence on the 
Commissariat's demand for grain and meat. As a result dealers and 
shopkeepers were prepared to take other kinds of goods in payment, since 
they could be passed on now that there were many other final buyers 
besides the Commissariat. Many stores were prepared to accept “all kinds 
of colonial produce at market prices”. Probably most firms in Sydney and 
Hobart did so; one can identify with certainty John Blaxland, John 
Dickson, S. Lord, P. Garrigan and Daniel Cooper in Sydney,185 and Raine 
& Deane in Hobart.186 Many other firms continued to specify particular 
commodities as acceptable,187 while the Australian Brewery in Sydney 
offered beer in exchange for “lard and salt, kangaroo skins, houses and 
eggs, grain and hemp, cattle and sealskins, sheep and fish oil, horses and 
sawn timber, cedar logs and pigs, pork and shingles, flax and poultry, 
tobacco and wattle-bark, cheese and wood, candles and laths, fuel and 
soap, shoes and coals, hides and Spanish dollars, etc., etc., etc.”188  
   Nevertheless, the use of money was increasing in relative importance, 
more especially in government finance. Some salaries were still paid 
wholly or partly in kind189 and minor services were largely remunerated in 
goods, particularly in Tasmania.190 On the whole, however, government 
finance had been converted to a mainly monetary basis by the end of 
Macquarie's administration.191 In 1822, on the surface, both private and 
public finance were still based on the makeshifts of a primitive penal 
settlement, but the seeds of the rapid development of the 'twenties were 
already germinating. The next fifteen years were to see a double change of 
monetary standard, first to the Spanish dollar and then to a sterling-
exchange standard; the multiplication of banks and the extension of 
banking with the appearance of branch and country banks, overdrafts and 
interest on deposits; the emergence of a market in foreign exchange 
independent of government finance; the development of specialized 
financial services such as organized dealing in shares and bill-broking; and 
the first financial crisis and depression of the new capitalist economy.  
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military sentry as the privilege of a chartered bank, Australian, 15 November 1826. 
41 Sydney Gazette, 1 March 1826. 
42 Report of meeting in Sydney Gazette, 22 March 1826; Wentworth cited J. T. 
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the winning side, had changed his opinion and was given credit for having warned 
the bank that the charter “was not worth a straw” (issue of 12 October). In the issue 
of 21 November 1827 it is alleged that he expressed this view “immediately on his 
arrival in the colony”. 
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80 This is inferential from the absence of any evidence of interest on deposits in the 
incomplete bank accounts or otherwise and from the discussion of “Scotch Banking” 
throughout the 'twenties. 
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99 Ibid., p. 6286; Beginnings of Government in Australia. 
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101 For a very early example in 1800 see “Riley Papers” (Mitchell Library), ii, folio 
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104 Bigge, Tasmanian Evidence, H.R.A., III, iii, 260, 352; Manuscript Evidence 
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105 Bigge, Manuscript Evidence (Mitchell Library), B.T. Box 5, pp. 2295–6; 
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111 Macquarie to Bathurst, 1 September 1820, H.R.A., I, x, 348. 
112 Report on Agriculture and Trade in New South Wales, p. 66. Bigge curiously 
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113 John Oxley in Bigge, Manuscript Evidence (Mitchell Library), B.T. Box 5, pp. 
1899–1900. A Board Minute of 3 February 1819 authorizes a mortgage loan of £100 
on 500 acres and another of £25 on 100 acres, “Bank of New South Wales 
Papers” (Mitchell Library). 
114 Beginnings of Government in Australia and Bigge, Manuscript Evidence 
(Mitchell Library), B.T. Box 27, p. 6286. A statement on p. 6285 shows the same 
amount at 26 January 1821 as at 31 December 1820. 
115 The procedure is shown in the Board Minute of 18 August 1818 in “Bank of 
New South Wales Papers” (Mitchell Library): the customer endorsed his receipts to 
the bank and gave an order to the bank and gave an order to the Commissary 
directing payment to the bank. 
116 Bigge to Wentworth, 25 January 1821, Manuscript Evidence (Mitchell Library), 
Number Amount Secured
1817 (from 25 January) 63 (£)11,861
1818 71 7,844
1819 35 10,753
1820 (to 24 June) 10 3,592
B.T. Box 26, p. 5893; Wentworth to Bigge, 26 January 1821, “D'Arcy Wentworth 
Correspondence” 1821–27 (Mitchell Library): “When I accepted the situation of a 
bank director it was not made a stipulation with me that I was to be precluded from 
using my own money in any way I might deem proper”. 
117 The rates were: 
No premium (Store receipts were not issued for some months). Sub-enclosure 40 in 
Macquarie to Bathurst, 15 March 1821, H.R.A., I, x, 436–7. 
118 Macquarie to Bathurst, 29 March 1817, H.R.A., I, ix, 220. 
119 Notices and advertisements in Sydney Gazette, 30 November, 14 December 
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120 Of the first seven directors four were government officials (Campbell, D. 
Wentworth, W. Redfern, A. Riley, replaced in March 1817 by W. Gore, another 
official); Thomas Wylde was the son of the judge; the others were John Harris and 
Robert Jenkins. 
121 Statistical, Historical and Political Description of New South Wales (1819), p. 
437. Wentworth thought no bank could succeed in the colony except with direct 
government aid, ibid., p. 213, and letter to his father 25 May 1818, “Letters from W. 
C. Wentworth” (Mitchell Library). 
122 Sydney Gazette, 3, 10 May, 27 September, 25 October 1817. 
123 Bigge, Report on Agriculture and Trade, pp. 65, 84. The two funds comprised 
the whole local Treasury accounts but not the Commissariat Chest. The deposit of 
the Orphan Fund was on the initiative of the Trustees, Macquarie giving no formal 
instructions, Bigge, Manuscript Evidence (Mitchell Library), B.T. Box 25, p. 5543 
(Wylde). 
124 Receipt dated 29 June 1820 in “D'Arcy Wentworth Correspondence”, 1817–20 
(Mitchell Library). See also Bigge, Report on Agriculture and Trade in New South 
Wales, pp. 65, 86, where the date of deposit is given as May. In Police Fund 
Accounts, Sydney Gazette, 11 November 1820, the deposit is recorded in the 
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125 Macquarie to J. T. Campbell (as president of the bank), 26 January 1821, (in his 
own hand). “Bank of New South Wales Papers” (Mitchell Library). Cf. Bigge, 
Report on Agriculture and Trade, p. 65. 
126 In the letter cited in the preceding footnote. The bank paid the interest for at 
(a) 19 August 1817–25 August 1818
Receipts due in 1 to 7 days 1 per cent
Receipts due in 8 to 14 days 11/2 per cent
Receipts due in 15 to 22 days 13/4 per cent
Receipts due in over 23 days 2 per cent
(b) 25 August 1818—February 1819
Irrespective of period 1 per cent
(c) After February 1819
least six months. Bigge, Manuscript Evidence (Mitchell Library), B.T. Box 27, p. 
6291. 
127 Macquarie to Commissioners of Treasury, 24 March 1819, H.R.A., I, x, 101. 
128 Drennan to Harrison, 6 March 1819, Bigge, Manuscript Evidence (Mitchell 
Library), B.T. Box 18, p. 2483. 
129 Macquarie to Commissioners of Treasury, 24 March 1819, H.R.A., I, x, 103, 
104, 105. 
130 General Order of 8 February 1819, Sydney Gazette, 13 February 1819; Hobart 
Town Gazette, 3 April 1819. 
131 Macquarie to Drennan, 26 April 1819, Enclosure 5 in Macquarie to 
Commissioners of Treasury, 12 June 1819, H.R.A., I, x, 159; to Sorell, 15 May 1819, 
H.R.A., III, ii, 396–7. 
132 Macquarie to Commissioners of Treasury, 24 March 1819, H.R.A., I, x, 104. 
133 Sydney Gazette, 1 May 1819. 
134 Report of Board of Investigation, H.R.A., I, x, 418, records 75 such settlers 
receiving payment in Sydney between 3 May 1819 and 24 June 1820, a number 
which must be interpreted in the light of the sparse settlement; the Bathurst 
storekeeper reported that suppliers did not bother to call for receipts until they 
happened to be coming to Sydney, ibid., 420. 
135 Notes were first sent in September 1819, Bigge, Tasmanian Evidence, H.R.A., 
III, iii, 305 (evidence of Hull, Commissary at Hobart), 440 (T. Walker, Launceston); 
the withdrawal of Store receipts was ordered in Hobart Town Gazette, 3 April 1819. 
136 Sorell to Macquarie, 6 April 1819, Enclosure 12 in Macquarie to Treasury 
Commissioners, 12 June 1819, H.R.A., I, x, 164, 166 and 10 April 1819, H.R.A., III, 
ii, 392. 
137 Macquarie to Treasury Commissioners, 12 June 1819; Enclosures 4, Drennan to 
Macquarie, 24 April 1819; 5, Macquarie to Drennan, 26 April 1819; H.R.A., I, x, 
155, 158, 158–60; and Macquarie to Sorell, 15 May 1819, H.R.A., III, ii, 396–7. 
138 Sorell to Macquarie, 22 May 1819; Macquarie to Sorell, 17 August 1819; 
H.R.A., III, ii, 401, 406. 
139 Sorell to Macquarie, 19 June 1819; to D.-A.-C.-Gs. Archer and Walker 14 June 
1819; H.R.A., III, ii, 406, 704; Bigge, Tasmanian Evidence, H.R.A., III, iii, 439–40. 
140 The notes were received, £4,200 in September, £11,200 in November and 
£13,500 in December. Hull's evidence to Bigge, H.R.A., III, iii, 305. Hull forwarded 
£11,606 of these from Hobart to Port Dalrymple. 
141 Sydney Gazette, 9, 16 October 1819; Report of Board of Investigation, H.R.A., I, 
x, 421. 
142 Report, H.R.A., I, x, 421. The documents relating to the frauds and forgeries are 
in Bonwick Transcripts (Mitchell Library) Box 22, pp. 4256–91. For the careful 
accounting in Tasmania see Archer's evidence to Bigge, H.R.A., III, iii, 335–6. 
143 Bigge to Macquarie, 16 June 1820 (Mitchell Library), B.T. Box 23, pp. 4423–6. 
The Committee set up comprised Judge-Advocate Wylde, Judge Field and J.T. 
Campbell. Bigge and his secretary assisted but did not sign the report because 
Bigge's instructions forbade his revealing the results of any inquiries he made in 
New South Wales but he agreed “entirely” with it. Bigge's confidential report on 
Drennan (Mitchell Library) B.T. Box 28, p. 7139. 
144 The feeling between Macquarie and Drennan is illustrated by Macquarie's 
reference to his “insolence and impertinence” (Macquarie to Sorell, 13 October 
1820, H.R.A., III, iii, 65), and Drennan's “General Macquarie would go any length to 
ruin me”, or “I find it my unhappy lot to be in continual hot water . . . General 
Macquarie must have taken leave of his senses” (Drennan to Harrison, 15 March, 3 
April 1819 (Mitchell Library), B.T. Box 18, pp. 2510, 2549). Immediately after this 
Drennan was court-martialled for disrespect to Macquarie (Antill to Drennan, 7, 9 
April 1819, ibid., pp. 2559, 2564). During his arrest his deputy, Cordeaux, continued 
the issue of notes, using his own signature (ibid., Box 10, 4138). 
145 Report presented 1 September 1820, Enclosure 4 in Macquarie to Bathurst 15 
March 1821, H.R.A., I, x, 413 ff. Phrase quoted is from Macquarie's letter of thanks 
to Wylde, 19 September 1820 (Mitchell Library), B.T. Box 24, pp. 5128–9. Some of 
the documents collected by the Board follow the Report in H.R.A.; the evidence is in 
Bigge's Appendix (Mitchell Library), B.T. Boxes 10, 18, 23. 
146 This would cover Macquarie's prohibition of note issue by Commissariat 
officials. 
147 I.e., Macquarie as Captain-General. 
148 Harrison (Secretary to Treasury) to Drennan, 17 April 1818, H.R.A., I, x, 430. 
Cf. Harrison to Drennan, 28 January 1820 reprimanding him for not submitting bills 
for the governor's signature, H.R.A., I, x, 440. 
149 Drennan's evidence (Mitchell Library), B.T. Box 10, p. 4127; Report of Board, 
H.R.A., I, x, 414. 
150 See references in previous note. 
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Chapter 6 The Dollar Standard 
The Question of the Standard 
   THE INTRODUCTION of the “dollar system” in 1822 meant the partial 
substitution of a full dollar standard, involving not merely the use of 
dollars for most cash transactions but government and private accounting 
in dollar terms and a near approach to the establishment of the dollar in 
place of “sterling” as the colony's standard money. British policy, however, 
decreed late in 1825 the removal of the uncompleted structure and the 
immediate institution of a sterling-exchange standard with a fixed rate of 
exchange, which was followed by the abolition of reckoning in either 
dollars or “currency” and the elimination—long delayed in Tasmania—of 
foreign coins from circulation. The story is that of the final firm 
establishment of the pound Australian.  
   The “dollar system” appears to have been due to a variety of motives, the 
disentangling of which is not made easier by charges of malice and 
corruption. The moving spirit was not Brisbane, who was “too accustomed 
to look at the moon through a telescope to have much pleasure in looking 
at the earth through any other medium”,1 but the Colonial Secretary, Major 
Goulburn. Brisbane officially endorsed the policy, with a public tribute to 
the Spanish dollar:  
   that invaluable coin, which has for centuries been disseminating its 
benefits over every other portion of the earth . . . a coin which from the 
extension of its circulation over every part of the commercial globe may 
justly be defined as the money of the world. Like the air we breathe, 
unlimited in the extent of the blessings which it showers over all mankind; 
like the ocean that surrounds our continent, a grand circulating medium 
assisting to waft to every part of the world the various products of her 
diversified climates. Driven, indeed, from the United Kingdom by her 
monies of sterling denomination it still however maintains all its pre-
eminence in every one of her colonies. Confined in its advantages to no 
faith, kindred or government, I refer you . . . to those sterling benefits it has 
for ages been bestowing on the British and Protestant North American 
Colonies; on the French and Papal Canadas; on Mohammedan India; and 
on the whole world.2  
   But it is doubtful whether Brisbane fully understood what was occurring. 
He made no report on the new system until six or seven months after its 
introduction and then did little more than forward copies of complaints.3 As 
late as 1825 he does not appear to have realized the extent to which the 
colony had been transferred to a dollar standard.4 He complained of the 
Commissariat officials acting without his consent in the import of dollars,5 
but it was the advice of the same officials he solicited and followed on 
currency affairs.6 There is no reason to doubt the testimony of J. D. Lang, 
the merchant Alexander Berry, the Colonial Times and the Sydney Monitor 
that Major Goulburn and Deputy Commissary-General Wemyss were 
responsible for the new system being “rather curiously foisted upon” the 
colony.7  
   Berry's charges against Goulburn appear to represent the opinion of the 
mercantile community. To Berry, Goulburn's motive for the change was 
compounded of hatred of Macquarie's policy of enforcing “sterling”, 
antagonism to the Bank of New South Wales, muddled ideas on money and 
a “job” between Goulburn and Admiral Sir Henry Blackwood of India. It is 
distinctly probable that these had some part in the decision although the 
desire to reduce governmental expenses, to provide the colony with a 
coinage, to avoid a repetition of Commissariat note issues such as those by 
Drennan in 1819–21, and an honest belief in the virtues of a dollar 
currency were also significant.  
   Berry's story of Blackwood's shipping dollars from India by the Nimrod 
to be bought by Brisbane on Goulburn's advice at 5s. each, and of his 
clandestine arrangements for collecting the bills on the Treasury with 
which he was paid,8 is without direct support, but is full of circumstantial 
detail and is made plausible by the tone of current references to the Nimrod 
shipment,9 and by the fact that the full operation of a dollar standard does 
not appear to have been intended at first. Similarly, there is no proof that 
Goulburn and Macquarie “mutually hated and despised one another” and 
that as a result Goulburn was determined to abolish “sterling” in favour of 
“currency” and thereby ruin the Bank of New South Wales whose assets 
were mainly “sterling” securities.10 But there was an atmosphere of distrust 
and suspicion in the relations between the Commissariat and the Bank 
which had appeared in the Drennan episode and was not to disappear for 
some time. Moreover, Macquarie's “sterling” policy meant that Bank of 
New South Wales notes ranked as equal in value to bills on the Treasury 
and in a sense this opportunity to convert notes into bills at par was a 
subsidy to the bank, ensuring the circulation of its notes as “sterling” rather 
than as “currency”. In what one might call the Commissariat view, the 
Bank was increasing its discounts rashly and issuing an excessive quantity 
of notes. Combined with the high exchange rate between local money and 
bills on the Treasury this constituted a bounty on imports, the increase of 
which, from other causes, would in any case necessitate a devaluation of 
local money. The introduction of dollars would thus achieve a number of 
objects. The bank would be compelled to be more cautious if there were a 
high sterling price for silver which would be needed for reserve purposes; 
government expenditure would be reduced since it would pay in 
“currency” rather than in “sterling”; the bounty on imports would be 
removed and excessive imports discouraged by a depreciation of 20 per 
cent in the exchange value of bank notes which was believed to represent 
their true value.11  
   It seems clear enough that the bank was getting into deep water by this 
time, fully embarked on the course which in 1826 nearly brought its 
dissolution. Nor was public opinion always favourable to its activities.12 
Berry himself admitted the glut of imported goods: “it appears as if the 
good people of England had anticipated the progress of the colony by 
twenty years”.13 In these circumstances a policy which was not free of 
suspicion as to the motives behind its particular details, even though the 
basic purpose and its theoretical justification may have been reasonable, 
might well appear in the eyes of merchants, whose ability to discount bills 
at the bank was reduced at the same time as the cost of imports was 
increased by the devaluation, to be intended to ruin the bank.14  
(a) First Phase: Dollars in Circulation 
   Whatever the precise intentions behind the change, the first move was a 
large-scale importation of dollars in the first months of 1822. The amount 
is uncertain. In 1826 it was reported as about $400,000, but there is no 
indication of what period this estimate covered, nor of whether it included 
private imports.15 Current comment assumed about $70,000 by the Nimrod 
and $14,000 by the Almorah as the first shipments.16 But private imports 
also occurred which Brisbane refused to restrict,17 and the amount 
introduced by the Commissariat is unknown; in any case it seems that the 
Commissariat did not so much import dollars as provide a market for those 
who did.18 No announcement of the government's intentions was made, 
dollars being paid out as equivalent to five shillings and accepted by the 
colonists because this was the conventional valuation, and it was assumed 
that they might be exchanged for bills on the Treasury at the same rate. 
When, however, it became known that the Commissariat would take them 
as 4s. 2d. only, the estimated bullion value in sterling, a storm broke. 
Indignation was aimed partly at the failure to inform the public, partly at 
what was considered as sharp practice on the part of government. The 
Bank of New South Wales refused to accept dollars “until a specific value 
is fixed thereto by the proper authorities”,19 and protested to Brisbane.20 
Their argument was that the recent influx of dollars meant that the old 
conventional valuation of 5s. could not be maintained except by 
government decree. But the Commissariat would accept dollars as 4s. 2d. 
sterling so that in effect the government was reducing the amount it paid 
for goods by giving the same nominal price in a depreciated currency. In so 
doing it had introduced confusion into private reckoning, exposed the bank 
to a loss of 10d. on very dollar which it held as reserve and treated those 
selling to government unfairly.  
   The response took the form of two concessions. By the General Order of 
10 May 1822 all colonial duties and quit-rents might be paid in Spanish 
dollars at 5s. each,21 and from the end of the month wheat bought by the 
government was taken at a price of $2 per bushel instead of the old 10s.22 
This concession was merely nominal since while suppliers were no longer 
misled as to the nominal price, the Commissariat paid for wheat in dollars 
only.23  
   Up till June 1822 government policy had achieved four things. The 
Spanish dollar had been devalued from 5s. “sterling” to an uncertain value 
of about 4s. 2d. “sterling” and 5s. “currency”.24 Large numbers of dollars 
had been introduced as a basic coinage and the dual system of reckoning in 
“sterling” and “currency” was given a new lease of life. The cost of 
government supplies was reduced by paying in “currency” (i.e., dollars at 
5s.) prices which had previously been “sterling”, a reduction which was 
effective because government was the dominating buyer.25  
   Public opinion as reflected in the columns of the Sydney Gazette fairly 
saw the issue as a choice of monetary standards. One group, represented by 
individual correspondents26 and by the signatories to an address from the 
“Inhabitants, Landholders, Merchants and Free Colonists”,27 objected 
strongly to the new policy. Substantially the opposition complained of the 
injustice of payment in “a foreign coin of doubtful and fluctuating value” 
which recipients could not rely on paying back to the government, of the 
risk that contracts in “sterling” made before the new system would be 
literally enforced, of the necessity to reduce wages if the new-devalued 
dollar were to be current, of the difficulties of remitting overseas, and of 
the risk of an influx of dollars. Instead of being “perpetually confused with 
the useless calculations of the science of exchanges” they wanted a 
sterling-exchange standard with a fixed rate of exchange and a British 
coinage.  
   The government champions hid their identities under the names of 
“Mercator” and “Subscriber”.28 The latter was a complete propagandist for 
what has been called the Commissariat view but “Mercator” went rather 
deeper. He admitted the confusion caused by the existence of two 
standards and two systems of reckoning and conceded the force of most of 
the arguments of the opposition, but pointed out that maintenance of the 
old “sterling” value of the dollar was impossible since it was a standing 
invitation to import dollars. He argued for a recognition of the fact that 
whatever its denomination local money would vary in “sterling” value 
according to the balance of payments and an artificially increased valuation 
would limit exports and inflate imports. If parity with sterling was desired 
it would be necessary to import British coin and ensure its retention. 
Otherwise either the Spanish dollar should specifically be the standard or 
there should be a strictly local coinage which might be attained most 
simply by stamping the dollars already in use. In effect his argument 
ascribed the defects of which opponents of the government complained to 
the failure to establish a full local standard.  
(b) Second Phase: The Dollar as Unit of Account 
   There is no evidence that government policy was influenced by 
“Mercator's” views, but after meeting criticism by a temporary stabilization 
of the “sterling” value of the dollar the government proceeded 
systematically to introduce a dollar standard and to cut the local monetary 
system free from a fixed parity with sterling. The concession took the form 
of a General Order of 6 June 1822 by which the Commissariat would 
temporarily sell bills on the Treasury at a premium of 21/2 per cent, 
accepting dollars at 5s.29 In a sense this reversed almost completely the 
devaluation of the dollar but it was specifically made temporary and was 
quickly followed by other measures.  
   Three weeks later Macquarie's two proclamations of 23 and 25 
November 1816, enforcing the circulation of “sterling”, were rescinded,30 
thus leaving all individuals free to make contracts, issue notes and draw 
bills in terms of “currency”, dollars or other money. In July “holey” dollars 
were called up at 5s. during a period of six weeks.31 In November “dumps” 
were called up in exchange for bills on the Treasury or sterling money at 
Is. 3d. per “dump” provided they were presented within six weeks. 
Thereafter they were to be re-issued as quarter-dollars.32 Following on this 
revaluation of “holey” dollars and “dumps” the public were warned of the 
government's intention to adopt a full dollar standard by notices that, on the 
expiry of this latter period, no bills, Store receipts, etc., in “sterling” would 
be recognized by Commissariat officers.33  
   Meanwhile in November 1822 the stabilized exchange rate was 
abandoned in favour of a rate determined by competitive tender. Tenderers 
were to offer Spanish dollars reckoned, for convenience only, at 5s., 
indicating a percentage premium which they were willing to pay.34 In April 
1823 “holey” dollars and “dumps” were accepted on similar terms.35 
“Holey” dollars whose re-issue had been overlooked were returned to 
circulation as three-quarter dollars.36  
   The next step was a General Order of 5 February 182337 by which in 
future the public accounts were to be kept in terms of dollars, salaries paid 
to officials in dollars (at four shillings per dollar), copper pence were to be 
treated as cent coins at one cent per halfpenny and colonial dues were to be 
paid in dollars, reckoned in sterling according to the maximum rate of the 
last tender for bills on the Treasury. The last somewhat clumsy provision 
was necessitated by the fact that customs and some other charges were 
fixed in £ s. d. by the British parliament.  
   This, the second phase of the dollar system, was completed by provision 
for the negotiability of dollar securities. The repeal of Macquarie's 
proclamations had removed the legal ban on them but it was doubtful 
whether they were negotiable instruments. Both in New South Wales and 
in Tasmania the issue was publicly raised,38 and settled by the first act of 
the New South Wales Legislative Council,39 which declared that dollar bills 
and notes should be transferable and negotiable “as if they had been drawn 
payable in money of the realm”.  
   The completion of the legal framework did not, however, mean the full 
and smooth operation of a dollar standard. Moreover, an important reversal 
of policy was made in 1825, the dollar being reckoned in all government 
transactions at 4s. 4d., probably because convenience required some 
defined rate when so many receipts and payments were fixed in £ s. d. and 
could not be modified by the local authorities. It is possible, too, that the 
parliamentary discussions in England on the future of the Empire monetary 
systems induced the New South Wales authorities to prepare for the 
change, the broad lines of which they could forecast.40 The transition was 
in any case simplified by rating the dollar at 4s. 4d. before any instructions 
to that effect were received. Prior to this last change, however, knowledge 
of English plans encouraged local policy instead of restricting it because 
Bathurst had given qualified approval to the dollar system.41 At the time the 
only details of the new procedure which had reached England were 
Brisbane's report of early complaints and these conveyed only the fact of 
the Commissariat paying for supplies in dollars at 5s., which was 
approved, provided tenders were advertised for. This had already been 
done.42  
   A number of valuations of the dollar existed for government transactions 
until June 1825. In payments to the general public the dollar was reckoned 
at 5s. But it was paid to the troops as equal to 4s. 8d.43 and to salaried 
officials as 4s.44 Some rate had to be fixed upon for these payments which 
were prescribed in sterling and could not be altered in New South Wales. 
Since the dollar was believed locally at this time to have a bullion value of 
4s. 2d. sterling, in effect the officers were overpaid and the troops 
underpaid. In payments to the government some rate had to be prescribed 
for a number of payments for the same reason. The rule adopted in the 
General Order of 5 February 1823 by which the value of the dollar in 
payments to government should be the value determined by the last tenders 
for bills on the Treasury did not apply universally. The Provost-Marshal in 
Sydney, receiving court fees fixed in sterling, counted the Spanish dollar as 
4s. and the “holey” dollar as 2s. 10d.45 The same practice was followed in 
Tasmania.46 In January 1825 the complexity of reckoning was increased by 
the proclamation of certain excises which might be paid in shillings, or in 
dollars at 5s.47 The counting of the dollar as 5s. in tenders for bills on the 
Treasury was less confusing, but over the whole field the various values 
made for complexity and dispute. This was accentuated by variations in the 
private rating of the dollar. During the months of 1822 when the 
Commissariat accepted the dollar as 5s. with a discount of 21/2 per cent so 
did a number of private sellers.48 Some offered the deceptive valuation of 
5s. 6d., making an upward adjustment of prices,49 but the general rule was 
to accept the dollar as 5s. and to price goods in “currency” in terms of £ s. 
d.50 The Bank of New South Wales was reported to accept the dollar as 4s. 
2d. in August 1822 and as 4s. in February 1823,51 while bank salaries 
(which were expressed in £ s. d.) were paid in dollars at 4s. from 1822 until 
the irate shareholders discovered that their profits were thus being reduced 
and insisted on a return to “the old system”.52 Under these conditions 
people continued to think in terms of pounds rather than dollars and it was 
necessary to specify a valuation for the dollar in all contracts.  
   In September 1824 Brisbane referred the matter to a Board of 
Commissariat officers, directing them to fix a rate on the dollar for all 
government transactions.53 The Board found that “the intrinsic value of the 
pure silver contained in the Spanish dollar is 4s. 3.79d. and . . . allowing a 
deviation to save the trouble of calculating with a complicated fraction, say 
4s. 4d. would be a fair ratio for converting sterling into currency”. 
Presumably the basis for this calculation was a sterling price of silver of 5s. 
2d. per standard ounce which had been, but was no longer, the English 
mint price. There was, in fact, no permanent sterling equivalent of the 
dollar but fortunately the English Treasury made a parallel calculation and 
ordered the same valuation when a sterling-exchange standard was 
imposed in 1826. The Board, however, pointed out that the major 
governmental revenues arose from ad valorem duties and the necessity for 
a rating of the dollar would disappear if values were assessed in dollars.54 
In a further Report55 the Board urged that in commuting rations to 
government employees rates should be fixed in Spanish dollars.  
   Brisbane took no immediate action but in April 1825 referred to England 
a scheme for stipulating “that the payment of all taxes as well as the 
salaries of public servants and other engagements shall be made on the part 
of government in dollars eo nomine without reference to any value; and in 
those cases where it may be necessary to express sterling money, to specify 
that the dollar shall be taken nominally at five shillings”. He suggested a 
local token coinage of fractions of a dollar.56 The British plan for an 
Imperial sterling area made consideration unnecessary.57  
(c) Third Phase: Retreat 
   Brisbane did not wait for this reply. Within three months, presumably 
because unofficial news made the new Imperial policy clear, he had 
decided upon the general adoption of the 4s. 4d. valuation and 
implemented it after a further reference to the Board of officers, who were 
required to make up a scale of salaries to fit the new valuation, including 
“all salaries and allowances whatsoever”.58 In May 1825 it was directed 
that all payments to government which were specified in sterling would be 
receivable in dollars at 4s. 4d. which “has been fixed upon with reference 
to the general average exchange paid for the Spanish dollar in the 
negotiation of government bills for a considerable time past”.59 This did not 
affect the purely conventional 5s. valuation for tenders for bills on the 
Treasury.60 Payments by government of amounts expressed in sterling were 
after June 1825 to be made in dollars at the same rate of 4s. 4d. Salaries 
were specifically mentioned.61 In this final62 provision for the legal 
framework of the dollar system was the recognition that the government 
had failed to establish a dollar standard. Even had this development not 
been followed immediately by the receipt of instructions for a sterling-
exchange standard, the most that would have been achieved was a 
continuation of the situation that existed in the closing months of 1825 and 
was to last for at least five years: the widespread circulation of Spanish 
dollars valued in £ s. d. in terms of which most reckoning was made, with 
the complication that some accounting was in terms of dollars and a dual 
scale of values in “sterling” and in “currency” was prolonged.  
   Government accounting was very incompletely transferred to a dollar 
basis. In New South Wales the Colonial Fund and Naval Officer's 
Accounts were given in dollars in 1823,63 although there was some delay in 
Tasmania where the Colonial Fund does not appear to have adopted dollar 
reckoning.64 Most revenue was received in dollars,65 but even then dollar 
reckoning was mainly a formal compliance with the order of 5 February 
1823. Most items of revenue and expenditure were reckoned in pounds and 
converted into dollars for the final accounts.66 Land prices67 or rewards68 
were occasionally reckoned in dollars but in general government 
accounting continued to be in pounds. Fines and penalties were in dollars.69 
Land prices were mainly in pounds,70 as were customs duties and many 
salary payments fixed in England. Court fees,71 tolls72 and other 
government wages and salaries73 determined locally were also reckoned 
thus. Even the Commissariat, which professed to price wheat in dollars,74 
continued to accept tenders in terms of shillings and pence throughout the 
whole period of the dollar system.75 Occasionally reckoning was mixed,76 
and it is impossible to resist the conclusion that in government finance the 
pound, not the dollar, remained the basic unit of account.  
   The situation in private finance was parallel. The Bank of New South 
Wales adopted some reckoning in dollars very early. Cheques in dollars 
were met as early as April 1822,77 and by the beginning of 1823 at latest it 
had dollar notes in circulation.78 Its refusal to accept dollars was shortlived 
and from July 1822 these were being taken.79 On the occasion of the 
renewal of the charter in 1823 the bank accounts were converted into 
dollars. Notes in £ s. d. were called up and deposits were receivable as 
dollars only from July 1823, reckoning 4s. 2d. “sterling” as one dollar.80 
Dollar notes for 1, 3, 5, 10, 20 and 50 dollars were then issued.81 Even so 
the transfer to dollars was not quite complete, the capital of the bank being 
still in pounds,82 and dividends were sometimes given in pounds per 
share.83 Store receipts in pounds were also accepted as deposits.84 The Bank 
of Van Diemen's Land was in a similar position,85 and other note issuers 
followed suit, issuing notes in dollars. The Waterloo Company's first issue, 
in June 1822, was of notes for 1, 2, 4 and 20 dollars.86 But while there were 
a number of such “bankers”,87 it is significant that regular issues of “small 
notes” for 3d., 6d. or 1s. continued, providing small change for a system in 
which the basic reckoning was in pounds. E. S. Hall, editor of the Monitor, 
issued numbers of notes for 4d. in 1823,88 while in Tasmania issues of 
these small notes were particularly widespread.89  
   These dollar note issues may be regarded as complementary to the use of 
dollar coin and did not mean that private finance was on a dollar basis. 
Promissory notes were often drawn specifically in dollars but probably 
more often in pounds.90 Prices were very rarely quoted in dollars,91 but 
almost always in pounds;92 the Sydney Gazette's market reports were in £ s. 
d. throughout the whole episode. Occasionally prices were advertised in 
both £ s. d. and dollars,93 just as the Bank of New South Wales declared a 
dividend of “£9 5s. currency or thirty-seven Spanish dollars”.94 Other 
reckoning directly in dollars was unimportant, consisting of such as the 
offer of rewards95 or prizes.96 But the fact that private contracts in pounds 
would be settled in dollars, dollar notes or cheques on dollar deposits 
meant that a rating for the dollar had to be specified. A typical form of 
promissory note was for “£16 15s. in Spanish dollars at 5s. each”,97 and a 
typical contract was that by which Cooper & Levey bought a share in the 
Waterloo Company for “four thousand seven hundred pounds in Spanish 
dollars at five shillings each”.98 With no exceptions worthy of mention, the 
rate used for accounting in such cases was 5s. per dollar and in the long run 
the significance of this proved to be the perpetuation of the dual 
“sterling”—“currency” system of reckoning, with the difference that now 
“currency” normally meant dollars reckoned as 5s. A good example is W. 
C. Wentworth's office accounts at the time of the substitution of a sterling-
exchange standard,99 receipts from August 1825 to July 1826 being entered 
as £ s. d. in columns headed “currency”, but totalled as “in Spanish dollars 
at 5s. each”. In a large number of cases advertised prices in £ s. d. were 
accompanied by a note of willingness to accept dollars at 5s. so that these 
prices too were in “currency”.  
   To the end, therefore, a dollar standard was not established. The dollar 
and dollar notes were widespread as means of payment but the unit of 
account was the pound, sometimes the pound “sterling”, but usually the 
pound “currency”, a state of affairs which may be traced to a number of 
factors. Because certain government receipts such as customs duties, and 
some payments, notably salaries, were fixed in sterling by the English 
authorities a rate of exchange for the dollar had to be prescribed in these 
cases. This need not have been permanent and even had it been so this 
would not have mattered if the public had been willing to reckon in dollars. 
But the population as a whole was familiar with accounting in pounds, 
while the only sections who were accustomed to other monetary units had 
special reasons for thinking in English terms. Most officials were paid 
salaries from England and Commissariat officials had to use accounts to be 
forwarded to England; the mercantile community was primarily engaged in 
dealing with goods imported from England. To this public reluctance to 
adopt dollar reckoning the local government itself contributed by accepting 
tenders in terms of pounds and fixing fees, tolls and the like in the same 
unit, and by unnecessarily fixing a value in shillings on the dollar when 
tendered for bills on the Treasury.  
“A Fixed and Uniform Medium of Exchange” 
   By the beginning of 1825 the British Treasury had reached definite 
conclusions100 on the need for “introducing a fixed and uniform medium of 
exchange for all transactions connected with the public service, in the place 
of the various fluctuating and anomalous currencies which have been 
created under the pressure of temporary emergency, or with views of local 
and peculiar expediency, in many of these colonies and possessions during 
the war, and which have been productive of much private and public 
inconvenience”. Moreover, the coin most widely used, the Spanish dollar, 
was scarcer and the troops were justifiably complaining of being paid 
dollars at rates which effectively reduced their pay. The appropriate 
remedy was held to be the circulation of British silver and copper coin, 
provided it was convertible on demand into British gold coin through the 
medium of Commissariat bills. The seignorage on these coins would 
restrict export to a foreign country and the right to exchange such coin for 
a bill on the Treasury would eliminate any return of coin to England itself. 
The proposal was thus for a sterling-exchange standard with British coins 
in local circulation.101  
   To effect this the Treasury proposed two main steps. Supplies of coin 
were to be shipped to the various colonies; and after arrival such coin was 
to be exchangeable for bills on the Treasury at the fixed rate of £103 of 
coin for a bill of £100, this rate being based upon an estimate of “the 
expense and risk” of re-export of coin to Britain. Recognizing, however, 
that sufficient supplies of coin could not be provided all at once, and that 
Commissariat expenditure might exceed the amount of bills which 
colonists would buy at the fixed rate, the Treasury provided for a restricted 
use of foreign coins. When British coin for Commissariat payments was 
insufficient, Spanish dollars might be disbursed, “invariably” at 4s. 4d., 
and other foreign silver coins at rates proportionate to their silver content. 
In obtaining these the Commissariat was to sell bills by tender at the 
highest rate obtainable; and it was to limit the need to resort to such coins 
by reserving the option to pay contractors by either British coin or 
Treasury bills at the fixed rate. At the same time all existing contracts were 
to be left undisturbed.102 An Order-in-Council gave legal force to the 
valuation of the Spanish dollar at 4s. 4d.,103 and in addition prescribed that 
British copper should be legal tender up to one shilling.104  
   Before any direct instructions in these terms reached New South Wales 
the content of these documents had become public knowledge,105 and 
certain preliminary measures were taken. Duties were made payable in 
Spanish dollars at 4s. 4d. instead of the 5s. rate ordered in May,106 and the 
Commissariat announced its intention to receive and pay the dollar at 4s. 
4d. from 25 December 1825 in New South Wales,107 and from 25 March 
1826 in Tasmania.108 The colonists were thus prepared for the 
implementing of the specific orders a few weeks later. Bathurst's 
instructions,109 enclosing the Order-in-Council and Treasury Minute, did 
little more than stress the essential points and call upon Brisbane to execute 
them. As it happened, however, the arrival of this despatch coincided with 
the replacement of Brisbane by Darling as governor of New South 
Wales,110 and the separation of Tasmania.111 The consequence was that the 
instructions were interpreted in divergent senses in the two colonies and 
the elimination of the dollar system achieved by different routes.  
New South Wales Abandons the Dollar 
   Abolition of the dollar system involved three steps, apart from the 
introduction of a fixed price for bills on the Treasury: elimination of dollar 
accounting, of “currency” reckoning, and of the dollar itself. On 17 
December 1825 £30,000 of the promised silver coin arrived112 in crowns, 
half-crowns, shillings and sixpences.113 Accordingly Darling advertised the 
Order-in-Council and Treasury circular and, by General Order,114 declared 
the manner of their local application. Bills on the British Treasury would 
be sold at £103 of British coin for a £100 bill, this being the minimum 
amount; dollars would be received and paid in all government transactions 
as 4s. 4d. “sterling” and the Sicca rupee as 2s. 1d.; and government 
accounts were to be kept in “sterling”, all these changes taking effect on 1 
January 1826.  
   The initial reaction to these measures was slight. Generally the change 
appears to have been welcomed and the Gazette's dutiful aspirations115 
shared by the colonists:  
   Our medium will no longer be of mutable and fluctuating value; it will be 
fixed; the same tomorrow as today, next quarter as this quarter, next year as 
this year. The value of property will consequently be steadier. The 
premium of 3 per cent being little more than nominal, we may be said to 
have a sterling medium. Our accounts will no longer be liable to 
complexity, but will be much simplified; the time and patience now 
consumed in calculations of premiums and fractions of premiums will be 
saved. Our pecuniary transactions with the Mother Country will be simple 
and more definite.  
   By the time the general order was published most dollar prices, tested by 
sampling Sydney Gazette advertisements, had disappeared. But the dollar 
continued to circulate as 5s. “currency” and most prices were in those 
terms, while the government's willingness to accept dollars and rupees at 
fixed “sterling” rates kept their values stable, as did payment for supplies 
and acceptance in sales of other than Treasury bills at the same rates by the 
Commissariat.116 The accounts of the Bank of New South Wales continued 
to be mainly in dollars: dollar bills were discounted,117 dollar deposits were 
retained and “sterling” deposits newly opened could be operated upon in 
“sterling” or dollars (at 4s. 4d.).118 In February 1826 notes in pounds were 
first re-issued,119 but the bank's own accounts were still in dollars,120 
dividends were declared in dollars,121 and a new issue of dollar notes was 
made.122 Private accounting was thus in a muddle, involving two scales of 
reckoning in pounds and two corresponding values for the dollar, as well as 
reckoning in dollars simply, with “currency” accounting predominant.123 
Rupees, which had appeared in numbers at the end of 1825, were 2s. Id. 
“sterling” and 2s. 6d. “currency”, and at least one petty banker, Barnett 
Levey, issued rupee notes.124 Few, even of its own members, paid attention 
to the Chamber of Commerce's recommendation to adopt “sterling” 
reckoning and treat the dollar as bullion of fluctuating value.125 There was a 
hint of worse confusion to come when a forger of a note for dollars was 
acquitted on the plea that dollars were not money in New South Wales.126  
   In July 1826 Darling put “an extinguisher on the hopes of the currency 
mongers”127 with the Currency Act128 which he explained as designed to 
promote the circulation of British money.129 This had been hampered by a 
number of factors. The banks130 continued to issue small notes, the Bank of 
New South Wales having re-issued five-shilling ones in May,131 and British 
coin was hoarded by them because it was the only means of buying bills on 
the Treasury.132 For the same reason all individuals with payments to make 
to government paid dollars so that the government disbursed British coin, 
receiving only dollars, while the British money went direct to the 
Commissariat for bills on the Treasury, not passing into general 
circulation. Accordingly, Darling argued, bank notes under £1 should be 
prohibited and dollars reduced to bullion status, when “the necessity, 
which everyone will feel, when dollars are considered only as bullion, to 
possess change, will keep the British coin in circulation. Those who have 
bank notes in their possession and have occasion for smaller sums or 
change, will demand from the bank coin in exchange for their notes so that 
the banks will find it impossible to hoard or retain the coin.”133  
   The act repealed the Dollar Act (5 Geo. IV, No. 1) and went on to 
provide that, where any future contract should specify Spanish dollars “as 
money”, they should be taken as legally equivalent to 4s. 4d. “sterling”. 
This might have created a double monetary standard by setting a fixed 
legal ratio between the dollar and “sterling” but such was avoided by a 
proviso that contracts might specify dollars “as merchandise”, which left 
the way open for the “currency” valuation of 5s. Notes or any other 
negotiable securities under the value of 20s. were prohibited,134 and copper 
coins were made legal tender up to one shilling. The New South Wales act 
thus differed from the Tasmanian in not prohibiting dollar securities and in 
not making the dollar legal tender, merely providing a value for 
interpreting contracts.135 On the other hand, the continued government 
acceptance at 4s. 4d. “sterling” stabilized its value. Darling had also 
expressed the view that “government should require the payment of all 
dues and debts to the public being made in money of sterling 
denomination”, and during 1826 this was temporarily adopted.136 “Sterling 
money”, said the Gazette “is beginning to show itself in current 
transactions. Others, beside merchants, are at length gratified with the 
privilege of handling the British coin.”137  
   Meanwhile one unintended result of the arrival of British coin was a 
large export of dollars. Having this British coin, the Commissariat was 
temporarily in no need of drawing bills which could only be demanded by 
those who had British coin. This coin was paid out to the troops and to 
government suppliers, but some time elapsed before it could come into the 
hands of those who needed bills.138 In addition to short-term hoarding by 
prospective bill-buyers, administrative necessity required that the Military 
Chest and local Treasury should hold substantial average amounts. 
Moreover, British coin was dispersed more widely than the dollar as a 
result of paying troops and government employees in the interior in British 
silver; it thus replaced not so much dollars as private paper issues, 
especially “orders”. A change of currency, if it were not to involve 
disturbance, would need to be achieved by relating the rate of injection of 
the new to the rate of with-drawal of the old. In this case the withdrawal of 
dollars was much more rapid than the supply of British coin. Lacking bills, 
Merchants shipped dollars, $30,000 by the Triton and $25,000 by the 
Caudry as early as February 1826.139 Those who could get bills were able 
to resell them for dollars (at 5s.) at 27 per cent premium and holders of 
British coin could get a dollar plus 9 per cent for every 4s. 4d.140 Brisbane 
“with his accustomed consideration” for the “urgent demand of the 
merchants” ordered all civil salaries to be paid in the British coin,141 but 
this was of little avail. Two ships alone carried away $100,000 in May and 
“every vessel that has lately left port has gone off with more or less 
dollars”.142 Even “a rage for drawing private bills on the Mother 
Country”143 failed to fill the gap and the Gazette announced dolefully “the 
quantity of silver specie is reduced to a mere sound . . . we may consider 
there's an end to dollars as our circulating medium”.144  
   Here was the proximate cause of the 1826 crisis which centred around 
the embarrassments of the Bank of New South Wales.145 These were only a 
dollar crisis on a superficial view and in the present connection the 
principal relevant point is that one condition imposed by the governor in 
making aid available was that the bank should return to “sterling” 
accounting.146 Only bills in pounds were discountable after June 1826,147 its 
dollar notes were later withdrawn and replaced by notes in pounds,148 
while, after some hesitation, the bank adopted the government valuation of 
the dollar as 4s. 4d. “sterling”.149 In September all accounts were 
transferred to a “sterling” basis.150 The example was followed by the 
Waterloo Company and other firms, some of whom also adopted 4s. 4d. 
“sterling” as the basis for pricing.151 But the typical accounting was still in 
“currency”, co-ordinated with an acceptance of the dollar as 5s.  
   The next step taken by the government concerned “holey” dollars and 
dumps. Their status had been left in doubt until in October 1826 the 
Commissariat commenced accepting and paying “holey” dollars as 3s. 3d. 
which fixed the general “sterling” valuation.152 In September 1828 these 
Macquarie coins were called up in exchange for Treasury bills at the fixed 
rates of 3s. 3d. and 1s. 1d. respectively,153 in pursuit of Darling's desire “to 
get rid of the dollar”.154  
   But this general objective could not be achieved so long as the 
government itself underpinned the system by accepting dollars as 4s. 4d. 
These continued to be the commonest coin in circulation. A few people 
still quoted prices in dollars,155 the courts occasionally imposed dollar 
fines,156 while most sellers charged “currency” prices,157 a number specified 
the dollar as acceptable as 5s.,158 and some advertised “currency for cash, 
sterling if booked”159 Wages were almost universally “currency”. The 
Australian160 might well complain of “hesitating delays, half-measures, 
subversion of all order in dealings, and in accounts, vexatious intricacies in 
merchants' books”.  
   By August 1829 when £55,000 in British coin had been imported since 
1825 by the government161 and another £20,000 was expected, the time was 
deemed ripe for the next major step. It was ordered162 that from 15 August 
1829 no foreign coins should be received in official payments and that the 
call-up of “holey” dollars and dumps would finally terminate on 30 
September. Two months later the colonists learned the reason, the expected 
arrival of £20,000 in British coin, and the dollar fell to 4s. “sterling”, the 
rupee to 2s. “currency”.163 The fall was inevitable in any case once the 
government refused acceptance, for a local merchant had had shipped to 
him by a client in India sixteen chests of dollars and rupees with 
instructions to convert into sterling. Finding direct exchange unprofitable 
he hit on the idea of discounting bills in terms of “sterling” at less than the 
rate charged by the banks. The sudden injection of such large sums of 
coins which the government had just refused to receive was followed, on 
the news of the impending British shipment, by an abrupt fall in value.164 
 
   There followed a battle of public meetings and a spate of newspaper 
arguments. The Chamber of Commerce165 reiterated its 1826 view that 
dollars and rupees should have no fixed local values, but a public meeting 
of shopkeepers three days later declared for a valuation of the dollar at 4s. 
2d., the rupee at 1s. 9d. and the dump at 1s. o1/2d. “sterling”, pledging 
themselves to reduce their “currency” prices 15 per cent to ensure which a 
watching committee of fifteen was set up.166 But many shopkeepers 
adhered to the 5s. “currency” value;167 others reduced the rate at which they 
took the dollar, while maintaining the old nominal prices.168 An anonymous 
advertiser summoned a meeting to proclaim dual values for the dollar and 
rupee,169 the shopkeepers re-assembled and re-asserted their policy, while 
the Chamber of Commerce had a change of heart, voting for the dollar at 
5s.170  
   The reason for this last reversal was the reaction of wage-earners to being 
paid the old wages in the now depreciated dollar, the compositors of the 
Australian opening the campaign with one of the first strikes recorded in 
the colony.171 Against this threat all factions united. The Chamber of 
Commerce urged employers to pay men dollars at 5s. and supply them with 
goods at “currency” prices; the shopkeepers, while clinging tenaciously to 
their 4s. 2d. valuation, agreed on the necessity to lower prices 
proportionately and avoid any increase in wages,172 the Gazette, which had 
clamoured for the abolition of “currency”, declared173 that “on no principle 
of equity can the labouring classes feel themselves entitled to demand a 
pound sterling in wages for every four dollars they had previously 
received.”174 The workers continued to organize and won higher wages,175 
while the public debate ran hotter, the contestants ranging themselves 
either for a 5s. valuation of the dollar or recognition of it only as a foreign 
coin of fluctuating value.176 In the midst of the dispute the governor 
republished all the despatches, proclamations, acts and orders relating to 
the introduction of “sterling”,177 and the colonists accepted the hint, the 
more willingly because it had been realized that in Tasmania and Mauritius 
dollars were still worth 4s. 4d. “sterling”.178 In Sydney 4s. 2d. became the 
predominant valuation although some shops still accepted the dollar as 5s. 
“currency”, but “currency” reckoning, while it did not disappear for a 
while, declined rapidly.179 The rupee, having fallen to 1s. 9d. and even 1s. 
6d., had disappeared to Tasmania where it was legal tender for 2s. 1d.180  
   The newly stabilized value for the dollar was shortlived. In August 1830 
a conference of merchants resolved to accept it at 4s. only,181 which 
remained the valuation during the half-dozen years the coin continued to 
circulate.182 With much grumbling183 the colonists acquiesced in the new 
status of the dollar. Before the collapse of the 5s. valuation, while the 
government still accepted the dollar and maintained the only important 
exchange rate fixed, adjustment to changes in the balance of payments 
appears to have come mainly via local prices; after 1829, with the general 
adoption of “sterling” accounting, changes in the value of silver abroad 
affected the local price of the dollar directly and led to its export as the 
volume of commodity imports to be paid for grew. The dollar had come to 
rank locally as bullion, with a fluctuating price, and was exported 
whenever the need for remittance made it profitable to send it to countries 
which maintained a fixed value, particularly Mauritius and Tasmania. “The 
dollars, holey dollars and dumps are making their exit fast.”184  
   The process was assisted by the steady inflow of British coin, mainly as 
the result of private import of capital,185 particularly after the advent of the 
Bank of Australasia. By 1835 the Bluebook reported that dollars “are but 
very few now in the colony”, and in 1836 it did not record them at all.  
   Meanwhile the last necessary legal provision had been made in 1832 by 
enacting186 that all the old acts and orders imposing fines and penalties in 
dollars should be construed as if they specified sterling money at 4s. 4d. 
per dollar. The banks had refused to accept dollars at all in 1830,187 and 
notes and bills in terms of dollars disappeared in the same year since they 
were no longer acceptable for discount,188 while the government policy of 
paying all officials in country districts in British coin eliminated the dollar 
there.189 Final export of the dollar was delayed by Bourke's fear of a 
shortage of coin in the Commissariat which, by 1832, was finding 
difficulty in selling its bills at 11/2 per cent premium,190 because other 
means of remittance could be obtained more cheaply. Accordingly he 
intervened, ordering the retention of dollars which the Commissariat had 
been instructed to ship to England.191 But the risk did not appear and, by 
1834, Bourke was arranging for their disposal to merchants trading with 
China at 4s. 4d. each.192 Thereafter the dollar was merely a casual alien 
visitor, leaving behind it nothing more than “the Spanish” as current slang 
for ready cash, as “the dumps” had been in the 'twenties.  
Transfer to Sterling in Tasmania 
   From the beginning of 1826 the story of monetary developments in 
Tasmania is different in many respects from that of New South Wales, 
partly because of differences of interpretation of the new British policy, 
partly because shipments of English coin were much smaller. In 
compliance with the Treasury instructions a government order193 declared 
that from 1 April 1826 all government receipts and payments would be 
reckoned in “sterling”, Spanish dollars being received and paid as 4s. 4d. 
and Calcutta or Sicca rupees as 2s. 1d. This difference from New South 
Wales may have been due to the fact that only small amounts of British 
coin had been received.194  
   The transfer of private accounting to pounds, shillings and pence was 
accomplished fairly easily. The Hobart Town Gazette market prices soon 
ceased to be quoted in “currency”195 while the Bank of Van Diemen's Land 
announced that it would express all accounts in “sterling” after 1 July.196 In 
making this decision effective it announced that dollars would be treated as 
4s. 4d. but no dollar securities would be dealt in, although depositors might 
choose to have their accounts kept in either dollars or “sterling”.197 Others, 
however, did not realize the way the law would be amended. Eight issuers 
of small notes summoned a meeting to consider the results of these 
changes by the bank and to devise methods of preventing forgery of notes 
for a shilling and sixpence.198 It was resolved199 that from a date to be fixed 
all merchants should take the dollar as 4s. 4d. Since small notes were 
deemed to be still “unavoidably necessary” a committee was appointed to 
report on the subject, and it invited public suggestions. No further details 
are available and it is possible that the government's intention to prohibit 
small notes became known, for many such notes were gradually withdrawn 
in the next few weeks.200 The Tasmanian Bank, opening at the beginning of 
August, issued notes for four dollars,201 while the reversion to English 
reckoning stimulated the private manufacture of one-fifth dollars passing 
as a shilling.202 Meanwhile the Colonial Times attacked the government's 
policy as set forth in the March proclamation. The bullion value of silver, it 
was argued, was sure to fluctuate and unnecessary import and export of 
dollars would be the result. Accordingly it was urged that the dollar should 
carry no fixed local value but (together with dollar notes) should pass at the 
exchange of the day. To ensure a local coinage, not liable to export, some 
dollars should be stamped and these should have a fixed local valuation,203 
a proposal which the Times reiterated was the cure for the endless 
confusion of a “currency” and a “sterling” standard existing side by side 
and both reckoned in pounds, shillings and pence.204 It was in these 
circumstances that Arthur appointed a committee of three to consider “the 
policy of allowing promissory notes for small sums to be issued by the 
Bank of Van Diemen's Land or by individuals”, and “the minimum amount 
of British money required to be maintained as the circulating medium of 
the colony, with a view to its general substitution for Spanish dollars”.205 
These terms of reference imply that someone had thought out the problem 
to the point of seeing that the Spanish dollar could not simply be banished 
without providing a substitute, and that an increase in private notes for 
small sums was likely.  
   The committee reported within a week.206 The first question it answered 
by declaring that small notes had been “productive of great injury and 
inconvenience to the lower classes, owing to the occasional insolvency of 
the issuers and the numerous forgeries”. The issue of any such notes below 
20s. should be prohibited, although limited issues might be authorized 
temporarily since the available coin was inadequate.207 The second problem 
involved an estimate of the need for coin. £10,000 in British silver had 
been received in November 1825 and £8,000 had been issued by the end of 
July 1826. The committee believed that a total of £30,000 was needed and 
that, when all dollars had been exported, £5,000 a year would be lost in 
remittances overseas. Accordingly it proposed obtaining an immediate 
£20,000 in British coin, to be supplemented by an annual import of £5,000 
by government. As a minor measure it was desirable to prohibit note issues 
except in terms of “sterling”.  
   The Committee's recommendations for legislation were adopted. The 
Sterling Money Act of 1826208 repealed the old New South Wales Act (5 
Geo. IV, No. 1) so far as it applied to Tasmania, except in respect of notes 
issued before 9 October 1826. It recited the expediency of a “sterling” 
circulation and reckoning, the need to forbid notes under £1, the common 
use of the dollar as five shillings “currency” and the shortage of British 
silver in Tasmania. In future,209 therefore, all negotiable instruments were 
to be drawn in “sterling”, and those in terms of dollars were to be void. 
British copper coin was to be legal tender for amounts up to one shilling. 
All notes, cheques, orders and the like for sums less than £1 were 
prohibited under penalties ranging from £5 to £20 for each offence. In all 
cases, including government duties and legal penalties, where amounts 
were expressed in the former “nominal or current money” one dollar or 4s. 
4d. “sterling” was to be taken as equivalent to five shillings “currency”. 
But in view of the scarcity of coin the Spanish dollar was declared to be 
money and a legal tender at fixed rates. One dollar should equal 4s. 4d. 
“sterling” and proportionately for fractions.210  
   The Tasmanian Bank replaced its dollar notes at once,211 issuing one-
pound notes, as did Barnes and T. C. Simpson, “petty bankers” of 
Launceston. The Bank of Van Diemen's Land was not so prompt, meeting 
its notes by paying dollars at 4s. 4d. each, but by the end of November it 
had recalled its outstanding dollar notes.212 Small notes of other issuers 
seem to have been withdrawn very rapidly.213 Indeed, the change was so 
rapid that for a short while the depressed conditions of the colony were 
accentuated. Prices had to be readjusted downwards,214 and this did not 
happen smoothly; while the sudden withdrawal of paper money was 
momentarily deflationary. The only independent newspaper, the Colonial 
Times, abruptly changed its views. Whereas it had rejoiced that “the good 
old English system of pounds, shillings and pence”215 should replace the 
“pernicious erection of the dollar system”,216 and explained the depression 
as being due to a period of overtrading followed by inevitable restriction of 
bank loans,217 it now218 asserted that “never was any proceeding attended 
with more ruinous or lamentable consequences than the assumption of a 
sterling circulation in this colony at a time when it was struggling with its 
own difficulties.”219  
   This was, of course, far too simple an explanation of the slump, the 
immediate causes of which were fairly stated by Arthur: “During the year 
1826 the commerce of the Colony suffered a considerable check, the 
natural consequence of two successive bad harvests. The change from 
colonial currency to sterling payments, the annihilation of small paper 
money and the enormous rate of interest demanded by capitalists threw the 
agriculturists and consumers generally back upon their own resources and 
compelled the community to circumscribe their expenses, particularly in 
imported articles of luxury.”220 In any case, in Tasmania conditions were 
far less acute than on the mainland. There were, for example, no banking 
crises; in fact the period saw the opening of a new bank, the Tasmanian, to 
be followed by the Derwent and the Cornwall in 1828 and the Commercial 
Bank in 1829. Their note issues remedied any shortage of cash, except for 
small change, and the success of these ventures is evidence of the fugitive 
nature of the slump. By contrast, after the Bank of Australia, formed before 
the change of monetary standard was effective, New South Wales 
produced only the unimportant and disreputable Bank of Newcastle until 
1834.  
   Within a very short time private reckoning in dollars had disappeared. 
Newspaper advertisements and other references to prices mentioned dollars 
very rarely after 1830 although (as in New South Wales) rewards 
continued to be offered specifically in dollars,221 and even these soon 
disappeared. Because the dollar had a legal value in “sterling” and was 
freely accepted by government there was no transfer to the pound 
“currency” as happened in New South Wales. But, while the unit of 
account became the pound “sterling” almost invariably, Spanish dollars 
and other coins continued to circulate. Besides English coins and Spanish 
dollars there were rupees and doubloons,222 ducats,223 French and South 
American coins and Austrian dollars224 and Mexican dollars.225  
   New supplies of these coins were derived from New South Wales and 
other countries, particularly India. When the rupee fell in value in Sydney 
the Tasmanian press took little notice. The Courier226 reported the Sydney 
disputes on the subject and congratulated the mainlanders on having “so 
much money to contend about”; the Colonial Times227 anticipated that the 
depreciation of the rupee in Sydney would increase Tasmanian exports 
thither. But the Treasurer foresaw trouble and forbade officials to accept 
rupees in payments to government.228 Rupees presently were pouring into 
Tasmania, which maintained a valuation of 2s. 1d. against 1s. 9d. in 
Sydney, until the Courier estimated they were half the coin in 
circulation.229 Local legal tender values counted for little, the banks and 
many others declining to accept these coins as more than 1s. 9d. and in 
some cases even 1s. 6d.230 It was commonly believed that this depreciation 
was deliberately induced so that rupees sent from Sydney were spent in 
Hobart at 1s. 9d., taken back again at 1s. 6d., then re-shipped to Sydney 
where they were valued at 1s. 9d. or to Mauritius where they were worth 
2s. 1d.231 Because large amounts were in fact remitted to Mauritius232 bank 
loans were restricted and private discount rates jumped upwards.233 
Accordingly local merchants combined to accept the rupee as 1s. 9d.,234 and 
the Courier could soon report that the 1s. 9d. valuation had been 
“completely re-established”.235 In doing so it urged the advantages of a 
stable local value for rupees in encouraging retired Anglo-Indians to settle 
in Tasmania. Remittances of capital by these and other residents in India 
were soon contributing to the colony's supply of coin, but in Spanish 
dollars, not in rupees. The effect of the episode, and the Treasury's 
unrepealed order against accepting rupees, made them for some years of 
minor importance.236  
   The circulation of foreign coins and especially the dollar was promoted 
by the limited circulation of British coin. It had been the intention of the 
British Treasury that this should “get into general circulation and gradually 
supersede the circulation of dollars and other foreign coins”,237 but this 
purpose was defeated because British silver was the only means of buying 
bills on the Treasury.238 The banks, therefore, hoarded British coin. They 
offered a premium on deposits of British coin equal to the rate on bills on 
the Treasury;239 exchanged notes and dollars for British coin at 1 per cent 
premium;240 and, as a concession, agreed to cash country cheques for as 
low as £2 in order to reduce the demand for coin.241 Bank-notes and 
cheques were met in dollars (at 4s. 4d. each),242 both the Derwent Bank and 
the Bank of Van Diemen's Land claiming that only the holder of 
government cheques could insist on payment in British coin.243 “You will 
pay all cheques”, wrote Swanston to the Derwent's Launceston agent, “in 
notes of the Derwent Bank, or in dollars, or in notes of the other banks, in 
case of having no other notes, but never in British currency.”244  
   The Commissariat assisted the banks. It occasionally accepted dollars but 
never for bills245 and commonly made its own payments in dollars, British 
coin and bills on the Treasury.246 There was in fact “a sort of trickery or 
management”247 between the Commissariat, the Treasury and the banks, 
particularly the Derwent, a friendly understanding by which the supply of 
bills on the British Treasury was mainly reserved for the banks who then 
resold at a profit. A large part of the supply of British coin thus circulated 
only through two channels—from the banks to the Commissariat in 
exchange for bills and back to the banks as a government deposit.  
   In New South Wales this problem did not arise acutely because of the 
larger government imports of British coin and the growing capital import 
in the form of coin. Tasmania's difficulties, however, were accentuated in 
the early' thirties by an adverse balance of payments, and a consequent 
drain of specie. Recorded merchandise trade showed a large increase in 
imports:248  
    
   The widening gap between imports and exports was no doubt partly due 
to capital import but the export of specie indicates clearly that “invisible” 
items did not account for the whole divergence. In June 1832 bills on 
England were at 5 per cent premium249 and specie began to be exported 
until, so the Courier claimed, no English money was left in circulation at 
all.250 The banks were forced to curtail loans and the causes of the “crisis”, 
the balance of payments and remedies, became subjects of vigorous 
discussion. Plans, of unspecified nature, for reducing imports and 
promoting exports, were called for;251 laws against usury were demanded;252 
the banks were attacked for restricting loans;253 the government was blamed 
for locking up money in the Treasury and in the Commissariat Chest;254 
“absentee capitalists” and the “gigantic unmerciful grasp” of the Van 
Diemen's Land Company were held to be the villains.255  
   A plan for retaining dollars by cutting them received scant attention;256 as 
did a plan by John Dunn for a national bank; a scheme, originating with J. 
T. Gellibrand, for a government mortgage bank, which should borrow in 
London; and another for a special issue of government bonds.257 All of 
these, except the first, had one common theme—the simple solution of 
compensating a loss of money by an increase in money. Without some co-
Imports Exports
1829 £272,189 £127,184
1830 255,298 145,980
1831 298,774 141,745
1832 392,666 157,906
1833 352,894 152,967
1834 476,617 203,522
ordinated control of imports the only effect would have been a temporary 
deferring of the restriction of imports which was being enforced by the 
contraction of bank lending.  
   More success attended the move by a large group of Hobart merchants 
and bankers who, in August 1834, petitioned for the legalizing of other 
foreign coins than the Spanish dollar.258 By chance this was presented a few 
weeks before the receipt of despatches concerning the British Treasury 
policy in relation to South American and similar dollars. The Treasury, 
having verified that South American dollars were not inferior in weight and 
fineness to the Spanish dollar, directed Arthur to provide by proclamation 
that these should be legal tender on a par with Spanish dollars and should 
be received and paid in all government transactions.259 Arthur promptly 
declared by proclamation260 that, from 1 December 1834, “all dollars 
whatsoever of the several South American states will be received and 
issued in this colony in the departments of the Commissariat and colonial 
Treasury and shall otherwise pass current as money” at the value of 4s. 4d. 
But he went further, and established a committee to investigate whether the 
Sicca rupee and United States dollar should be legalized.261  
   The Committee's evidence262 consisted of a collection of opinions, eleven 
for and two against legalizing rupees,263 and the majority opinion was 
accepted, the report favouring legalizing the Sicca rupee at a local 
valuation of 2s.264 on two grounds. First there was a deficiency of British 
coin, because it was mainly held by the banks and the Commissariat. 
Second, legalizing the rupee would promote trade with India.265 United 
States dollars were rejected since the Committee did not expect trade with 
that country to develop.266 The governor adopted these recommendations 
and introduced the Sicca Rupee bill,267 which had a rapid passage.268 It was 
a simple measure declaring the Sicca rupee legal tender in Tasmania as 
2s.269  
   The relief, however, was only temporary and early in 1836 the old 
difficulties recurred in new forms. After February bills on the Treasury 
were sold in Sydney at par270 while in Hobart they were at 11/2 per cent 
premium.271 Accordingly the Bank of Australasia shipped large amounts of 
British coin to Sydney to take advantage of the more favourable rate.272 The 
result was to leave the Commissariat and the colonial Treasury short of 
coin, forcing them to pay contractors with bills on the Treasury. Paid at 
11/2 per cent premium these could only be cashed at the banks at par.273 As 
an emergency measure bills were issued at par, and the Commissariat 
directed to pay contractors cash only,274 while a committee was appointed 
to inquire “into the present state of the currency of the colony, and . . . 
whether any derangement of the circulating medium has taken place of 
such a nature as to call for the interference of the legislature”.275 
 
   The committee found the Bank of Australasia to be the source of the 
trouble, while conceding that others too were exporting coin.276 More 
important than the export of British coin to Sydney was the fact that the 
bank had eliminated the Commissariat from the bill market by selling its 
own bills at par for rupees and dollars. The Commissariat had thus been 
forced to restrict specie payments to amounts under £100, giving bills for 
larger sums. These, paid at par since 18 June, had become an important 
part of the colony's currency, circulating at a discount. To protect the 
holders and to save contractors from loss, as well as to replace the coin 
exported, the committee proposed to make bills on the British Treasury 
legal tender.277  
   Momentarily the government accepted this plan and passed the Treasury 
Bill act,278 which for two years empowered the governor to issue a 
proclamation making bills on the Treasury legal tender for a period of six 
months. But second thoughts prevailed and no proclamation appears ever 
to have been issued.279 For this the Colonial Treasurer seems to have been 
responsible, in spite of his having been chairman of the committee, for he 
took the initiative in suggesting the plan in fact adopted of directing the 
Commissariat to sell bills for all legally circulating coins.280 Before the act 
was through the Council the Commissariat had announced its willingness 
to sell at par and for any coins which were local legal tender, not only bills 
on the British Treasury but also bills on the Sydney Commissariat, thus 
eliminating any need for specie exports to Sydney.281 This was a fortunate 
decision, for at the same time Glenelg was circularizing colonial governors 
directing them to hold for royal sanction all legislation “relating to the 
local currency and circulating medium; or to the rates at which coins 
should pass current, or be a legal tender, or to the circulation of promissory 
notes, or other paper, either by the local government or by any corporate 
bodies, or by individuals”.282 The disallowance of the Sicca Rupee act 
followed automatically and the local Treasury agreed to buy in Sicca 
rupees at 2s. for one month.283 But the practice of selling bills for “current 
legalized coin” and of making Commissariat payments in the same way 
continued.284  
   But difficulties were not at an end. During 1838 the Union Bank 
transferred capital to Tasmania in Mexican dollars, paying them out at 4s. 
4d. and later refusing them in deposit, while the Derwent Bank found itself 
embarrassed by deposits of coins which it had taken at 4s. 4d. and could 
not pay out at that rate.285 Pressure from that bank286 led Franklin to forget 
his answer to Glenelg's instructions concerning currency legislation,287 and 
an act was passed to remedy an apparent defect in the dollar proclamation 
of 1834 which had not specifically mentioned Mexico, by placing Mexican 
dollars on the same footing as the Spanish dollar.288 A new difficulty arose 
two years later with the appearance of some Mexican dollars inferior in 
weight and fineness to the Spanish dollar. Lawrence, Launceston manager 
of the Bank of Australasia, took the opportunity to move for the repeal of 
all the dollar legislation.289 Instead, an amending act290 restricted the 
previous act to dollars of the same silver content as the Spanish.291  
   The final legislative move was stimulated by protests, sharpened by the 
conditions of depression in 1842, against the banks which, to bring bills on 
the Treasury,292 met their notes in dollars while hoarding British coin. It 
was therefore deemed expedient that dollars of any kind “should no longer 
circulate under the sanction of the law at any fixed rate”, and that, while 
they might still circulate, they should not be legal tender.293 In a single 
short measure294 all previous legislation making dollars of any kind legal 
tender was swept away.295  
   The dollar, however, did not disappear at once. Franklin instructed the 
Treasury to buy up all dollars offered at 4s. 4d. until 1 November 1842,296 
and both it and private firms were able to dispose of such dollars, mainly to 
those trading with China.297 After that date the banks agreed between 
themselves dollars should be accepted as 4s. only.298 Nevertheless some 
dollars remained at 4s. together with the survivors of Macquarie's “holey” 
dollars at 3s. and dumps at 1s., rupees at 1s. 6d.; in 1847 French five and 
one franc pieces made a fleeting appearance.299 In September 1848 the 
bànks declined to accept any of these coins except dollars but for some 
days the exception was not realized,300 and the episode finally destroyed the 
acceptability of dollars. By 1849 the Bluebook could report that only 
British coins were in circulation; the last remains of the dollar system had 
been interred.301  
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Chapter 7 Boom and Slump in the 'Twenties 
   THE 'twenties opened with New South Wales clearly going through a 
rapid transition from paternal convictism to capitalism. The story of this 
emergent capitalism is yet to be told; it took the form of the first business 
boom and slump the colony had yet experienced.1 When Macquarie left, 
that boom was getting under way, carrying the scale and range of private 
enterprise to the point where, far from being an appendage of the gaol, 
dependent upon it for market, labour supply and land, it was increasingly 
in conflict with it, until by the end of the decade it was evident that private 
enterprise was destroying the gaol as it created a new capitalist community. 
The dominant theme of the boom, as of that of the 'thirties, was pastoral 
expansion financed by capital import. Quantitative measurement of even 
the main aspects of the process is impossible, for the available statistical 
material is scanty and its meaning frequently questionable.2 But the main 
contours of the movement are clear.  
   From 1818 onwards pastoral settlement had been spreading beyond the 
mountains in the Bathurst and Goulburn districts and in the Hunter valley 
from 1822; squatters were further afield reaching out to the Murrumbidgee 
River in the south-west and to the Macleay River in the north,3 and from 
October 1824 land sales opened a new form of investment.4 Population was 
growing, from 13,300 in 1815 to 25,300 in 1820 and 33,500 in 1825,5 of 
whom an increasing proportion were free.6 The advertising columns of the 
Sydney Gazette and the Hobart Town Gazette testify to a rapid expansion 
of the number and variety of business establishments. The expansion was 
fed by capital import, the dimensions of which can only be roughly 
indicated.7 Trade figures have a wide margin of error, but the gap between 
imports and exports was so wide that no amount of error can affect the 
immediate inference of very heavy capital import.  
    
   A major form of capital import was British expenditure on the 
maintenance of a gaol. Bills drawn by the Commissariat were:8  
IMPORTS AND EXPORTS, 1824–27 
Year NSW Imports NSW Exports NSW Import Surplus Tas Imports Tas Exports Tas Import Surplus
1824 — — — £62,000 £14,500 £47,500
1825 — — — 88,161 23,837 64,324
1826 £360,000 £106,500 £253,400 99,747 44,498 55,249
1827 362,324 76,314 286,010 152,627 59,902 92,725
1819 .. £129,499 1823 .. £95,828
1820 .. 181,376 1824 .. 199,112
1821 .. 166,315 1825 .. 170,899
   Private capital import was managed in one of three forms. To a small 
extent immigrants carried British coin, Bank of England notes or, when 
forewarned of the local monetary situation, Spanish dollars. Many 
deposited funds with English agents and drew bills against these funds. 
Many invested their capital in goods which they hoped, or were advised, 
were readily saleable in the colony.9 With the formation of the Australian 
Agricultural Company capitalized at £1 million and of the Van Diemen's 
Land Company, private capital import reached a new high level.10  
   Their appearance brought local enthusiasm for pastoral expansion to its 
peak, the more so as the colonists saw in the Australian Agricultural 
Company an insatiable buyer of stock. Lang11 vividly described the stock 
speculation as he saw it in January 1826: “barristers and attornies; military 
officers of every rank and civil officers of every department; clergymen 
and medical men; merchants, settlers and dealers in general were there 
[Sydney cattle market] seen promiscuously mingled together every 
Thursday, and outbidding each other in the most determined manner, either 
in their own persons, or by proxies of certified agricultural character, for 
the purchase of every scabbed sheep or scare-crow horse, or buffalo cow 
that was offered for sale in the colony”. Loans of the Bank of New South 
Wales rose from £23,577 at the end of 1820 to £42,553 in May 1825 and 
then raced upward to £67,493 by the end of the year and on to a peak of 
£95,408 in May 1826. “The Country is Infinitely Beyond the Grasp of the 
New South Wales Bank”12  
   This was a situation in which the Bank of New South Wales could not 
hope to remain unchallenged. Even its rapid expansion could not satisfy 
would-be borrowers, and capitalists itching to draw tribute from the boom 
were not prepared to leave the banking field to it. The Bank itself was 
unwilling to make large additions to its capital, contenting itself with an 
increase to £40,000 with a limit on holdings of ten shares.13 It was not 
disturbed by the appearance of its first Sydney competitor, the Waterloo 
Company, nor by the loss, through the opening of the Bank of Van 
Diemen's Land, of the possibility that it might have expanded to Tasmania.  
   The Waterloo Company passed by various names. Having begun 
operations as a flour mill under the firm name of Hutchinson Terry & Co., 
it added note issue (in terms of dollars) to its activities in June 182214 under 
the name of the “Waterloo Company”.15 By 1824 control had passed to 
Terry & Cooper,16 although Hutchinson retained a one-third interest until 
1825 when he sold out to Daniel Cooper and Solomon Levey.17 Thereafter 
the business was usually known by the title of Cooper & Levey, although 
its notes, from May 1826 in “sterling”,18 were water-marked “Waterloo 
1822 .. 229,826
Company”,19 and even in the 'fifties the place of business was known as the 
Waterloo Warehouse. In addition to the issue of notes the firm accepted 
deposits20 but banking activities were never more than a sideline. Its 
interests had become very widespread, ranging through the keeping of a 
general store, importing, shipowning and squatting. The firm's note issue, 
never more than a few thousand pounds, was greatly reduced in 1831 
because of a run caused by an entirely innocent trip to Tasmania by 
Cooper. The holders thought he was absconding.21 In 1833 Solomon Levey 
died in London,22 and by the terms of the partnership its affairs were wound 
up one year later.23 Its notes were still in circulation,24 but when the 
business was reorganized as “Cooper, Holt & Roberts” all connection with 
banking was dropped.25 With it went the last important example in Sydney 
of a merchant's establishment in which banking was a department.26  
   The first open move for the Bank of Van Diemen's Land was in July 
1823 when a meeting resolved on the formation of the bank for an initial 
seven years and a subsequent meeting completed the plan, fixing the 
capital at $40,000 in shares of $200 each, 70 shares being reserved for the 
Launceston district. Sorell (who later claimed credit for initiating the whole 
thing) promised to solicit a charter from Brisbane in Sydney.27 Within two 
months the charter had been approved and the promoters were busily at 
work, collecting subscriptions, seeking staff and premises and securing 
directors.28 Opening day was 15 March 1824.29  
   The charter30 listed 73 shareholders, the majority of them merchants and 
storekeepers of Hobart. It confirmed the capital arrangements (although it 
referred occasionally to pounds instead of dollars),31 incorporated the 
company for a period of seven years, prohibited the bank engaging in trade 
or “in any kind of agency for the buying and selling of public securities”, 
restricting its activities to the conventional banking activities of discount, 
deposit and note issue. Notes might be as small as $1/4 or as large as $100. 
Discount rate was not to exceed 10 per cent. Liability of shareholders as a 
unit was unlimited (but liability of individuals was to be proportionate to 
holdings) for all loans in excess of subscribed capital.32 It does not seem 
that the validity of the charter was ever publicly questioned, but when that 
of the Bank of New South Wales had finally to be abandoned, the Bank of 
Van Diemen's Land was discreetly notified and took the necessary legal 
steps to acquire recognition as a joint stock company as from 1 January 
1828,33 using the charter as the basis of its deed of settlement,34 except for 
the necessity of securing a local act to enable it to sue and be sued in the 
name of its managing director.35  
   As the boom developed and the demand for capital grew, the formation 
of a second bank in New South Wales was only a matter of time. The 
occasion was the declaration in January 1826 by the Bank of New South 
Wales of a dividend at the rate of 531/2 per cent per annum.36 A small 
group moved swiftly—its plans were partly known the next week37 —and 
by late February the main conditions were determined: capital £100,000 in 
£100 shares, £10 payable on allotment.38 Little publicity was given to its 
later steps. The press was refused information as to its meetings,39 but it 
soon became clear that there would be no public offer of shares. Three 
hundred shares had been reserved for the public but all were taken by the 
original promoters,40 the “monopolists” as the Australian called them.41 It 
was said that barely ten merchants secured shares, one-third going to 
government officials and half to “settlers”, i.e., pastoralists.42 Undisturbed 
by the clamour, the promoters proceeded with their plans, completed a 
deed of settlement,43 elected directors,44 and made a second call of £8 per 
share.45 Opening was delayed, but the bank finally began business on 3 July 
1826.46  
   The exclusiveness of the promoters of the Bank of Australia precipitated 
a plan for a new bank, the Sydney Commercial Bank47 amongst investors, 
many of them shareholders in the Bank of New South Wales who could not 
secure Australia shares. “The Bank of Australia . . . was so quickly filled 
up with its thousand shares, that there was no opening left for any decent 
or respectable looking man to get in edgeways.”48 On 27 February 1826, 
five days after the inaugural meeting of the Bank of Australia, circulars 
were ordered at 3 p.m. for a meeting at 7. Printing was completed by 5, and 
a large group assembled to endorse the plan which provided for a capital of 
£100,000 in £50 shares, it being forecast that only £20,000 would actually 
be needed. Despite legal doubts raised, it was promised that liability would 
be limited to the amount of shareholding.49 Six hundred shares were 
reported as taken by the end of the week,50 but already there was talk of the 
new bank being absorbed by the Bank of New South Wales,51 a discreet 
way of describing pressure from that bank on those of its shareholders who 
were involved. At first they stood firm,52 but when the Bank of New South 
Wales proprietors met on 18 March it became clear that a bargain had been 
struck and that “the Sydney Bank has almost if not entirely met with 
annihilation . . . Many of the contemplated proprietors of the new bank 
were large shareholders in the old Bank [of New South Wales] and it was 
astonishing to see with what calmness these gentlemen suffered themselves 
to be abused and contemned . . . The Sydney Bank proprietors were given 
to understand that not above ten of them possessed means adequate to the 
formation of a third bank; and that their presumption was by no means of a 
trifling description when they could venture on the proposal of terms to 
that venerable institution—the Bank of New South Wales”. The terms of 
the bargain were, in effect, stated by one of the speakers who proposed an 
increase in capital from £30,000 to £100,000 with four additional directors. 
But the meeting would only go so far as to resolve on the full payment of 
capital, to agree that it was “expedient to increase as soon as practicable, 
the number of proprietors”, and to this end “that a bye-law be framed to 
subdivide the 300 shares created by the charter into tenths; these tenths, or 
so much of them as the proprietors are willing to part with, be thrown open 
to the public and sold publicly or privately at the option of the 
proprietors.”53  
   The Sydney Bank shareholders were, not unnaturally, dissatisfied and 
made known their intention of proceeding as soon as the transfer to the 
“sterling” standard was complete.54 They were enabled to come to terms 
with the Bank of New South Wales because, with the first signs of 
temporary deflation created by the transfer to “sterling”, that bank had to 
secure additional funds and for the same reason shareholders repented of 
their endorsement of calls on existing shares.55 The compromise was 
abandonment of the second and third calls, deferment of the first call to 1 
May and an application to the governor for an amendment to the charter to 
permit the creation of an additional 700 shares for sale to the public.56 The 
application was duly made, but without immediate result, for the governor 
raised questions as to the validity of the charter and referred the matter to 
England.57 Whether the Sydney Bank shareholders would have been 
prepared to wait is not recorded; within a matter of days all thought of 
creating a new bank was swept away by public knowledge of the acute 
embarrassment of the Bank of New South Wales and no more is heard of 
the Sydney Bank.58  
   The Bank of New South Wales was quicker to respond to the threat of 
real competition from the Bank of Australia. With that Bank barely 
conceived, a general meeting rushed through a reduction in the rate of 
discount from 10 to 8 per cent, established two discount days instead of 
one, and discussed a more liberal lending policy without making definite 
decisions about it.59 The Bank of Australia necessarily met the new 
discount rate when it commenced operations,60 but the Bank of New South 
Wales lost deposits (and therefore cash) heavily to the new competitor as 
shareholders paid up subscriptions, and its new deposits claimed cash at 
clearing. More serious was the heavy and rapid drain of dollars throughout 
April as a result of the foreign exchange crisis.61 The bank was forced to 
proceed very cautiously with discounts,62 and to meet notes and deposits in 
Store receipts, which led to a wild rumour that it had stopped payment.63 
Despite a public declaration by the proprietors of “the solvency and 
stability” of the bank, weakened by the announcement of no discounting of 
dollar bills,64 the situation was desperate and the bank was forced to apply 
to the government for a loan of £20,000 in specie to determine which 
Darling directed an immediate inquiry into the bank's affairs.65 “Very 
Improvident . . . Very Unsafe and Improper”66  
   The Board of Inquiry made a rapid survey of the bank's affairs.67 A 
balance sheet as at 10 May68 showed the central fact of relevance for any 
immediate action: the state of the bank's cash. It held £521 in British gold, 
£1,560 in silver, £1,812 in rupees, $4,739 in coin and $1,168 in Store 
receipts. Against these it had notes in circulation of $124,869 and deposits 
of $282,794. This amounted to a ratio of 5.7 per cent of cash to notes and 
deposits combined, and even that was putting the best face on it, for the 
demand was for dollars, not British silver. The speed of the dollar drain is 
shown by these figures of dollars held:69  
     
   The immediate need was obvious: cash to enable the bank to stay open. 
But the board looked deeper. It drew attention to the great amount of 
accommodation bills70 and pointed out that three borrowers appeared as 
drawers, endorsers or acceptors of bills for $249,046, well over half the 
bank's loans.71  
   In reporting to London Darling professed to take a charitable view.72 He 
pointed out that “the recent alarm has been caused by the bank being left 
without dollars, which appear to have been withdrawn from it to a large 
amount, partly for the purpose of remittance as bills could not be procured, 
and partly on account of the establishment of the Australian Bank”. The 
latter bank found the plight of its rival not unwelcome, and declined to 
accept Bank of New South Wales notes or cheques except for capital 
subscriptions, and for these notes desired to receive, if not cash, “such bills 
of exchange or promissory notes in the Old Bank as we may approve”.73 
But Darling's real view is implied in the conditions he attached to the offer 
of a loan of £20,000: namely that (i) the government should appoint three 
additional directors, (ii) the bank's weekly discounts should be reduced by 
a quarter until 1 January 1827, (iii) by that time capital to be fully paid up 
and no dividend should be payable meanwhile, (iv) the bank should adopt 
“sterling” reckoning.74 With great reluctance the shareholders agreed, but 
only after an all-day meeting in which the president posted to and fro in a 
gig between the bank and government house with successive counter-
proposals.75  
   The mere guarantee of aid allayed the public alarm. Deposits exceeded 
withdrawals almost at once,76 and for a time there was no need to call on 
3 April $122,933 8 May $8,812
1 May 89,818 10 May 4,739
the loan.77 But the note issue was cut by a quarter,78 and no new bills were 
discounted for a time, renewals being limited to three-quarters of the old 
loans,79 a restriction which was intensified in September.80 In spite of the 
bank's efforts to avoid it, most of the loan had to be called upon and this 
was not repaid until January 1827.81  
   But the terms on which the loan had been offered involved a reduction in 
bank loans, not fully compensated by those of the Bank of Australia, and 
accentuated by the Bank of New South Wales seeking to avoid the 
necessity to use the loan by severely curtailing its discounts.82 Darling 
himself increased the difficulty by withholding from circulation the dollars 
received for Treasury bills,83 while the British parliamentary vote (against 
which bills were drawn) was cut in half by the adoption of the policy of 
placing on the colony the cost of the salaries of civil officers.84 The export 
of dollars caused other lenders, such as the Waterloo Company, to restrict 
loans, while the prohibition of notes under £1 eliminated temporarily a 
large fraction of the colony's cash.85 Deflationary as all these events were, 
their effect was greatly intensified by their happening all together. By the 
end of July 1826 the crisis was at its height.  
   Darling proposed three measures.86 First, the amount of $60,000 which 
had a few weeks earlier been lent by the colonial Treasury to the 
Commissariat should be repaid by the Commissariat selling bills to this 
amount. This would obviate the need to export dollars and retain the coin 
for cash purposes.87 Second, the Commissariat should thereafter make all 
its payments in British coin, thus ensuring that it was held idle for a 
minimum period. Third, to provide the banks with a cash reserve, while 
releasing coin for general circulation, the Commissariat should supplement 
its British coin by issuing £5 and £10 notes. With the unanimous approval 
of the Council the plan was put into force from 1 September,88 
Commissariat and Treasury payments being made half in British silver and 
half in these notes, both being acceptable for Treasury bills on the same 
terms. Only £6,250 was thus issued as Darling's authority to do so was 
presently in doubt because of British instructions on local finance,89 and 
they were almost all withdrawn in February 1827 until the matter should be 
cleared up,90 their place being taken by a re-issue of dollars by the 
Commissariat.91 Subsequently the continuance of the issue, until adequate 
coin had been sent, was authorized,92 but as the British Treasury had before 
this rejected Darling's explanation of the crisis the notes still outstanding 
were called up.93 In June 1828 with much ceremony the notes and plates 
were solemnly destroyed.94 But the combined effect of these measures, the 
arrival of another £14,800 in British coin,95 a falling-off in imports and the 
passage of time was that the year 1827 opened with the crisis over. “The 
Policy Adhered to by the Old Bank Direction is Rapidly Effecting its 
Annihilation”.96  
   But if the crisis were over for the colony, for the Bank of New South 
Wales it was not. It had, from its weakened position and with damaged 
reputation, to meet the aggressive competition of the Bank of Australia 
which, by March 1827, had built up a note circulation of £11,915 and 
deposits of £18,836 and had total loans of £33,505 which in the following 
twelve months were to be greatly increased, note issue to £18,100, deposits 
to £40,361 and loans to £62,404.97 That competition had to be met in 
deepening depression with the burden of reorganization required by the 
abandonment of the charter and with bitter internal disputes. In quest of 
funds to restore its competitive position the Bank of New South Wales 
early in 1827 considered the offer of interest on deposits, 5 per cent on 
amounts over £50 and 4 per cent on smaller sums, fixed for six months, but 
the proprietors would have none of it, only three speakers and a third of the 
votes being in favour.98 Feeling secure in its growing strength, the Bank of 
Australia in October 1827 took the initiative in restoring the discount rate 
to 10 per cent.99 The Bank of New South Wales did not follow 
immediately; perhaps it hoped to gain some transfer of business. But in 
December, having waited only a few weeks, it adopted the same rate,100 
which was to be maintained without interruption until 1842 as the general 
short-term discount rate.  
   The last months of 1827 and the first half of 1828 saw a series of bitter 
personal and faction fights in the Bank of New South Wales the details of 
which are not material except in three respects.101 First was the decision, 
taken in this battle and in part occasion for it, not to discount for any 
private note issuers; second, the revelation of current banking methods; and 
last, the serious loss of public confidence which ensued, most serious, 
perhaps, amongst the business community, who took sides and in many 
cases transferred their business to the Bank of Australia.  
   The setting for the squabbles was the need to reorganize as a joint-stock 
company as a result of the final declaration that the charter was invalid. 
Resentment at the alleged control of the bank by a clique, the use by 
directors of their position to secure funds which they used for private 
discounting at enhanced rates, and a clash of personal ambitions and 
dislikes boiled up into disputes which for a time threatened the ability of 
the bank to complete the reorganization. Holders of substantial numbers of 
shares for months declined to sign the new deed and were only brought to a 
new frame of mind by the proposal to pay off their capital in the form of a 
pro rata distribution of discounted bills held in the name of the old bank, 
recipients carrying all the risk of dishonour.102 The blow was softened by 
the resignation as director of Redfern, the chief target of abuse,103 and 
peace was well on the way to being restored when in July realization of the 
unsoundness of the bank's finances brought an abrupt closing of the ranks 
and a united public front.  
   Two of the chief critics had been Daniel Cooper of Cooper & Levey 
(Waterloo Company) and Robert Howe, editor of the Sydney Gazette and 
against them was aimed a decision in November 1827 “that this bank do 
not in future discount for any person or firm that issues paper payable on 
demand, or receive any other paper payable on demand except the paper of 
the Bank of Australia”.104 Cooper & Levey, who had a year before 
transferred their account from the Bank of Australia because of a similar 
ban,105 were indignant and defiantly announced that they would “continue 
to issue our paper” and would get along without the Bank of New South 
Wales.106 Howe, although he called in his notes107 —he said they had only 
amounted to 250 of £1—carried the war to the enemies' camp. He 
disclosed that a private note issuer was the bank's own cashier,108 and 
delivered his main broadside, at a special bank meeting, at Redfern whom 
he charged with securing loans for himself for dubious purposes, and 
whose removal from office he unsuccessfully moved.109 But in formal 
defeat he made his point, that Redfern as director was party to discounting 
his own bills, the proceeds of which he relent. He followed this up by 
printing correspondence in which some of the less essential facts were 
challenged but on which a jury would convict, to show in a specific case 
that Redfern had offered a loan at 15 per cent to a borrower who was 
directed to give a bill excluding Redfern's name, in a form which he could 
himself discount at the bank—at 10 per cent.110 The public might well 
believe that Redfern was merely the one who had been caught out and that 
the common charge that the directors did that sort of thing was true.  
   In these circumstances the bank was fortunate to be able to carry through 
its legal reconstruction. The new deed of settlement111 provided for a 
capital of £100,000 in £100 shares for a joint-stock company for seven 
years. Profits and losses were to be shared proportionately to holdings. At 
first seven directors were provided but this was raised to eleven so that “a 
certain number of country gentlemen” might be included112 —in effect one 
of the terms of settlement of the fight. An act enabling the bank to sue and 
be sued in the name of its president was secured.113  
   Meanwhile the Bank of Australia insisted on clearings each week 
between the two banks being in hard cash.114 In July 1828 it was rumoured 
that the Australia was deliberately collecting New South Wales notes in 
order to embarrass the latter bank,115 and there was public gossip that the 
New South Wales would be forced to suspend convertibility.116 The bank 
retaliated with a public declaration by a large number of shareholders and 
business firms of their willingness to accept Bank of New South Wales 
notes and by announcement of a substantial increase in capital.117 The new 
shares were, in view of the current shortage of coin, to be available in 
exchange for discounted bills, but 400 shares remained untaken in October 
when existing proprietors took them for bills on an assurance that these 
would be payable in four quarterly instalments.118 The amended deed of 
settlement which also increased directors to twelve was duly signed and 
apparently peace was restored.119 “The Colony is Ruined, Absolutely 
Ruined”120  
   In the latter part of 1827 the first unmistakable signs of depression 
appeared.121 The main factors were a liquidation crisis leading to a heavy 
fall in the prices of imported goods, a cut in capital imports, probably 
associated with the 1825 crisis in England, a fall in wool prices and a 
severe two-year drought. Contemporary explanations placed great stress on 
the first of these. The growing stream of free immigrants to an important 
extent transferred their capital in the form of goods which they planned to 
sell on arrival; an even larger flood of goods represented the optimism of 
English merchants shipping to local agents to exploit the market, reports of 
which were a year or more old by the time they were acted upon. These 
could only be sold at heavy losses which involved not only English 
principals but also local dealers and, of course, the new immigrants.122 The 
importance of this liquidation crisis must be admitted, but its place was as 
accentuating a slump already serious, not as a primary factor, for the great 
flow of increased imports was in 1828 and 1829, not in 1827.  
    
   Of prior causal significance was the 1825 crisis in England which 
interrupted the flow of British capital abroad and still more important the 
decline in English wool prices associated with the reduction of the British 
customs preference for colonial wool. To these must be added the credit 
restriction and disturbance involved in the transfer from the dollar to the 
sterling exchange standard and the concurrent troubles of the Bank of New 
South Wales, accentuated late in 1827 by the increase in discount rate 
initiated by the Bank of Australia. On these was superimposed a two-year 
drought, widespread but most severe in the older-settled areas and the 
Hunter valley123 (i.e., the grain-producing districts), as a result of which the 
harvest of 1827–1828 was a total failure in many parts of the colony and 
RECORDED IMPORTS (New South Wales only)
1826 £360,000 1829 £601,004
1827 362,324 1830 420,480
1828 570,000
less than half the normal even in the most favoured districts,124 and the 
harvest of 1828–1829 was little better. Relief for the immediate problem of 
food supply was sought by suspending the duties on grain and flour from 
June 1828.125 Imports of wheat leaped to 85,716 bushels in 1828 and 
107,929 in 1829, with 320,640 lb. of flour in 1828. The relief carried with 
it an aggravation of the balance of payments problem, while the high prices 
of foodstuffs intensified the internal situation, especially by raising wages 
both directly and also indirectly in the cost of rations. Landowners still 
owing the government for their land were hard hit, and secured deferment 
of payments at low interest.126 The need for cash to maintain solvency was 
so acute that creditors frequently accepted low compositions for immediate 
payment, rather than wait for slow realization of larger sums.127 The 
Gazette128 pictured the situation: Such things as ready-money transactions 
are nowadays never heard of; credit is the only hinge on which business 
turns; credit in town—credit in country; credit with the wholesale 
merchant—credit with the retail dealer; credit with the farmer—credit with 
the grazier—credit with the butcher—credit with the baker—credit with 
the cabinetmaker— credit with the blacksmith—credit with the mason—
credit with the shoemaker—credit with the laundress—credit with the 
shoeblack! ‘Credit! credit! credit!’ is in everyone's mouth; ‘three months—
six months—nine months—eighteen months—two years—three years’— 
are words in constant use; one sees them in almost every placard and 
advertisement and hears them in almost every counting house and shop. 
Everybody is offering to sell—nobody offers to buy. Houses— ships—
investments—allotments—grants—leases—farms—horses —cattle—
sheep—pigs etc., etc., etc., etc., etc., are proclaimed for sale—proclaimed 
by the printer—proclaimed by the auctioneer— proclaimed by the bellman; 
but the proclamation is not heeded: the largest letters of the printer—the 
loudest orations of the auction room—the most melodious chimes of the 
ringer, are alike ineffective in the difficult art of persuasion. Cattle at £2 a 
head and sheep at three dollars, and other things at a proportionately 
ruinous reduction, are frequently unable to obtain purchasers.  
   Not until 1830 was there an Insolvent Debtors Act,129 and until then 
creditors depended upon their ability to make private arrangements with 
debtors, or upon legal action for the recovery of debt. The following 
figures, relating to the Supreme Court only and not the Court of Requests, 
take no account of debts except as they ended in that court; their 
significance lies therefore in their growth not in their absolute size:130 
Year Executions against persons or property Mesne Process or ca. res. Summonses Total Writs
1825 107 166 283 556
1826 129 231 250 610
   The Gazette131 strained its type resources to bring home to its readers 
what the figures meant—if they were in any doubt: “during the first ten 
months of the year 1829, one in every 41/4 persons was served with a writ 
of one kind or another; . . . one in every 10&frac13; persons either had an 
execution against his person or property or was held to bail; and . . . one 
in every 14&frac13; persons had an execution upon his person or 
property! And this, let it be borne in mind, was through the Sheriff's Office 
alone exclusive of the process of the Courts of Requests which must also 
have been considerable”.  
   For the Bank of New South Wales the dominant result of the slump was 
the export of coin which hit it harder than the Australia. As was to be 
expected, with a fixed Treasury bill rate and a supply of bills limited by 
Commissariat expenditure, coin was quick to move, especially to Mauritius 
where the rating on silver coin made it a more profitable form of 
remittance than bills on the Treasury.132 Reduction of the premium on 
Treasury bills from 3 per cent to 11/2 per cent in 1828 was too small to 
affect the situation much; in any case remittance by Treasury bill had the 
advantage only that coin was not exported—it was nearly as effectively 
immobilized in the Commissariat. Of the total British coin imported by the 
Commissariat (£60,000) no less than £50,000 was said to be in the 
Commissariat at one time in September 1827 in payment for bills.133 The 
banks were reduced to ceasing advances before the sailing of ships, to limit 
the outward flow,134 but the flow continued—£30,000 on the Elizabeth to 
London in November 1827, $20,000 (in dollars) shipped by Cooper & 
Levey to Mauritius in March 1828,135 £30,000– £40,000 to London by the 
Boddington in September136 being only the outstanding shipments. Torn by 
internal strife, handicapped by the aftermath of 1826, weakened by its 
losing battle with the Australia, the Bank of New South Wales could not 
stand the strain as a run developed in the closing weeks of 1828. “That 
Hasty and Disgraceful Resolution”137  
   In December 1828 the bank had again to apply for a government loan of 
£15,000.138 As before, the central fact which made refusal virtually 
impossible, was the state of the bank's cash, which thrust on the governor 
the responsibility of deciding whether he would force the bank to close 
immediately or not.139 On the day of the application the bank held £339 
17s. 8d. in cash against notes in circulation of £9,401 and deposits of 
£20,905, a reserve ratio of 1.1 per cent.140  
1827 216 240 464 920
1828 456 329 964 1,749
1829 670 251 1,305 2,226
(to 31 Oct.)
   A more searching inquiry than in 1826 disclosed a sorry picture.141 In 
1826 it had been a condition of the loan that subscribed capital should be 
fully paid. It now appeared that the nominal capital stood at the enlarged 
figure of £150,000 of which £148,520 was subscribed and £29,018 shown 
as paid up. But the president admitted that some £11,435 of this 
represented bills given by shareholders which had already been renewed 
once and which it was proposed to renew twice more, with a 25 per cent 
reduction on each occasion. Some of these bills dated from before the crisis 
of 1826. Moreover, only as recently as October 400 unsold shares had been 
disposed of and the public given the impression of a real capital increase 
by the proprietors taking the shares in return for bills.142 Even classing 
these as “payment” the “paid-up” capital of £29,018 was made up in a 
remarkable way, the amount paid-up per share varying from £71 12s. 6d. to 
16s. 8d. with an average of £20 6s. 10d.143 The bank's loans showed that it 
held (apart from bills for shares) £41,255 in bills falling due, together with 
£8,900 in overdue bills, the drawers of all of which were also drawers of 
bills among the larger amount. The president estimated that only a third of 
those falling due would be paid and the rest would have to be renewed. The 
crowning facts were the admission by the president that he and other 
directors kept their personal accounts with the rival Bank of Australia and 
the disclosure that despite the state of the bank only the lack of hard cash 
had prevented the declaration and payment of a dividend of 12 per cent, 
requiring £1,900.  
   Darling's consideration of the problem was complicated by publication of 
the fact of the application and a consequent heavy loss of deposits (£3,200 
between 15 and 26 December)144 and by the attitude of the Bank of 
Australia. Two of its directors, John Macarthur and Edward Wollstonecraft 
were examined before the Executive Council, their evidence showing a 
mixture of fear of their own bank being involved in a run and hand-rubbing 
over the embarrassments of the rival. Wollstonecraft crudely proposed that 
the Bank of New South Wales be allowed to crash and the situation dealt 
with by the government lending his bank £15,000 at 5 per cent. Many civil 
officials and members of Darling's own family were shareholders in the 
Australia, and any hesitations he may have had must have been overborne 
by the need to clear himself of the charge of using the situation for family 
gain.145 The Executive Council accepted his view and the bank was offered 
a loan of £15,000 for twelve months at 8 per cent on these conditions: (i) 
“the bank shall wind up its concerns finally in the course of twelve 
months”, (ii) a director to be appointed by the government to ensure that 
terms were observed, (iii) reduction of discounts, (iv) no dividends until 
loan repaid, (v) security for the loan in the form of bills from the bank's 
portfolio, replaced by others as they became due. It was foreshadowed that 
the governor would not oppose a completely new and purified Bank of 
New South Wales when the old one was wound up.146  
   The bank sought to escape the sentence. A meeting on 20 December 
proposed that the terms be varied so that winding-up need not occur if the 
loan were repaid within nine months, but the Council accepted Darling's 
vigorous argument that this was asking too much; if the government helped 
the bank to meet its commitments and wind up smoothly it had done 
enough, and must demand as a condition the end of an institution which 
pursued, and apparently intended to continue, such dubious methods. The 
request was refused.147 A bank meeting of 27 December defeated an 
amendment that the bank cease operations forthwith, and “after a few 
heated debates” accepted the terms of the loan.148 A further meeting in 
January sought to reverse this decision but without success.149  
   The loan was drawn upon at once150 and further instalments were used in 
the next few weeks.151 A vigorous campaign was undertaken against 
overdue loans. Overdue bills, it was optimistically demanded, should be 
retired immediately,152 with the threat that action would be taken against all 
parties “whether they be drawers, payers, acceptors or indorsers” unless 
within a reasonable time they made arrangements “either by payment, by 
providing better paper, or by giving some sufficient real or personal 
security”.153 The amount involved was some £12,000 and they were 
required by April to complete arrangements for payment by the end of the 
year.154 It does not appear that the proprietors were so active in collecting 
their own capital subscriptions, for unpaid bills in respect of bank shares 
were down only to £10,686 by 9 March and were reduced by only £205 
two months later.155 Nevertheless the situation was improving and in March 
the bank besought Darling not to insist upon winding up at the end of the 
year, but he was adamant.156 Within three months the bank felt strong 
enough to defy the governor. The outstanding debt was repaid,157 and the 
proprietors invited “in consequence of the reviving prosperity of the bank . 
. . to take into consideration the expediency of rescinding the resolution to 
wind up”. This they did with a unanimous vote, on the specious plea of 
“the government having relieved the proprietors from their undertaking to 
do so by refusing to make further advances in the shape of loan”.158  
   Darling accepted the fait accompli. He had repeatedly expressed his 
desire for a second bank; his legal remedy or other means of enforcing the 
bank to honour its agreement were obscure; and he was particularly 
vulnerable on this issue to a charge of misusing his official position for the 
private ends of his family and his officials. Indeed, within a year he was 
prepared, with evident relief, to re-establish the government deposit in the 
bank. Before the loan, in view of the known difficulties of the bank, the 
Commissariat had taken to making its payments by cheques on the Bank of 
Australia or in its notes159 (a minor addition to the difficulties of the Bank 
of New South Wales) and when, having received the first instalment of the 
loan, the bank discussed rejecting the terms, the Colonial Treasurer's 
deposit was allowed to become exhausted.160 When the bank in June 
applied for its restoration, Darling's relief at being able to close an incident 
in which his motives were open to such shrewd attack is evident in his 
glossing over the events: “the money advanced on loan to the Bank of New 
South Wales . . . was almost immediately returned, and the bank has 
perfectly recovered from its embarrassment, which was but temporary; 
besides such a check has been established as will prevent its getting in 
arrear without the knowledge of government, and no difficulty would be 
found in with-drawing the money deposited, whenever it might be deemed 
necessary, the amount seldom exceeding £3,000”. The “check” was the 
supply of half-yearly statements within a month of the end of the half year, 
an arrangement not likely to check anything.161  
Tasmania's Banking Boom 
   Tasmania escaped both the slump and the monetary troubles and the 
banking crisis of the mainland. There was no drought—in fact the island as 
the granary for the mainland profited from the shortage of wheat and its 
high price in New South Wales, and the wheat-growing north-east saw the 
next important development in Tasmania in the early 'thirties. The transfer 
to “sterling” was long-drawn out, and produced no balance of payments 
problems with the repercussions on domestic credit. Accordingly the latter 
half of the decade witnessed a rapid expansion of banking facilities.  
   The former Attorney-General, J. T. Gellibrand, and his son opened in 
Hobart in 1826 the “Tasmanian Bank”,162 which for two and a half years 
issued notes (originally for $4 later for £1),163 received deposits and 
discounted bills. It never did any extensive business,164 and was closed 
early in 1829 when Gellibrand transferred his interest to whaling, Dunn's 
Commercial Bank succeeding to the premises.165 Nevertheless the virtual 
monopoly of the Bank of Van Diemen's Land and its consequent profits 
inevitably attracted not only criticism but competition. Arthur declared:  
   Whilst this bank did much good at first in putting down the various notes 
circulated by petty shopkeepers and others, the directors soon afterwards 
made the institution quite subservient to their private views and interests 
and such a reciprocal understanding existed amongst them in discounting 
each other's bills as placed large funds at their disposal, and excluded fair 
and liberal competition—in fact matters were so managed that none but 
directors and their friends could purchase cargoes of goods brought into the 
Port, and thus they held the whole community at bay by a very contracted 
monopoly . . . the ‘merchant-directors’ successfully exerted themselves by 
the promise of pecuniary assistance, and by the threat of withholding it, to 
make a very formidable party in the colony, opposed to the government.166  
   Arthur's readiness to accept the common charge of monopoly and 
favouritism is partly explained by his last sentence, but there was no doubt 
of the monopoly and the charge of partiality was widely believed—it was 
in fact contemporary bank practice in both New South Wales and Van 
Diemen's Land.167 The profits were extremely satisfactory, even for the 
time and place, the second dividend, for instance, being at the rate of 42 
per cent per annum, not counting indirect gains accruing to individual 
shareholders as merchants.  
   More in the hope of sharing in these gains than in the spirit of public 
service they professed,168 a group of public officials in the latter part of 
1827 approached the Bank of Van Diemen's Land with proposals for a new 
deal. They indicated their intention of forming a new bank and suggested 
that competition (and loss of profit) might be avoided by a merger. Their 
terms were: admission of all holders of ten shares to board meetings so that 
impartiality in the granting of loans would be assured; directors to hold 
five shares, and preferably merchants to be excluded; at least half the 
subscribed capital to be paid up; and the abandonment of the “three-names 
system” under which bills for discount must bear three names, drawer, 
acceptor and at least one endorser. These terms were “inflexibly rejected”, 
the Van Diemen's Land directors, it was alleged, not even referring the 
proposed union to a meeting of shareholders.  
   Accordingly the prospectus of the Derwent Bank appeared in November 
1827.169 A capital of £15,000 in £100 shares was to be fully paid in four 
instalments within a year of opening, with 10 per cent discount for 
immediate payment of the later calls. Discount of bills, on two days a week 
compared with one for the Bank of Van Diemen's Land, was to be at 10 per 
cent and in large letters it was announced “the system of three names to be 
dispensed with”. It was largely a civil officials' bank and their control was 
safeguarded by a proviso that no shareholder should sell his shares publicly 
until after they had been offered, through the directors, to the existing 
partners at the current price. (How that was to be ascertained was not 
stated.) There was also a provision, later revoked, for holders of ten shares 
to attend board meetings. Directors were duly elected and the bank opened 
in Hobart on 1 January 1828.170  
   Its methods of operation, however, soon exposed it to a shrewd counter-
attack from the Bank of Van Diemen's Land which petitioned Arthur for a 
direction that public officials should sever all connection with the 
Derwent.171 It was pointed out that the Colonial Treasurer, Collector of 
Customs, Sheriff, Solicitor-General, Clerk of the Council and Master of the 
Supreme Court were all either in name or in fact directors of the Derwent 
and it was charged that they used their official position to foster its 
business. All were accused of promising official favours to those who 
would transfer their accounts, particularly access at the official price to the 
limited supply of bills on the British Treasury. The Sheriff was said to be 
actively canvassing for business for the bank and to make all his official 
payments in its notes which were obtained in exchange for British coin, the 
only money received in government offices and accepted for bills on the 
Treasury. The Collector of Customs was said to keep his official account in 
his own bank. Against the Treasurer the most serious charges were made. 
Not only, it was claimed, did he give Derwent Bank notes preference in 
official payments, but he sold to it and only to it bills on the British 
Treasury, at the fixed premium, so that persons with payments to make in 
England must pay the Derwent's price for these bills. Moreover, it was 
asserted that he had, in the presence of witnesses, offered to make official 
use of Van Diemen's Land notes if that bank would lend him money for his 
private use.172  
   Arthur and the Executive Council passed over these very definite charges 
in decent silence, confining themselves to the general question of whether 
officials, in the conditions of the time and place, should have such an 
intimate connection with a bank with which they must have official 
relations. On Arthur's lead, the council directed that the Treasurer and 
Collector of Customs who handled large sums of money should forthwith 
sever all connection, while the other officials should do so within a 
reasonable time, defined as nine to twelve months. Direct evidence is 
lacking but there is some support for West's claim that compliance was 
purely formal.173 Despite the blow the bank flourished and expanded in a 
small way. Within six months it could claim a paid-up capital of £13,000, 
deposits of £10,000 and loans totalling £35,000.174 At the end of that first 
half year it had not only covered establishment costs but had a profit which 
it could not distribute under the deed of settlement until a full year had 
elapsed,175 and during the next two or three years its progress was steady if 
slow. One contributory factor was its selection to run the first convicts' 
savings bank for the government.176  
   The Derwent Bank at its foundation considered a Launceston branch177 
and the decision against it prompted local residents in January 1828 to 
initiate action for the Cornwall Bank.178 Originally planned with a capital of 
£30,000 in £50 shares,179 this was finally organized on a capital of £20,000 
and opened in Launceston on 1 May 1828.180 For its second half year 
(details of the first are not available) it was able to record “a gross profit of 
£22 16s. 2d. per cent”.181 Soon afterwards it secured an act of council 
enabling it to sue and be sued in the name of the cashier,182 and was 
fortunate enough to secure the Launceston deposit of the government on 
which it declined to pay interest.183 Meanwhile a new competitor in 
banking appeared in Hobart.  
   John Dunn had been a foundation director of the Derwent Bank but at the 
end of 1828 he withdrew, selling out his shares,184 and a few months later 
abandoned shopkeeping to open, on 29 June 1829, the “Commercial 
Bank”, perhaps as a successor to the Tasmanian Bank.185 Discounts were 
offered at 10 per cent with preference for those who kept their accounts 
with the bank and, a new departure, 5 per cent interest was offered on 
deposits for six months or more. In search of additional deposits he opened 
a “General Savings Bank” department in January 1831 although its savings 
character is a little doubtful.186 The introduction of interest on deposits 
forced the other banks to follow, when it became clear that Dunn's bank 
was a success.187 Very little information is available as to its operations for 
the next three years until it was converted, in 1832, from a one-man 
business to a joint-stock company, the change being effective from 1 
October 1832 and the title becoming “Commercial Bank of Tasmania”.188 
Under the deed of settlement189 capital was £60,000 in £100 shares of 
which Dunn held a majority190 and was assured of full control,191 
shareholders having only the right, by general meeting, of deciding the 
opening of agencies and branches.192 The co-partnership was initially for 
fourteen years.  
   Two other events—the passage of a Usury Act and reorganization of the 
Derwent Bank—at the close of the decade were to be of importance in 
opening the way to a great inflow of overseas capital in the 'thirties to 
finance not only Tasmania's domestic expansion but also that of Port 
Phillip in which Tasmanians took a leading part.  
   The officials interested in the Derwent Bank were generally believed to 
be responsible for the passage in 1830 of the act which declared English 
usury laws never to have been in force in Tasmania.193 No regard had in 
fact ever been paid to these restrictions on interest rates but this act, and the 
New South Wales act of 1834 modelled on it, cleared away all legal doubt 
and thus opened the way for the large inflow of British capital to finance 
the pastoral boom of the 'thirties. Important as it was for the economy as a 
whole and for all the banks, it had a special significance for the Derwent 
which, under Swanston, first came to be a channel for direct English 
investment and then relied on indirect investment in the form of English 
deposits.194 The absence of legal restrictions on interest was frequently used 
by Swanston as an argument to influence these investors.195 As in 1893, so 
in 1843, the policy was to prove dangerous.  
   On the 1830 act the Colonist commented:  
   How did the usurer tremble for the uncertainty of his unhallowed gains, 
till the prime mover of the mischief, with the subtlety of the first tempter, 
insinuated that noxious measure among the laws of the land, under the 
pretext of doing good! The act passed, and the term usury was, for a time, 
blotted from the language of Van Diemen's Land; and usurers, bill-brokers, 
bank directors, pawnbrokers, et hoc genus omne, applauded the wisdom of 
our Councils, and Hobart Town, from the Sheriff's Office to the Derwent 
Bank, from Dan to Beersheba, exhibited one scene of Jewish 
congratulation . . . Never before did Shylock, in Van Diemen's Land, sleep 
so sweet as on that night; his seared conscience was, even for that night, 
proof against the orphan's curse, the widow's tear and his bankrupt victim's 
moan.196  
   In practice, however, the act made little difference to interest rates. 10 per 
cent had for years been the minimum rate on a safe short-term loan and as 
risk or term increased the rate rose rapidly. When the Colonial Advocate197 
accused official shareholders in the Derwent Bank of privately discounting 
at 35 per cent, the only defence the Austral-Asiatic Review198 could find 
was to point to higher rates charged by others. Interest rates continued at 
extremely high levels throughout Australia until the slump of 1841, 
although their tendency after the local legislation of 1830–34 was slightly 
downwards.  
   The reorganization of the Derwent Bank in 1830 was designed to open 
the way for expansion by eliminating the comparative publicity of its 
dealings, centralizing control in a single director, and increasing the ease of 
borrowing, all new developments in Australian banking.199 In February 
1830 W. H. Hamilton persuaded the directors to accept certain measures 
which were: to deprive holders of ten shares of the privilege of attending 
board meetings; to reduce the number of directors from seven to three; a 
managing director to have control of bank lending, details of which were to 
be known only to himself and the cashier. To increase business loans were 
made daily (normal bank practice in both New South Wales and Tasmania 
was on one or at most two days a week), and when adequate security was 
given only one name was to be required on bills. Adequate security, as 
letters to borrowers in 1829–31 show, usually meant mortgage of land as 
collateral to the bills, discount of which was treated as the actual loan.200 
W. H. Hamilton was appointed full-time salaried managing director, the 
first in any Australian bank. His reign was short for in the following year 
he returned to England, his successor being Charles Swanston, who made 
the Derwent Bank his own and dominated policy until its closure in 1849.  
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Chapter 8 the Pastoral Expansion of the 'Thirties 
   THE decade between 1830 and 1840 was a period of extraordinarily 
rapid economic growth in which immigration and capital import furnished 
the material for a vast geographic expansion of the wool industry.1 For a 
variety of reasons it was wool, rather than other partly exploited resources, 
which dominated the scene. There was a great and growing demand from 
England; more easily than other possible products it could be handled by 
the crude and expensive transport, both within and beyond Australia; it 
required, relative to the value of output, modest amounts of labour in 
which little skill was demanded, and assigned convicts and emancipists 
were a readily accessible supply; apart from the sheep themselves the 
capital investment was small in relation to output; a major item, land, was 
available by simple squatting for which at worst the squatter paid very 
modest licence fees. The 'twenties had, in a sense, been preparatory for that 
great boom. Then had occurred the exploratory invasion of the west, in 
which routes had been established, the nature of the country roughly 
ascertained, the technique of sheep farming in a new environment at least 
crudely learned. Overseas transport had been sufficiently developed and 
the metropolitan centres had grown to the point where they could function 
as bases for the squatters' advance, furnishing supplies on annual credit, the 
organization to handle the product and the institutions to finance growth. 
Between 1830 and 1835 wool exports quadrupled in quantity and in the 
following five years more than doubled again. Exports were virtually 
synonymous with production and those figures are the simplest measure of 
the magnitude of the boom.  
   Geographically the boom meant the effective occupation of half a 
continent. In Tasmania the expansion of the occupied area was of necessity 
small, since there was so little new pastoral country to occupy. But on the 
mainland the story was different. In (modern) New South Wales settlement 
was in 1830 little beyond the Nineteen Counties; by 1845 roughly half the 
total area was occupied. By the same date, starting from nothing in 1835, 
half the Port Phillip District (modern Victoria) had been taken up. South 
Australian settlement was not pastoral, but the political acceptance of the 
Wakefield doctrine, in terms of which that settlement has been almost 
entirely discussed, did not occur by chance in the mid-'thirties. The 
practical application of the doctrine required investors who thought it 
would pay and a government convinced that it would at least not be 
expensive, and it was the general Australian boom that produced both 
convictions.2 What made this great boom possible was a flood of capital 
imports from Britain. The available data will not support even a crude 
estimate of its size, and all that can be done is to indicate broadly its 
dimensions. Trade figures have a wide margin of error and are in any case 
not the whole story, but the story they tell is unmistakable.  
    
   It will be noticed that Tasmania's import surplus was small and declining 
even through the boom (there was an export surplus in 1839) but that of 
New South Wales was growing at a remarkable rate, the more so when it is 
remembered that it was not till the end of the decade that the colony's 
population exceeded 100,000, and at its beginning was only half that. A 
still rising volume of British expenditure in connection with convicts; the 
formation of banks and mortgage companies in Britain to operate in the 
colonies; transfer of funds by absentee investors for disposal by individuals 
and firms in the colonies; import of cash and goods by those who 
migrated—these were the channels through which came the flood tide of 
capital.  
   In the banking field, as might be expected, the first steps to exploit the 
pastoral expansion were colonial: creation of new banks and the 
enlargement and development of old, especially the Derwent. But the 
capital was coming from abroad, and that explains the dominance of 
British banks and companies in the main financial expansion. After the two 
Commercial Banks (of Sydney and the 1832 reorganization of that of 
Tasmania) the colonies did not themselves produce a major bank. From 
abroad came the Bank of Australasia, the Bank of South Australia, the 
Union Bank, the Trust and Loan Companies and flamboyant and fraudulent 
schemes such as the Royal Bank or the Agricultural Bank. Locally a move 
for a new bank inevitably meant squabbles about the allocation of shares 
and an obvious rogue such as “Tommy the Banker” could flourish. But it 
was from abroad that the main capital came and in Britain the new banks, 
honest or otherwise, found all the subscribers they needed; the Derwent 
Bank and other firms and individuals following the same methods found 
ample funds flowing from England, Scotland and India for investment in 
mortgages and in other ways. Not until the top of the boom did a few 
minor colonial banks appear, the last effort of local capitalists to compete, 
and not one of them survived the slump. The new overseas institutions not 
only brought, themselves and through their foreign exchange services, 
RECORDED IMPORTS AND EXPORTS, 1831–40 
Year NSW Imports NSW Exports NSW Import Surplus Tas Imports Tas Exports Tas Import Surplus
1831 £490,152 £324,168 £165,984 £298,774 £141,745 £157,029
1836 1,237,406 748,624 488,782 558,240 420,123 138,117
1840 3,014,189 1,399,692 1,614,497 988,356 867,007 121,349
great sums for investment. They first fully mobilized local deposits for 
investment, in the process firmly establishing deposit banking as the 
Australian type; their competition ensured the triumph of branch over unit 
banking. By the end of the decade it was, for time and place, a very mature 
banking system.  
   The scale of the increase in banking operations is illustrated by a few 
figures. In June 1830 the loans of the Bank of New South Wales totalled 
£36,838; by the second half of 1836 they averaged £222,787. Those of the 
Bank of Australia rose from £62,404 in March 1828 to £208,340 in the 
second half of 1836. These increases had been attained against competition 
of the Commercial Bank which by the latter half of 1836 had £223,518 on 
loan, and of the Australasia which had £76,276. In short, in the first half of 
the decade bank loans in New South Wales had increased by something of 
the order of 600 or 700 per cent.3 In the next four years they quadrupled 
again. Information for Tasmania, less complete for the earlier period, 
indicates increases of a similar order, while in South Australia bank loans 
were, of course, all created after 1836. There is no evidence to suggest that 
these increases represent the substitution of loans by banks for loans by 
firms and individuals; rather there is evidence of a considerable growth in 
the absolute scale of non-bank loans, although lack of data on their actual 
volume prevents verification of the probable relative decline in such loans.  
Tasmanian Banks Take the Lead 
   It was in Tasmania that local initiative in banking was first shown. 
Throughout the 'thirties the island experienced brief ups and downs in 
economic activity and after this first outburst of enterprise fell more and 
more behind the mainland in the race, in part, at least, because Tasmanian 
residents saw more profit in mainland adventures. During 1831–34 there 
were constant complaints of poor business, of restricted bank advances, of 
the intolerable burden of interest rates; John Dunn was even urging 
amalgamation of all the local banks into a single national bank.4 After 1835 
the energies and funds of residents were drawn off to exploit the Port 
Phillip district, not merely in the slightly comic Port Phillip Association, 
but in a sustained squatting invasion, by contrast with which the narrowly-
confined prospects of the island appeared unattractive.5 Yet, at the 
beginning of the boom Tasmanians were taking the lead in developing the 
banking facilities of Launceston and its district and producing in the 
enterprising Derwent Bank a remarkable financial engine; and all through 
the decade there was maintained, if irregular, economic growth and 
banking expansion.  
(a) Derwent Bank Growth 
   Swanston, Hamilton and Stephen Adey each held, in September 1831, 40 
shares out of a total of 200, giving them full control of the Derwent Bank.6 
The departure of Hamilton and later of Adey to England, leaving Swanston 
as their agent, transferred their power to him alone, and he buttressed this 
by buying, usually on his own initiative, further shares for English 
investors whose votes he could then exercise as proxy. These purchases 
more than counterbalanced the sale of some of Hamilton's and Adey's 
shares and meant that Swanston, apart from his position as managing 
director, controlled a majority of votes and could therefore run the bank as 
he pleased. When, for instance, Swanston went to Sydney in 1836 to plead 
the case of the Port Phillip Association, Adey felt he could not assist the 
Tamar Bank in its difficulties, although he wished to, and knew that 
Swanston would view such help favourably.7  
   How he used this power is best seen by first examining his other 
activities, in his personal capacity, as import and export agent, investment 
agent, woolbroker, a sort of commercial manager for the Port Phillip 
Association and of its successor the Derwent Company, as well as an 
absentee squatter. “Since I resigned the army,” he wrote in February 1834, 
“I have formed connections in India and China with the first houses from 
whom I look for considerable agency business, particularly from Calcutta 
in consequence of the rum and other produce and manufactures of India 
being now admitted into this colony on the same footing as the rum of the 
West India Islands and the produce and manufactures of any British 
colony.”8 From the beginning he was acting as agent for various firms in 
the East for the sale of their products, the most important being tea. The 
practice was for the firms— Maguire & Co. of Canton; Jardine, Matheson 
& Co. of Canton; Berry & Co. of Madras; Laing & Barlow of Mauritius; 
Lyall, Matheson & Co. of Calcutta; Edi Otudin & Co. of Manila; Binny & 
Co. of Madras; John Bird & Co. of Lambok, N.E.I.; and others famous in 
the eastern seas trade—to forward goods to Swanston, the types and 
quantities being based on his advice (black tea, for instance, was 
unprofitable, being drunk only by poor Irish and soldiers). He then 
disposed of them, usually to whole-salers in Hobart, but sometimes as far 
afield as Sydney or Adelaide and remitted the proceeds, less expenses and 
his commission. Remittance might be direct to the firm or to its head office 
or agent in London, and took whatever form was available, the most 
satisfactory being bills on the British Treasury which thus started 
journeyings in the East which might delay their presentation to the 
Treasury for two or three years.9  
   In these activities Swanston was not exceptional, although the range and 
scale of his operations was rivalled by only one or two others in Hobart. 
But trade connections facilitated a different type of business, that of 
investment agent. Hamilton had done this on a small scale for English and 
Indian residents and transferred his interests to Swanston whose own circle 
of acquaintance in India enabled him to enlarge this type of business 
speedily. It is possible, as Betts10 suggests, that this type of business was 
the reason for the 1830 reorganization of the Derwent Bank, in which case 
Swanston's taking over of control may have been planned with Hamilton as 
early as 1829.  
   Initially the clients were army officers and officials in India with funds to 
invest with a view to their retirement, many of them coming to New South 
Wales or Van Diemen's Land at the end of their service.11 To these 
Swanston was soon writing, with minor variations, a standard letter:  
   In this colony there are only two modes of investing money, one is by 
mortgage on landed security and the other by investments in bank shares.  
   By the first mode interest at the rate varying from 10 to 15 per cent can 
be obtained on good landed security for a period of from three to ten years. 
When mortgages are, however, taken at the high rate of 15 per cent there is 
generally difficulty attending the regular payment of the interest. If the 
period is from three to five years, 121/2 per cent is readily obtained, and if 
the period extends from seven and ten years a little less is generally given. 
The minimum however is 10 per cent.  
   The banks of this colony are joint-stock companies and are managed by 
boards of directors, the stock consisting of shares of £100 and £50 each. 
They are all banks of issue, of deposit and of discount, and are entrusted 
with the government colonial funds as well as with deposits from the 
Military Chest. Their dividends are declared half-yearly and hitherto these 
have averaged from 14 to 15 per cent per annum . . .  
   This mode of investment by the purchase of shares I recommend to all 
absentees for part of their funds and mortgages for the other part, because 
it is an investment which can be easily realized and one that yields a 
regular and certain income . . . I will invest the money for you in the 
manner I have stated, should such meet your views.12  
   Not all his clients were offered a choice, the smaller ones who left him 
discretion frequently being told that their money had been invested in 
Derwent Bank shares or, at a later date when G. D. Mercer junior was its 
managing director, in the Port Phillip Bank. In other cases funds were 
invested in mortgages selected by Swanston, or in some instances in direct 
purchase of estates over whose management he then exercised a general 
control.13 His Indian connections spread over most of the large centres of 
English settlement and these and his trade connections made him known to 
investors in England. Jardine, Matheson & Co. of Canton introduced his 
second largest investor (after G. D. Mercer), Sir George Bart Robinson14 
and soon there was a steady stream of inquiries and a satisfying flow of 
funds from England. As these grew with the rising sheep boom Hamilton 
in England and Swanston in Hobart devised a series of measures which 
brought these investors into closer contact with the Derwent Bank itself 
until many of them were its depositors.  
   It was in this early development of the English connection that Swanston 
caught his biggest fish of all, Major G. D. Mercer of Edinburgh. Mercer 
had already committed himself to the purchase of a farm in Tasmania 
before, in 1833, he wrote to Swanston asking him to act as his financial 
representative and to advise David Fisher, the manager he was sending out 
to develop the estate as an enclosed sheep farm associated with various 
other small-scale activities. Swanston was authorized to spend up to £6,000 
on this. Mercer's dream of becoming the laird of a Tasmanian version of a 
Scots village got little respect from Swanston who wrote:  
   Your ideas are the same as those of all men who have never visited a 
colony just arising from the wilderness. You are anxious to build mills and 
make salt and to lay out money which will never bring you in any return. It 
is with these English ideas that too many emigrants and all companies yet 
formed have ruined themselves. In a young colony we must go step by step 
and not get into manhood before we can run on our legs. And when money 
can be otherwise more advantageously laid out as it can be here in land, in 
sheep and cattle, in bank shares, or lent on mortgages, mills and salt must 
be left to the miller and small capitalists who, by their personal labour and 
with few or no servants make their trades answer. Cultivation also, beyond 
cultivating for home consumption, does not pay the great landholder and 
lord of flocks. It suits the purpose of the small farmer and gives him a 
moderate income after paying his expenses. Wool is the great point to be 
attended to and the secondary object to the great landholder is the breed of 
cattle for market. But the breed of sheep and gradual improvement of the 
fleece is the source from whence ultimately a certain return can only be 
expected for any great outlay of capital.15  
   Mercer did get his lordly acres near Hobart, but his appetite was whetted 
by Swanston's promise of greater profits in other directions. He acquiesced 
in being made a shareholder in the Derwent Bank and in various advances 
on wool and mortgage loans totalling many thousands on his behalf.16 
Swanston's shrewdest stroke, however, was to include Mercer in the Port 
Phillip Association—and then write to explain what it was all about.17 
Mercer's half of the correspondence is not available and Swanston's 
probably not complete, but Mercer appears to have been an eager associate 
and readily accepted his role as English representative, in which he 
bombarded the Colonial Office with unsuccessful petitions on its behalf. 
Until it was wound up he continued as a member of the Derwent Company 
when this succeeded the Association. It is unnecessary to trace the story of 
the Association beyond noting that Swanston was a very active member, 
serving as a kind of commercial manager.18 It was he whose name appeared 
first in the various legal documents defining the Association, who brought 
in the financial and political support of Mercer and conducted the 
correspondence with him, whose influence with Arthur through John 
Montagu partly explained the Tasmanian governor's backing, who, as one 
of the three trustees for other members, handled the business side of the 
Association and later of the Derwent Company.  
   In the process he found himself, not unwillingly, cast for a new role, that 
of absentee squatter. Several stations, notably that at Indented Head, were 
associated with his name although most and perhaps all of them were in 
fact the joint property of the Derwent Company comprising Swanston, 
Mercer, Thomas Learmonth and David Fisher. When the company was 
dissolved in 1843 with a loss of £2,659 for each member, the lands were 
divided although final settlement was delayed for years by informalities of 
title.19  
   This was not the end of Swanston's manifold activities. He joined John 
Baker of Adelaide, with whom he had had business dealings, in the 
Kapunda mine, contributing £1,000 towards its development.20 Another 
venture, killed in 1844 by the government's inability to meet the cost, was a 
company to supply Hobart with water.21 His advances on wool were 
extensive. The procedure was summarized in a letter of May 1843:  
   I never purchase wool, but will be happy to make an advance upon yours 
to the extent of 1s. per lb., if the wool is of good quality and well got up—
otherwise to the extent of 8d. per lb. Upon these advances 21/2 per cent is 
charged. You can either deliver the wool to be shipped to Mr. Edward 
Willis at Geelong, or you can ship it yourself, to the order of Messrs. Bogle 
Kerr & Co., of Glasgow, forwarding a bill of lading and invoice on the 
vessel by which the wool is shipped enclosed to Messrs. Bogle Kerr & Co., 
and two other sets to me.22  
   He had good reason for refusing to buy, illustrated by his letter to 
William Forlonge: “The wool sent home on your account last year was not 
only sent home in the most shameful state, but also stones were put into the 
bales to increase the weights. In one bale there was a stone weighing 74 
lbs. After this it will be impossible to ship any wools with the same marks 
as yours have hitherto borne.”23 Even with a close friend he was careful: “I 
do not hold myself or my agents responsible for weight. It is quite unusual 
for any other than the owner to incur such responsibility.”24 The money to 
provide these advances was obtained by discounting with local importers 
bills drawn on London, and the objective, he explained, was to get the 
wool away as soon as the loan was made so that it should be sold and the 
loan repaid if possible before the bills were presented, or at least soon 
after.25 The usual practice of nominating an agent in Britain to handle the 
sale of the wool was followed (the alternative local agent was unusual) as 
much to ensure that the loan was repaid as to gain the additional 
commission. The only risk run for these substantial gains was that in the 
unlikely event of the price realized being below the advance, the squatter 
would not pay the difference—a much more likely event.26  
   At the time Swanston assumed control of the Derwent Bank its 
expansion had temporarily ceased. Adey was writing that new deposits 
were not sought, “having already received as much and more offered than 
can well be employed”.27 The new manager however had larger ideas. 
Within a few months he had persuaded shareholders to increase the capital, 
partly to establish a branch at Launceston, but also to provide the basis for 
utilizing the flow of funds anticipated from overseas investors.28 More 
extensive and important were his changes in 1834 for which the occasion 
was news of the coming of the Bank of Australasia, but the driving force 
was the prospect of profit from the incipient pastoral boom. The first step 
was a further and large increase of capital to £100,000 “to show the Home 
Government that we require no foreign aid from banking as well as to 
show the projectors of the new banking scheme in London that they will 
have establishments of equal capital with themselves to encounter in these 
colonies”.29 At the time Australian banks still relied mainly on 
shareholders' capital and note issue for their funds; deposits were less 
important and not eagerly sought.  
   To make the loans of the Derwent more attractive than those of other 
banks “cash credits” were introduced as part of the 1834 programme for 
countering competition from the Australasia. The cash credit was 
substantially identical with the overdraft, and at the time was most 
common in Scotland, although used in England. Swanston described it 
thus: “A cash credit is a loan, the amount of the loan varying every day, the 
maximum being fixed.” The procedure in the Derwent was as follows: 
accounts were balanced half-yearly, interest on amounts drawn being 
charged at 10 per cent from the date of drawing to balancing date; each 
half-year the balance was transferred to debit or credit of the customer and 
bore the appropriate interest. The loan was terminable at any time by the 
bank which also charged an overall commission of 1 per cent on all debit 
entries. Although Swanston called it the “Scotch system”, details made it 
nearer the contemporary English cash credit.30 Thus in November 1834 the 
overdraft made its first appearance in Australian banking. It was adopted 
by most of the other banks though not continuously nor on the same scale 
as by the Derwent, and it continued for many years to be less favoured by 
bankers than the discounting of bills, partly because the latter system 
offered prospects of indirect profits. While shareholders in banks were 
mainly merchants, a neat system of exploiting the primary producer was 
possible. Imports were handled by a few firms in each metropolitan centre, 
almost all being as a matter of course, participants in the local banks 
which, while the bill on the Treasury was the principal means of overseas 
payment, had preference in securing these bills which were sold only for 
British coin. Shareholders in the banks naturally received preference when 
the bills were re-sold. The squatter and the farmer must thus buy their main 
supplies of imported goods from a few sources. To do so they needed to 
borrow, and their bills were not accepted by the banks who asserted 
repeatedly that the risks with “settlers' bills” were too great. But the 
evidence is clear that less creditable motives dictated preference for the 
bills of merchant shareholders. Therefore, the primary producer got his 
credit from the merchant, who not only allowed for this in his prices, but 
added the condition that at harvest or shearing the wheat or especially the 
wool be sold through his agency, yielding him a commission in addition.31  
   Most significant of all the steps to adjust the bank to take full advantage 
of the boom in a period of intensified bank competition was the 
establishment of a London agency. Only one other Australian bank had 
thus far tried the experiment, the Australia in 1828, and that had not proved 
worth continuance. A similar plan at the same time by Cooper & Levey 
had come to little because Levey, on going to London, had become 
involved in Peel's scheme for Swan River. Originally the Derwent's need 
was for a London agent to meet on its behalf bills sold to merchants 
seeking to make payments in London, but no London bank had been 
prepared to give the Derwent a credit, and use for other matters was 
therefore made, as occasion required, of Swanston's personal agent 
Buchanan.32 In June 1834, however, Hamilton reported that the volume of 
English money offered for investment in Australia was so great that such 
an arrangement would now be acceptable.33  
   Until this period the mechanism for investment from overseas had been 
inadequate. The most important avenue was created by British government 
expenditure on the convict settlement through the medium of the sale of 
bills on the Treasury. These were supplemented in the 'twenties by the bills 
of the Australian Agricultural and Van Diemen's Land Companies, 
together with those of the missionary societies and a few private 
individuals whose credit was good. Even then, however, many individuals 
found it more satisfactory to bring out their capital in the form of English 
bank-notes, coin or actual goods. This was a system suitable for those 
emigrating with their capital, but not for the absentee investors, and the 
demands of these in the 'thirties were met by other institutions following 
the practice of the Derwent: the Australasia and Union, the Royal Bank and 
a number of investment agents such as Swanston in his private capacity. 
By the late 'thirties the absentee investor had a choice of agencies in 
London who could relieve him of all trouble in transferring his funds.  
   Swanston welcomed the opportunity of tapping funds which were likely 
otherwise to go to the Australasia. Accordingly Hamilton was authorized to 
make an agreement, the terms suggested being that the London bank 
should accept deposits on behalf of the Derwent, which could draw upon 
them by bills of exchange. While the money remained in London at the 
disposal of the bank there, the Derwent should receive 2 per cent interest. 
Such an arrangement was made with Barnett Hoare & Co. but 
subsequently transferred in 1841 to Hamilton who, at the same time, 
succeeded Scott Bell & Co. as Swanston's private representative for 
handling wool and other agencies.34  
   Initially the hope seems to have been for large deposits but English 
investors sought larger returns and wanted the aid of the Derwent rather to 
transfer their money and then to invest it, principally in mortgages at up to 
15 per cent, but mainly on good security at 10 to 12. By 1839, when the 
squatting boom was at its height, this was a settled part of the bank's 
business, a special department having been created with a clerk exclusively 
engaged upon the business of absentees. When funds were received in 
London, the investors were credited with 5 per cent interest until a suitable 
investment was found when, as Swanston was careful to point out, the 
bank's responsibility ceased, except for carrying on the work of collecting 
and remitting interest, for which it charged 21/2 per cent commission. 
Connections were developed with other firms, particularly Peter Murdoch 
of Glasgow, Lyall Bros. of Canton and Binny & Co. of Madras, who joined 
Barnett Hoare & Co. in forwarding funds on similar terms.35  
   It was because of the extent of this type of business that the recorded 
statistics give the impression that the Derwent was falling behind the other 
banks in the race. Between 1837 and 1840 the Commercial Bank of 
Tasmania more than doubled its deposits and trebled its loans, while the 
Union and the Australasia grew to overshadow all the local banks. The 
increases in the Derwent's business appeared much more modest, but only 
because its overseas deposits were temporary and loans made by it were 
credited directly to overseas investors. Swanston was prepared to leave the 
business of issuing notes and discounting bills to the other banks while he 
held first place amongst the mortgage lenders—a type of business of which 
orthodox bankers were chary—and collected his 21/2 per cent for work 
which was mere routine and risks that were slight, so long as the boom 
lasted. This explains why, without a struggle, he abandoned the Melbourne 
branch of the Derwent, established in February 1838, to the Union Bank in 
October of the same year.36  
(b) Launceston Banking 
   Meanwhile Launceston, the second metropolis, which had had to create 
its own Cornwall Bank when the Derwent Bank refused to open a branch, 
was the scene of experiments in branch banking, the final result of which 
was the emergence of a second unit bank and the disappearance of the 
branches.  
   The Bank of Van Diemen's Land originally was hostile to branches; 
country residents were indeed told to appoint Hobart agents and not expect 
the cashier to do any “agency matters” for them,37 but by 1832 they were 
planning a Launceston branch which opened on 3 July 1832.38 For this 
purpose capital was increased by £10,000 in £50 shares and a joint Hobart-
Launceston Committee appointed to organize the branch.39 A few months 
later a move was made to absorb the Cornwall Bank, which was in 
difficulties, and closed temporarily, but it came to nothing.40 Apparently 
the branch proved unprofitable for when, two years later, the Bank of Van 
Diemen's Land deed of settlement was due for renewal the occasion was 
taken for closing the branch as from the end of December 1834, the 
business being continued by the new Tamar Bank organized by the local 
shareholders in the Bank of Van Diemen's Land.41  
   The Derwent Bank retorted quickly to the Bank of Van Diemen's Land 
move towards the north of the island and announced an increase in capital 
to permit an agency to be opened in Launceston.42 With Michael Connolly 
as agent business was begun on 2 July,43 but was a failure because of its 
inability to meet the competition of the Van Diemen's Land branch, which 
itself was due to the restrictive conditions of Swanston's instructions.44 
Apart from directions about keeping of books, the main terms were these: 
Connolly was supplied with £2,000 in Derwent notes for issue (deposits 
were expected to reach a like sum) which he was instructed to keep in 
circulation. To this end he was to see that his cash balance consisted 
mainly of Bank of Van Diemen's Land notes, either to exchange against his 
own at clearing, or to remit to Hobart. It was stressed that, as an agent only, 
he was not obliged to meet any Derwent note presented. Deposits could be 
taken “in British currency, Spanish dollars, in Colonial bank notes, in 
Treasury bills, orders on the Commissariat and on the Treasury, and in 
good private bills (to be taken to account when sold) on England, on 
Hobart Town, or Sydney”. For these deposits Connolly was to give receipts 
and make entries in pass books endorsed “payable at Launceston” to ensure 
that depositors did not thereby secure cheap remittance to Hobart. British 
currency so received in excess of £20 was to be exchanged for a 
Commissariat order on Hobart for a Treasury bill, “Orders on Hobart Town 
are only to be given to the friends and constituents of the bank or to such 
parties as may present to you specie, Derwent Bank notes (should you want 
them for circulation), orders on Sydney, Commissariat orders, bills on 
London . . . You will pay all cheques in notes of the Derwent Bank or in 
dollars, or in notes of the other banks in case of having no other notes, but 
never in British currency.” In clearing with the other banks Connolly was 
“always to consult your own convenience and the interests of the Derwent 
Bank”, and to stand on his right to refuse to cash Derwent notes. He was to 
meet clearing balances in notes of the other banks, if he had them, in 
dollars, or, if necessary, by a draft on Hobart. “Such a course of proceeding 
will in a very short time compel the other banks to enter into your terms.” 
Swanston was, in a very short time, to learn that two could play that game.  
   The first difficulty with this scheme was, in Swanston's own words, “the 
balance of trade being against Launceston”. Despite restriction of note 
issue to small denominations to limit the sending of them to Hobart,45 this 
occurred. Moreover a large proportion of Launceston shopkeepers were 
shareholders in the branch of the Bank of Van Diemen's Land and 
therefore paid to their accounts there all Derwent notes which were 
promptly presented for clearing.46 The refusal to cash notes or to meet 
deposits in Hobart (for remittance a customer had to buy a draft at a 
premium) was unattractive to customers; moreover the Bank of Van 
Diemen's Land was discounting bills up to six months without requiring 
Hobart approval of the bills, and therefore got the best of the business.47 
Clearing was the final source of trouble. With the Cornwall Bank, which 
was in no condition to be aggressive, an arrangement was concluded for 
settling balances by drafts on Hobart,48 but Gilles of the Van Diemen's 
Land, having sized up the situation, demanded daily settlement in specie 
which forced Connolly to refuse to meet any notes in coin. Thereupon the 
Van Diemen's Land could fairly refuse to accept Derwent notes and 
thereby destroy their public acceptability.49 Connolly added to the public 
unwillingness to deal with the agency by refusing to accept in Launceston 
payment of bills originally discounted by Swanston in Hobart.50 Swanston 
accepted the inevitable and directed Connolly to wind up the branch, three 
months after it had opened, Connolly himself promptly joining the board of 
the branch of the Bank of Van Diemen's Land.51  
   With the opening of the Van Diemen's Land branch and Derwent agency 
the Cornwall Bank proposed to raise additional capital by additional calls 
and 200 new shares,52 and secured an agent to cash its notes in Hobart.53 
Sale of the additional shares proved difficult in competition with the new 
shares of the Bank of Van Diemen's Land and against public knowledge 
that the bank was in difficulties, and they were still being offered three 
months later.54 By November 1832 the directors were announcing their 
intention of closing and had already ceased to make new advances, being 
embarrassed by frozen loans.55 But the step was not taken immediately and 
it was not until June 1833 that the directors advertised their intention to 
“close all matters connected with that establishment with as little delay as 
possible”.56 But almost immediately after it became effective the decision 
was reversed. Notwithstanding the admission of considerable losses, plans 
were made to reopen on 1 January 1834 with a further 200 shares offered 
to the public57 and a new manager and board.58 The new lease of life was 
due to C. S. Henty who also secured a credit of £2,000 from the Derwent 
Bank to meet drafts on Hobart and the right to issue in Launceston £2,000 
of Derwent Bank notes.59 Under its new manager the bank prospered, 
paying 10 per cent dividend a year later.60 The bank was then able to 
reorganize the capital structure, converting the old £50 shares on which 
£15 was paid to fully paid shares and extending the total shares to 1,000 by 
a new public offer with attractive bait, the bank then having a nominal 
capital of £15,000 which it was intended should be fully paid.61  
   It was at this point that the local agent of the Van Diemen's Land 
Company approached Arthur with a proposal that the Company should add 
banking in the northern part of the island to its other activities.62 Arthur 
conceded the desirability of better facilities in the north, but reflected that 
“banking and paper issues are subjects of peculiar perplexity in a new 
country, more especially when the proposed bankers are absentees whose 
local interests are separate from and perhaps opposed to those of the 
community generally, and whose wealth is so great as to enable them to 
control the local money market with the most despotic authority”. He 
thought the proposal might be approved if mortgages were forbidden; an 
office established in Hobart to cash notes; the local government 
empowered to set limits to note issue and discounts from time to time; the 
governor had power to suspend activities if it operated “injuriously”; and 
the initial charter were for a short period. That was the end of the scheme.63  
   Plans for reorganizing the Launceston branch of the Bank of Van 
Diemen's Land as the independent Tamar Bank were laid, nearly a year in 
advance, the prospectus being published in February 1834.64 Capital was 
nominally £200,000 in £50 shares (to be 75 per cent paid before the bank 
commenced), which it was hoped to spread widely by limiting 
subscriptions prior to opening to thirty shares. The bank was to take over 
the Van Diemen's Land branch as a going concern, but with two new 
departures. Cash credits “according to the Scotch banking system” were to 
be available, with a limit (the usual one in Australian banks in the next two 
decades) of £500. Secondly, interest was to be offered on “dormant 
deposits”, provisionally set at 5 per cent for sums lodged for six months 
and 4 per cent for those lodged for three months, with a minimum of £25. 
By June a board had been appointed and in due course the new bank 
opened on 1 January 1835.65  
Banking Boom in New South Wales 
   Although the organization of new banking facilities to exploit the boom 
was slower in starting than in Tasmania, once begun the process was 
sustained and far-reaching, reflecting its ultimate basis in the spread of the 
sheep. It is not entirely coincidence that the story begins with the 
legislative removal of all restrictions on interest rates. No one had ever 
paid serious regard to what the law might mean on that subject, and no 
doubts or uncertainties had delayed or hindered the already substantial 
inflow of funds. But doubts having been raised by the perversity of a judge 
who took his law seriously, business interests made it clear that they would 
not tolerate interference with the golden opportunity. The Interest Act of 
1834 became the ideal advertising document with which overseas investors 
could be convinced that only delay on their part could limit their returns. It 
was followed closely by four episodes in banking, each of which 
demonstrated a central fact about the finance of the boom. Roemer's 
peculiar scheme for a bank showed that too great precision in the terms 
investors were asked to accept and the limitations on their freedom were 
not the bait for the times. The immediate success of the Commercial 
Banking Company of Sydney pointed the way to the future in banking; 
new modes of lending in cash credits, the importance of deposits attracted 
by interest as a basis for loans, the function of branch banking—in short, 
old-fashioned restricted banking through a single office on the basis of 
shareholders' funds had had its day. The initial success of the Bathurst 
Bank and its ultimate defeat underlined the fact that while the boom, to 
feed which all this banking development was ultimately designed, lay on 
the plains to the west and south, no merely local resources could exploit 
more than a tiny share of the harvest; while the trivial story of Tommy the 
Banker illustrated how readily the financier with the right technique could 
gain easy acceptance of the most suspicious security.  
(a) Interest Act 1834 
   In June 1833 the question of whether English usury laws applied in New 
South Wales was raised by a difference of opinion amongst Supreme Court 
judges.66 No interest being expressed in a disputed contract, the plaintiff 
asked for 10 per cent as being customary in the colony; the defendant 
argued that under English law the maximum was 5 per cent. The majority, 
Chief Justice Forbes and Judge Dowling, held that English usury law had 
no application to New South Wales, but that King's order of 1804 was 
valid and awarded the plaintiff 8 per cent. This had been the custom of the 
court, summarized by Dowling: “In 1828, when I became a judge in this 
colony, I found that eight per cent was regarded by my brother judges, by 
professors of the law, by assessors and magistracy, by the whole mercantile 
body, as the just and reasonable rate of interest for money lent on 
securities”, the source of the unanimity being King's order.  
   Judge Burton took a different view, holding that King's order was invalid 
and that, English law applying to the colony, the maximum that could be 
recovered was 5 per cent. He analysed the practice of the court and found 
that it had upheld contracts for much higher rates: 
   His was a minority view, but Forbes was unsure of his law and Burton's 
more authoritative judgment was at least plausible. Accordingly Forbes 
moved in the Council for a bill to fix the maximum rate recoverable at law 
at 8 per cent.67 But the bill when introduced was of very different 
substance. It followed a declaration that English usury laws had no 
application to New South Wales by providing that in actions where “the 
rate of such interest hath not been previously agreed upon by or between 
the parties”, but in no other case, maximum interest recoverable at law 
should be 8 per cent. Bourke, in introducing the bill, disclosed his doubts 
by proposing that it be not proceeded with until the next session.68  
   In the interval, a sub-committee of Council took evidence on the bill and 
Judgments 
Rate per cent 1829 1830
8 75 86
10 13 2
2 29 31
13 1 —
15 — 2
TOTALS 118 121
there was a vigorous public discussion. The Australian supported the bill: 
“The cant about the sin of usury we utterly despise, for money is as much 
an article of commerce as sugar, tea or tobacco”,69 as did the Herald.70 The 
Monitor took the other side,71 and the Gazette maintained a steady attack 
on the bill, pointing out correctly the extremely restricted nature of the 
limitation it proposed.72 Burton sent to Bourke a long protest73 against the 
bill, reciting cases which had come before him in Court: “£45 per cent was 
given and taken upon the discounting a bill of exchange for £38, which had 
between four and five months to run . . . £1 per week was taken for a loan 
of £15 . . . £1 was taken for discounting a promissory note for £7 which 
had fourteen days to run . . . £3 were taken for discounting a promissory 
note for £5, payable in two months . . . it is a common thing in this country 
for poor people to give ten shillings a week for the loan of £2”. He 
followed this recital with two statistical tables showing for the period from 
the first law term of 1828 to the end of the first term of 1834, first, 
judgments entered by the court and second, mortgages registered with the 
court. These give such a complete picture of the interest rate structure that 
they are reproduced in full (pp. 248 and 249).  
   It will be noticed that contracts below 8 per cent were negligible and that 
where precise rates were expressed there is a concentration upon 10, 121/2, 
15 and 20. “Colonial interest” meant 10 per cent and “legal interest” 8 per 
cent. The other striking columns are those covering cases where interest 
was provided for but no particular rate mentioned and where no interest 
appeared in the contract. These show the prevalence of the devices 
mentioned by Burton for concealing the size of the rate, subtracting interest 
from the loan in advance, or adding it to the principal agreed to be repaid. 
(He was not alive to the ways in which these and other tricks familiar in 
England could defeat a general restriction.) His plea was that the bill 
should extend a legal maximum to all loans irrespective of whether 
contracts specified a rate or not. Meanwhile the sub-committee had been 
taking evidence, the weight of which was against any general usury law, 
although some witnesses who suggested a maximum rate appeared 
uncertain whether they were proposing a general restriction or one to apply 
where contracts mentioned no rate. The sub-committee accordingly 
reported in favour of the bill,74 which went back to Council in unchanged 
form and was promptly passed.75  
(b) New Colonial Banks 
   Under the title of “Sydney Bank”, Charles William Roemer, a 
storekeeper, announced the opening of a new bank on a somewhat original 
plan, on 1 February 1834. His initial advertisement disclosed no more than 
that the bank had opened on this day, that it had already issued £1 notes 
payable on demand, and that Roemer was acting “in conjunction with some 
friends” who proposed to issue a prospectus “shortly”.76 As if this reversal 
of the logical order were not enough, the prospectus published two months 
later77 extended the reversal. The capital was set at £100,000 in £100 shares 
on which Roemer had “advanced” £5 per share (a nominal total of £5,000). 
The “friends” were revealed as Edward Hancock, whose place was 
evidently that of partner, and Richard Jones (then president of the Bank of 
New South Wales) who was nominated as trustee for shareholders. These 
shareholders were to take over the shares held by Roemer, paying him the 
first instalment of £5 plus a premium of £1 “in consideration of his 
exertions and incidental expenses, and for providing the first instalment”. 
There the rights of shareholders ended for twelve months, during which 
Roemer was to “retain the entire management”, but after a year (or earlier 
on a requisition by holders of 300 shares) a general meeting was to decide 
the form of future management and whether any further calls were 
necessary, Roemer undertaking to repay any dissentients. Meanwhile bills 
were to be discounted daily at a rate fixed by agreement, deposits were to 
be received, including fixed deposits, and notes were to be issued.  
    
    
MEMORANDUM of Judgments entered up on Warrants of Attorney, from the 1st
1st Term, 1834, both inclusive. 
Year 8&percnt; 10&percnt; 12&percnt; 121/2&percnt; 13&percnt; 15&percnt; 20&percnt; No 
particular 
rate 
expressed
With 
colonia
interes
1828 25 20 – 1 – 1 2 12 –
1829 16 46 1 – 1 1 1 17 2
1830 5 44 1 – – 2 1 19 –
1831 9 32 1 – – 2 5 16 1
1832 – 12 1 1 – 5 2 6 –
1833 – 11 2 1 – 4 – 10 –
1834 – 2 – – – – – 2 –
TOTALS 55 167 6 3 1 15 11 82 3
MEMORANDUM of Mortgages Registered in the Supreme Court of New South W
Year 5&percnt; 71/2&percnt; 8&percnt; 10&percnt; 11&percnt; 12&percnt; 121/2&percnt; 13&percnt; 131/2
   Whether any subscribers were found to take these risks is uncertain, but 
there could not have been many, for it does not seem that, except as 
Roemer's private concern, the institution operated. Certainly had it been 
active at the time another name would have been sought for the Sydney 
Banking Company of 1839. Subsequent references are to Roemer as an 
individual financier, not to any bank; he may have secured some additional 
capital by his move but he did not found a joint-stock bank. These later 
references are mainly to the high rates he charged. From the beginning a 
discount rate of 15 per cent was imposed, at least on second-rate bills,78 and 
English notes were exchanged for immigrants at the same rate.79  
   The initial planning of the Commercial Banking Company of Sydney 
was carried through without publicity, mainly in August 1834. The Sydney 
Gazette gave the first report which it said it was unable to confirm;80 less 
than a fortnight later the first public announcement recorded that the 
original plan for a nominal capital of £120,000 in £100 shares was to be 
revised since the whole had already been taken up.81 A week later a 
meeting “with the greatest ardour” enlarged the shares from the 1,500 
proposed by the promoters to 3,000,82 of which all were taken up 
immediately,83 and holders of more than half had signed the deed of 
settlement by early November84 and all calls had been paid by the end of 
December.85 10 per cent of capital was called (some subscribers voluntarily 
paid more) and the bank opened in Sydney on 1 November 1834.86  
   In offering interest on deposits the bank made an important innovation, 
the start of the scramble for deposits of the next eight years. Originally it 
was proposed to offer 5 per cent on three months deposits and 21/2 per 
cent on current accounts,87 but the directors more cautiously fixed 3 per 
cent on amounts which were in fact left for three months but withdrawal of 
which was possible at any time.88 “They fear this rate is too low, in 
comparison with the current rate of interest in the colony, to induce 
capitalists to invest deposits permanently in the bank, but it has been 
deemed advisable to commence with a low rate to be afterwards increased 
if found expedient, rather than to commence with a high rate and be 
obliged to reduce it.”89 The other banks of necessity followed suit and were 
also stirred to action by the promise that the Commercial would discount 
1828 – – 13 17 – 1 – – –
1829 1 – 6 23 – – – – –
1830 – – 4 48 – 3 6 – –
1831 – 1 – 38 – 6 4 – –
1832 1 – – 30 1 6 13 1 –
1833 – – 9 62 – 14 20 – 1
1834 – – 2 32 – – 1 1 –
TOTALS 2 1 34 250 1 30 44 2 1
thrice a week compared with the traditional single day of the others.90 The 
Banks of New South Wales and Australia both adopted two discount days91 
(unnecessarily since the Commercial after all took bills only one day a 
week)92 and considered reducing the discount rate to 8 per cent, but decided 
to adhere to 10 per cent.93 Both considered capital increases, again without 
result.94 The threat of competition appeared real, for after only two months 
the Commercial held deposits of £22,630 and had lent £38,183, while its 
cash holdings, £22,232, pointed to its ability to extend rapidly,95 but 
presumably the other two banks decided, correctly enough, that there was 
room for all without aggressive competition.96  
   The pastoralists of Bathurst were quick to seize upon the fashionable 
device of bank flotation as an instrument for financing pastoral expansion. 
A meeting on 10 September 1834, thin in numbers because of rain but 
enthusiastic, adopted a plan which had evidently been fully prepared in 
advance.97 Capital was set at £10,000 in £100 shares; business was to 
comprise issue of notes of £1 and £5, but not other denominations; 
discount of bills up to three months at not more than 10 per cent,98 loans on 
real estate, plate or bullion to a maximum of one-half the capital; the 
receipt of deposits on current account and on three months' notice, deposits 
bearing not more than 5 per cent.99 A major reason for forming the bank 
was the difficulty of making local payments since cheques were payable 
only in Sydney at the banks there and could only be locally negotiated, 
even in goods, at a discount.100 The necessity for close financial connection 
with Sydney was recognized in providing that bills discounted might be 
payable either in Bathurst or at a Sydney bank, that cheques on Sydney 
banks should be accepted for deposit, and that an account should be opened 
with a Sydney bank willing to act as agent there.  
   Few other Australian banks achieved their initial plans so quickly and 
smoothly. By late September the newly elected directors101 could announce 
that capital was fully subscribed and that, as planned, the bank would open 
on 1 January 1835 as indeed it did.102 In the interval the directors had 
secured temporary use of an idle portion of the Commissariat store for 
premises,103 ordered the printing of notes,104 arranged for the Bank of 
Australia to keep the Sydney account of the bank,105 appointed John Slade 
to be cashier,106 received “nearly £1,000” in deposits from shareholders the 
day before opening, and obtained the privilege of acting for the 
Commissariat in paying pensions to local residents.107  
   The business as it developed fell into two main parts. First was 
discounting bills at 10 per cent. Loans secured by mortgage as promised in 
the prospectus were provided for, each being limited to £300 for twelve 
months, to be drawn by cheques payable at 10 per cent discount,108 but few 
such loans were made109 and by 1837 they had been abandoned in favour of 
discounting exclusively.110 The other main business was in receiving for 
collection in Sydney notes of and cheques on Sydney banks and “orders” 
on the Sydney agents of local residents. Within two days of opening some 
£260 worth of these was remitted and a constant stream followed.111 At first 
commission was charged for collecting,112 but soon this was abandoned so 
far as depositors were concerned,113 for the bank was keen to build up 
Sydney funds for lending in Sydney. Note issue was never a large source 
of profit, although not insignificant.114  
   The immediate flow of deposits in the form of cheques on Sydney banks 
caused the Bathurst directors to inquire whether the Bank of Australia 
could lend on their behalf in Sydney,115 but apparently this could not be 
arranged for an offer was accepted from Henry Gilbert Smith, a merchant 
of Sydney.116 The terms as finally agreed were that the Bank of Australia 
should retain £300 for immediate cash demands and that the surplus 
(initially £2,000) should be transferred to Smith who was to give the 
Bathurst Bank six months bills at 10 per cent discount. Smith received 
&frac38; per cent commission and was free to get the best return he could. 
“The bank does not wish to be at all known in the business, so that you 
may charge the parties with whom you have money dealings any sum you 
like.”117 Should the bank require cash before the six months expired, Smith 
undertook to repay on a week's notice with a rediscount charge of 11/4 per 
cent. The business continued on these terms throughout the life of the 
bank.118  
   The volume of these Sydney funds was maintained because the bank 
sought deposits from Sydney residents which it credited in Bathurst at par, 
on notice of receipt by the Bank of Australia.119 The practical effect 
therefore amounted to the bank doing banking business not only in 
Bathurst but also, by proxy, in Sydney. In Bathurst it received as deposits 
Sydney bank notes and cheques and orders on merchants; to these it added 
deposits solicited in Sydney and through Smith lent in Sydney. In these 
circumstances it avoided the expensive and risky business of transferring in 
cash its Sydney balances, which in any case were too large for it to lend 
locally—Bathurst pastoralists necessarily received their main income 
through Sydney and made a substantial part of their payments there. So 
long as the economic weather was good the bank needed cash only in small 
amounts for local change purposes, and these it drew at intervals from the 
Bank of Australia, with slightly comic devices for secrecy as a precaution 
against theft.120 Amounts drawn at varying intervals, most frequently from 
November to May, when they were often monthly, ranged from £50 to 
£200, indicative of the modest local needs for cash.  
   The combined Bathurst and Sydney business proved profitable. The 
dividend at the end of the first year was 343/4 per cent (on the paid-up 
capital)121 and this was followed by three half-yearly dividends of similar 
size.122 Thereafter rates were lower but still profitable.123 Accordingly there 
was talk of a private act to give the bank more permanence than its original 
seven-year term,124 although this was not achieved until 1839,125 and of 
plans for a bank building,126 and attempts to secure more capital. It is not 
clear how much of the original nominal capital of £10,000 had been paid 
up (the first payment was only 5 per cent), but certainly only a modest part, 
when in November 1835 the nominal capital was increased to £20,000 
(with a first payment on the new shares of 5 per cent).127 Almost 
immediately a new share issue was preferred to further calls and nominal 
capital was raised to £30,000.128 A year later there was a call of 5 per cent 
coupled with a threat of forfeiture of dividends if it were not paid,129 but if 
there were other calls, as there probably were (apart from an emergency 
call in 1839), they have not been recorded. Total paid-up capital at its 
maximum was probably of the order of £5,000.130  
   This suggests a large reserve of uncalled capital for emergencies, but the 
shareholders were local residents, pastoralists or townsmen dependent 
upon the fortunes of wool, and had the bank survived until the slump the 
reserve would have proved illusory. Nor would consideration of its loans 
suggest ability to meet sudden pressure. Those in Sydney were dependent 
upon the ability of Smith to recall them, and the bank had no control over 
his choice of borrowers; indeed, by requiring him to pay the bank 10 per 
cent they ensured that his choice would not be amongst the quickest 
payers. Local discounts were tied to the fortunes of wool and even early in 
1838 Kinnear of the Bank of Australasia noted that the Bathurst Bank was 
embarrassed by the failure of borrowers to meet their commitments.131 The 
good profits therefore were gained at the cost of vulnerability. The 
challenge, when it came, was competition, a branch of the Bank of 
Australasia.  
   In the bustle of bank flotations, light relief, at least for those who avoided 
his notes, was provided by “Tommy the Banker”. This cheerful rogue, 
Thomas Wright, who claimed to be 102, commenced note issue at least as 
early as 1835 with £1 and £5 notes in the name of “Defiance Bankers”.132 
In November 1836 he failed to secure customers when he announced, 
“Notice is given out by the said Thomas Wright, banker, to inform any 
respectable company of gentlemen that wishes to establish a bank, I engage 
with them to establish a bank as respectable a bank as in all England, there 
is ne'er a gentleman banker in all England able to beat me in a banking-
house for the benefit of the bank.”133 Accordingly he started in business 
himself the following year with notes resembling those of the Banks of 
Australia and Australasia, and kept, so the press reported, just within the 
law by cashing them on demand.134 Emboldened, he launched out reaching, 
it was said, an issue of £9,000 in £1, £10 and £20 notes of the “Austilin 
Bank” four months later,135 and proceeded to vary it as “Austiln” and 
“Austilian” and to add the “Sydney Bank”, “Parramatta Trading Bank”, 
and, appropriately, “Defiance Company”. A career of this sort which was 
not interrupted until August 1839 merited a better end than a sentence of 
fourteen years to Norfolk Island.136 His success makes that of apparently 
more respectable institutions unnecessary to explain.  
The Coming of the English Banks 
   Long before the Commercial Bank of Sydney was afloat London 
capitalists were planning on the one hand the Bank of Australasia and on 
the other the South Australian Company, soon to be followed by the Union 
Bank of Australia. The two banks by their titles indicated the range of their 
plans and they and the Bank of South Australia created by the company 
were a completely new development. While they sought and used the 
advice and knowledge of colonial residents, they were British ventures, 
designed to make profits for British shareholders, with close and detailed 
supervision of policy by London directors. (The devices of colonial 
shareholders and local directors were to ensure acceptance by interested 
parties and the benefit of specialized knowledge on the spot; there was 
never any question of independent local control or of the subordination of 
policy to local interests.) They, and their specialized imitators, the 
mortgage companies, were the response to the desire of British investors 
for a larger share in and a more direct control over the golden fleece.  
(a) Bank of Australasia 
   The first local references to the formation of the Bank of Australasia give 
credit for the initiative to Potter Macqueen, then in London, who, it was 
said, proposed a joint bank and whaling company, each part separately 
capitalized but the two run in close association. For the bank a capital of 
£500,000 was suggested, to be subscribed partly in the colonies, partly in 
England; interest on deposits at 6 per cent and discount rate of 10 per cent 
were forecast; the manager to be sent from England was “Mr Joplin, 
brother of the present actuary of the Provincial Bank of Ireland”.137 A 
number of points make it certain that this scheme, whether it were 
Macqueen's own or he merely the go-between for colonial support, was the 
basis from which grew the Bank of Australasia.138 The directors, however, 
in their first report, dated the commencement of their plans as November 
1832,139 implying presumably the time at which the main lines of the plan 
finally adopted were agreed upon. That plan140 was for the “Royal Bank of 
Australasia and South Africa”, to be chartered with limited liability, 
capitalized at £300,000 (to be increased if necessary by directors to double 
this amount), the capital to be fully paid within two years. Branches were 
to be established initially in Sydney, Hobart, Cape of Good Hope, Maitland 
and Launceston.  
   The application for a charter, however, came at a time when the Treasury 
and Colonial Office were trying to work out a policy for colonial banking 
and as this was to be the first bank chartered for operation in the colonies 
many questions of principle had to be settled before the charter was finally 
granted.141 The original memorial, setting out proposals which the directors 
by prior discussion had learned would have a good chance of acceptance, 
was sent forward in May 1833.142 It proposed a charter for a bank 
capitalized at £300,000 to operate in both Australia and South Africa, with 
power to increase capital to double this amount, liability of shareholders 
being limited to their subscriptions. The Treasury took some months to 
reach decisions which involved the general question of colonial banking, 
and only in December 1834 stated the conditions upon which a charter 
might be granted:143  
 
(i) The bank was not to commence business until all shares were taken up and half 
capital paid up; if this was not achieved within eighteen months the charter was to be 
void;  
(ii) total debts should never exceed thrice the sum of paid up capital and deposits;  
(iii) notes were to be payable on demand, at the principal office in each colony as 
well as at branch of issue, although a branch need not cash the notes of a principal 
office;  
(iv) suspension of cash payments for any continuous period of sixty days or for a 
total of sixty days in one year should terminate charter;  
(v) liability should be limited to twice subscriptions;  
(vi) the company should not buy its own stock or lend on security of that stock;  
(vii) bills to which directors or officers were parties should not exceed one-third of 
total discounts;  
(viii) land or other real estate must not be taken as security, nor should the company 
deal in real estate or merchandise except as might be necessary to realize property 
taken for debt;  
(ix) dividends should be paid only out of profits;  
(x) notes should be for £1, £2, £5 or higher but none for fractions of a pound;  
(xi) weekly statements should be kept and half-yearly averages published in the 
colonies and in London.  
   On these terms a charter would be granted for twenty-one years, for 
Australia only, not for South Africa.  
   Modification of these terms was sought.144 The refusal to include South 
Africa was reiterated, as were the prohibition of notes for fractions of a 
pound, and the twenty-one-year limit, although the latter was softened by 
pointing out that renewal could be sought.145 The sixty-day limit for cash 
suspension was extended to 130 days, a reduction in initial capital to 
£200,000 because of the exclusion of South Africa was approved, but the 
prohibition on real estate being security for a loan was elaborated to 
include prohibition of its being taken as collateral.146 The directors 
acquiesced in these terms, although they did not abandon hope of doing 
business in South Africa. Repeated representations for the extension of the 
charter for this purpose having been refused,147 they took up the suggestion 
for a separate Bank of South Africa, the unsuccessful negotiations for 
which are no part of the Australian story.148 Long before they ended the 
Bank of Australasia was in operation in New South Wales and Tasmania.  
   Having agreed to the terms of the charter, issue of which was delayed by 
legal technicalities, the directors pushed ahead with organization and 
preparations for the despatch of officers to the colonies. A revised 
prospectus was prepared149 and shares allotted; and the structure of the 
bank determined. In accordance with the original proposals for the charter, 
ultimate control was vested in a London “Court” of directors, with 
authority to appoint local boards for branches. For these local boards it was 
hoped, without avail as it turned out, to secure one or two government 
officials;150 and for other members local merchants, partly to give the bank 
standing but mainly for their local knowledge of the reputation of 
borrowers. Montefiore, a director, was authorized to commission his 
brother, J. B. Montefiore of Sydney, to form the local board there, and his 
brother's Hobart partner, Furtado, to do likewise in that town.151  
   These local boards were to exercise general supervision, subject to 
directions from London and, in certain matters, for example the variation 
of discount rates,152 the concurrence of the Inspector; in certain things, such 
as the opening of sub-branches, the local directors had no discretion.153 At a 
very early stage it was decided that the Sydney establishment should be the 
main one in the colonies and its manager should have “certain control” 
over the others.154 This finally took the form of uniting the offices of 
Sydney manager and Inspector, the first appointed being George 
Kinnear.155 The powers and functions of this officer were supposed to be 
directed towards co-ordination of the policies and practices of the several 
branches as well as checking the efficiency and honesty of officers and 
ensuring that London instructions were carried out. A good deal of friction 
arose, as it turned out, since the powers of the Inspector vis-à-vis the local 
boards were necessarily vague; precise statement of them would have 
made it impossible to secure satisfactory local directors by making too 
clear that their only real purpose was as scrutineers of bills offered for 
discount.  
   The organization of the London office was completed by the appointment 
of a permanent secretary,156 and the main conditions of business in the 
colonies were settled. In addition to discounts cash credits were approved, 
as was interest on deposits, but not on current accounts; in general only 
three months bills were to be discounted subject to the discretion of local 
boards.157 Branches would draw bills on London at thirty days after sight, 
limited initially to a total of £80,000 in excess of their remittances to 
London.158 Since the Bank of England could not provide new coin, 
arrangements were made for the minting of £50,000, the bank advancing 
funds for the Mint to purchase the bullion.159 Subscriptions came in 
promptly from shareholders (being temporarily invested in Exchequer 
bills)160 and by March 1835 the half payment of capital required by the 
charter being in hand,161 Kinnear was despatched in a ship named for him, 
with the newly minted coin, to establish the colonial branches in Hobart, 
Launceston and Sydney, arriving at the first of these on 23 October 1835.162 
Meanwhile the London board signalled the commencement of business by 
advertising its willingness to buy and sell bills on the colonies.163  
   The colonists received news of the Bank of Australasia, “Goliah” as the 
newspapers christened it, with mixed feelings. Reduced interest rates as a 
result of competition and facility in exchange dealings were the advantages 
most frequently foreseen.164 But fears were expressed that it would operate 
to drain the colonies of coin in remittance of profits,165 and doubts were 
raised as to the merits of its limited liability.166 The comment was 
predominantly hostile and Kinnear's first task was to establish good 
relations in a chill atmosphere. In Hobart hostility was most marked, 
Kinnear thought, because of false beliefs that the Australasia was to have a 
monopoly of government business and its notes were to be inconvertible 
legal tender.167 It was difficult to persuade suitable men to join a local 
board168 and the governor refused to nominate an official;169 and the branch 
had to open with a local board of two.170 The governor, although he 
complied with his instructions by making the Commissariat vault available 
for safekeeping of the bank's specie,171 proved difficult, long refusing to 
give the bank a share in the government deposit,172 and Kinnear did not 
endear himself by objecting to the publication of returns from the other 
banks since this might suggest they were of equal status with the 
Australasia.173 Opening was further delayed because of a number of 
bankruptcies, Kinnear thinking it wise to wait and see what might 
happen;174 exchange business, for sale of bills on London and Sydney 
commenced on 18 December 1835175 and full banking business on 1 
January 1836. Terms of business included 8 per cent discount on bills to 
three months, 10 per cent interest on cash credits, and 5 per cent on 
deposits subject to three months' notice.176  
   Apart from approaches from Phillips of Cape Town to revive the project 
for a South African offshoot, from Rowland Hill for a branch in Adelaide, 
and by various persons for a Perth branch,177 the London directors received 
an offer from James Henty for absorption of the Cornwall Bank in 
Launceston. Henty had gone to London in 1834 in search of more capital 
for the Cornwall, but instead proposed, subject to confirmation by the 
proprietors, that the Cornwall should transfer its business.178 The terms 
agreed upon were that the Cornwall should close, transferring its premises, 
and the Cornwall directors undertaking “to use their influence” to persuade 
customers to keep their business with the Australasia. The Australasia 
incurred no liability in respect of Cornwall business, but undertook to 
appoint C. S. Henty as local manager and to provide at par the share 
qualification for local directors.179 Henty's offer was probably dictated by 
knowledge of the Australasia's decision to establish a Launceston branch;180 
its acceptance was the more ready because the directors had already 
determined to explore the possibility of absorbing colonial banks181 and had 
already discussed with W. H. Hamilton, agent of the Derwent Bank, the 
possibility of absorbing it and the Bank of Van Diemen's Land, but had put 
these schemes aside to seek, without success, exclusive rights over colonial 
government banking business.182 The Cornwall proprietors readily accepted 
the proposal,183 and Kinnear proceeded overland to complete arrangements 
for taking over the business. He found that the Cornwall's paid up capital 
was £9,760, mainly held by proprietors who had no occasion to borrow 
from it.184 The Cornwall directors, in anticipation of the taking over, had 
reduced their discount rate to 8 per cent,185 and as a result of the consequent 
expansion of loans had to be given immediate aid by a loan of £4,000.186 C. 
S. Henty was appointed manager and his brother James one of the five 
local directors;187 terms of business were fixed at the same rates as those 
later adopted by Hobart.188 Kinnear, alive to the general hostility he had so 
far experienced, thought it politic to continue the clearing agreement which 
the Cornwall and Tamar had concluded, subject to six months' notice since 
he did not like the arrangement.189 The Cornwall Bank closed on 31 
December 1835 (it was finally wound up in April 1836)190 and the 
Australasia opened on 1 January 1836.191  
   Kinnear had already proceeded to Sydney to establish the main branch 
which he did so promptly that it opened on 14 December 1835, before 
either of the Tasmanian branches. The terms of business provided for 10 
per cent discount on bills to three months, 10 per cent interest on cash 
credits and 5 per cent on deposits subject to three months' notice.192 He met 
considerable hostility from the local banks who lost cash to the Australasia, 
and from merchants whom he deprived of exchange business which was 
formerly their preserve. Initially the main business was in exchange, and 
customers showed interest in discounts, but not in other business.193  
(b) Bank of South Australia 
   In the original plans for the settlement of South Australia a bank had no 
place, but the promoters soon had to face two problems, how to pay its 
own employees in the colony, and how to meet requests by migrants that 
the South Australian company should receive their funds in London for 
payment in the colony.194 Approaches were made to the Bank of 
Australasia for a branch of that bank,195 but the directors were not keen 
(when they did establish a branch later it was only as a “temporary 
experiment”)196 and the company turned to self-help. As a temporary 
expedient arrangements were made for special notes for small local 
payments in the colony. The Resident Commissioner and the Surveyor 
were empowered to make payments by orders on the storekeeper, who in 
turn was equipped with a small amount of cash and directed to meet these 
notes from “the moneys arising from the sale of stores”.197 The notes were 
for denominations of 6d., 1s., 2s., 5s., 10s. and £1 and in all they were 
issued from the first establishment at Kingscote to the amount of £1,192 
9s. 6d.198 They were unpopular with workmen because in small amounts 
they could only be spent at the company's store, which was not always 
ready to take them,199 and once the company's bank was opened it was 
possible to withdraw them and substitute Bank of South Australia notes.200  
   As a more permanent solution the directors determined upon “the 
establishment of a bank or banks in or connected with the new colony of 
South Australia, making loans on land or produce in the colony, and the 
conducting of such banking operations as the directors may deem 
expedient”,201 and were soon able to announce “shipped by the Coromandel 
of 662 tons, the frame and materials of their banking house, safety iron 
chests, furniture, books and other necessary articles for this undertaking, 
with a supply of specie and bank notes, under the care of the Deputy 
Manager and Accountant, a gentleman of respectability and of 
considerable experience in banking in this country”.202 In June 1836 
immigrants were being invited to make deposits in London for payment 
through the bank in the colony.203 Agents (of the company, not of the bank 
as such) were appointed at the Cape, St. Helena, Sydney, Hobart, 
Launceston, Madras, Calcutta, Bombay, Canton, Mauritius and Ceylon.204  
   The bank duly opened in Adelaide in April 1837.205 Terms of business, 
fixed in conference with Gilles of the Tamar Bank, were 10 per cent 
discount on loans, advances and bills; 7 per cent interest on deposits 
exceeding £50 and 5 per cent on smaller sums. Purchase of local bills on 
London was at favourable rates of discount: 5 per cent on government bills, 
7 per cent on “prime commercial” and 10 per cent on “second-rate”.206 The 
government account was obtained.207 The bank was reassured about 
competition in this attractive business: “It is an express understanding with 
them [the Union Bank] that they are not to establish a bank in South 
Australia”,208 although it soon had to face a branch of the Australasia.  
(c) Union Bank 
   Late in 1836 it became known in the colonies that Liverpool capitalists 
were planning, on the same general lines as the Bank of Australasia, a 
“United Bank of Australia and Van Diemen's Land”.209 Capital was 
ultimately fixed at £500,000 in £25 shares, with power to increase to £1 
million. The title, later changed to Union Bank of Australia, was due to the 
avowed intention of effecting “junction with some of the existing banks”, 
for which purpose one-quarter of the shares was reserved for colonial 
sale.210 This purpose was not to be achieved, except for the absorption of 
the Tamar Bank which occurred in very special circumstances. The Tamar, 
barely recovered from its tumble with the Australasia, on learning of the 
projected new bank, sent Philip Oakden to negotiate “a connection”.211 
Oakden found organization proceeding slowly and was instrumental in 
persuading George Fife Angas to join the Union promoters (in June 1837). 
He stirred them to action so effectively that the company was formally 
established by the end of the first week in July and an agreement to absorb 
the Tamar concluded.212 Apart from his vigour in organization, Angas 
ensured that there should be no competition with the South Australian 
Company's Bank, this having been a determining factor in his decision to 
lend aid.213  
   From this time organization proceeded rapidly. The shares reserved for 
sale in England were disposed of without the need of public 
advertisement,214 and a structure similar to that of the Australasia agreed 
upon, with J. C. McLaren as first inspector. The taking over of the Tamar 
Bank in Launceston was smooth and prompt, the formal opening of the 
Union Bank branch being on 1 May 1838.215 In Hobart, opening was 
slower, occurring on 6 September 1838.216 Almost as prompt was the 
opening of a sub-branch of the Launceston branch in Campbell Town in 
the next month,217 and the replacement of the small-scale agency of the 
Derwent Bank in Melbourne by a Union branch, initially associated with 
the Launceston office.218 In Sydney time was lost seeking a merger with 
one of the existing banks and the bank did not open there until 2 January 
1839.219  
   The bank operated in each colony under a local act.220 In 1842 a charter 
was sought unsuccessfully.221 The Colonial Office referred the question to 
the colonial governors and received a long statement of reasons against the 
grant from Gipps.222 His arguments were that with the exception of the 
Australasia, all the other five banks in New South Wales were on an equal 
footing with the Union, and in fairness a charter could only be given to the 
Union if it were given to all; the bank had been in business for nearly four 
years without need of a charter, and it would be unjust to existing creditors 
now to give it limited liability; there could be no case that a charter would 
encourage capital import—the Union's capital was already sunk, and New 
South Wales had too much banking capital; and the usual safeguards of a 
charter were irrelevant. Publicity was already required by a local act, and 
the other usual restriction in charters, prohibition of mortgage lending, was 
ineffective and in fact evaded by the Australasia. Replies of the other 
governors are not available, but the request was refused with a statement of 
reasons which is a precis of Gipps' advice.223  
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Instructions to a certain extent evaded.” Colonial Secretary to Kinnear, 11 
November 1835, enclosed in “Letters to London”, 7 December 1835, repeats 
decision to publish. Kinnear in Sydney used the prestige argument the opposite way, 
to object to the Australasia being called upon to furnish the return required of other 
banks (see below, Appendix). 
174 “Letters to London”, 7 December 1835. 
175 Hobart Town Courier, 18 December 1835. 
176 Ibid., 20 November 1835. 
177 For Phillips, see Arndt, loc. cit.; for Adelaide and Perth, see below. 
178 “Minutes”, 26 February 1835. 
179 Ibid., 2 March 1835. A curious Launceston tradition has built this episode up 
into James Henty founding the Bank of Australasia; an anonymous article (by D. 
Weedon, formerly of Australasia, Launceston) turns it into an argument that the 
bank first began business in Launceston from the date of the agreement in London. 
Australasian Insurance and Banking Record, 21 October 1935. Walker, op. cit., p. 
25 accepts the statement of “a friend” that “the success of [the Tamar Bank] induced 
the Henty family to emigrate from England to Tasmania, from which sprang the 
Bank of Australasia”. 
180 “Minutes”, 1 January 1835. 
181 Ibid., 8 January 1834. 
182 Ibid., 15, 22 January 1834. Hamilton, despite his connection with the Derwent, 
advised the Australasia to offer both banks absorption, and if it were refused to start 
in opposition forthwith. 
183 Cornwall Chronicle, 21 November 1835; Launceston “Minutes”, 10 November 
1835. 
184 “Letters to London”, 7 November 1835. 
185 Cornwall Chronicle, 21 November 1835. 
186 Launceston “Minutes”, 10 November 1835. Kinnear made no comment on the 
obvious manoeuvre of extending loans at the eleventh hour, and raised no written 
objection to the loan to the Cornwall by the Australasia board, the same persons 
being a majority on each board. 
187 Cornwall Chronicle, 19 December 1835. 
188 Launceston “Minutes”, 14 November 1835; “Letters to London”, 7 December 
1835. 
189 “Letters to London”, 7 December 1835; Launceston “Minutes”, 18 December 
1835. For the subsequent conflicts over clearing see Chapter 14. 
190 Cornwall Chronicle, 9 April 1836. 
191 Ibid., 19 December 1835. 
192 Sydney Herald, 3 December 1835; First “Report”. 
193 “Letters to London”, 12 March 1836. 
194 First “Report”, 20 May 1836. Evidence of Angas to Select Committee on South 
Australia, Evidence, Q. 364. 
195 Letter from Rowland Hill, 14 November 1835 (London office), and reply in 
“Minutes”, 19 November 1835; interview with Angas, ibid., 17 December 1835. 
196 “Minutes”, 25 January 1838. Evidence of Angas to Select Committee on South 
Australia, Q. 560: “It was expected that the Australasian Bank would afford the 
necessary banking assistance, and application was made to them. They did not feel 
disposed at that time to render it, and the South Australian Company had no 
alternative but to establish a bank themselves.” 
197 Second Letter of Instructions to Resident Commissioner, 8 October 1836, 
Appendix 5 to Second Report of Colonization Commissioners for South Australia; 
Thomas Gilbert (storekeeper) to Resident Commissioner, 2 February 1838, 
“Resident Commissioner's Correspondence, Incoming” January–July 1838, pp. 50–3 
(Archives, Adelaide). The notes for £1,200 were originally given to Light, the 
Surveyor, who was directed to transfer the unused portion to Fisher, the Resident 
Commissioner. These original notes were for 2s. and 10s.; the other denominations 
were added locally and differed in form. 
198 South Australian Company, Returns Relative to Bank Notes Issued 1836–7 
(Archives, Adelaide, No. 1180). There is a summary on p. 78 of the detailed record 
of issues. The storekeeper (see reference in preceding note) said amount outstanding 
at any one time did not exceed £200. 
199 John Brown (Emigration agent at Glenelg) to Resident Commissioner, 4 March 
1837, “Brown Papers” 1837–49 (Adelaide Archives); Record of Court at Kingscote 
on 9 January 1837 (Archives No. 331/B4) includes a memorandum by Samuel 
Stephens directing penalties for all men who refused the notes (they were demanding 
British coin). He described the notes as “exchangeable at all times for stores, and 
(twice a week) for cash, or (if the amount were sufficient) for an order on London”. 
The “sufficient” amount was £100, out of reach of a workman. 
200 The storekeeper (loc. cit.) said the withdrawal occurred in June 1837. The 
Returns cited in note 198 show issue continuing until 27 October 1837. The conflict 
may be explained by the bank continuing to issue the Kingscote 5s. note. 
201 Revised prospectus. 
202 Supplement to First “Report”, 7 April 1837. The gentleman was McLaren. 
203 Advertisement dated 6 June 1836 annexed to First “Report”. 
204 Supplement to First “Report”. This supplement first uses the title “Bank of 
South Australia” by which name the banking department of the company and later 
the separate bank were always known. 
205 “Letters to London”, 1837–40, 19 May 1837. This first book of letters, by E. 
Stephens, is a delight, giving his account of the development of the colony. Bank 
business was small, and he wrote long letters to London with such comment as: 
“Every day elicits from him [the governor] some fresh instance of injudicious and 
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of the Australian colonies, to be styled ‘The United Banking Company of Australia 
and Van Diemen's Land’, and to whom we have this day written on the subject.” The 
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Bank of the South Australian Company from competition . . . ” The Union Bank, in 
its First “Report”, June 1839, explained that because of these “most friendly 
relations” it did not propose to open a South Australian branch. Hodder, op. cit., pp. 
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at either Launceston or Melbourne. 
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capital in a charter, the directors of this bank preferred to allot a greater proportion 
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Chapter 9 The Crest of the Boom 
   IN the closing years of the 'thirties the boom became wilder and more 
and more reckless, based on the seemingly limitless prospects of the wider-
ranging sheep1 ; despite a downward trend in wool prices and two years 
drought in New South Wales in 1838–39, the spread of the squatters 
continued. The English crisis of 1839 had no immediately obvious effect 
on the flow of capital; the Australasia and Union had no difficulty in new 
issues of shares, several mortgage companies were successfully 
inaugurated for Australian operation, while Swanston was not alone 
amongst investment agents in finding funds thrust upon him.  
   As a rough guide to capital import recorded trade figures must again 
serve: 
For Tasmania the statistical evidence shows no such rise, for the very good reason 
that residents were interested to the point of wild enthusiasm in grasping opportunities 
across Bass Strait in newly opened Port Phillip. For the mainland no allowance for 
invisible items and for errors of record can change the impression of a tidal wave of 
imported capital, which financed both monetary inflation and the last stages of 
pastoral expansion. 
   Sales of crown land in New South Wales rose rapidly: 
   These were, however, returns from sale of the freehold of Crown land 
only and do not disclose the increase in squatting occupation. Still less do 
NEW SOUTH WALES 
TRADE, 1836–1841 
(including Port Phillip)2 
Year Imports Exports Import Surplus
1836 £1,237,406 £748,624 £488,782
1837 1,297,491 760,054 537,437
1838 1,579,277 802,768 757,509
1839 2,236,371 948,776 1,287,595
1840 3,014,189 1,399,692 1,614,497
1841 2,527,988 1,023,397 1,504,591
VALUE 
OF 
CROWN 
LAND 
SOLD3 
1836 £126,459
1837 120,427
1838 116,325
1839 £152,963
1840 316,626
they convey the wild gambling in land values which developed in 
Adelaide, and, to an even higher degree, in Melbourne. Comparisons of 
prices of land sold by the Crown with prices at re-sale shortly afterwards 
summarize what was happening: 
   The magnitude of the inflation of city land prices points to another aspect 
of the boom's last fling. Urban enterprise flourished as vigorously as 
pastoral, attested by the expanding number and range of advertisements in 
the press, and by the appearance of a number of craft trade unions of 
skilled workers,5 who secured higher wages as labour shortage became 
PORT PHILLIP LAND PRICES4 
Government 
Sale
Private Re-
sale
Price 
(b )
Date Quantity 
(a)
Av. 
Prices 
(b)
Date
Highest Lowest Average
Melbourne 
Land
£ s. d. £ s. d. £ s. d. £ s. d.
1/6/37 100 35 15 0 4/39 to 
11/40
4,250 0 0 864 10 0 2,019 0 0
11/37 83 42 18 6 4/39 to 
11/40
9,450 0 0 416 0 0 3,471 0 0
13/9/38 68 117 5 0 5/39 to 
12/40
968 0 0 479 0 0 930 0 0
2/39 89 121 5 0 5/39 to 
12/40
1,266 0 0 404 0 0 747 0 0
6/40 85 406 2 9 7/40 to 
12/40
965 0 0 400 0 0 650 0 0
8/40 45 316 13 4 9/40 to 
12/40
1,662 0 0 625 0 0 989 0 0
Suburban 
Land
13/2/39 1,002 7 11 0 9/39 to 
11/40
440 0 0 46 0 0 179 3 0
1/8/39 316 20 12 6 12/39 to 
8/40
212 0 0 88 7 4 134 8 4
3/10/39 250 16 14 2 11/39 to 
10/40
200 0 0 19 1 1 67 10 0
Country Land
12/9/38 38,853 13 0 10/39 to 
11/40
3 1 5 1 10 0 2 10 0
1/8/39 5,907 1 7 6 9/39 to 
11/40
28 12 0 3 18 3 17 7 9
3/10/39 5,234 2 4 6 1840 20 0 0 5 0 0 8 0 0
5/2/40 21,589 1 9 2 26/2/40 12 1 7 1 13 10 7 7 8
10/6/40 4,502 9 3 6 8/40 60 0 0 40 0 0 50 0 0
acute, despite the extension of schemes of assisted migration.6 There was 
an outburst of joint-stock enterprise, auction companies, insurance 
companies, shipping companies and the like, even a Floating Bridge 
Company proposing to span Sydney Harbour and a premature railway 
company in Adelaide in 1839.  
   To finance these developments there was a further multiplication of 
colonial banks and increased capitalization of existing banks, a wide 
development of branch banking, and the formation in England of 
companies to lend on mortgage in Australia. Bank loans are a simple index 
of the final uprush of the boom. In New South Wales loans averaged 
£646,872 in the first half of 1836; at their peak in the second quarter of 
1841 £2,616,489, that is, they had been quadrupled in less than five years. 
In Tasmania and South Australia, where total figures can only be 
estimated, the expansion was of similar dramatic proportions.  
New Colonial Banks 
   The top of the boom saw no less than seven colonial attempts at creating 
new banking institutions. Three of these, with specialized purposes, were 
still-born; of the four ordinary banks none achieved any large established 
businesses. The times were not favourable; all commenced operations in 
1839–40, when the slackening of expansion was already discernible, and, 
except for the Colonial, all were managed in ways which made them 
extremely vulnerable to the first blast of adversity.  
   The organization of the Sydney Bank late in 1839 was carried through 
quickly. A first informal announcement in November7 was followed by a 
public meeting which issued a statement. Inter alia this proposed a curious 
method of pacifying those who had not received shares.8 A further meeting 
reached an even more curious decision, pretending to make shares 
available to “as large a number as possible of the respectable inhabitants” 
by increasing share value to £20, curtailing the number to be actually 
issued to 35,000 with 15,000 held for later disposal by the directors. 
Nominal capital thus became £1 million.9 There were vigorous protests of 
control by a clique and plots to monopolize discounts,10 not dissipated by 
an advertisement informing shareholders that their proposed amendments 
to the deed of settlement would be considered if received that day.11 That 
deed12 confirmed the capital arrangements, and foreshadowed an extensive 
business by empowering the directors to appoint agents in London and 
elsewhere, to create branches with local shareholders, and to buy other 
banks. A final meeting elected directors,13 and the Bank was able to open in 
the new year, with its shares, on which only £1 had been paid, at a 
premium of £2 10s. per share.14 
 
   The prospectus of the Port Phillip Bank was circulated in June, 1839, 
providing for a capital of £60,000 in £40 shares, and extolling the progress 
of Melbourne, which “must ultimately become the grand Emporium of the 
Commerce of the Southern Hemisphere”.15 There was delay in starting 
because a Sydney subscription of 200 shares was withdrawn and the 
proposed manager changed his mind.16 But a manager, J. Gardiner, was 
secured, and share applications proved so numerous that shares were 
increased first to 2,000 and then to 3,000.17 Opening day was 2 January 
1840,18 the Bank conforming to the terms of business of the Union and 
Australasia.19 Mutual agency arrangements were concluded with the Bank 
of Australia in Sydney, with Lewis Gilles & Co. in Launceston, and the 
Derwent Bank in Hobart,20 and the first of several efforts to establish a 
branch at Geelong was made.21 The usual Act for legal actions in the name 
of a public officer was secured.22  
   In June 1840 Lewis Gilles retired from the Union Bank in Launceston to 
open his own private bank there, Lewis Gilles & Co. Deposits were invited 
“at the usual rate”, daily discounts were offered, and agency business 
invited.23 Gilles carried with him the funds of the Launceston Bank for 
Savings,24 and secured the Launceston agency of the Derwent Bank,25 the 
Colonial Bank26 and the Port Phillip Bank.27 In August Gilles was joined by 
three members of the Archer family and James Cox, and the name was 
changed to Archers Gilles & Co.,28 under which title for three years a 
modest business was carried on.  
   The Colonial Bank was a lightning formation in Hobart in July 1840. The 
first public reference,29 describing it as “essentially devoted to the 
mercantile and trading interests” was followed a week later by a prospectus 
and a simultaneous announcement that all shares had already been taken up 
in less than two days.30 Capital was originally £200,000 in £20 shares but a 
later meeting, after sharp division, increased this by half.31 Launceston 
agents were Archers Gilles & Co. and the Bank opened on 5 October,32 
offering the usual terms of 10 per cent discount on bills up to 100 days, and 
5 per cent interest on current accounts and cash credits.33 For its first half-
year it was able to declare a dividend of 10 per cent per annum,34 and for 
three more years it maintained a small but profitable business.  
   Simultaneously with that of the Colonial Bank came the prospectus of 
the Agricultural Bank of Tasmania. Capital was to be £300,000, employed 
in making yearly advances to settlers by way of cash credits, repayable 
after each harvest. Agents were to be sent to country districts to test the 
opinions of settlers.35 The results can only be inferred from the absence of 
all further action or news.  
   The Australian Society for Deposits and Loans seems to have been an 
attempt to provide, on something like Starr-Bowkett principles, for small 
loans to shopkeepers and skilled workmen.36 Four trustees37 opened an 
office in King Street, Sydney,38 and invited deposits for which 121/2 per 
cent per annum was promised and offered loans of £10, £30, £40, or £50 
repayable at the rate of 6d. per £ per week, with interest at 15 per cent.39 
These rules were almost immediately modified,40 to provide that borrowers 
should pay 1s. for every £10 sought to be borrowed, apparently as a 
contribution to expenses, and commence paying the 6d. per pound not 
when the loan was granted but immediately. Loans were apparently to be 
granted in rotation, and the weekly subscriptions were not deposits for 
interest purposes. The press had been favourable but the revised rules 
brought an attack from the Gazette41 on a scheme which it described as one 
for lending a man his own money and charging him 15 per cent for the 
privilege. The Society's reply42 was unconvincing, and indeed implied, 
probably wrongly, that the weekly subscriptions before a loan was granted 
were not credited to the would-be borrower but used to pay expenses. It is 
not clear whether the Society did any business; certainly if it did it was 
negligible and the Society very shortlived.  
   The slackening of activity in South Australia produced, as in other 
colonies, a plan for a “tradesman's bank”,43 which was planned originally 
as the “Adelaide Banking and Trust Company”. It was proposed to engage 
in the ordinary business of deposit, discount, and issue on a capital of 
£50,000 (in £1 shares), with the addition of what was described as “trust” 
business, by which a depositor of security over real estate, merchandise or 
livestock could receive one quarter of the value in notes (payable on 
demand).44 But despite enthusiastic promises of subscriptions45 hard cash 
was not forthcoming and it was decided to restrict activities to the “trust” 
business with loans on mortgages and liens. Subscribers were invited to 
pay 5s. instalments at three-monthly intervals. The name was changed to 
Adelaide Loan Company.46 Advertisements inviting subscriptions 
continued to appear until the end of 1841 when the projectors ruefully 
accepted the fact that it had proved “nothing but a bottle of smoke”,47 and 
decided in January 1842 to abandon the plan. Subscriptions then totalled 
£83 4s. of which expenses had absorbed £24 8s.48  
British Bank Formations 
   Even less success attended the last pre-slump moves by British capitalists 
to participate through ordinary banking in the profits of Australian 
prosperity. Had they been managed with entire honesty, as the British and 
Australian Bank was not, or been concerned with banking proper, as the 
Royal Bank was not, they might not have experienced difficulty in 
securing British capital. Boyd's Royal Bank certainly found trusting 
support, and three mortgage companies were able to raise large funds, 
suggesting that the flow of British capital might, with tempting bait, have 
been maintained longer. But personal idiosyncrasies determined that the 
chief contribution of both plans to the Australian banking story should be 
colourful but neither substantial nor permanent.  
   During 1838 Frederick Boucher tried again, with the “Australasian Loan 
Company” capitalized at £300,000, to specialize in mortgage loans,49 but 
the scheme grew and, as finally announced to the colonies,50 it had become 
the British and Australian Bank with a capital of £1 million. It was 
proposed to open branches at Sydney, Maitland, Port Phillip, Hobart, 
Launceston, Adelaide, Perth, Albany and to undertake extensive exchange 
business between the colonies as well as acting as agent for colonial banks 
in London. All kinds of banking were forecast: deposits with interest, 
discounts, cash credits and mortgages.  
   Frederick appointed his brother Charles as Adelaide manager and sent 
him a formal authority to draw bills on the London office up to £10,000, 
supplemented by a private note advising him not to draw any bills until he 
heard further, merely using the letter as a means of establishing prestige.51 
Frederick then proceeded to “appoint” Robert Gouger as Adelaide agent, 
an honour he refused,52 Askin Morrison as agent in Tasmania,53 and Walker 
& Co. as Sydney agents.54 To none of these did he remit any funds,55 but he 
proceeded to sell bills drawn on Charles in Adelaide and give emigrants 
money orders on him. This was done despite knowledge that his brother 
had gone to Mauritius, but when he learned of this intended trip he made 
desperate but unavailing efforts to persuade the Bank of South Australia to 
take up these bills.56 The move was in any case too late but there was worse 
to come.  
   Having arrived in Adelaide as agent of the British and Australian Bank, 
Charles Boucher, with the usual family optimism, joined with the Rev. R. 
L. Milne to float the Australian Agricultural Bank, remarkable chiefly for 
the effrontery of its promoters. A brief notice of intention to open on 5 
November 1838 was followed by delay, ostensibly because Milne the 
manager was ill,57 but soon there was a succession of prospectuses with 
flamboyant promises and wild claims of business connections which were 
promptly disowned. A newspaper advertisement58 promised the execution 
of business which “no other bank would enter”. Preliminary arrangements, 
it was suggested, would occupy a year; “it is our intention at present 
merely to lay the foundation stone of the Australian Agricultural Bank”, 
although that stone was to comprise all the usual business of a bank. It was 
claimed that it would be the local agent of the Australian Loan Company. 
Then followed three broadsheets.59 Note issue was postponed, but 
depositors were offered 25 per cent subject to a year's notice and with 
security in the form of title deeds lodged with the Bank of Australasia. 
External funds were sought, depositors being told to deposit, in England 
either with F. Boucher or the Australasia, and in other colonies with the 
Australasia. “Bank post bills on London” were offered, and “commercial 
and agricultural” departments, distinct from “the banking department” 
were forecast. A special savings department offered 5 per cent on amounts 
under £20 and 10 per cent over £20, repayable, however, only on 1 January 
on six months' notice. Anyone rash enough to make a deposit fixed for five 
years was promised 15 per cent. Milne had already sought to take over the 
Government business, promising to “advance any amount that may be 
required without discount, merely taking your Excellency's bills on Her 
Majesty's Commissioners for the amount”.60  
   Unfortunately the Australasia declined the honour of the association. 
Kinnear, the Superintendent in Sydney, proclaimed: “Mr. [F.] Boucher is 
not the Secretary of this Bank in London . . . this Bank has no connection 
whatever with the proposed Australian Agricultural Bank; nor will deposits 
be received for it at any of the colonial establishments of this Bank.”61 It 
did not avail for Milne to plead ignorance of F. Boucher's “retirement” 
from the Australasia and to “abandon” the arrangement for deposits to be 
received through its agency.62 The Register63 openly suggested that there 
was no ignorance and that Milne was a fraud; Milne and C. Boucher 
discreetly disappeared.64  
   Charles sailed for Mauritius carrying his wife's body for burial without 
making arrangements for the taking up of the bills Frederick was drawing 
upon him; there is no evidence that he had any funds to do so. He 
reappeared early in 1840, in Sydney, to find that bad news had preceded 
him. In Adelaide the Bank of South Australia had forwarded the 
dishonoured bills, on behalf of the holders, to Sydney where the “agents” 
of the British and Australian Bank, Walker & Co., declined to be 
responsible.65 Charles launched forth into public justification.66 Claiming 
that Frederick had “created” the Bank of Australasia and then the British 
and Australian Bank, he “explained” that he had established the Australian 
Agricultural Bank as the Adelaide branch (a connection not revealed when 
that bottle of smoke was puffing) and his wife having died and being left 
without instructions he sailed for Mauritius. It was, in short, all an 
unfortunate mistake. Remarkable as it may seem, he was able publicly to 
sell bills on the London office of the Bank,67 and then moved back to 
Adelaide to rejoin Milne in selling more bills there.68 
 
   But Nemesis was at hand. In November 1840 it was known in Adelaide 
that Frederick's bills, dishonoured in Adelaide a year before and refused in 
Sydney, had not been met on presentation in London,69 and when a few 
months later the necessary documents had arrived from London Charles 
was arrested on information laid by the Bank of South Australia on a 
charge of false pretences.70 Remanded, he bolted to Hobart, where twenty 
years earlier he had started his career in banking as note issue clerk to 
Lempriere & Co., and so he disappears from the Australian banking story.71 
It was therefore something of an anticlimax for Frederick to disown 
Charles, advertising that he was no longer an agent of the British and 
Australian Bank because of “unwarrantable acts under the pretence of 
acting on behalf of this establishment”.72  
   Meanwhile legal proceedings in London in connection with the 
dishonoured bills had revealed that no funds had ever been remitted to the 
colonies by the Bank, “the books of the Bank are exceedingly irregular”, 
Frederick had never paid any calls on his own shares and could only justify 
dishonouring Charles' Sydney bills by claiming that Charles was Adelaide 
agent and only Walker & Co. could draw bills from Sydney.73 Following 
the revelations a committee of proprietors took charge, dismissed Boucher 
and set about winding up the affairs of the Bank, using the Bank of South 
Australia so far as the Adelaide affairs were concerned.74  
   Ben Boyd's Royal Bank of Australia, formed in 1839, finally began 
business in Sydney in July 1842.75 With a nominal capital of £1 million76 it 
had long been expected,77 but when it finally began its banking activities 
were very limited. Notes for 5s. and £1 were issued—Boyd also issued 
notes from Boyd Town—and these attained considerable circulation; bills 
on the London office added to the supply of foreign exchange.78 But its 
main purpose was to finance Boyd's varied interests in the settlement at 
Boyd Town, in pastoral property, in shipping and in South Seas trade; its 
impact on the general banking structure was negligible.  
Branch Banking 
   Tradition has traced Australian adoption of branch banking to a supposed 
predominance of Scotsmen amongst early bankers,79 but all the evidence 
points to a predominance of Englishmen and to a general reluctance of 
banks to establish branches as a matter of policy. The Scotch theory 
appears to be ultimately due to the discussions, frequent in the 'twenties 
and 'thirties, and reflecting English controversy of the time, of the 
characteristics of Scotch banking and the desirability of introducing them 
into Australia. However, in Australia (and in England) at that time the 
special nature of Scotch banking was not traced, except on rare occasions, 
to its somewhat greater development of branches. Payment of interest on 
deposits, or the making of loans by cash credits, were the things most 
commonly stressed.80  
   On the contrary, Australian branch banking owes its origin to 
competition working in an economy which was expanding geographically. 
The normal pattern was that isolated settlers in an area were content to 
bank in the metropolis (or not bank at all) until their numbers increased; 
then they pressed for local facilities and, when these were not forthcoming, 
set about forming their own local institutions. Threatened with a loss of 
accounts, the metropolitan bank most directly interested opened a branch. 
Sometimes this was not done quickly enough to forestall the local 
proposals, as in the case of the Cornwall or Bathurst Banks. More usually 
the branch killed the plan for a local bank before it was established, as in 
the case of the Campbell Town Savings Bank in Tasmania or, in New 
South Wales, the Goulburn, Windsor, Wollongong, Maitland, Hunter's 
River or Ipswich Banks. Even where a “local” bank commenced operations 
it soon succumbed, although in the Launceston case it was the 
experimental branches which failed first; in the end, however, after the 
middle 'thirties no “local” bank was able to withstand competition, real or 
threatened, from the branch of an established bank. Not until then were 
there centres of population, except Launceston, outside the metropolis in 
each colony large enough to support either a branch or a local bank.  
   In the country districts it proved impossible to retain, for local 
circulation, either coin or bank-notes since they were drawn off in 
payments to the metropolis. Even in Launceston, it will be recalled, there 
was a constant flow of notes of Hobart banks from Launceston to Hobart. 
Country residents found a solution in “orders”, usually on a metropolitan 
agent but sometimes on a local storekeeper, sometimes for the exact 
amount of a debt, in which case they were usually wholly handwritten, 
sometimes for round sums, when they were commonly printed forms. The 
latter were most often for £1, in deference to the 1826 Act prohibiting the 
issue of notes under £1, but orders for smaller sums were used.81 Gipps 
described them in 1843 in terms which were valid for the preceding fifteen 
years and continued to be for many years thereafter:  
    . . . what are called in the Colony ‘orders’, and which in fact are drafts or 
checks, payable to bearer. The reason why drafts or checks of this 
description abounded more in New South Wales than elsewhere may easily 
be traced to the convict character of the colony which rendered it unsafe 
for any person to have money either on his person or in his house. In the 
interior of the country, until very recently, accounts have all been settled, 
and servants' wages paid by ‘orders’ or checks payable in Sydney; and 
even travellers have used the same medium in respect to their bills at inns 
on the road. These checks or orders often passed through numerous hands, 
before they were presented for payment, and so formed, as already stated, 
the chief circulating medium of the interior.82  
   Gipps was correct in believing they were far more common in New 
South Wales (including modern Victoria and Queensland) than in the other 
colonies, but they were not unknown there. They were recorded in 
Tasmania as early as 1827, when their use was attributed to the refusal by 
the banks to cash cheques less than £5,83 but they were not common. In 
South Australia they appeared when the mining boom took population well 
away from Adelaide,84 but again their use was not extensive. The contrast 
with Tasmania should have warned Gipps that he was too easily tracing the 
difference to the presence of convicts in New South Wales, despite the 
weight that should be allowed for the risk of keeping a stock of ready cash. 
The basic reason was the wide geographical range of settlement by contrast 
with the narrow spread of population in Tasmania and South Australia 
which meant that in New South Wales stocks of cash could only be 
obtained at infrequent intervals and must therefore be dangerously large; 
distance equally explains why such orders circulated in the locality instead 
of being promptly cashed in Sydney. The remoteness of issuers was the 
theme of an 1832 petition from “traders, shopkeepers and inhabitants of 
Sydney” who objected to legislation which would have required them to 
sue, in the district of residence, defaulting issuers of orders which they had 
met.85  
   Throughout the 'thirties such orders were the common money of the 
interior, subject to a heavy discount for local negotiation, varying with the 
credit of the drawers, some of whom were far from scrupulous and all of 
whom found it an effective if clumsy way of borrowing at a time when 
direct loans from banks to squatters were hard to get.86 To the recipients 
they were much less attractive. Harris, from personal experience, gives the 
country storekeeper's view: “You must give credit or be content with less 
than half the trade; and you must take paper money when presented, or lose 
your sale, though taking it thus you lie under the constant risk of putting 
some worthless scrap of paper, a mere forgery, into your cashbox in return 
for six or seven pounds' worth of goods. The dealer who should refuse 
orders till he knew the names of all the various drawers would never make 
a sale.”87 A similar view is given by Haygarth of the position in the mid-
'forties:  
   It is usual for proprietors of stations ‘up the country’ to keep an account 
current with a Sydney merchant or agent, from whom they also purchase 
their annual supplies, and, when discharging any debt in the interior, they 
simply draw an ‘order’ upon him for the amount; their produce is likewise 
intrusted to his charge, and he either sells it in Sydney, purchases it himself 
from the settler, or ships it to England, as may be most advisable from the 
state of the market. A storekeeper's cash-box, therefore, seldom contains 
anything more than a number of these ‘orders’, commencing with ‘Please 
to pay’, and addressed to various mercantile houses in the capital. Every 
now and then he remits a number of them to his agent in Sydney, who 
collects them and credits him with the amount. In the interior they pass 
current throughout the districts where the signatures are known, and thus 
often remain in circulation for a considerable time.88  
   In such circumstances it is not surprising that there should have been 
attempts at branches and local banks very early.  
   The Tasmanian Bank of the Gellibrands established the first branch to 
exist in Australia. One Bartley of Launceston acted as their agent there 
although the dates both of opening and closing of the branch are uncertain. 
It was in operation in March 182789 and probably was closed by January 
1828,90 its failure being due to the agent refusing to meet in cash, notes 
issued in Hobart, paying instead by a draft on the Hobart office issued at 
21/2 per cent discount.91  
   In November 1828 Frederick Boucher, then a general merchant of 
Newcastle, announced his intention “at the solicitation of the most 
respectable settlers in this district”, of opening the Bank of Newcastle as an 
offshoot of his store. His plan included the issue of notes, interest on three 
months deposits, and general banking business; and he proposed to have 
correspondents to cash his notes in various parts of the Hunter Valley as 
well as in Sydney.92 For a brief period the enterprise flourished, at least so 
far as note issue went,93 but his business methods were not above 
reproach94 and eleven months after the original announcement of the bank 
Boucher leased his premises, advertising them as “in the enjoyment of a 
full trade”, without referring to any note issue or banking business.95 
Temporarily he abandoned his proposed visit to England, setting up as a 
wine and spirit merchant in Sydney, to which he added the function of 
“General Commission Agent”, whose activities included the arranging of 
loans and discounts.96 But Boucher had tasted the delights of finance and 
presently reappeared as provisional secretary at the Bank of Australasia in 
London from which he was dropped in obscure but suggestive 
circumstances; and again, as has been seen, in 1839 with his brother 
Charles in the formation of the Australian Agricultural Bank in Adelaide 
and the British and Australian Bank.97 But in the present context what is of 
interest is that the Bank of Newcastle was the first “country bank” in 
Australia, a harbinger of developments which were to issue into the general 
adoption of branch banking in place of the unit banking with which 
Australian banking began.  
   There was nothing in these two experiments to indicate which pointed 
the way to the future. In the next few years it seemed that the abandonment 
of the Derwent and Van Diemen's Land branches in Launceston and the 
successful establishment of the Cornwall, Tamar and Bathurst Banks 
meant that a unit-bank system, something like the English country banks, 
was to be the outcome. But both the Launceston and Bathurst cases were 
special. Launceston was already a second metropolis and more initiative by 
the Derwent Bank at the outset would have forestalled the Cornwall at its 
foundation, just as more interest in additional business would have kept the 
later Derwent and Van Diemen's Land branches alive. In the Bathurst case 
the affiliation with the Bank of Australia was so close that the local bank 
had some of the attributes of a branch. All three local banks were, in any 
case, established in the early phase of the boom; new banks with more 
expansive ideas were soon to appear, ready to establish competitive 
branches when prospects appeared to justify them.  
   First in point of time was the Commercial of Sydney which proposed to 
operate on the “Scotch system”, meaning interest on deposits, but also 
included a limited provision for branches. These, under the deed of 
settlement, might be established within the colony of New South Wales 
only; an innuendo aimed at the Australasia rejected “branch banks in 
different colonies, the mismanagement of any one of which might involve 
the ruin of the whole”.98 One small agency at Maitland was promptly 
established and a few months later converted to a full branch.99  
   The Australasia was organized from the beginning as a system of 
branches, but the original branches were planned for the metropolitan 
centres of Hobart, Launceston and Sydney, and those of Melbourne, Perth 
and Adelaide were established on the same model. It was not quite true to 
say that “the branches are as distinct as if they belonged to separate 
companies, they emanate from London and are perfectly independent of 
each other”.100 They had a considerable measure of autonomy—the Hobart 
board was especially difficult—but were in many respects subject to the 
Inspector whose periodical inspections with accompanying advice had 
great weight because in the end London could override any local board 
decision. But whereas such head branches were planned from the 
beginning, there was much greater caution in the establishment of 
subordinate branches attached to them. It was decided at the beginning that 
local boards should have no power to open such branches, and London 
awaited a report from Kinnear.101 He proposed branches in the small 
country towns, or agencies with local storekeepers; London deferred all 
except the possibility of the Launceston branch having a Port Phillip 
agency,102 but soon authorized him to open small-town branches.103 
Kinnear, more informed by this time, was not keen, limiting the 
possibilities to Bathurst and Maitland, excluding, on the advice of the 
Launceston board, a Port Phillip agency.104  
   There was a change of attitude with the establishment of the Union Bank 
which was organized on very similar lines and which promptly opened 
major branches in the same centres as the Australasia—Launceston, Hobart 
and Sydney. Kinnear was instructed to open a branch wherever he had 
reason to believe the Union would otherwise open first; he was not greatly 
impressed by the competitive power of the Union, perhaps because he had 
already forestalled them in Bathurst, Melbourne and Adelaide.105  
The Spread of Branches 
   The Bathurst Bank had adequate warning for Kinnear had twice visited 
Bathurst, first in May 1838 to look around, when he had sought the advice 
of A. K. McKenzie, and then in September to arrange for the branch and 
had put out hints for an amalgamation without getting response.106 But not 
until the branch was in operation107 were any precautions taken by the 
Bathurst to meet competition and then only to the extent of arranging for a 
right to overdraw the account in the Bank of Australia, which the Sydney 
agent, Smith, had much earlier been instructed to maintain at at least 
£1,000.108 For nearly a year this self-confidence appeared to be justified, 
but as the months went by and the Bank of Australasia established itself, 
old loyalties weakened,109 the more quickly when the maturing of loans 
released customers to transfer their accounts to a bank which could give 
better service in internal and overseas exchange and which paid interest on 
deposits which the Bathurst Bank continued to refuse, even after the 
Australasia declared war.110  
   In August 1839 a proposal for absorption by the Union Bank was 
declined111 and the directors contented themselves with arranging a cash 
credit of £3,000–£5,000 with the Bank of Australia112 and with making a 
call on capital of 5 per cent only.113 The main problem was the transfer of 
deposits, the very size of which may have made it impracticable to 
compete in paying interest. In the thirty-three weeks from July 1839 to 
February 1840 the Bank had an adverse clearing balance with the 
Australasia in twenty-four weeks against nine favourable balances, a total 
of £8,418 against £3,884.114  
   In February 1840 the Australasia notified that, commencing in April they 
would require specie in settlement of weekly clearings instead of taking 
drafts on the Bank of Australia or holding Bathurst bank-notes for re-issue 
by themselves. It was a declaration of war, reminiscent of the Australasia's 
campaign against the Tamar Bank, but the Bathurst directors did not see it 
as such and contented themselves with arranging “small drafts of £50 or 
£100 in gold brought or sent up by private opportunities”.115 But in May, a 
month after the new clearing system began, there is a note of urgency in 
the search for ready cash.116 By June Smith in Sydney was being instructed 
to collect every mature bill in his possession and rediscount all others, 
remitting cash as quickly as possible—£1,000 at once.117 Total discounts 
were still £14,000 but being reduced.118 Even when, in August, the Bank 
could not meet its clearing liabilities all hope was not abandoned:  
   Since you left we have managed to get two days over without coming to 
a stop altogether. Both days there has been a rather sharp run for silver 
which has reduced our stock very much. £12 is all we have remaining 
which I think will carry us through tomorrow as we close early. For the 
three days next week till we can hear from you we must only make fair 
promises, trusting to your supply on Wednesday. Mr. Liscombe went 
round to the several tradespeople and stated the true circumstances of the 
case, which has done a great deal of good. You will see by the 
accompanying copy of letter to Mr. Street, the Bank of Australasia are not 
inclined to proceed to extremities. From the same you will likewise 
perceive how we now stand. Besides the notes mentioned, £482, they have 
a balance against us of £58, which is again allowed to stand over. I should 
say by Wednesday the balance altogether against us will be about £700, 
although it will not be imperatively necessary to provide for this by that 
time, you will see the necessity of sending some specie to pay casual notes 
etc. presented, as our being ready to do so will go a great way in regaining 
the confidence of the public.119  
   The mission on which S. Finley, the cashier, had been sent to Sydney 
was the raising of a loan, and he was authorized if necessary to commit the 
Bank to transfer its business to the Union Bank if the loan could not 
otherwise be obtained.120  
   He secured a loan of £3,000, but only on condition that the Bank transfer 
its business to the Union.121 Optimism could go no further and the directors 
accepted the terms without waiting for the shareholders—perhaps they 
were the optimists—to resolve as they did a week later “that the business 
of the Bathurst Bank on its dissolution be handed over to the Union Bank 
on the best terms that can be made”.122 The transfer took place rapidly. 
Deposits were repaid by drafts on the Bank of Australia, the Union took 
over all accounts and undertook to meet outstanding notes, while Smith 
was directed to pay to the Union all sums he received.123 On 30 September 
the Bank closed and the next day the Union Bank reopened the office as its 
own branch.124  
   In February 1838 William Rucker, Melbourne storekeeper, announced 
the opening of a Derwent Bank agency, to “receive deposits and discount 
bills and orders for account and under the responsibility of the Derwent 
Bank Company at Hobart”.125 He fixed the discount rate at 20 per cent, 
letting it be discreetly known that Hobart rates would apply when a court 
was established in which debts might be recovered. Attempts were made, 
with what success is not clear, to secure the accounts of the Customs 
Officer and of the Land Fund.126 But the agency met considerable 
difficulty. Swanston did not send specie to pay depositors who had to take 
drafts on Hobart and later on the Australasia in Sydney, as a result of 
which no wage-earner would take a Derwent Bank cheque.127 Other banks 
were more successful in circulating their notes; at the beginning many 
Tamar notes were found in Melbourne,128 and in June 1838 the Commercial 
of Sydney appointed one Craig their agent for the issue of notes for which 
he took Derwent notes at 4 per cent discount.129 When the Australasia 
proposed to open a branch Rucker belatedly reduced the discount rate to 
10–15 per cent,130 but Swanston was in no mood to fight and arranged to 
hand the business over to the Union Bank.131  
   The Australasia branch in Melbourne opened on 28 August 1838 as an 
offshoot from Sydney whence the staff of two proceeded by sea with an 
armed guard provided by the governor and two bulldogs to guard the cash. 
Kinnear was not enthusiastic as to prospects; it was difficult to get a local 
board since so many of the residents were either irresponsible young men 
or agents in charge of flocks owned by absentees; he expected business to 
be mainly cashing orders on Sydney and Hobart.132 Within a few weeks the 
Union had taken over the Derwent agency and established its branch.133  
   In Adelaide the Australasia had not to fear Union expansion because of 
that Bank's agreement with the Bank of South Australia, and a branch was 
the result of directions from the London board, no doubt regretting their 
earlier reluctance.134 On 14 January 1839 the branch opened, to the 
rejoicing of critics of the Bank of South Australia, because it offered more 
favourable terms: 4 per cent interest on current accounts and 8 per cent 
discount on bills under 60 days, compared with no current account interest 
and a discount rate of 10 per cent on all bills.135  
   Meanwhile the Union had had to meet branch competition in Tasmania. 
Dunn's Commercial Bank on 23 August 1838 opened a Launceston 
branch136 and followed this with a Campbell Town branch on 15 October 
1838.137 A savings bank in Campbell Town was already being discussed138 
and it was believed that Dunn was planning a network of branches 
throughout the island,139 for which a capital increase was projected.140 The 
Union reacted so promptly that it was able to open a Campbell Town 
agency before the Commercial branch,141 and Dunn did not proceed with 
further branches.  
   These branch developments had made little difference to country areas, 
which turned in 1839–40 to projects for their own local banks. There had 
been one previous attempt which had resulted in the projectors being 
satisfied with a branch.  
Defeat of the Local Banks 
   In July 1836 it became known that a local bank was projected at 
Goulburn,142 and for a time it appeared that it might operate. A provisional 
committee had prepared a deed of settlement and planned an inaugural 
meeting to execute it, collect subscriptions and elect directors.143 But before 
this meeting one of the sponsors, W. H. Dalton, sought the co-operation of 
the Bank of Australasia, either in cashing Goulburn Bank notes in Sydney 
or in making Australasia notes available for issue in Goulburn. The 
subscribers, he said, would be equally well satisfied with a small branch of 
the Australasia. Kinnear, for the latter bank, was cautious and would not 
even promise to consider a branch for which he required assurances of 
local support, without consulting his Sydney board.144 Apparently the 
Goulburn committee felt rebuffed and took their proposition to the 
Commercial Bank and abandoned their plan for a local bank in favour of a 
Commercial agency.145 This was followed by a series of similar episodes.  
   The only certain information of the “Hunter's River Bank” is an 
advertisement under that title reading “two-thirds of the shares having been 
nearly subscribed, a meeting of the shareholders will be held at the Rose 
Inn, West Maitland, on Wednesday, 25 September, at twelve o'clock, to 
elect officers and take all necessary measures for establishing the Bank”.146 
The rest is silence, but it is fair inference that the meeting elected not to 
proceed since a month earlier it had become public knowledge that the 
Bank of Australasia was about to open a Maitland branch.147 Even had local 
residents not recognized the greater advantages of that branch, wisdom 
would have dictated not trying a fall with “Goliah”. At all events, the 
Hunter's River Bank is heard of no more and the Australasia branch duly 
opened in December.148  
   Why the proposal for a Bank of Wollongong did not survive the first 
move is uncertain. A meeting was summoned for 15 January 1840 to 
consider either a local bank or a branch from one of the Sydney banks.149 
Perhaps a simpler agency arrangement with one of these banks was 
established; certainly there was no local bank and for many years no 
branch.150  
   The first public moves for a Windsor and Hawkesbury Banking 
Company were made in February 1840, but must have been in train for 
some time since the announcement of the intention of the Commercial 
Bank to open a branch, which effectively killed the plan, was published 
earlier.151 But the local enthusiasts did not retire without exploring the 
prospects of a local bank despite certain competition. Several meetings 
were held and a plan agreed to. The bank was to have £100,000 capital in 
£20 shares of which only £2 was payable at once; maximum shareholding 
was to be thirty shares.152 It was said, probably correctly, that it was 
proposed to discount bills as low as £10.153 However, support was not 
strong, the Commercial branch opened promptly,154 and the local plans 
were abandoned, the more readily as the Commercial promised that “drafts 
are granted on Sydney and cash transmitted free of any charge”, for this 
had been one of the sore points stirring local initiative.155  
   In April 1840 dissatisfaction of Melbourne and Geelong shopkeepers 
with restricted credit conditions found expression in a plan for the 
Tradesmen's Bank of Melbourne and Geelong.156 This was to have 
£100,000 capital in £10 shares, no individual being permitted to hold more 
than a hundred shares; business was to be the receipt of deposits as low as 
£5 and the discount of bills as small as £10. It was a “small man's” answer 
to the first stringency of the receding boom and, as the Port Phillip 
Gazette157 put it, “the bantling was strangled in its birth”, which was a 
colourful way of describing the energetic reaction of the Port Phillip Bank 
to the threat of competition. That bank hastily implemented its deferred 
plan for a branch at Geelong,158 removed the limit on shares to be held by 
one person, and forecast “other radical changes”159 which proved to be a 
call of £2 10s. per share to enable lending to be expanded,160 a plan for 
3,000 new shares to be offered in England, and the creation of a London 
office.161 The Tradesmen's Bank, which had advertised that its share list 
would close at the end of June,162 was not able to achieve formal 
establishment in the face of the evident intention of the Port Phillip Bank to 
fight.163  
   In July 1840 a public meeting in West Maitland agreed upon a plan for a 
Maitland Tradesmen's Bank.164 A capital of £10,000 (which might be 
increased to £50,000) in £10 shares was proposed, payable in £1 
instalments at the discretion of the directors; no one was to hold more than 
25 shares nor have more than five votes; an act was to be sought enabling 
the bank to sue and be sued in the name of a public officer; discounts were 
to extend to six months bills. For a time all went well. “Nearly 700 shares” 
were bespoken at the original meeting,165 a manager was advertised for,166 
and subscribers were invited in September to pay their subscriptions to 
either the Bank of New South Wales or the Sydney Bank.167 Perhaps the 
demand that enthusiasm be supported by cash revealed the weakness of 
that support; perhaps discretion overcame valour as the promoters reflected 
on the competition that would have to be met from the branch of the Bank 
of Australasia, opened a couple of miles away in East Maitland, the 
previous December,168 or from the Commercial branch;169 perhaps the first 
impact of the slump made the plan impossible. Whatever the cause, the 
demand that subscribers should pay up was the last public act of the 
promoters and no more is heard of the Maitland Bank.170  
   After these experiences the metropolitan banks were readier to establish 
branches without waiting for local enterprise. In August 1840 the 
Commercial of Sydney established a branch at Port Macquarie.171 The 
Australasia contemplated a Parramatta branch but finally rejected it on the 
grounds that transport over the short distance to Sydney was so good as to 
make it unnecessary.172 The Union was ahead of the Australasia in opening 
a branch in New Zealand in 1839,173 causing the latter bank to hesitate 
before deferring indefinitely New Zealand branches.174  
   The most active development, however, was in Port Phillip where 
settlement was expanding most rapidly. The Port Phillip Bank, as has been 
seen, established a branch at Geelong which was very shortlived,175 but a 
year later a more modest agency for note issue was established with 
Alexander Thomson,176 to which was added a separate agency for 
collection of bills and cheques payable in Geelong.177 The Australasia 
arranged agencies, mainly to facilitate note circulation, with the Hentys at 
Portland and with Campbell & Woolley, Geelong storekeepers.178 The 
Union soon after opened a branch at Geelong managed by the same Dr 
Thomson who was circulating Port Phillip Bank notes.179 The fate of these 
Australasia and Union extensions is obscure; those of the Australasia never 
appeared in Bluebooks, while the Union's Geelong branch was regularly 
listed from 1842 onwards. Both banks undoubtedly established new 
branches, the Australasia in Geelong and the Union in Portland, in 1846, 
and the most reasonable interpretation of the scanty evidence is that all 
these Port Phillip agencies and branches except the Union at Geelong 
became inoperative with the onset of depression and were not revived but 
replaced.  
   Apart from these doubtful cases only the Melbourne agencies of the 
Derwent and the Commercial of Sydney and the Union's branch in 
Campbell Town failed to survive until the depression. Just as Swanston 
abandoned his Melbourne agency rather than compete actively, so did the 
Commercial of Sydney; faced by the Australasia, Union and Port Phillip 
Banks, it withdrew, consistently with its original objections to remote 
branches.180 The Union abandoned its Campbell Town branch early in 1841 
because the agent had embezzled £3,400.181 Immediately prior to the 
slump, therefore, there were, outside the metropolitan centres, branches or 
agencies at Windsor, Maitland (two), Bathurst (two), Goulburn, Port 
Macquarie, Geelong (two or three), Portland on the mainland, and at 
Campbell Town in Tasmania, as well as Savings Bank branches at 
Parramatta, Windsor, Bathurst, Maitland and Penrith. Every major 
population centre had at least one branch and it seemed that the principle of 
branch as opposed to unit banking was firmly established.  
The Scramble for Capital and Deposits 
   As the boom rose both English and Colonial banks sought to expand 
business by increasing capital. The Australasia obtained Treasury approval 
for doubling its subscribed capital in 1837,182 and to the full amount 
authorized by the charter, £600,000, in 1839.183 The Union followed more 
slowly, attaining £373,000 by end-March 1841.184 The need for increased 
capital for banking purposes was one of the main reasons for the separation 
of the Bank of South Australia from the parent South Australian Company, 
the other being British Treasury objections to chartering a land company 
which operated a bank. Shareholders unanimously supported the proposal 
and after delay the division took effect early in 1842 when the bank was 
nominally reorganized, technically under the title South Australian 
Banking Company, but, in Adelaide, always known as the Bank of South 
Australia. A London board created a local Adelaide board, but, since its 
functions were only advisory, the change was purely formal.185 Attempts to 
secure a charter were delayed until 1847 because of the bank's unavailing 
desire to obtain authority to take land as collateral security.186  
   The colonial banks responded to the spur of competition and the bait of 
profits by successive capital increases. In Tasmania the Bank of Van 
Diemen's Land called its full capital in 1831, added £100,000 in 1837 and a 
further £20,000, which it was able to issue at 20 per cent premium, in 
1840.187 The Commercial of Tasmania increased its capital to £80,000 in 
1837, still further in 1839, and again by £30,000 in 1840.188 On the 
mainland, the Australia, on the renewal of the partnership in 1833, raised 
capital from £120,000 (all fully paid) to £200,000 and in the following 
years repeatedly invited voluntary instalments,189 as did the Bank of New 
South Wales.190 The Commercial of Sydney permitted voluntary 
subscriptions at the will of shareholders until 1840.191 These are no more 
than illustrations of the general trend.192  
   Funds raised by capital subscription, however, were far from enough. 
There were too many other avenues for investment offering higher 
immediate returns; moreover, the boom produced a large volume of funds 
the holders of which were prepared to deposit but not to become 
shareholders; it was all the more necessary to the banks to seek these funds 
since otherwise they might be employed in discounting or other loans in 
competition with them. Accordingly, interest on deposits became the 
general rule, at rates which rose to unprecedented levels.  
   The Commercial of Sydney, it will be recalled, had hesitantly introduced 
to the mainland a limited interest on deposits. It was left to the Australasia 
to take the lead aggressively, compelling the other banks to follow. At the 
outset it offered 5 per cent on three months deposits, but soon followed 
this, in 1836, with the innovation of interest on the daily balance of current 
accounts at 4 per cent, to which the local banks had to conform.193 In 1838 
it briefly offered 7 per cent on deposits subject to ten days' notice, and in 
1840 reached a peak with 4 per cent on daily balances, 5 per cent on 
deposits at ten days' notice and 7 per cent on three months deposits. In 
Tasmania it did not introduce current account interest until 1838 but there 
too reached a peak in 1840 with 7 per cent on three months deposits and 5 
per cent on daily balances. Similar rates were introduced in South Australia 
in 1839.  
   Such rates could still yield profits while loan rates were still substantially 
higher; they could even be regarded as necessary to attract funds from 
other lending channels. But they had an important, unplanned result, the 
substitution of deposits for shareholders' capital as the most important 
source of loanable funds. In the 'twenties the banks did not actively seek 
deposits and declined to offer interest; the fact that their deposits were 
nevertheless substantial reflected the narrow opportunities for small 
individual investment. Capital subscriptions and note issue were regarded 
as the primary sources of bank funds. By the 'forties note issue was being 
regarded doubtfully and capital had taken second place to deposits, a 
position which was maintained despite the depression abandonment of 
deposit interest.  
   Had the upward leap of deposit rates merely represented competition 
between the banks it would probably have been limited by agreement, but 
the banks had to face competition from other quarters. The growing 
number of insurance companies almost all competed in discounts. Thus the 
Marine Assurance Co. (Sydney) as early as 1831 decided to discount, and 
did so weekly until the slump;194 the Australian General Assurance Co. 
(Sydney) commenced discount on its establishment in 1836 and continued 
to do so until a “want of approved bills” brought abandonment in 1843.195 
The same practice held of most insurance and other companies who either 
discounted or lent on mortgage or both.196 Added to these were a significant 
number of individuals who increasingly specialized in arranging loans by 
way of discount or mortgage and whose competition continued to be 
important even after the slump.197 The mortgage companies, appearing on 
the eve of the slump, were a less potent immediate threat and were not 
competitors for local funds, but on a longer view they implied restriction of 
the field of bank lending.198  
The Mortgage Companies 
   While the newest colonial banks were struggling to establish themselves 
and the exploits of the Bouchers were discrediting colonial banking as a 
field for investment, British capitalists were busy organizing specialist 
companies based upon the principle of transferring funds raised in Britain 
for loan on mortgage in the colonies. In the event, all were to find the early 
years of operation unpromising, but the timing of their start and the mode 
of their lending were to prove a major factor in softening the impact of the 
slump, for all were able to invest heavily in the first stages of recession, 
before it was recognized as such, providing a breathing space for all 
borrowers who were fortunate enough, in that brief space, to substitute a 
new mortgage for a discount or cash credit from the established banks.  
   Planned in London in 1839 the British Colonial Bank and Loan 
Company initially intended “uniting with the usual business of banking 
that of advances by way of loan to shareholders and customers on 
securities”. Capital was nominally £1 million, half to be raised in London, 
half in the colonies, and colonial business was to be controlled by a Sydney 
board.199 However, plans were revised. Banking was abandoned, 
arrangements being made for the Bank of South Australia to place loans in 
that colony and the Union Bank in others, except New South Wales,200 
although it does not seem that in its early years it did much business 
outside New South Wales. Colonial shares (transferable only in the 
colonies) were reduced by nine-tenths to 1,250, although “English shares” 
were also available to colonists.201  
   Business began in Sydney in June 1841 with the sale of bills on the 
London office and the offer of scrip certificates, carrying interest at 6 per 
cent per annum, as a means of remittance to England202 and, a little later, 
loans (either in cash or bills on England) against bills of lading of wool or 
whale-oil.203 But difficulty followed the making of loans in the company's 
scrip. This was provided for in the revised prospectus, such scrip bearing 6 
per cent per annum for the first two years and thereafter receiving the 
ordinary dividend. Many loans were taken wholly or partly in this form 
because of the invitation, referred to above, to use them as a means of 
remittance to London. There they proved nearly impossible to negotiate, 
falling, according to The Times, to 50 per cent of face value.204 A group of 
Sydney shareholders who claimed scrip loans were nearly £200,000 in 
New South Wales alone, forced the manager, William Wright, to 
implement London instructions for a local board,205 while the London 
office stepped in to cancel arrangements for scrip loans. Those who had 
taken loans partly in this form were given until the end of 1842 to repay, 
with the alternative of taking debentures at 8 per cent while loans wholly in 
scrip were to be cancelled.206 Direct loans in cash were henceforth available 
at 10 per cent instead of the 11 per cent on loans wholly or partly in 
scrip.207  
   The company survived the storm and before the end of 1842 had loans 
exceeding £250,000 and was emboldened to seek a charter, undertaking 
that if it were granted banking would be eliminated from the objects of the 
company.208 This was refused, but with an offer to seek the advice of 
Gipps.209 His reply was cold.210 He confirmed that the company had not 
engaged in banking, beyond a small amount of bill-discounting; the offer 
of mortgage loans, its primary business, he regretted. It “induces people to 
borrow money when under any temporary pressure instead of striving by 
industry and economy to extricate themselves from their difficulties, whilst 
the rate of interest charged by them (10 per cent) is, I believe, more than 
the profits of farming in the Colony will justify, though not perhaps greater 
than the risks run by the lenders require”. No harm would follow the grant 
of a charter, but he could see no case for it. Naturally the Colonial Office 
reaffirmed its refusal and the company continued as a partnership but did 
not venture into banking.211  
   Incorporated by charter, the Australian Trust Company was exclusively a 
mortgage-loan institution. Its basis was the transfer of low-interest capital 
from England for loan in Australia. The charter provided that its English 
borrowings should not exceed four times its paid-up capital. Nominal 
capital was £1 million with power to increase to £2 million.212 The 
Australian manager, Hastings Elwin, arrived in July 1841, it was said, with 
£150,000 in specie and authority to draw on London for a further £50,000, 
and opened the Sydney office on 2 August, offering mortgages on real 
estate at 10 per cent213 interest, and bills on London for sale by tender.214 
Initially it had been proposed to limit business to New South Wales proper, 
but in 1842 Melbourne agents were appointed.215 Property owners showed 
an alacrity in mortgaging their property which disturbed Gipps,216 and the 
company enjoyed a steady business, its loans, at a uniform rate of 10 per 
cent, reaching £400,000 by 1845.217  
   The prospectus of the Scottish Australian Investment Company showed it 
as having been formed in Aberdeen in 1840, with a wealth of advocates 
amongst its directors and a capital of £100,000.218 It began business in 
Sydney in August 1842 as a mortgage loan company, the manager, R. A. 
A. Morehead, explaining that he proposed “as part of the business of this 
company in future, to undertake the collection and remitting of revenue 
arising from mortgages, bank stock, etc., as well as the making of further 
investments on account of individuals having property in the Colony but 
who are not resident in it, and, generally, the management of the monetary 
affairs of such absentees”.219  
   The flood of overseas funds, which he was already receiving, was so 
great that Swanston determined to get the maximum profit by converting 
the Derwent into a mortgage bank, inspired perhaps by the Trust and Loan 
companies. He was reinforced in this decision by a belief that there were 
now too many banks for ordinary note issue and bill discounting, the 
profits on which must fall, whereas the demand for mortgage loans 
appeared to be insatiable. In October 1841—on the eve of the slump—the 
plan was put into effect, the occasion being the renewal of the bank's deed 
of settlement. As Swanston wrote to Hamilton.220 The change that has been 
adopted in the constitution of the Bank is in consequence of the increased 
competition of banking in the colony, which has already subjected the bank 
to extended expenses and risk without adequate compensation, and from its 
having appeared to us inevitable that to keep pace with existing 
competition the Banks will be obliged either to give excessive facility of 
discount or to offer an increased rate of interest for deposits, thereby 
increasing the risk and lessening the profits. It also appeared to me that the 
colonial banks could not continue much longer to compete successfully 
against the foreign banks and to give the dividends that have been hitherto 
given, and that although the shareholders of the foreign banks might be 
content with 8 per cent, it would not answer the purposes of a resident to 
have his money only yielding that interest as long as mortgages and other 
channels are open for safe investment and employment of money at a much 
higher rate. It was therefore our opinion that the sooner some of the 
colonial banks retired from the field as banks of issue, deposit and discount 
the better, and as no bank is so well prepared to do so as the Derwent, the 
greater part of its funds being already secured by mortgages and bonds, we 
thought it a good opportunity in the extending of our charter to do so.  
   Note issue was abandoned and the capital increased to £250,000, while 
the directors were authorized to borrow an equal amount at up to 8 per 
cent. (This was to provide for English investors.) Deposits, earning 8 per 
cent, were to be received in London for transfer to Tasmania, where they 
would carry 8 per cent. The bank's loans were to be mainly by way of 
mortgage or advances against shipments of exports.221 Existing English 
clients were to be offered a clear 8 per cent, payable half yearly, if they 
would surrender their mortgages to the bank and become depositors. 
Arrangements were made for current accounts in the Australasia and 
Union, carrying 5 per cent on credit balances, and with facilities for 
rediscount. Officially the new plan commenced on 1 January 1842, but 
Swanston implemented it at once and was so pleased that he told Hamilton 
to inform English investors that he could no longer act as middleman for 
mortgage loans and would accept deposits only under the new 
arrangement.222  
   Note issue was abandoned readily because it had fallen steadily since the 
English banks had commenced to operate, and was by 1841 too small to be 
profitable. Bill discounting was restricted to export transactions, and cash 
credits were steadfastly refused,223 but some of their features were retained 
by providing that borrowers might make repayments, in instalments of not 
less than £10, at any time, the credit balances carrying 5 per cent interest.224 
Local deposits Swanston was less ready to surrender, and both the 
Australasia and Union, who had co-operated on the understanding that 
Swanston would no longer be a competitor, applied pressure, agreeing that 
if he had to repay depositors he could draw on a cash credit of £10,000 
with each to the full amount, in addition to the established occasional 
rediscounting.225 Swanston continued to evade this condition until the end. 
His deposits did not reach their peak until 1846, and their subsequent 
decline represented mainly overseas withdrawals.226  
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Chapter 10 Slump (1841–1843) 
   1 
 
   TOWARDS the end of 1840 it became obvious in New South Wales that 
the economic carousal was over, and with devastating rapidity acute and 
prolonged depression developed, spreading throughout the colonies. In 
Tasmania it was somewhat slower in reaching its depths, and in South 
Australia it was overshadowed and conditioned by a crisis in public finance 
caused by the bills drawn by Gawler being dishonoured in England; this 
and the speed and strength of later recovery justify the historians' 
convention of speaking of “depression” in eastern Australia but “crisis” in 
South Australia. In Western Australia the impact was comparatively mild.1  
The Origins and Course of the Depression 
   Much has been made of the fall in the value of wool as a major factor in 
the slump.1 But a glance at the statistical data discloses that the connection 
cannot be a simple one.  
   WOOL EXPORTS, NEW SOUTH WALES, 1836–45  
   (including Port Phillip)  
    
   (a) Value entered for return of exports, not realized price.  
   This is hardly a picture of a bankrupt industry. The 2s. per lb. of 1836 
was exceptional, prices of the preceding ten years having been much lower, 
and the main price decline occurred in 1837 and 1838, when the boom had 
still to reach its peak; over the critical years 1840–42 values were 
remarkably well maintained. The export (virtually equivalent to 
production) of wool shows no slump in quantity, indicating that despite 
individual disasters the squatters saw profit in continued expansion in the 
numbers of sheep (not much affected by boiling down for tallow) even 
Year Quantity (million lb.) Total Value (a) Pence per lb.
1836 3.69 £369,324 24.0
1837 4.45 332,166 18.0
1838 5.75 405,977 17.0
1839 7.21 442,504 14.6
1840 8.61 566,112 15.8
1841 8.39 517,537 14.8
1842 9.43 595,175 15.1
1843 12.70 685,647 12.9
1844 13.54 645,344 11.5
1845 17.36 1,009,242 13.9
though the taking up of new land suffered a check. Total income from 
wool continued to rise in spite of the moderate fall in price during the 
slump period.  
   Income from wool, however, is only half the story. Other forms of 
income suffered a severe check. The meat market was of small account 
when the relative human and sheep populations are considered, for there 
was as yet no export market. The great market for sheep (as live animals) 
had come from the expansion itself, in providing the base stock for new 
squatters and new stations, and when the expansion ceased this market 
necessarily disappeared, to be replaced only imperfectly by the returns 
from boiling down sheep for tallow. More important were the rising level 
of costs and the narrowing of the scope for occupying new land. Wages 
were rising through the later 'thirties as were the prices of equipment and 
supplies. The further the squatters went afield the more it cost to haul 
supplies in and wool out. According to the knowledge and prejudices of the 
time most of the best land was taken up before the end of the 'thirties, and 
what remained appeared to offer poorer yields and higher costs, especially 
for transport. Sheep for new stations were more costly, and low in 
quality—the squatter who could carry more sheep would sell only his 
worst. The cessation of transportation after 1840 appeared to threaten 
increased scarcity of labour and therefore higher wages; Gipps' 
announcement of the volume of immigration bounty orders outstanding, 
with its obvious implication of restriction or abandonment of assisted 
immigration, suggested that there would be not merely no substitute for 
assigned convicts but a new source of labour scarcity. From this point of 
view, and seen against the continued growth in wool production, it 
becomes understandable that in New South Wales and Tasmania the 
favoured explanation of the slump should have been scarcity of labour; and 
that in the midst of unemployment, which for the size and type of the 
economy was severe, assisted immigration should have been the favoured 
remedy to be pressed again and again.  
   What happened, in the first instance, to the wool industry can therefore 
be viewed as the apparent exhaustion of opportunities for profitable 
expansion into new areas after a decade in which its profits and its 
technique of growth had been reckoned in terms of geographical spread. 
Rosy expectations and rash investment plans assumed continued expansion 
at the rate of the 'thirties; that expansion itself produced a denial of the 
assumption, in the dual form of converging income and cost trends and of 
the occupation of what appeared to be the good sheep land. The very 
extremity of optimism, which all contemporary critics later found so 
absurd, made the shock of disappointment the more severe, especially to 
absentee investors in England.4 It is this which gives a significance not 
intended by them to the chorus of governors, bankers, merchants and select 
committees on the theme of wild speculation as the primary cause of the 
slump. It was a cause of great importance in the sense that anticipations so 
disregardful of the trends in the industry could not but be disappointed 
severely, and in their disappointment was the immediate occasion for the 
collapse of (geographical) expansion of sheepfarming, and the chain 
reaction of credit contraction, private and public economizing, the slump in 
land sales, and the cumulative spread of falling prices and incomes, leading 
to insolvency and unemployment on a serious scale for the first time in the 
country's history.  
   This analysis, it will be noted, assumes so far that the primary slump 
developed from conditions within the wool industry itself, and does not 
require the collapse of British investment which later historians have traced 
to the British crisis of 1839.5 How far British investment in Australia 
declined for reasons unrelated to Australia can only be a matter of rough 
judgment, but the imperfect evidence suggests that it was more sharply 
curtailed by what was happening in Australia itself. The crisis of 1839 is 
not reflected in the availability of capital for expansion by the Bank of 
Australasia in 1839 or even 1841, or for the Union Bank; the three 
mortgage companies and the Royal Bank all raised their funds after the 
crisis, in the period which coincided with Swanston's zenith as an 
investment agent. Recorded trade figures, for what guidance they give, 
show the great drop in capital transfer as occurring in 1842 with 1840 as 
the great peak. These facts hardly point to stringency in the English capital 
market as a major circumstance.  
   The truth is rather that the sharp fall in British investment was initiated 
by bad news of returns in the colonies, and that its role is in greatly 
accentuating a slump already begun and so producing the dire disasters of 
1842–43. This view gains strength from considering the situation in South 
Australia, where the central factor was an acute crisis in public finance 
precipitated by the dishonour of Gawler's bills.6 Sharp and severe while it 
lasted, it might be expected to have brought Australia as a whole under 
suspicion of investors. But in South Australia itself it was short-lived, and 
recovery was marked long before the mining boom began. As early as 
January 1843 Grey could report that not only were there no workers 
remaining on government relief, but there was “no surplus labour in the 
colony”;7 the banking statistics suggest that recovery had begun by mid-
1843. But once disappointed expectations dried up the stream of capital, 
the effect was severe, and, in New South Wales and Tasmania, prolonged.  
   The salient facts of public finance in New South Wales fit this 
interpretation. Gipps was assailed by the press, by bankers and merchants 
for his 1842 withdrawal of government deposits from the banks, and this 
charge of having forced bank contraction has been accepted by modern 
historians.8 But the withdrawals were required to meet the deficiency in the 
Land Fund for immigration payments already incurred. The Land Fund 
was insufficient because of the sharp fall in land sales, and the worst that 
can be said of Gipps was that he might have braked the boom by not 
making the deposits in the first place, and later might have adopted other 
means of making immigration payments, including more heroic borrowing 
measures than his £50,000 of debentures in 1842.9 But his contemporaries 
praised him for the deposits, which they largely forced upon him, and the 
debentures were a daring departure for the colony; moreover, the critics 
appear to assume that Gipps hoarded the withdrawals whereas they went 
where the Land Fund would have gone—into private hands, and therefore 
mostly back to the banks—and payments for additional debentures would 
have enlarged government deposits at the expense of private. The origin of 
the decline in deposits was the fall in land sales, not government policy.  
   That fall itself is primarily explicable as the result of a realization that 
rosy expectations were being falsified, reinforced by the effects of the great 
drought of 1838–40, which affected most severely the agricultural areas 
and sent the prices of wheat and flour to high levels which were small 
compensation to farmers with low yields (imports of wheat and flour were 
very large). The increase in the minimum price of Crown land in 1839 to 
12s. per acre and two years later to £1 was of little account; nearly all land 
sold for more in any case and the most important consequence was 
probably to assure private owners of poor land that sales of even the worst 
Government land could not force them to accept less than the Government 
price. To the squatters, who were occupying not buying Crown land, the 
minimum price was irrelevant.  
   The first clear signs of crisis were the difficulties of farmers and flour-
millers whose losses by drought were now followed by a sharp drop in 
prices and losses in the market for imports.10 Sydney wheat prices, which 
had reached famine levels of £1 2s. per bushel in August-September 1839, 
slumped to 13s. 6d. in November, and a year later, in September, abruptly 
dropped from 11s. to 6s. 11d., from which level decline continued slowly 
to reach ultimately 2s. 9d. in April 1845. Flour followed a similar course, 
collapsing from £75 per ton in September 1839 to £33 in November, and 
£20 a year later.11 The first major insolvencies were those of flour-millers, 
in late 1840.12 But there was difficulty in the market for imports, which 
were commonly forwarded by English houses to local merchants in 
anticipation of demand, and covered by bills drawn on consignees, 
customarily for two-thirds of the estimated selling price. These were 
discounted usually, for obvious reasons, with the London offices of the 
Australasia and Union which forwarded them for collection. By mid—
1840 Australian merchants were confronted by the impossibility of 
realizing the prices on which these bills were based, because the twin 
factors of agricultural distress and the running-down of the pastoral boom 
had dramatically changed the former sellers' market. The need for ready 
money to meet these bills forced them to press for payment of accounts 
which had been suffered to run on and accumulate, and to turn to distress 
sales.13 Sales by auction in New South Wales are a rough guide to the 1840 
pressure for ready money which was the first phase of the slump: 
Pressure for cash, once initiated, spread almost overnight, and merchants and traders 
were neither prepared to give new credit nor to wait for old debts; they in their turn 
were pressed by the banks and other lenders—the first sharp reduction in bank loans 
came early in 1841. 
We will sue right and left, not a soul will we spare;  
Be they good, be they bad, the same sauce they shall share;  
Not a day will we wait, not a penny renew;  
To your marrowbones all! We will sue! we will sue! 
No matter to us whether willing or not,  
Whether able, or hardly worth powder and shot;  
We will take no instalment in part of our due,  
But we'll heap up expenses. We'll sue! we will sue! 
It is clear as the day, ev'ry man that's in debt 
Is going down hill!—if he's not of our set: 
A fig for his properties, many or few, 
His ships, sheep, or cattle. We'll sue! we will sue! 
VALUE 
OF 
SALES 
SUBJECT 
TO 
DUTY14 
1836 £313,171
1837 321,346
1838 409,167
1839 513,388
1840 1,246,743
1841 £963,697
1842 686,089
1843 454,565
1844 310,831
1845 404,543
We know there's no money; we know it full well, 
That there's no one to buy, and that nothing will sell; 
But we won't take securities, real and true— 
We musht have our monish. We'll sue! we will sue!15  
   Some of the worst failures were.16 
 
    
   While these were the more conspicuous formal insolvencies, they were 
typical in the predominance of merchants and the high proportionate 
deficiencies. As important as the formal insolvencies was the collapse of 
most of the joint-stock companies formed in the boom, involving all the 
lately formed banks and virtually all the other companies, except those 
formed for insurance and the Australian Gas Light Co.  
   Inevitably, the pressure produced in New South Wales successful 
demands for legislation relaxing the treatment of insolvents, and a new 
act17 gave relief, most notably in permitting debtors with real prospect of 
ultimately paying to retain and use their property. Its effect was shown 
immediately in a rush of insolvencies, most of them voluntary, as those in 
difficulties took “Burton's Purge” in “Whitewash Hall”18 In eleven months 
of 1842 some 600 insolvency petitions were filed and “meetings of 
creditors this day” became a normal heading in the press.19 A summary in 
1849 gives an illuminating picture:20  
Date filed Name Occupation Liabilities Deficiency
Feb. 16 J. Wright brewer £8,774 £8,694
Feb. 25 J. Roberts gentleman 14,516 6,841
Mar. 25 W. Lang merchant 34,110 34,093
Mar. 25 E. Turner settler 14,337 8,601
Mar. 30 G. & E. Weller merchants 28,669 28,669
Apl. 23 G. Rust & Co. — 10,087 5,561
Apl. 29 R. Duke & Co. merchants 175,235 175,235
May 9 J.H. Scrutton agent 7,143 7,094
June 29 T. Gore & Co. merchants 112,697 17,626
Sep. 5 W. T. Arnold merchant 10,450 9,350
INSOLVENCIES—
NEW SOUTH 
WALES, 1842–49 
(Estates 
Sequestrated) 
Year Number
1842 629
1843 539
1844 192
1845 137
1846 110
1847 115
   Total: 1,923, less 42 estates not proceeded with, leaving 1,881, of which 
51 were compulsory and 1,830 voluntary.  
   Proved debts £3,995,063, of which £3,478,258 was owing in New South 
Wales.  
   Of these 1,881 estates: 650 paid dividends (of £400,894, or 2s. 31/4d. in 
£)  
   10 paid unstated dividends 1,198 paid no dividend 23 were previously 
assigned.  
   Dividends paid were:  
 
   Of the 1,198 no—dividend estates: 569 had no assets 200 were pauper estates 429 
had as only asséts, land already mortgaged. 
   The low dividends were as much the result of the loopholes for debtors 
as of the severity of the deflation.  
There's nothing so common, convenient, and good,  
So fitting, effectual, and neat,  
'Gainst a bailiff that's curt, or dun that is rude,  
As to schedule and get out of debt. 
You may talk of your honour and honest repute,  
And for loss of your credit may fret;  
But when you can't pay there's nothing will suit,  
But to schedule and get out of debt. 
What are stores choked with goods, if all empty your tills,  
Sheep, cattle, farms, houses to let,  
If you've not got cash, or discountable bills?  
Better schedule and clear off your debt. 
You part with your pony, piano, and plate;  
Your wine, and your beer, with regret:  
But retrenchment is vain, and amendment too late,  
You must schedule and get out of debt. 
Your boys and your girls you withdraw from the schools,  
And old tasks, which you fain would forget,  
You rub up anew—but your ardour soon cools;  
You must schedule and get out of debt. 
You are loth to surrender—no wonder you're loth, 
For you know you have property yet; 
1848 145
1849 (to 19 June) 56
In £ No. of Estates In £ No. of Estates
up to Is. 149 5s. to 10s. 132
1s. to 2s. 6d. 133 10s. to 15s. 20
2s. 6d. to 5s. 145 over 15s. 71
But beset with ca.sa.s and fiery fa.s both 
You must schedule and clear off your debt.21  
   In these events lies the primary explanation of the shutting off of British 
investment in the colonies. Not because of difficulty at home, but as a 
natural response to low returns or losses on past investments and reports of 
disaster and insolvency in the colonies, British investors were as keen to 
recover their capital as so recently they had been anxious to lend it. 
Recorded trade statistics show clearly the sharp violence of the reversal:  
   SLUMP (1841-1843)  
   TRADE STATISTICS, NEW SOUTH WALES, 1840–45  
   (including Port Phillip)22 
 
   A change of this magnitude, once it had occurred, was sufficient cause for all that 
followed—widening insolvency, collapse of land sales, credit restriction, 
unemployment. 
   Following the liquidity crisis of 1840, with its chain-reaction of 
insolvencies, came the end of the land boom. Sales of Crown land had 
reached their peak in 1840, and in 1841 fell calamitously in both area and, 
for country land, in price. From £324,072 land revenue fell to £92,637 in 
1841, £18,313 in 1842, and a minimum of £9,175 in 1844. Already Gipps 
had sought English aid in cancelling the immigration orders involving 
commitments for nearly £1 million which he had rashly allowed to 
accumulate,23 and was forced to deplete government bank deposits, a 
contraction only offset in small degree by his issue of £50,000 of 
immigration debentures. Bank loans, after an initial break in 1841, 
appeared to recover in 1842, but then, as the severity and duration of the 
slump were recognized, and a number of banks failed, fell precipitously, 
being halved in two years in New South Wales. In Tasmania the fall was 
nearly as severe, but in South Australia was comparatively mild, for that 
colony escaped the worst of the depression.24 Initially, the severity of this 
credit contraction was mitigated by the substitution of mortgage loans by 
insurance companies who hurriedly withdrew from discounting, by the 
Derwent Bank in Tasmania, and by the mortgage companies on the 
mainland. Figures of New South Wales mortgages show both the 
magnitude of the substitution, and the abruptness with which it was 
Year Imports Exports Surplus Imports Surplus Exports
1840 £3,014,189 £1,399,692 £1,614,497 —
1841 2,527,988 1,023,397 1,504,591 —
1842 1,455,059 1,067,411 387,648 —
1843 1,550,544 1,172,320 378,224 —
1844 931,260 1,128,115 — £196,855
1845 1,233,854 1,555,986 — 322,132
terminated after 1843, that is when bank restriction had reached its worst 
levels, offset to a substantial but inadequate degree by the new wool liens 
and stock mortgages.25 
   SOURCE: Return 13 August 1847, Votes and Proceedings, New South 
Wales Legislative Council, 1847.  
   NOTE: Prices include remissions, i.e., are nominal prices paid, not 
necessarily identical with net proceeds. Figures differ slightly from those in 
annual returns, presumably because of later adjustments of prices or 
correction of errors.  
   By 1842, when the great decline began in loans by the banks, they were 
in no position to do other than seek their own safety. In Tasmania, the 
Derwent Bank was crippled, the Colonial and Archers Gilles & Co. forced 
to close, and the surviving institutions—Bank of Van Diemen's Land, 
Commercial, Australasia and Union—forced into severe contraction. On 
the mainland the major failure was that of the Bank of Australia, the 
prolonged settlement of whose affairs overshadowed and bedevilled 
recovery until the end of the decade; its fate was shared by the Sydney and 
Port Phillip, while the New South Wales and Commercial of Sydney were 
in difficulties.  
    
LAND SALES—NEW SOUTH WALES, 1836–46 
Year (Town) 
Acres
(Town) 
Proceeds 
£
(Town) 
Aver. per 
acre (£)
(Country) 
Acres
(Country) 
Proceeds £
(Country) 
Aver. per 
acre (shill.)
(Total) 
Acres
(Total) 
Proceeds 
£
(Total) 
Aver. per 
acre 
(shill.)
1836 136 7,556 55.6 373,978 121,322 6.49 374,114 128,878 6.89
1837 213 8,308 39.0 368,483 113,655 6.17 368,696 121,963 6.61
1838 229 17,571 76.7 315,090 111,294 7.13 315,318 128,865 8.17
1839 2,785 21,206 7.6 283,130 145,507 10.28 285,916 166,713 11.66
1840 5,525 118,611 21.5 183,944 205,461 22.34 189,469 324,072 34.20
1841 249 9,710 39.0 86,092 82,927 19.26 86,341 92,637 21.45
1842 170 10,963 64.5 21,733 7,349 6.76 21,904 18,312 16.72
1843 157 5,379 34.3 4,660 6,827 29.30 4,818 12,206 50.66
1844 246 3,074 12.5 4,013 6,100 30.40 4,259 9,174 43.08
1845 1,755 6,311 3.6 5,513 11,715 42.50 7,268 18,026 49.60
1846 283 9,172 32.4 6,736 18,528 55.01 7,019 27,700 78.93
REGISTERED MORTGAGES ON LAND, 1837–5026 
Year (Syd) 
No.
(Syd) 
Amount £
(Syd) 
Average £
(PPh) 
No.
(PPh) 
Amount £
(PPh) 
Average £
(Total) 
No.
(Total) 
Amount £
(Total) 
Average £
1837 286 231,014 807.7 — — — — — —
1838 356 248,892 699.1 16 17,260 1,078.8 372 266,152 715.5
1839 383 348,818 910.8 110 77,464 704.2 493 426,282 864.7
1840 459 514,741 1,121.4 82 134,445 1,639.6 541 649,186 1,200.0
1841 709 1,098,742 1,549.7 99 108,474 1,095.7 808 1,207,216 1,494.1
   It is evidence both of the severity of the slump and the changed nature of 
the economy that unemployment was a major factor, as it had not been in 
1826–30, and that both in New South Wales and South Australia public 
works were organized for relief. In the latter colony the need was brief, but 
in New South Wales the unemployed were not so readily absorbed. Figures 
are necessarily fragmentary. In 1843, when the amount of unemployment 
first became important, a select committee obtained an incomplete list of 
1,243 unemployed in Sydney, of whom roughly a third were labourers (i.e., 
unskilled workers) and many of the rest building workers;27 while Caroline 
Chisholm reported having on her books 572 seeking employment, with a 
similar concentration of occupations.28 In a town which, including suburbs, 
had a population of 35,507 in 1841 and 45,190 in 1846, even these 
incomplete figures meant severe unemployment.29  
Monetary Recovery Measures 
   Consistent with contemporary views of causes, recovery plans 
concentrated on non-monetary measures. In all colonies there were 
petitions and propaganda for protection for agriculture, which met the fate 
which might be expected in British colonies in the 'forties. The most 
persistently favoured remedy in all colonies was revival of assisted 
immigration to provide more (and cheaper) labour. This entailed borrowing 
locally and abroad, and might have had important consequences for the 
monetary system had its attainment not been delayed until after recovery 
and its scale limited. The creation of government securities as a form of 
investment was in fact of importance prior to 1850 only to the savings 
banks.30  
   Generally, however, there was acceptance by the dominant interests that 
“the natural course of events” must be endured.31 In the monetary field, 
after the initial shock had stimulated proposals for extensive government 
lending and state banking, which did not mature, agitation concentrated on 
reduction of interest rates—with the weight of opinion successfully 
resisting legislative restriction—which was achieved more as a matter of 
1842 625 824,412 1,319.0 162 113,262 699.1 787 937,674 1,191.4
1843 582 1,055,581 1,813.7 134 270,414 2,018.0 716 1,325,995 1,851.9
1844 494 299,818 606.9 68 48,659 715.6 562 348,477 620.1
1845 318 272,823 857.9 63 46,723 741.6 381 319.546 838.7
1846 308 170,375 553.2 70 35,737 510.5 378 206,112 545.3
1847 320 180,555 564.2 97 43,032 443.6 417 223.587 536.2
1848 307 202,647 660.1 141 71,729 508.7 448 274,376 612.4
1849 376 198,480 527.9 267 116,158 435.0 643 314,638 489.3
1850 310 142,023 458.1 397 154,698 389.7 707 296,721 419.7
profitability than because of agitation or the threat of legislation. The 
unorthodox invention of wool liens and stock mortgages, a genuinely novel 
Australian contribution to financial technique, was the only important 
piece of monetary policy actually implemented, and the only permanent 
change in the nature of the monetary system induced by the slump.32  
   Recovery, therefore, owed little to government policy, and conformed to 
the classical pattern of painful re-establishment of profit prospects after a 
Reinigungskrise. Those who had succeeded in retaining their stations found 
that wool still paid, and numbers of sheep and production of wool rose 
steeply. By 1844–5 depression was over, although except in South 
Australia where a mining boom was gathering way, the colonists still 
complained of bad conditions through the rest of the decade.  
(a) Committee on Monetary Confusion 
   In August 1843, on the motion of Richard Windeyer, a Select Committee 
on “Monetary Confusion” was appointed in New South Wales; the title, 
according to Windeyer, was a phrase from the governor's opening address 
to the Council, its task to investigate and propose remedies. Windeyer 
tentatively suggested the issue of “notes, debentures, or exchequer bills” 
secured on real estate or “any property that is not perishable”. Most 
members were a little dubious of the remedy, but only one opposed 
inquiry.33 The committee proceeded to examine a large number of 
witnesses, and reported at the end of October.34  
   Apart from a wealth of diverse explanations of the slump, and one 
concrete proposal which the committee gratefully embraced, the evidence 
is chiefly remarkable for the exhibition of masochism by the bankers. Hart 
of the Australasia, who found the causes in the slump in export prices, loss 
of convict labour, and a “wild spirit of speculation . . . which unhappily 
was fostered and encouraged by the banks and by the government”, 
declared that the banks had “participated in the general delusion”. All he 
could propose was renewed immigration and the “strictest economy”; he 
was discouraging as to the possibility of issuing bills modelled on British 
Exchequer bills. McLaren of the Union substantially agreed as to causes, 
admitting with more restraint that the banks had been “perhaps too liberal”. 
He was equally unhelpful as to remedies; Exchequer bills the banks might 
take in exchange for doubtful bills in their portfolios. Griffiths, formerly of 
the Australasia and then a local director for the Union, found the main 
cause in “over-speculation” on the strength of excessive bank loans. As to 
remedies: “We must look greatly to time for relieving our present distress; 
but we can only succeed by reducing all our expenditure to the lowest 
practicable level; by checking, in every way, the lavish system of credit 
which has too long prevailed here, and by reducing our imports to what we 
can fairly pay for; these are the best remedies which I can suggest. I would, 
however, strongly recommend to the banks and mortgages the reduction of 
interest to 6 per cent or 7 per cent; but I would not desire that any measures 
should be taken by the legislature to force such a reduction”. Mitchell, a 
director of the Australia, declared that “too great facilities were offered to 
speculation in the way of discounts from the desire of the English and other 
banks to establish themselves”. C. W. Roemer roundly asserted that “the 
ignorance of bank directors, particularly of their duty to their shareholders, 
is almost incredible”; they had put all their eggs in the basket of “Sydney 
speculators and adventures”. Only two bankers refused to accept blame: 
George Miller of the Savings Bank and the defunct Sydney Bank and S. K. 
Salting, a Union director, but they agreed in opposing government action. 
Miller said “things must be left to their natural course; property must 
change hands”. Salting echoed: “the distress and ruin of individuals, much 
as they may excite our sympathies, may perhaps be preferable in a general 
point of view, to any artificial measure which, by interfering with the 
currency of the country, may seriously affect the permanent interests of the 
community and greatly impede the further progress of the colony”. The 
only other banker to express an opinion as to remedies, T. W. Smart of the 
Sydney Bank, held the same view: “I think it impossible effectually to 
relieve the present distresses; nothing but time and a strict observance of 
economy by every person will ultimately restore the country.”  
   The few non-banker witnesses were no more helpful. Francis Kemble, 
sugar refiner, looked only to more immigrants; auctioneer T. Stubbs 
enumerated eighteen causes of the slump (in fact mainly a list of the chief 
events) and was too exhausted by the effort to provide a cure. Only 
Thomas Holt had a plan, fully developed and persuasively argued, which 
the committee adopted entire. They excused themselves from the larger 
burden imposed upon them by their terms of reference by generously 
allowing “that the present distressed state of the colony is to be attributed 
to a combination of most of the causes assigned for it by the different 
witnesses” and by excluding all “but the monetary measures of relief” on 
the grounds that several other committees were already at work on non-
monetary proposals.35  
   Holt's plan, as finally embodied in a bill, provided for a Land Board 
empowered to buy up mortgages in exchange for Land Board notes or 
Pledge certificates, charging 7 per cent interest. The former, Land Board 
notes, were to be inconvertible legal tender, payable for taxes, limited to 
£100,000; the certificates were to bear 6 per cent interest from the 
government, redeemed by a sinking fund provided by mortgagors.36 
Despite the known intention of Gipps to withhold the royal assent,37 
Council pressed ahead with the bill. A legal difficulty appeared in that as a 
bill appropriating revenue it was invalid unless introduced by the governor, 
but a motion asking him to adopt it was defeated, partly because it 
appeared as a move to shelve the bill, partly on the plea of Wentworth and 
Windeyer that the Council should not admit such a limitation on its 
powers.38 The bill was duly passed, but Gipps withheld assent and the 
whole matter was dropped.39 Gipps, in his prorogation address, had 
tactfully warned Council not to proceed further: “After the most painful 
consideration, however, I find myself, I regret to say, forced to the 
conclusion . . . that the Colony cannot, by any direct legislative enactments 
be relieved from the depression under which it labours; and that it is only 
by the general tendency of their measures that the Legislative and 
Executive Authorities can aid individuals in the efforts which are necessary 
for the recovery of their affairs.”40  
(b) Interest Reduction 
   During 1842 and 1843 the need for interest reduction in New South 
Wales was constantly discussed. Leading the campaign was the Herald 
which steadfastly maintained the view that reduction was essential, but 
must not be achieved by legislative action.  
   Can the colony, in its present and prospective circumstances afford this 
eleven per cent? That it has afforded it heretofore, and even prospered 
under it, is nothing to the purpose. Can it afford it now? Will it be able to 
afford it hereafter? The merchant says no; the shopkeeper says no; the 
landholder says no; the farmer says no; the flockmaster says no; the 
Commercial Bank says no; the Bank of New South Wales half says no; the 
other Banks, within the secret recesses of their board rooms whisper a 
melancholy no; the Governor of the Colony makes the walls of his Council 
Chamber reverberate with his emphatic NO. Would you have still more 
conclusive testimony? Go to the Supreme Court; examine the cause-lists; 
search the records of the Sheriff's office; and there you will see ‘No’ 
written on every brief, incorporated with every verdict, and stamped upon 
every writ. Go to the Debtors' Prison; go to the office of the Chief 
Commissioner of Insolvencies; and there ‘No’ will salute your eyes in its 
most humiliating forms, and your ears in its most plaintive cadences.41  
   The first definite move came from the Bank of New South Wales, which 
in April declined to receive more 7 per cent deposits and gave three 
months' notice of reducing deposit interest to a maximum of 4 per cent.42 
The Commercial, which had earlier held its hand because none of the other 
banks would agree to common action,43 a month later went further, 
abolishing, as from June, all interest on current accounts, and reducing the 
rate for bills of less than 100 days to 8 per cent, with proportionate 
reductions in other rates.44  
   This was followed by efforts by the Bank of New South Wales to secure 
joint action. A meeting of the colonial banks, other than the Commercial, 
concluded that reduction in discount rates required the abandonment of 
current account interest, and sought a meeting with the Inspectors of the 
Australasia and Union. Both refused, McLaren of the Union adding that he 
would consider a discount rate of 8 per cent but not abolition of interest on 
current accounts, and the whole question was dropped temporarily.45 
However, early in 1843, the maintained lower rate of the Commercial 
forced cuts. The Sydney Bank in January 1843 met the Commercial's rates 
(10 per cent) on long bills and cash credits, in March the Australasia and 
Union suddenly reduced their rates to the Commercial levels, except that 
they retained 3 per cent on current accounts. Thereupon the New South 
Wales and Commercial adopted 3 per cent as their current account rate.46 
The relief was less than it might seem, for the rate on cash credits, bills 
exceeding three months, renewals and mortgages, all remained at 10 per 
cent, and these were of more importance in depression than the rate on new 
short-term bills. Accordingly, attention turned to a usury law.  
   This grew out of a series of rowdy public meetings organized by Robert 
Cooper,47 whose main proposal was to shut the law courts for a year; at the 
third of these Wentworth announced his support of a usury law, and a 
turbulent meeting ended with a simple resolution inviting the governor to 
convene the Legislative Council as soon as possible.48 When it did meet, 
not exceptionally early, Wentworth introduced a drastic interest reduction 
bill.49 This proposed to prohibit interest on deposits, not only in banks, but 
also in other companies; prescribed a maximum rate of interest in all future 
contracts, left blank in the original draft, but with a forecast of 5 per cent; 
applied the restriction retrospectively to all mortgages; and established a 
board which, at the request of a creditor, should investigate any mortgage, 
and, if the security were adequate, substitute a government debenture for 
the mortgage. This was too Draconian to have any hope of acceptance, and 
after some skirmishing it was shelved by a vote of 21 to 12 on the second 
reading.50  
   Whether because they expected less severe but more effective action, or 
merely because it was the profitable thing to do, the day after the defeat of 
Wentworth's bill, the Union and Commercial took joint action to reduce 
interest rates. Short-term bills (to 100 days) were discounted at 6 per cent, 
longer at 8 per cent; current account interest was reduced to 2 per cent and 
deposits at three months' notice to 3 per cent.51 This action was not 
followed by the Australasia, Hart believing that there would be no loss of 
business since practically every customer was so indebted that he could 
transfer his business only if the receiving bank first paid all his 
commitments to the Australasia.52 The truth of this view of the weak 
competition between the banks in such conditions is shown by the fact that 
not until February 1845 was the loss of business sufficient to compel the 
bank to reduce its short-term discount rate to 6 per cent.53 The Savings 
Bank held to its 10 per cent mortgage rate until April 1844 when it became 
8 per cent, the Trust Company retaining its 10 per cent rate throughout.54  
   The next stage was the reduction of deposit interest initiated by the Bank 
of Australasia early in 1844. It came down to the same rates as the other 
banks, except that current account interest was to be reckoned on the 
minimum monthly, not daily, balance, a change followed by the Bank of 
New South Wales abolishing all deposit interest other than 2 per cent on 
the minimum monthly balance.55 That bank soon after took the further step 
of abolishing all interest on deposits,56 followed by the Commercial Bank 
after six weeks' delay,57 and after a further month by the Australasia and 
Union.58  
   There were, however, no further cuts in loan rates, and consequently 
interest in legislative reduction revived. William Foster, barrister member 
for Northumberland, introduced a new bill to control interest,59 which 
proposed to restrict interest on new loans by way of pledge or mortgage 
only, for a period of two years. It had to face persistent and bitter 
obstruction; members left the house to deprive it of a quorum (at least once 
they had to return since a quorum remained), there were repeated motions 
for adjournment, and several times the house having been counted out, it 
was claimed that the bill had lapsed. There were heated debates as to the 
rate of interest to be prescribed, 8 per cent being finally adopted on the 
casting vote of the chairman of committees; attempts to exempt renewals 
of existing mortgages and to exclude the Port Phillip District were 
defeated, and the third reading was finally carried by a majority of two.60 
Gipps reserved the royal assent, not primarily because of opposition to the 
principle. His views on that point were changing. In 1842 he had declared 
that “the opinions he formerly entertained on the subject of usury laws had 
been very much shaken by the events of the last two years, and he should 
no longer be so opposed to them as he formerly was”,61 and he now hinted 
pretty plainly that he would welcome an indication from England that the 
bill would be approved after removal of legal flaws. His main reason for 
reserving assent was that the bill was aimed primarily at the mortgage 
companies, and they should have time to state their case in England, and, 
Gipps implied, to consider voluntary reductions.62 However, the royal 
assent was refused, and, with revival in the colony, the whole subject was 
abandoned.63  
   Tasmanian discussion of remedies for the slump concentrated almost 
entirely on the level of interest rates. There were occasional pleas for 
reduction of wages64 and for protective duties,65 but the newspapers lined 
up either as advocates of a usury law or opponents of it. (They were 
unanimous in their belief that recovery could not be achieved without 
interest reduction by some means). “None can refuse a usury law”, said the 
Advertiser, “but the political economist, the usurer, and those who dread to 
be the victims.”66 The Launceston Examiner, doctrinaire laisser-faire in 
this as in other questions, declared: “Laws for the regulation of commerce 
are naturally sought by particular interests, but the current of opinion is 
strongly running against them; because they are generally useless, often 
vexatious, and sometimes insufferably inquisitorial and oppressive.”67 In 
varying tones the others followed one or other of these two persistent and 
vigorous leaders.  
   The lead in seeking legislative reduction of interest rates was taken by 
Michael Fenton who in the last three months of 1842 presented ten 
petitions to the Legislative Council.68 This followed an approach to the 
governor by himself and W. Kermode, when he was told that Franklin was 
not only opposed to legal control of interest on principle, but was satisfied 
that the level of interest rates was unrelated to the problem of depression—
having been so assured by Hobart bank managers.69 In the Council he now 
sought the introduction of an 8 per cent maximum, but the governor 
refused to entertain either the 8 per cent or the principle of restriction,70 and 
with the air of trumping an ace produced a Launceston petition hostile to a 
usury law.71 Fenton thereupon moved for a select committee to examine 
both his proposal and the state of the colony, but the systematic obstruction 
of the governor and all official members left his motion formally without a 
seconder; undaunted, the next day he moved a similar proposal (omitting 
the “state of the colony”) but achieved no more than a seconder against a 
solid eight votes for the governor.72 He and Kermode, as a parting shot, 
tabled a protest in which they “heaped together twenty-nine propositions, 
without order and without natural connection, and in language peculiarly 
rugged and obscure”.73  
   Fenton turned to an alternative plan, for what amounted to a government-
aided conversion scheme for mortgages. He proposed a mutual 
organization (the name varied—Land Bank, Mutual Protection Society, 
Loan Company) to raise funds in England for this purpose, with 
government backing.74 But dissension destroyed any small hope of success; 
Kermode entered the field with a counter proposal on similar lines.75 and 
the critical meeting in Hobart in May 1843 spent so much time in 
acrimonious personal dispute that those present drifted away as darkness 
fell.76 By July 1843 Swanston, who in April was making private inquiries 
in England as to the availability of capital, reported the plan to be dead.77 A 
like fate killed a wheat stabilization scheme at the end of the same year. 
This provided for a committee of landholders to take wheat at 3s. per 
bushel, to be stored for resale when the market improved, paying growers 
the excess over 3s. per bushel; faction fights and the difficulty of financing 
the plan produced inaction.78  
   Meanwhile two other efforts at interest reduction had been made. Dunn 
of the Commercial Bank proposed to the governor that he abandon all 
interest on government deposits and that the Commercial Bank would 
reduce discount rates to 8 per cent and abolish deposit interest. Franklin 
agreed, but extended the proposal to all the banks.79 Consequentially all the 
banks cut their rate on bills under three months from 10 per cent to 8 per 
cent in September 1842, they and the Derwent Bank at the same time 
reducing the mortgage rate from 121/2 per cent to 10 per cent.80 The second 
move came from Swanston who in June 1843 further reduced the Derwent 
Bank mortgage rate to 81/2 per cent in the hope that the banks would make 
similar reductions in their discount rates.81 In this he was disappointed, and 
reverted to 10 per cent at the beginning of 1844.82 Not until April 1846 did 
the other banks make any further reduction in their discount rates, to 6 per 
cent for bills of less than 100 days and 7 per cent for those of longer term.83 
Mortgage rates, other than those of the banks, came down early in 1845, on 
the initiative of the Derwent and Tamar Insurance Co. which, after some 
hesitation, set its rate at 6 per cent. This Swanston was ready to follow, 
subject to the approval of his clients in England.84  
(c) Preferable Liens 
    
REGISTERED LIENS ON WOOL, 1843–50 
Year (Syd) 
No.
(Syd) 
Amount
(Syd) 
Average
(PPh) 
No.
(PPh) 
Amount
(PPh) 
Average
(Total) 
No.
(Total) 
Amount
(Total) 
Average
1843 54 £30,665 £567.9 9 £4,960 £551.1 63 £35,625 £565.5
1844
139 57,733 415.3 66 23,023 348.8 205 80,756 393.9
1845 125 55,866 446.9 37 11,785 318.5 162 67,651 417.6
1846 149 71,351 578.9 22 11,160 507.3 171 82,511 482.5
1847 199 107,448 539.9 43 33,791 785.8 242 141,239 583.6
1848 240 108,892 453.7 102 62,532 613.0 342 171,424 501.2
   In August 1843 Wentworth introduced in New South Wales a bill for 
preferable liens on wool and mortgages on stock.85 It was to be, in the long 
run, the most important measure taken to combat depression, but at the 
time it excited little interest or enthusiasm. The debate was almost entirely 
concerned with technical details;86 various amendments proposed by the 
governor were readily accepted,87 and Gipps reported the act with the 
comment that “no very salutary effect is anticipated from it by any party”.88 
Thus quietly for the first time squatters acquired a security on which they 
could borrow readily, for the act provided that agreements to advance 
money on unshorn wool might be registered, thus giving the lender a lien 
on the wool which the borrower might discharge by repayment of the debt.  
    
   Registration entitled the lender to prior claims and barred subsequent 
liens. Similar provisions applied to mortgages of sheep, horses and cattle.89 
By the end of the year, in only eleven weeks, 104 mortgages on sheep or 
cattle and 63 liens on wool had been registered,90 and by the end of 1844, 
357 mortgages for £358,623 and 228 liens for £148,972 had been 
registered.91  
   The volume of such loans could not offset the decline in bank loans, but 
even quantitatively they were important in aiding those squatters who were 
otherwise sound to ride out the storm.92  
   The great importance of the measure lay in the changed borrowing power 
of squatters. They possessed little equipment, they generally owned no 
land but held a short-term right to occupy, and their main property was 
their sheep or cattle. Banks did not look with favour on “settlers' bills”,93 
and mortgages required ownership of real estate; discounting and 
mortgaging were therefore small aid. Delay in payment was a device 
frequently resorted to. It was the common excuse of bankers for not 
discounting squatters' bills that they paid too slowly. Wages were paid 
1849 211 84,693 401.4 118 111,814 947.6 329 196,507 597.3
1850 187 82,731 442.4 105 18,420 175.4 292 101,151 346.4
REGISTERED MORTGAGES ON STOCK, 1843–50 
Year (Syd) 
No.
(Syd) 
Amount £
(Syd) 
Average £
(PPh) 
No.
(PPh) 
Amount £
(PPh) 
Average £
(Total) 
No.
(Total) 
Amount £
(Total) 
Average £
1843 96 178,567 1,860.1 28 24,132 861.8 124 202,699 1,634.7
1844 226 241,727 1,069.6 117 129,008 1,102.6 343 370,735 1,080.9
1845 152 132,355 870.8 71 44,384 625.1 223 176,739 792.6
1846 146 150,733 1,032.4 85 100,071 1,177.3 231 250,804 1,085.7
1847 168 137,857 820.6 125 135,907 1,087.2 293 273,764 934.3
1848 205 219,757 1,072.0 146 129,809 889.1 351 349,566 995.9
1849 213 161,553 758.5 185 191,483 1,035.0 398 353,036 887.0
1850 163 118,987 730.0 132 224,060 1,697.4 295 343,047 1,162.9
annually, after the harvest or wool clip, and then by “orders” which 
ensured a further delay. To this surreptitious borrowing the main addition 
was credit from metropolitan merchants, who coupled their advances with 
high prices for supplies and conditions restricting the handling of the 
borrower's wool to their own agency. Direct advances against wool had 
been common since the 'twenties, but only after prior delivery of the wool. 
Now the settler was able to offer any lender security of a high order since 
registration ensured that one claim against the wool or the stock should 
have legal priority.  
   But the Colonial Office viewed the act with horror. It was, wrote Stanley,  
   a measure so irreconcilably opposed to the principles of legislation immemorially 
recognized in this country respecting the alienation of things moveable that, under 
any other circumstances than those in which the Colony has unhappily been 
involved, it would not have been in my power to decline the unwelcome duty of 
advising Her Majesty to disallow it . . . But while I am ready to admit that 
embarrassments so overwhelming may have justified innovations otherwise 
indefensible, I must not less distinctly deny that they afford any valid plea for a 
permanent departure from those established rules to which all theory and all 
experience alike lend their sanction. The disasters of New South Wales will ere long 
have passed away; but there will remain on the Colonial Statute Book a law 
expressly authorizing transactions which the law of England regards as affording the 
conclusive indication of fraud. It is a law which will place society at the mercy of 
any dishonest borrower, and which will stimulate the speculative spirit which it is so 
important to discourage. 
   Gipps was informed that unless notice of repeal were received earlier, the 
act would be disallowed in July 1846.94  
   The news was ill received in the colony. The Atlas jeered at “the 
ignorance, presumption and incapacity of the Colonial Office”,95 the 
Herald could find no wisdom in the “Solons of Downing Street”, who 
failed to see how the act had benefited the colony by “its soothing and 
encouraging influence upon the minds of the flockmasters. It found them in 
what appeared to be inextricable difficulties. It found them involved in 
debt, and in those corroding cares and anxieties which are so fatal to the 
energies of hopeful industry. It approached them with the benign aspect of 
a comforter. It brought them unexpected relief. It invested their flocks with 
a new species of value—a value which enabled them to raise money upon 
the carcass or fleece, not only without sacrifice but without even parting 
with the property.”96 The Select Committee appointed to consider what 
should be done declared “their deep regret that in a matter of such purely 
domestic legislation the well-considered and judicious endeavours of your 
Honourable House to place the monetary transactions of the principal class 
of our colonial producers on a secure foundation—endeavours which have 
so largely contributed to the reviving prosperity of the community at 
large—should be rendered nugatory by mere theoretical surmises, equally 
unwarranted by the law of England and the analogies of some of the most 
important of the British Colonies”.97  
   That committee found witnesses unanimously in favour of the legislation. 
The Australasia reported direct loans secured by liens as £60,000 with a 
larger amount advanced on discount to merchants who protected 
themselves by taking liens “with our knowledge and concurrence”.98 This 
avoidance of direct loans by the banks to settlers, a continuance of their 
earlier policy on bills, seems to have been general. Thus Duguid of the 
Commercial Bank said: “We do not take the security alone, but require a 
name between the settler and the bank . . . the practice of our Bank has 
been not to bring ourselves into direct contact with the security; we always 
have a person between us and the settler.”99 Gilchrist, a merchant, indicated 
that it loans on liens merchants had become mere agents: “It is usual 
everywhere for merchants to charge a commission for making these 
advances, over and above the interest or discount charged by the bank.”100  
   The committee, therefore, reported in favour of continuance of the 
legislation, which they believed should be permanent. For this purpose two 
new acts were passed, a Mortgages of Sheep, etc., Act to preserve existing 
mortgages, and a Lien on Wool Act which repealed the earlier measure, 
and re-enacted similar provisions, both for a term of two years.101 
Gladstone, now at the Colonial Office, took a kinder view than Stanley; the 
acts were allowed, because they operated only until the end of 1848, but 
the governor was informed: “It will be open to you to bring the subject of a 
further continuance of these; or any equivalent measures, under the 
consideration of the government, in case you shall hereafter see cause to 
think that the decision of Lord Stanley should be reviewed.”102  
   Gladstone's successor, Grey, took a less liberal view and reacted 
vigorously to a South Australian copying of the wool lien. Disallowing the 
ordinance he declared: “The necessary tendency . . . must be to increase the 
existing competition for labour, by enabling settlers to raise money on this 
species of mortgage, beyond what they would otherwise command for the 
extension of their present holdings. It would therefore have all the ordinary 
evil consequences of undue encouragement to speculation aggravated by 
that of enhancing the price of labour against all who brought their own 
unborrowed capital into the market.”103 He did not pursue this argument to 
its logical end of requiring repeal of all legislative protection of the rights 
of lenders, but in the same vein next day despatched to FitzRoy a long 
essay on the unwisdom of such legislation, with lengthy discussion of the 
evil results of crop liens in the West Indies, and advising that it be allowed 
to expire. Almost as an afterthought he explained that the objections were 
solely to permanent legislation, and “I shall be as ready as my predecessor 
expressed himself to consider any additional grounds which may be urged 
for a further continuance of this temporary law”.104 Even as he wrote there 
was on its way to England a new act extending the operation of the old to 
the end of 1850,105 and as that date approached, the legislation was again 
extended for a period of three years, with a set of resolutions denouncing in 
general and in detail the English opposition to it.106 The lien on wool and 
mortgage on stock were too precious for squatters to abandon them; they 
had come to stay.  
Bank Failures 
(a) Bank of Australia 
   On 2 March 1843, “a great sensation was created in the City by the report 
that the Bank of Australia had failed”.107 This was, however, merely public 
discovery of a situation for which Hart of the Australasia blamed the 
“usual duplicity and want of nerve” of McLaren of the Union who, he said, 
could not make up his mind whether to share in lending aid and called so 
many special board meetings and sought the advice of so many individuals 
before (at first) refusing to help, that the Australia's difficulties became 
widely known.108  
   Behind scenes, the Australasia had for two successive weeks in February 
assisted the Australia at clearing,109 and then secured access to the books of 
the Australia. A balance sheet at 21 February 1843 showed the Australia to 
have notes in circulation of £17,909 and deposits of £90,891, of which 
£69,624 were repayable on demand. Cash holdings were only £4,860 in 
gold. The bank held bills totalling £145,000 but was involved to the 
admitted extent of £143,497 in the affairs of the bankrupt firm of Hughes 
& Hosking.110  
   Hart was fearful—as were the other banks—of the effects of a public 
collapse on the banks as a whole, but had a special reason for aid. He had 
rediscounted for the Australia, on acceptances by the chairman, £46,885 in 
bills, together with £34,000 of Hughes & Hosking bills, and as well the 
Australasia was involved, on its own account, in loans the fate of which 
was bound up with Hughes & Hosking. Accordingly he bullied McLaren 
of the Union into making available £60,000 to cover note issue and 
deposits of the Australia, and agreed to advance £150,000 (including the 
£80,885 already rediscounted) on somewhat stringent conditions: (i) the 
Australia was to wind up as a bank, conducting all receipts and payments 
through the Australasia; (ii) no transfer of Australia shares should be made 
without the consent of the Australasia; (iii) the Australia was to secure 
deeds of trust from Hughes & Hosking giving complete control of their 
affairs to the Australia, with all future receipts and payments to be 
conducted through the Australasia. It was made clear that the loan was “on 
the condition that [the Bank of Australia] should identify the engagements 
of Hughes & Hosking with its own”. Hart made no secret of his intention 
of, in effect, substituting the Australia as debtor to the Australasia in place 
of Hughes & Hosking so far as concerned that firm's debts to the 
Australasia, while securing indirect control of all Hughes & Hosking's 
assets against the loan to the Australia. He proposed to apply £80,885 of 
the loan to retiring bills already discounted for the Australia, making a net 
new advance of about £70,000. He calculated that by the end of 1843 bills 
held by the Australia itself, totalling £60,457, would fall due, while 
revenue from Hughes & Hosking properties would be £81,500. In two 
years, he assumed, all debts would be paid off.111  
   But plans went astray immediately. Hart left to visit Maitland and 
Melbourne branches, and in his absence the Sydney manager, not being in 
his confidence, paid over to the Australia the full loan, instead of applying 
a major part to paying off Hughes & Hosking bills held by the 
Australasia.112 The Australia, having secured control of Hughes & 
Hosking's assets, was alarmed at the size of liabilities and refused 
responsibility for them; Hart could do little to enforce the agreement, his 
only weapon being to call up the loan, which he thought the worse 
solution.113  
   A report in September by a shareholders' committee brought out the 
extent to which the Bank of Australia had financed Hughes & Hosking and 
a few other firms.114 The face value of total assets was given as £467,726, 
of which overdrawn accounts accounted for £184,393; of these £126,363 
were for Hughes & Hosking and £55,498 for J. T. Hughes individually. 
These two and five other accounts were responsible for £357,277 of the 
total assets.115 But the main liabilities were shown as almost all to other 
banks; notes outstanding were only £1,347 and deposits £4,823. In other 
words, the general public had not suffered seriously, and the issue that 
remained was the sharing of losses between shareholders and the other 
banks. The latter agreed amongst themselves to refrain from suing the 
Australia for a year,116 and the Australasia and Union jointly advanced 
£10,000 to pay off all liabilities other than to banks, an advance given 
priority for repayment.117 The Australia, for its part, made the first of three 
calls of £5 on shareholders.118 Hart followed the third of these with a two-
edged suggestion that these calls would be easier to enforce if “a friendly 
judgment” on the debt to the Australasia were secured; the other banks 
naturally opposed, and the Australia, which was using every legal 
technicality to resist claims, equally naturally refused the spider's 
invitation.119  
   In July 1844 matters took a new turn for, for the first time, the question 
of the legal validity of the Australasia's claim was raised,120 and the 
desperate shareholders grasped at the chance; they resolved “that the loan 
negotiated between the Bank of Australasia and the former directors of this 
Bank and Messrs. Hughes & Hosking is not binding on the proprietors of 
this Bank; and the directors are hereby instructed to defend any action the 
Bank of Australasia may bring for the recovery of the same”.121 The 
shareholders had every reason for desperation: the directors at that meeting 
had reported that the dividend to be expected on the £232,739 of Hughes & 
Hosking debts to the Bank would not exceed £35,154, a loss of £197,585; 
the loss on the rest of the business was £130,000; and beyond all this was 
the £154,000 claimed by the Australasia.  
   Their courage no doubt derived from the hatching of a novel scheme for 
getting rid of the burden of debt: a lottery in which the prizes should be the 
estates foreclosed for debts unpaid, other than those of Hughes & Hosking, 
which were omitted as “encumbered with trusts, mortgages, marriage 
settlements, etc.”.122 The scheme originated with the board of the bank,123 
and the argument for it was that sale of such extensive properties in 
depression could only be at bargain prices, but the claim of the Australasia 
and the effects of unsettled debt on the standing of all shareholders made 
early settlement desirable.124 A bill was accordingly introduced by 
Wentworth to give legal sanction to a lottery,125 and a barrage of petitions 
organized in its favour.126 A select committee heard evidence of striking 
unanimity in its favour, from which a few important points emerged. 
Practically every witness agreed that the uncertainty as to the liabilities of 
shareholders was the occasion for extreme caution in dealing with them; an 
act, it was explained, was sought only to clarify the position between bank 
and public, a lottery being regarded as quite legal as between 
shareholders;127 shareholders were disposing of property or deliberately 
encumbering it, as a protection against possible levies.128 The claims of the 
various banks against the Australia were shown as: Australasia £176,000; 
Union £29,000; Commercial £11,000; and New South Wales £10,000.129 
The lottery proposal provided for raising £80,000 by the sale of £20 
tickets; there were to be 4,000 prizes (i.e., no blanks) the highest being two 
estates valued at £10,000 and the lowest £20. This appearance of a lottery 
in which one could not lose was achieved by valuing properties at double 
current prices; the total nominal value was £163,000. “It is expected that 
with this aid [£80,000] the proprietors will be enabled, from the remaining 
interests, viz., bills and doubtful titles, and by subscriptions amongst 
themselves to arrange or settle the remainder of the claims or debts”.130 The 
committee's report was a faithful reflection of the evidence,131 although its 
weight was somewhat lessened by the fact that its chairman and another 
member were shareholders in the Australia, and of the thirteen witnesses 
three were in a similar position and six were participants in banks hoping 
to be paid.132  
   Despite questions as to its validity, the bill was carried by 18 to 3.133 It 
authorized a lottery of the type proposed to the Select Committee.134 Gipps 
reluctantly reserved the royal assent, solely on legal advice as to its 
validity, reporting to England: “I consider the settlement of the affairs of 
the Bank of Australia to be an object of such high importance to this 
community that I should be happy to see it achieved by almost any 
means.”135 But he took the precaution of publicizing the opinion of his legal 
advisers,136 and the Australia did not wait for the inevitable disallowance in 
England137 before seeking a compromise. The Australasia was offered 
£60,000 from colonial shareholders; properties valued at £85,000 (but 
requiring £23,000 to clear the titles, to be advanced by the Australasia); a 
consent judgment to enable it to enforce claims against English 
shareholders who, it was suggested, should contribute £40,000. To this 
Hart retorted that he would consider no proposal from directors and then, 
from a general meeting only, would require an unopposed judgment 
reserving all rights of the Australasia to enforce its full claims.138 Neither 
side would modify its position and the Australasia turned to legal action.139  
   The trial commenced in the Supreme Court on 27 March 1845 and 
occupied ten days, argument centring around the authority of the chairman 
or directors to make a valid contract for such a loan; there was no dispute 
as to facts other than this. The judge, advising the jury that the deed of 
settlement did not empower the directors to borrow money without express 
authority, directed them to “find that the plaintiffs did not lend money to 
the Bank of Australia”. The jury were not amenable to such direction, and 
after three sessions totalling seventeen hours were unable to agree, and 
were discharged.140  
   A new trial, commencing in June, occupied twenty days, with an ending 
scarcely more conclusive. The jury, again unable to agree, finally brought 
in a “special verdict”, that is, subject to the opinion of the full court on 
points of law. The verdict was for the Australasia for the main sum of 
£154,000 together with interest at 8 per cent, a total of £175,704. But by a 
two to one majority the court held that the directors of the Australia had no 
power to raise such a loan.141 This form of verdict permitted appeal to the 
Privy Council for which the Australasia immediately prepared, although 
because of time consumed in exchange of mail to ensure that proper copies 
of documents were obtained, the hearing was not reached until December 
1847.142 Judgment was given two months later, for the full amount of the 
debt, interest on the original loan, and costs of the Sydney actions, in 
favour of the Australasia.143  
   The Australia shareholders took defeat with a good grace, expressing the 
“unanimous opinion that every exertion should be made to pay”, and 
appointed a committee, ominously thirteen in number, with the task of 
realizing assets and assessing contributions from colonial shareholders,144 it 
being expected that they would lose their whole capital and have to pay an 
equal sum.145 The English shareholders were left to make terms with the 
London board, which at almost every meeting in 1849–50 had before it one 
or more proposals for individual compositions, most of which were 
accepted.146 By August 1850 the total so  
‘A thousand pounds to the tinker bold, 
Who restores to my screw its might.' 
He cried, but in vain, for no screw can hold, 
Against both Law and Right.” 
   received was £58,892,147 but with some of them the bank could not reach 
agreement, complaining that it was “met by every device that legal 
ingenuity could suggest”,148 and some amounts had to be abandoned. The 
major part of the debt had therefore to be collected from colonial 
shareholders.  
   The Australia decided on two main steps. Shareholders were called upon 
to contribute an amount equal to their shareholdings to meet the 
Australasia debt,149 while it was proposed to arrange a division of assets 
amongst shareholders by a lottery, this time without benefit of legal 
sanction. This was put forward since, by this time, assets were almost 
wholly real estate which, it was argued, could not itself be distributed 
equitably. The scheme was for 11,247 tickets each worth £4 (shareholders 
receiving them in proportion to their shares, with a right to resell) and with 
a like number of prizes, of which nine were of some size, the largest 
claimed to be worth £6,000, but almost all were said to be worth roughly 
£4 each.150 As a lottery it was not very attractive to shareholders since each 
ticket could win only one prize, and many resorted to sale of their tickets 
by auction or other means, preferring ready money to the very small 
chance of winning one of the larger estates.151 Many of the public were 
ready buyers—the Herald claimed £10,000 was withdrawn from the 
Savings Bank to buy tickets.152 
 
   The drawing was spread over three days.153 “Who can ever forget,” wrote 
the Herald, “the rows upon rows of anxious purchasers of tickets, male and 
female, daily and all day long crowded in the pit and boxes of the City 
Theatre? Who can ever forget the eager looks, the patient and sustained 
listening to the announcements of the numbers of the tickets as drawn, the 
uncompromising suppression of an occasional child—for even crying 
infants in arms were carried by their amiable mothers to the lottery—the 
hard breathing, and the excitement amongst the shoes, whenever something 
considered a prize was drawn, the almost audible groans of the old woman 
as a FitzRoy fell to her . . . ”154  
   This was intended to be the first of two lotteries, the second to deal with 
the Hughes & Hosking properties, of which titles were in confusion. But 
plans to hold this, in April 1849, went awry.155 W. C. Wentworth decided 
that it was a profitable method of disposing of miscellaneous properties not 
easily sold by orthodox methods, and through a “committee of friends and 
political supporters” proposed a lottery with 12,000 £5 tickets to dispose of 
his property so that he could give his full time to public affairs.156 This was 
too much for the government. It had averted its gaze discreetly while the 
Australia mess was being cleaned up, but it could not permit large private 
lotteries to become a habit, and Wentworth was notified by the Attorney-
General that persistence would bring legal action.157 Consequentially, the 
second Australia lottery had to be abandoned.158  
   The Australia therefore made a new agreement with the Australasia.159 
Some £71,928 had already been paid in the colony and £52,732 was known 
to have been received in England. Assuming that another £10,000 would 
be provided by English shareholders, there remained £88,030 to be found 
in the colony to make up the total debt of £222,689. This it was proposed 
to pay by making five quarterly instalments of £16,000 commencing with 
January 1850. Auction of properties held was arranged,160 and with an 
extension of time to July the bank was able to settle its debt and close 
finally in July 1851.161  
(b) Derwent Bank 
   For two or three years Swanston's mortgage banking plan appeared to 
promise well; by December 1841 he was reporting that the new demand for 
bank mortgages was so great that he could not now accept overseas funds 
to be invested on any other basis.162 Loans grew from £171,295 at the end 
of 1841 to a peak two years later of £190,083; any increase at all looked 
well by contrast with the falling discounts of the other banks. But the 
contrast points to the real reason for the demand for mortgage loans on 
which Swanston was congratulating himself: the pinch of the recession 
which was on the point of turning over into a disastrous slump. A boom 
which had meant for the banks collectively a quadrupling of their loans in 
four years, now ended in a depression which cut those loans to half in a 
single year. Borrowers who were refused discounts turned to the Derwent 
with the offer of a mortgage, and Swanston lent heavily to men who could 
not hope to repay. The Derwent would have suffered from the slump in any 
case, but the transfer to mortgage banking settled the matter, although the 
bank limped along until 1849.  
   The real estate on which these loans had been secured declined heavily in 
value, and Swanston was faced with the problem that borrowers could not 
meet the interest payments, yet foreclosure involved taking over property 
which was no longer worth the amount of the loan. It was therefore 
necessary for him to allow time for payment of interest and to defer 
foreclosures where there was any prospect of ultimate recovery. This not 
only hit the English mortgagees, but both directly and indirectly the bank. 
Swanston's faith in mortgages was such that most of the bank's direct 
loans, even before 1841, were in that form, including cash credits secured 
by mortgage.163 In addition, however, English holders of deposits withdrew 
their funds, and declined to forward more. The writers of “angry letters” 
who had suddenly learned that their Tasmanian mortgages were involving 
them in serious loss would not consider direct deposit in the Derwent 
Bank, and if they accepted the new offer to convert mortgages into deposits 
it was only as a first step towards withdrawing their funds altogether. Their 
only interest was in recovering as much of their money as possible, and the 
only brake on their demands was the prospect of regaining more by giving 
debtors time.164  
   A contributory factor to the bank's failure was Swanston's inability to 
keep separate the affairs of the bank and his own private business. Indeed it 
is doubtful whether he ever thought of them as separate, so completely was 
the bank under his control. It was not only that he allowed personal 
connections to influence his management of the bank, although that was 
important. One friend, A. Macdowell, was given a bank loan with the 
words, “I require no security beyond your good faith”; another, James 
Clarke, was given a special interest reduction “as a favour”; and a third, L. 
W. Gilles, was told to “take your own time” in repayment.165 Heavy loans 
were made to relatives and friends with whom he shared ownership of 
businesses. Robert, his son, and Edward Willis (partners with Swanston in 
Swanston, Willis & Co.) were each advanced £11,000, technically by 
Swanston personally, while £7,000 of the firm's bills were discounted at 
the bank. Similar loans were made to Swanston, Potts & Co. at 
Launceston.166 The bank subsequently disowned all connection with 
Swanston's various agencies for overseas firms and individuals, and in 
particular for his advances on wool, although it appeared that bank funds 
had been used for the purpose.167 Swanston himself entered correspondence 
concerning wool advances in the letter books of the bank, and wrote to 
Hamilton on the subject, addressing him as “agent for the Derwent 
Bank”.168 In other cases Swanston received funds from absentees and 
invested them in his own ventures. “Many parties,” wrote John Walker, the 
bank's liquidator, “have entrusted Captain Swanston with money under the 
impression that they have good security, and the money has been laid out 
at Port Phillip and other places, and many of the transactions are of such a 
nature that they will not bear investigation.”169 The Union Bank Inspector, 
who had for several years watched the situation with some anxiety, 
commented, “Captain Swanston's conduct as manager amounts morally to 
felony”.170 In one instance, at least, funds paid to the bank were recorded 
not in its books but in those of the Derwent Company, and used for private 
purposes.171 There is no reason to suspect Swanston's good faith in these 
matters. He had simply ceased to distinguish the policy and affairs of the 
bank from his own interests and business.  
   The impact of the slump was further accentuated by Swanston's slowness 
in becoming aware of its severity and of its effect on the bank. He was 
ageing and tiring. “I am daily getting more and more tired of work and 
fretful, which warns me to retire,” he confessed in 1843. But it was not 
until well into 1843 that he even admitted the existence of a slump, 
continuing to lend on mortgage and to accept English deposits until July of 
that year.172 He took an active part in the plan, discussed up and down the 
colony, for a company to raise a long-term loan in England to fund colonial 
mortgages, believing that the Derwent Bank could act as the financial 
link.173 A year later he was still hopeful, “as it is impossible that either the 
times or the prospects of the Colony can get worse”, and was making plans 
to resume borrowing from English depositors at 5 per cent, anticipating 
that the bank could still earn dividends of 8 per cent.174 A momentary note 
of despair appears—“I regret I ever came to the Colony”—but he turned 
nevertheless to the task of bringing the absentee depositors “as well out of 
the fire as I trust I shall be able to bring the Derwent Bank”.175  
   Swanston accepted the view most widely held in Tasmania as to how the 
slump might be alleviated, i.e., by reduction of interest rates, the argument 
being that the situation had been stabilized by a general reduction of prices 
and incomes, and that farmers and traders could carry on and meet their 
obligations if interest were lowered correspondingly. “The mortgagors,” he 
wrote in July 1843, “have paid as long as they could, and are willing to pay 
the high rates of interest to which their lands are bound, but they are unable 
to do so, and it is only by assisting them to keep their estates by reduction 
of interest that the mortgagees may receive back, when required, their 
principal.”176  
   Despite resistance by the banks rates came down. In 1844, as in New 
South Wales, all deposit interest was abolished by bank agreement, paving 
the way for a reduction in loan rates. This Swanston tried to initiate by 
cutting the Derwent mortgage rate to 81/2 per cent in 1843, but the other 
banks held off and the Derwent restored its rate to 10 until a general 
reduction was made.177 Meanwhile, he had been negotiating with the 
overseas mortgagees to accept 8 per cent net, and in anticipation had taken 
81/2 per cent (1/2 for expenses) from debtors whose liability was direct to 
absentees.178 He apparently believed the difficulty had been overcome, for 
by 1844 he was prepared again to accept English deposits.179 In this belief 
he was encouraged by a revival of deposits, mainly local, which climbed 
back almost to the 1841 level. He was mistaken, for while absentees 
consented to interest reductions, they would not renew loans. “Instead of 
investing money,” he complained, “the absentee mortgagees are calling in 
all their debts, and requiring that their funds should be sent to England. All 
persons are becoming so fearful of the securities offered for loans that they 
refuse to re-invest their funds on any consideration.”180  
   The truth was that most of these loans had been for ten-year periods, and 
those made in the early stages of the boom were falling due in large 
amounts, which increased in the next few years. During 1845 the bank's 
own loans fell from £178,000 to £142,000 and the fall continued. During 
the years 1846–49 Swanston was scraping together what funds he could to 
meet the drain, even borrowing from the Union and Australasia for the 
purpose. By early 1849 all new loans were being refused and no extensions 
of time granted, but the drain went on without any interruption.181 The end 
came when the Union Bank refused to advance £25,000 for an indefinite 
period. The Union already held bills to the value of £12,640, rediscounted 
for the Derwent, which were not likely to be met at maturity. These it 
agreed to renew, but declined further aid, as, apparently, did the 
Australasia which also held overdue rediscounted bills.182 Swanston, ill and 
hopeless, threw in his hand.  
   A meeting of shareholders faced the unpleasant facts, and decided to 
wind up, viewing the situation so seriously that they demanded payment of 
all debts within two months. It was forecast that, with good luck, 
shareholders would lose only 50 per cent of their capital.183 Swanston 
assigned his personal estate for the benefit of his creditors, Mrs Swanston 
surrendering her rights of dower.184 His personal liabilities proved to be 
£104,375, of which £58,509 was due to the bank, having been invested in 
one or other of his varied ventures.185 Settlement was protracted, the final 
dividend in 1854 bringing payments to creditors to ten shillings in the 
pound.186 Early fears of equal loss on the Derwent itself proved pessimistic. 
The convict savings bank was wound up promptly, the few outstanding 
notes were met and the remaining deposits repaid within a few months.187 
Over the next few years the land and other securities foreclosed by or 
surrendered to the bank were sold and capital repayments were completed 
by January 1854, shareholders receiving a small surplus of 21/2 per cent.188  
   Meanwhile, quietly, unnoticed by the press and scarcely by his friends, 
the tired, bewildered man had in January 1850 slipped out of the colony 
where for eighteen years he had held so proud a position, one of the score 
or so of commercial adventurers who had at least the illusion of controlling 
and directing Australian economic expansion in the period during which 
the emergence of a capitalist economy was completed. Following his 
doctor's advice of a sea journey, from Melbourne and Sydney he went on 
to California and, sailing from there, died at sea on 5 September 1850.189  
(c) Sydney Banking Co. 
   The collapse of the Bank of Australia precipitated inquiries by 
shareholders of other banks into the activities of their directors.190 The 
Sydney Bank at first appeared to have survived the check, for it seemed 
that the total liabilities of the directors amounted to only £27,000, that the 
largest borrower of them all had only £8,000 and three had no loans. The 
proprietors declared their “entire satisfaction” and “fullest confidence”.191 
But the shaken directors took their duties seriously for once, and soon 
discovered that the manager and accountant had been falsifying statements 
put to meetings. Each had himself heavily overdrawn, and total overdrawn 
accounts were £30,000, not £4,000 as they appeared in the accounts.192 
Despite an attempt to put up a bold front,193 there was a more searching 
inquiry which revealed that “every clerk in the establishment has been 
allowed, in a greater or less degree, to anticipate his salary”;194 the manager 
had without authority overdrawn his account by more than £4,000, and the 
accountant nearly as much; accounts had been falsified, e.g., £9,300 in 
dishonoured cheques had been counted as cash, and overdrawn accounts 
were really £35,000. The directors found that weekly statements of affairs 
on which they based their lending policy had been falsified.195 With a bad 
grace the directors accepted the inevitable, and bowed to the decision of 
the proprietors not to reopen.196 So far as the general public was concerned 
winding up was prompt. Depositors were required to remove their money 
by 1 September,197 and capital repayment commenced almost 
immediately,198 although complete repayment was not made until 1847, 
when it totalled 861/2 per cent.199 The ease with which liabilities to the 
public were met and the major part of capital repaid in the midst of acute 
depression indicates that the falsified accounts, however upsetting, were 
not the full story of the decision to dissolve. The other part of that story lies 
in the statistics of its business: except in the period of its 1843 difficulties 
the bank's loans were always from six to eight times its deposits, and its 
note issue was small. In other words, the bank was mainly lending its 
capital. Proprietors pressed for cash in the midst of depression and, fearful 
of risks worse than the defalcation already discovered, preferred to cut 
their losses and take the cash in hand for uses more immediately urgent, 
than to wait for possible profits in later years.  
(d) Port Phillip Bank 
   The story of the collapse of the Port Phillip Bank is much like that of the 
others. In January 1843 admitted losses compelled it to close and wind 
up.200 A balance sheet of a month later showed a total capital paid up of 
£52,915, of which £44,220 was held in the colonies; “probable assets” 
were set at £28,859 and losses at £26,750, foreshadowing a loss of 50 per 
cent of capital.201 It was said that the indebtedness of four directors alone 
exceeded £27,000.202 Swanston commented: “This unfortunate termination 
of the affairs of that establishment has been brought about by the 
unprincipled conduct of some of the directors (I exclude the managing 
director Mr Mercer) who to carry on their visionary land and other 
speculations discounted their own paper, and overdrew their accounts to a 
very large extent.” He forecast accurately that repayments of capital would 
be only 25 per cent.203  
   Holders of notes were asked to present them and depositors to 
withdraw,204 and these were quickly paid off.205 By the end of the year it 
was clear that the only losers, and that heavily, were the shareholders 
themselves.206 Assets against capital of £48,090 were shown as totalling 
£38,049, but only £4,174 of this was in cash; the main item was £26,765 in 
past-due bills followed by £3,915 current accounts overdrawn and £1,200 
due from A. Thomson, the Geelong agent. Shareholders were lucky to get 
25 per cent when the bank finally closed.207  
(e) Colonial Bank 
   The Colonial Bank had been unfortunate in the time of its starting. It had 
failed to secure large deposits—these were only £36,735 at the end of 
1842; or to achieve large note circulation—only £9,763 by the same time. 
Its loans, £141,128 at that date, were therefore largely based upon capital 
subscriptions and, moreover, were mainly to “settlers” (i.e., primary 
producers) who were never prompt in payment and were hard hit by the 
slump.208 In the first half-year of 1842 losses of £700 were acknowledged, 
although the dividend was maintained at 10 per cent,209 and for the first 
half-year of 1843 admitted losses (ignoring doubtful debts and frozen 
loans) were £3,600.210  
   Some of the proprietors, reflecting on these gloomy facts, canvassed the 
question of dissolution, and thereby precipitated a run which cut note 
circulation by a half and deposits by a third. This finished matters and it 
was decided in December 1843 to cease business, explaining the decision 
publicly as proceeding “from the conviction that the capital is not 
beneficially employed”, and privately as “impelled by the paralysed state 
of trade, and the anxious desire of the proprietors”.211 The decision once 
taken was implemented with speed. Interest on deposits ceased from 31 
December,212 mortgages and cash credits falling due were called up,213 cash 
deposited with other banks was withdrawn;214 and the premises (of which 
the lease had three years to run) were sub-let.215 Realization of other assets 
in the form of discounts, cash credits and mortgages proved more difficult, 
and these were finally disposed of by auction early in 1847.216 Repayments 
of capital totalled 18s. 6d. in the pound, and affairs were finally wound up 
in August 1847.217  
(f) Archers Gilles & Co. 
   By the middle of 1842 Archers Gilles & Co. were in difficulties and 
resorting to doubtful devices to keep afloat. For instance, bills were drawn 
on the Melbourne agents, the Port Phillip Bank, the proceeds being used by 
Archers Gilles themselves; bills for collection in Melbourne were sent 
secretly to the Union Bank to avoid the proceeds being offset by the Port 
Phillip against the firm's indebtedness. The situation was only discovered 
when Port Phillip bills on Archers Gilles were dishonoured.218 The firm 
nevertheless struggled on, despite having “locked up a great deal of money 
since they commenced business, so much so that they are now powerless as 
a bank”219 But by the end of 1843 they were compelled to seek aid, which 
the Union Bank gave only on condition that the firm abandon banking.220 
Accordingly as from the end of 1843 the firm announced its intention “to 
relinquish the business of bankers and agents” and disappeared from the 
banking field.221  
(g) Royal Bank 
   Boyd's Royal Bank, despite its impressive title, had not gone far in 
banking business beyond sale of bills on London and issue of notes, and 
only at Sydney. Boyd engaged in whaling, the running of a small fleet of 
trading vessels, dealing in wool, the creation of Boyd Town, sheep farming 
and various other colourful enterprises, and his Hobart and Melbourne 
offices were primarily for these activities, not for banking.222 Not engaging 
in banking in 1842 was wisdom; but Boyd's use of funds provided for 
banking was less defensible. He presented rosy accounts purporting to 
show, for example, profits of £36,071 for 1845,223 but share and debenture 
holders, finding that payments did not measure up to promises, forced him 
out in 1847 in favour of his brother, W. S. Boyd, who did little better and 
was in 1849 replaced by a liquidator. It appeared that not only had Boyd 
invested funds for banking in almost every other type of enterprise, but the 
raising of funds was in an equal state of confusion. Some £310,000 had 
been raised by “deposit notes” bearing 5 per cent interest; there were semi-
fraudulent loans from English insurance companies. The liquidator, 
struggling with incomplete, false and inadequate accounts, made out that 
total “debentures” issued were £490,572 (apparently including the “deposit 
notes”); of these the holders of £44,500 could not be found; those debts 
(incomplete) still to be paid in 1851 totalled £183,152. Many years passed 
before the mess was cleared up completely—Boyd's stations in the 
Deniliquin district were finally freed of legal entanglements for sale in 
1856—and heavy losses were incurred by the trusting “depositors”, mainly 
from Edinburgh, and by the shareholders.224  
   The Sydney office was closed in 1849 and the colonial end of the long 
winding-up process handled by Smith Campbell & Co.,225 the Legislative 
Council not even giving a first reading to a bill for an act to enable the 
company to sue and be sued, the conclusive argument being that to hamper 
creditors, it had avoided having such a measure while it was actively in 
business, and should not now have assistance in proceedings against its 
debtors.226  
Fortunes of Surviving Institutions 
   On the whole the overseas banks and mortgage companies came out well. 
The Australasia, Union and Bank of South Australia showed the general 
decline of business and of profits, and the first had to pass dividends while 
its Australia debt was in dispute. The Scottish Australian Investment 
Company escaped lightly and continued a profitable career into the 
twentieth century, although its competitors, the Trust and Loan companies, 
were for a time less fortunate.  
   At first the depression seemed to have treated the Loan Company lightly. 
Ignorant of the full severity of the slump, the London directors in March 
1843 reported only that the Sydney board had in July the previous year 
reduced mortgage interest from 11 per cent to 10 per cent (probably more 
to meet the rate of the Trust Company than because of depression), and 
recommended “the shareholders not to enter into the more hazardous and 
uncertain business of banking, involving as it does much greater 
responsibility and requiring much larger outlay”. This, the only hint of the 
banking situation in the colonies, was softened by pointing out that it 
would also aid the application for a charter. A dividend of 6 per cent on the 
paid up capital of £250,728 for 1842 was voted, and the directors were 
authorized to pay a further 6 per cent for the first half of 1843. The reason 
for the optimism was the ease with which it had made its 10 per cent loans; 
apart from a modest £6,692 in discounted bills it held, at June 1842, 
mortgages for £258,902.227 But a year later the effect of the depression was 
admitted, if well disguised228 In execution of the decision to cancel loans 
originally made in scrip £70,840 (“only”) had been eliminated; mortgages 
in the colony stood (June 1843) at £187,138. No dividend beyond the 
anticipatory 6 per cent authorized by the previous meeting could be paid. 
The Company had been forced to give time to pay interest and its net 
profits for 1843 were a mere £2,363.  
   Local shareholders were less easily satisfied and urged that the company 
be wound up.229 But a mortgage company in depression could not withdraw 
so easily, and London rejected the recommendation, and in 1845 was able 
to declare a dividend of 2 per cent for the year 1844, maintained the 
following year.230 But the latter dividend concealed what had happened to 
the company. In June 1845 the loans still in being were only £44,075 and 
mortgages for £126,863 had been foreclosed.231 It had become a company 
managing large estates.232 By 1848 the directors were paying a dividend of 
21/2 per cent (for 1847) and gloomily assuring shareholders that probably 
all assets would be realized in the end and the whole capital would be 
repaid.233 Dissolution was, however, averted and the company was able to 
resume lending.234  
   The Trust Company escaped the impact of the slump more lightly than 
the Loan Company. Like its competitor, it found it easy to make its initial 
loans as the banks contracted. From £127,850 in June 1841 mortgages 
grew to £227,950 in June 1842, but despite the 10 per cent interest, the 
directors cautiously recommended only 3 per cent dividend for the year 
1842.235 Many of these loans were foreclosed in the next months, but the 
company was content if it received its interest and gave time for that.236 The 
policy paid (perhaps too it was wiser than the Loan Company in its choice 
of borrowers), for at the end of 1844 it had loans in being for £396,000 and 
a year later for £365,000 and was still continuing its modest dividend 
policy.237 For many years afterwards it maintained a profitable business.  
   Of the colonial banks, the Commercial of Tasmania and the Van 
Diemen's Land weathered the storm without great difficulty, but the 
Commercial of Sydney and the New South Wales were for a time in some 
distress, the result of the greater severity of the slump in New South Wales 
and the greater banking shocks there.  
   The Commercial of Sydney escaped disaster, but its business was 
severely curtailed. Note issue fell by the end of 1843 to half what it had 
been in the peak year of 1840 and deposits by over a third; by that time 
advances had started a steep decline, reaching a third of the peak level 
during 1845. Dividend rates were cut to 6 per cent per annum. All branches 
were abolished as an economy measure, and the bank took the lead in 
reduction of interest rates. An attempt to reduce capital by purchase of 
shares in the market failed despite the bank having an excess of cash 
representing £40,000 of idle funds; one quarter of capital (i.e., £60,000) 
was returned to shareholders, a motion for winding-up having been 
defeated.238 By mid-1845 admitted losses on dishonoured bills for the 
preceding three years was £8,285.239 Two years later there was a shock in 
the discovery that the accountant, Townsend, and the manager, Duguid, 
had embezzled £10,700 between them during the depression years.240 But 
on the whole the bank came through the slump with little damage.  
   It was, therefore, fortunately placed for the complete reconstruction it 
had to face before the end of 1848, the necessity for which arose from the 
fact that the original deed of settlement provided for a term of seven years 
with one extension of a similar period only. It was determined that the new 
bank should have a capital of £150,000 in £25 shares, with a right of 
existing shareholders to convert their holdings, but, in correct anticipation 
that many holders would withdraw, £50,000 was at once offered for public 
subscription.241 By February 1848 conversions and new subscriptions 
amounted to five-sixths of nominal capital,242 and the “old” bank 
commenced repayment of capital,243 while the “new” commenced 
successful operations under a fresh Act, the first of a type to be a model for 
subsequent bank Acts.244 This set the capital at £120,000 with power to 
increase to £500,000 and, with the consent of the governor or the British 
Treasury, beyond that figure. The company was incorporated, with limited 
liability, for an initial period of twenty-one years.245  
   The Bank of New South Wales suffered more severely than the 
Commercial and for some time was forced so to restrict its activities that, 
in September 1843 Hart of the Australasia fairly said that it could “no 
longer be considered an operative bank”.246  
   A private committee of inquiry shortly before had made a survey of the 
state of the bank and its cautious optimism did not conceal a note of 
anxiety.247 Of the bills held by the bank the committee reported “a great 
portion of them appear to us unexceptionable and equal to any which could 
be furnished by this community—of the remainder many may be collected 
by judicious management and allowing time—and though we contemplate 
under this head some inevitable loss we trust it may not prove of such 
amount as seriously to affect the interest of the shareholders”. Attention 
was drawn to the fact that £27,700 in mortgages represented securities 
taken for loans by discount which had been impossible to recover. Two 
directors owed £20,000 and three other borrowers between them £33,000, 
secured by “wastelands, sheep in the interior and ships at sea”. Their 
recommendations were more illuminating: that no director borrow more 
than £4,000 or any other customer more than £7,000; no transfers of shares 
from debtors be registered; and all discounting other than renewals cease 
until the situation improved.  
   A second investigation a year later produced an estimate of total losses of 
£75,000,248 which the directors claimed had by October been reduced to a 
correct figure of a little over £60,000.249 The directors' recommendation 
that capital be reduced by one-half by repaying one-sixth and writing off 
one-third was adopted.250 With this the worst was over. For some time the 
bank proceeded with extreme caution, but two years later it was again 
developing a brisk business, launching out in the late 'forties into foreign 
exchange business and branch banking. By 1848 the bad debt reserve, built 
up after the capital repayment, was distributed by way of capital 
increases251 and in 1850 the bank was completely reconstituted as a limited 
company under an act almost identical with that of the Commercial 
Bank.252  
   The onset of depression caused a fairly general retreat from branch 
banking. The London board of the Australasia directed that no further 
branches should be created without its authority,253 and accepted Hart's 
advice that Bathurst should be closed, with discretion in the case of 
Maitland.254 Hart had already acted in Bathurst, arranging for it to close at 
the end of February 1844,255 but Maitland proved more difficult. Loans had 
been mainly by cash credits (to meet competition from the Commercial), 
and reduction was impossible until after sale of the wool clip; even then 
winding-up would be a drawn out process requiring a staff in the district 
large enough to keep the branch open. Accordingly Hart took advantage of 
the discretion allowed and retained it, pointing out that it was then the only 
bank in the district.256  
   It was so because the Commercial of Sydney had, despite protests, 
abolished all its branches and agencies from the end of March 1844.257 The 
Union, having the field to itself in each case, retained its Bathurst and 
Geelong branches, but the Inspector declared himself opposed to any 
extensions: “I would by no means advocate the extending our branches into 
the inland towns of the Colony. A branch in a seaport with a fine country 
around it will ensure a profitable business in exchange operations alone, 
but in an inland town you must almost entirely depend upon your 
circulation and deposits both of which in a colony like this must be 
trifling”.258 By early 1844, therefore, country branches on the mainland 
were reduced to one each in Geelong, Bathurst and Maitland, and the last 
was only being continued because it was cheaper to continue than to close.  
   One result of the retreat from branch banking was new life for country 
“orders”. Their circulation had fallen in the neighbourhood of branch 
banks, and they were severely curtailed by widespread default by issuers in 
the slump and the consequent decision of Sydney banks to refuse to accept 
them as deposits or to collect them.259 Gipps, however, exaggerated when 
he said they had “almost altogether disappeared”,260 although he had the 
warrant of the Select Committee on Monetary Confusion which spoke of 
their “annihilation”.261 Although several witnesses before that committee 
said they had almost disappeared,262 others gave a truer picture of a drastic 
reduction far short of disappearance.263 Other committees in the same year, 
1843, filled the picture out. Orders were still widely used, especially in the 
remote squatting districts such as Moreton Bay, being cashed locally only 
at a heavy discount, and frequently dishonoured on presentation in 
Sydney.264 In the following years, as the depression lifted, their use was 
restored to something like its pre-depression range in the absence of branch 
banks and because their issue was a convenient form of borrowing from 
the general public.265  
   The banks themselves encouraged their use by re-instituting restrictions 
on the drawing of cheques for small sums. The Bathurst branch of the 
Union Bank in 1846 restricted cheques to a minimum of £5 for residents of 
Bathurst and Kelso and £1 for residents of surrounding districts,266 and a 
little later all four banks adopted a general £2 limit with a refusal of 
cheques other than those drawn to bearer.267 The abolition of cheques 
drawn to order facilitated the negotiation of cheques for sums in excess of 
£2, and mitigated the effect of that limit, which greatly increased the use of 
“orders” for smaller amounts,268 so much so that in 1848 the Commercial 
and New South Wales undertook to cash cheques for country residents for 
as low as £1.269 
 
   The result of these restrictions, as the 1850 Select Committee on Banking 
found, was that the issue of notes for 1s., 5s., and £1 by storekeepers in 
country districts became quite general, and they together with “orders” and 
cheques of employers constituted the main money of inland districts.270 The 
committee was not disposed to interfere—too many members of Council 
were concerned for them to agree to restrict either the use of “orders” or of 
these storekeepers' notes. Indeed they asked that the legality of employers' 
“orders” be put beyond doubt, and proposed only that note issuers be 
required to make returns and to make their notes convertible at a specified 
place. None of their recommendations were adopted,271 and the country 
storekeeper's note continued its career into the twentieth century.  
   Nevertheless the future lay with branch banking, and the later 'forties saw 
a cautious extension of branches. In 1845 Hart of the Australasia 
established two agencies, one with Henty Bros. at Geelong and the other 
with Rutledge & Co. at Port Fairy (Belfast), and the following year 
received authority to make the Geelong agency a full branch under the 
control of the Melbourne office.272 The Union Bank proceeded to open a 
full branch at Portland in July 1846.273 Initially the branch was not 
authorized to discount local bills, but issued notes, held deposits, bought 
and sold exchange on other branches, and cashed orders.274 When local 
discounting began in January 1847 it was almost entirely limited to wool 
bills, and hence highly seasonal, but by 1849 discounts had reached a total 
of £14,000.275  
   McLaren, the Inspector of the Union, proposed to go further afield to 
Adelaide, but the Bank of South Australia reminded the Union of its 1837 
undertaking not to open in South Australia and the matter was dropped,276 
but only temporarily. The question was raised again at the July 1848 
meeting in London,277 but deferred while the two banks discussed 
amalgamation. This fell through since the Bank of South Australia would 
have had to abandon its charter, and the Union promptly determined to go 
ahead with an Adelaide branch, which opened on 2 January 1850.278 
Operating under a local act, and without local directors, it conformed to the 
terms of business of the other two banks.279  
   Meanwhile, the Bank of New South Wales had completed its 
reconstruction and for the first time showed an active interest in branches. 
One of these was in Melbourne early in 1851,280 followed by an agency 
arrangement with Cohen & Co., storekeepers of both Armidale and 
Tamworth, the agents issuing Bank of New South Wales notes and selling 
drafts on the bank in Sydney.281 Earlier there was a full branch in Brisbane, 
the first provision for banking in what was to become, nine years later, the 
separate colony of Queensland.  
   The Moreton Bay district was thrown open for settlement in 1842 and 
developed initially as a pastoral area with minor urban centres at Ipswich 
and Brisbane, the latter because virtually the only external communication 
was by sea with or through Sydney. Transactions were often in kind, 
illustrated by the 1846 advertisement of a general store: “Wool and tallow 
taken in exchange for goods or purchased at market prices”,282 and by notes 
of the Sydney banks, including the £1 and 5s. notes of the Royal Bank283 
when such notes were available. But the main currency was the ubiquitous 
“order” on a Sydney merchant as agent. Wages were universally paid in 
this manner, as were many other payments. The issuer had to meet a 
collection charge of 21/2 per cent from his agent and the local shops took 
them at up to 20 per cent discount.284 Negotiation was often difficult and 
sometimes had to be achieved by advertisements such as this: “The 
undersigned has for sale on advantageous terms two I.O.U.s signed R.H., 
one for the sum of £6 os. 3d. and the other for 18s. 2d., or the above will be 
given in exchange for turtle, salt beef, tallow, hides, sheepskins or any 
other colonial produce.”285  
   Circulation of orders was promoted by the 1847 rule of the Sydney banks 
against cheques under £2,286 and one local firm announced the opening of a 
special discount office at which orders would be discounted, and also 
accepted direct from drawers for goods to be supplied from Sydney, 
although such business was in practice done by all Brisbane merchants.287 
The Moreton Bay Courier might well declare that “our utter and childish 
dependence upon Sydney and, consequently, the continual flow of cash to 
that city, paralyses our energies and public enterprise becomes weak and 
nerveless”.288 In its second issue,289 under the title “We Want a Bank”, it 
had pleaded the case for a branch of one of the English banks, putting the 
replacement of “orders” well ahead of loans to pastoralists as the prime 
advantage. It assumed that it was only necessary to make the prospects of 
the district known, and continued at intervals to plead the case.290  
   But the prospects of the district were assessed too coldly in Sydney. Hart, 
Superintendent of the Bank of Australasia, had received in March 1846 
authority to open a branch in the district, but preferred to wait until it had 
developed further.291 A petition to the Union Bank in 1848 was signed “by 
almost every inhabitant of the settlement engaged in business”,292 but a year 
later no reply had been received.293 The residents of Ipswich accordingly 
turned to self help and planned their own Ipswich Bank. A meeting in 
February 1849 approved of a capital of £20,000 in £10 shares (£1 payable 
on allocation), with liability limited to double shareholdings; seven of 
those present undertook to subscribe for 110 shares. Caution, however, 
dictated deferring the issue of a prospectus until the measure of support 
had been taken by subscription lists to be collected in Ipswich and 
Brisbane.294 The caution was justified for the wool season had been bad, 
and the firm promises obtained were insufficient to justify any further 
action.295  
   The question was revived the following year when Ipswich residents 
besought the Commercial Banking Company of Sydney to establish a 
branch, and those of Brisbane approached the Bank of Australasia.296 The 
Commercial was unwilling,297 and Falconer of the Australasia referred the 
question to London, despite the earlier authorization to open a branch.298 
Help came from an unexpected quarter. In May Judge Therry and the 
Attorney-General, in Brisbane for the first Circuit Court, gave public 
notice of their opinion that “the small paper currency of Brisbane” was not 
merely worthless but an offence,299 and this was confirmed by judicial 
decision in Sydney in July.300 The decision caused consternation, for these 
orders were the only small change, indeed nearly the only local money.301 
Ipswich residents again turned to their bank plan,302 but the Bank of New 
South Wales acted more swiftly. The legal decision meant that a branch 
would have no competition from private issues, and that bank and the 
Union promptly sought information as to the prospects of an agency.303 The 
Bank of New South Wales announced its intention of opening a full 
branch,304 which duly commenced business on 14 November 1850,305 
causing a rapid decline in local discount rates and replacing a large part of 
the “orders” with its own notes.306 With that and other branches, including 
those of other banks, in the succeeding years Queensland was integrated 
into the general Australian system.  
   In the end, therefore, the long-term results of the slump on the nature of 
the banking system were slight. The failures were in the long run important 
primarily in increasing the already dominant position of the English banks. 
Otherwise the chief result was the introduction of new types of investment, 
the wool liens and stock mortgages and colonial government securities, 
which were to become important to the banks, but which at this stage were 
not. The basic nature of the banking system was unaffected by its 
adventures.  
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unpublished thesis in the S.A. Archives. For the East (mainly New South Wales) the 
discussion by Roberts, Squatting Age in Australia, is derived from the despatches of 
Gipps, who accepted a very simple “excessive speculation” doctrine, and who was 
resentfully defending his administration against stinging censure from England. The 
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12 Gipps, loc. cit., p. 199. 
13 Gipps, loc. cit., p. 199, and later despatches found the blame for the results of this 
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Chapter 11 Western Australia 
   THE monetary history of Western Australia parallels in miniature the 
general lines of eastern development, although the early primitive phases 
were of much briefer duration. Founded as a government-endorsed scheme 
for a company colony because it would forestall the French and ensure 
Britain's claim to the whole continent, it became with the passing of 1831 a 
Crown colony administered in much the same fashion as New South Wales 
and Tasmania. Its origin and the slow development (population was not 
quite 6,000 in 1850) meant that all its economic affairs, including its 
monetary arrangements, were small-scale. The only policy common to east 
and west, that of the British government, was in monetary matters of minor 
significance compared with the force of local economic development. 
Since these trends were similar in all Australian colonies it is not surprising 
that by the middle of the century Western Australian monetary 
organization was much the same as in the east, with which it had 
developed exchange relationships, and that its later absorption into a 
general Australian monetary system should have been almost 
imperceptible.  
Primitive Beginnings 
   At the outset the first governor, Stirling, inquired as to the manner in 
which he would be supplied with money. The reply was that he would take 
with him £1,000 of which £200 would be in copper coin, £200 in Spanish 
dollars and £600 in British silver. For any further needs he was to draw 
bills upon the Commissariat in Sydney or, if that proved impracticable, on 
London. A copy of the Commissariat circular of 1825 prescribing a 
sterling-exchange standard and the use of British coin in all colonies was 
supplied for his general guidance.1 Stirling soon found that the means at his 
disposal were inadequate. There was neither Treasury nor Commissariat, a 
storekeeper doing all the work of both, and cash to pay the troops could 
only be obtained by selling bills on the Treasury at a discount. He asked for 
the appointment of either a Treasurer or a Commissary and a regular 
supply of coin on the Sydney model.2  
   The requests fitted in with steps being planned for the formal recognition 
of the settlement as a Crown colony and were partly granted, a 
Commissary being despatched in 1831 with £5,000 in silver, and the 
arrangements for drawing bills against the British parliamentary grant 
being brought into line with those applying to other colonies.3 What further 
shipments of coin there were is uncertain, but any such must have been 
small in view of the constant shortage of coin.4  
   The shortage was met by a variety of makeshifts, paralleling in a general 
way the earlier expedients of the eastern colonies in their corresponding 
stage of development, but with many local variations. No Store receipt 
system developed but bills on the Treasury were given direct in payment 
for individual government debts,5 a practice which continued well into the 
'forties.6 These were of course especially attractive as a means of paying 
for imports and were regularly offered in exchange for coin, as in other 
colonies, in order to secure cash for payments to the troops and to others 
who had to be paid in that form.7  
   Apart from the original shipment of dollars, foreign coins were received 
in trade with visiting ships, rupees particularly, because of the nearness to 
India, but foreign coins were never of any importance. British Treasury 
instructions (of 1825) prevented such coins being given any official 
standing; the great period of the Spanish dollar as an international money 
was in any case over, while Indian coins were fleeting visitors because of 
the constant pressure to pay for imports in coin. Rupees circulated for a 
number of years at 2s. and Spanish dollars at 4s. 4d., but this was mere 
convention which collapsed in 1838 when, in accordance with its 
instructions from England, the Commissariat ceased to accept these coins. 
The Bank of Western Australia at first responded by lowering its valuation 
of the dollar to 4s. and of the rupee to 1s. 8d. but almost immediately 
declined to accept them at all.8 These coins did not disappear entirely and 
throughout the 'forties the Commissariat continued to accept them at the 
rate of exchange of the day, if acceptance proved convenient, when 
offering bills on the Treasury,9 but they were a minor part of the current 
coinage, the rupee being more common than the dollar.10  
   The problems of government transactions in these circumstances induced 
Stirling to make a government note issue: “In the absence of specie I have 
been forced to issue in payment promissory notes. These have been a 
beneficial temporary substitute for a better currency but I trust the 
continuance of the practice may soon become unnecessary by the receipt of 
specie from England.”11 Unfortunately the clerk responsible for writing out 
the notes could not resist temptation and made forged duplicates of many 
notes and thereby forced the cancellation of the issue during 1831–32 with 
a total loss of £288.12  
   The shortage of coin did not lead, as it had in the east, to extensive 
private note issues, partly because in the early years the coin shortage was 
too acute. Issuers were unready to commit themselves to promises to pay 
coin which might be unavailable, and creditors were disinclined to accept 
promises the fulfilment of which was extremely doubtful. “Orders” for the 
amounts of particular debts were given and circulated on a small scale,13 
but the small notes typical of New South Wales and Tasmania until the 
mid-'twenties appeared only in one issue by Thomas Peel, and private £1 
notes only in two shortlived issues.14  
   The first systematic private note issue would seem to have been that in 
1830 of Messrs. Peel & Levey.15 These were for 5s. and 10s., payment of 
which was promised locally or at Cooper & Levey's in Sydney.16 These 
proved of little importance and soon disappeared, for in the settlement 
Peel's inability to meet such commitments was common knowledge, while 
a promise to pay in Sydney was not attractive even if there had not been 
doubts of the willingness of Cooper & Levey to accept the obligation.17 
These doubts were soon confirmed by Cooper declaring that any notes 
presented to him would be paid only on the specific order of Levey, and 
then only if the firm held private funds of Levey's;18 since Levey was in 
London this finished the matter, no one being prepared to take notes which 
the local issuer could not meet, and which might conceivably be cashed in 
the dim future if Levey in London could be persuaded to direct Cooper in 
Sydney to use his private funds to pay notes issued by Peel in Perth.  
   More success attended an issue of £1 notes by Peter Brown,19 less 
because of his position as Colonial Secretary than because the governor 
agreed that they should be accepted in payments of customs duties. This 
followed propaganda by the Perth Gazette,20 and as first planned involved 
adoption of a proposal originally made a year earlier for a government 
advance of capital to establish a bank. That earlier scheme was for a bank 
to be established by a government loan of £5,000 with twenty-five 
guarantors, but Stirling was without authority (or means) and could offer 
no better advice than the taking up of public subscriptions.21 Brown 
commenced by issuing notes in April 1833 but went no further when Irwin 
(in Stirling's absence in England) declined to give an advance in the form 
of bills on the Treasury.22 Because of this and the refusal of his notes in 
payment of duties on spirits Brown contemplated abandonment of his note 
issue,23 but was induced to continue by the acting governor agreeing to the 
acceptance of the notes for duties on spirits.24 For a few months this 
ensured the general acceptability of the notes but at the end of the year the 
privilege was withdrawn. The reason for this is not clear but the most 
plausible explanation is that the amount accumulating in government hands 
was becoming excessive. How large the total issue was and how great the 
government holding cannot be ascertained, but Brown's net debt to the 
government, assessed at £1,245 in 1844, was “principally” on account of 
its holdings of his notes.25 The general public were no longer prepared to 
accept the notes—merchants would cash them only if the purchaser took 
half the value in goods—and Brown was forced to call them in, running an 
auction sale of part of his property, payment to be in his notes, as the only 
way of meeting that part of his issue not held by the government.26 The 
whole episode had lasted just eight months.27  
   The withdrawal of Brown's notes coincided with (and was perhaps 
hastened by) an acute coin shortage which left the Commissariat with 
insufficient for current purposes and unable to replenish its supplies by the 
sale of bills on the Treasury. Accordingly a special issue of £1 notes by the 
Commissariat was authorized in January 1834, made payable on demand in 
specie or bills on the Treasury, and declared to be legal tender equally with 
British coin.28 This was in conflict with instructions then on the way as a 
consequence of the earlier government issue: “I must especially desire you 
to refrain from giving your sanction or concurrence to any issue of colonial 
promissory notes or other paper currency in future.”29 To the new issue, 
naturally, the British Treasury objected and Stirling was instructed to call 
in all these notes and report fully on the reasons for their issue;30 but the 
call-up was delayed for many months, presumably because of the great 
convenience of the issue, and was not made until November 1836 by which 
time supplies of British silver coin had been received by the 
Commissariat.31 The amount of the issue was substantial, one instalment in 
May 1836 being £2,500.32 A proposal to re-issue £2,750 in August 1837 
was not proceeded with,33 the need for a government issue having been 
removed by the establishment of the Bank of Western Australia.34  
   Meanwhile 1835 had seen the last plan for a systematic private note 
issue, that of William Lamb, a merchant of Fremantle. He circularized 
“most of the principal settlers in the colony” announcing an issue of five 
hundred £1 notes payable not on demand but one year after date with 
interest at 5 per cent. Security to ensure repayment was lodged with A. H. 
and G. F. Stone whose standing was unquestioned and who appended an 
assurance that the security was ample. The promise was to pay “in specie 
current in this colony or in a Treasury bill” which, coupled with the year's 
currency, meant that Lamb was taking no serious risk.35 Indeed, there was 
too much emphasis on security and the Perth Gazette reflected natural 
doubts in asking on what terms anyone would accept such long-dated 
notes. It suggested that the first instance would become a model: a debtor 
who agreed to accept payment of a doubtful debt in Lamb's notes rather 
than involve himself in court proceedings. The general public was equally 
reluctant to welcome the notes and in a few months the whole issue was 
withdrawn.36  
   Useful as the issues of Brown and the Commissariat had been, their only 
contribution was to the machinery of payments. Such issues had not 
touched the problem of lending. The small volume of funds available to the 
many who desired to borrow to develop their properties, or to initiate the 
cruder manufactures, was reflected in a rate of interest of up to 25 per cent 
in the early years.37 Even as a means of payment private notes made little 
impression on the barter (with goods on each side valued in money) which 
was the predominant mode of exchange in private transactions until the 
Bank of Western Australia was established. The reasons for this were 
much the same as those which had operated in the early years of New 
South Wales and Tasmania but were given greater force by the Western 
Australian land grant system which until 1831 awarded land in proportion 
to the “capital” brought by the immigrant, money not being counted.38 
Naturally immigrants invested their funds in goods which then had to serve 
as purchasing power. Thus the price of a boat was “35 guineas cash or 40 
guineas in barter for livestock or useful articles of provisions”;39 for house 
rent “stores will be taken at the market price”;40 land was offered “in 
exchange livestock would be preferred”.41 Marshall MacDermott 
afterwards described the position: “If you required a team of horses, the 
person desirous of selling one did not want what you could offer in 
exchange but wished for sheep. You then applied to an owner of sheep 
who desired something you did not possess; and frequently two or three 
exchanges were necessary before you could procure the articles you 
wanted.”42 Even the government on occasions accepted payment in kind.43  
   So widespread and inconvenient were such exchanges that in September 
1833 the Agricultural Society took up seriously an ingenious scheme for a 
“Swan River Barter Society” to amalgamate co-operative note issue with 
systematic barter.44 The rules of this society45 proposed a membership of 
“agriculturists” and merchants each of whom should have the right to issue 
fifty £1 notes, each agreeing to accept notes issued by other members.46 
Notes were to be payable quarterly at the place of meeting of the 
Agricultural Society: “any person tendering a note or notes shall have the 
right of choice of any property of the kinds mentioned in the note which 
the drawer may have to dispose of, but . . . he shall not be obliged to take 
hay, straw or green crops, excepting potatoes to the extent of one 
hundredweight; or, presenting such note to a merchant shall have the right 
of choice of any articles for sale in his store but shall not be obliged to take 
any but those of general consumption.”  
   This attempt to design a “goods standard” was still-born,47 as was 
another, that of the “Western Australian or Colonial Mart Society”, which 
was clearly inspired by the Barter Society plan.48 This proposed to establish 
in Perth a general store, shareholders paying an initial £5 in cash or goods 
plus £1 a week, and receiving notes in exchange. Funds so received were to 
be spent on goods for sale although how or why, if subscriptions were in 
kind, was not stated. Very cautiously it was suggested that funds might be 
used “to a limited extent, and under certain conditions or restrictions, [to] 
discount private bills or grant loans”. This disjointed amalgamation of a 
general store, a note issue, and a moneylender did not appeal to the 
colonists in spite of the call to admire the way in which it “attains that 
point which constitutes the perfection and excellence of every monetary 
system, viz., that the circulating medium be in exact proportion to the 
articles to be exchanged”, and no more is heard of it.  
The Establishment of Banking 
   When local ingenuity and initiative, whether in note issue or in plans for 
banks49 and barter societies, failed to surmount the obstacles, the colonists 
turned to attempts to interest the newly-formed Bank of Australasia.50 
Receipt of British instructions for the withdrawal of the Commissariat note 
issue was followed on 15 March 1835 by a public meeting which 
appointed a committee with Marshall MacDermott as secretary,51 charged 
with the duty of inducing the Bank of Australasia to open a branch.52 The 
proposal was that the branch should have £50,000 allocated to it, of which 
£15,000 should be used to pay off existing mortgages taken at high 
interest, £25,000 for the import of sheep, and the rest “for general 
purposes”.53  
   The new bank had already had a proposal from George Leake, evidently 
acting individually,54 and replied to MacDermott that it was not yet 
prepared to enter Western Australia, giving as its reason the prohibition in 
its charter of loans against land or livestock which it believed to be the 
only available securities in the colony.55 The colonists were, however, now 
readier to consider independent action of their own. Slow but steady 
progress of production was reflected in the only two indexes which 
survive.56 The number of sheep, which was 1,469 in the first year of 
settlement, 1829, rose to 7,981 the next year and then dropped abruptly, 
but from 1834 expansion was rapid:—  
    
1834 3,545
1835 5,138
1836 8,119
1837 10,815
1838 16,816
1839 20,829
1840 30,961
   The area under crops (wheat or hay) shows similar progress:  
    
   Exports, other than ships' stores, commenced with 7,585 lb. of wool (at 
2s. a lb.) in 1834, and in the next few years grew slowly but steadily with 
the addition of whale-oil and small amounts of timber. Against these small 
exports the maintained level of imports reflected a steady inflow of capital 
of which a declining proportion and a declining absolute amount came 
from British government expenditure on the colony (as represented by the 
only available index, the value of bills drawn on the Treasury).  
   Population was growing very slowly: 
   so that all these signs of progress represented a small community firmly 
establishing itself. The project for a local bank therefore came in 1837, by 
contrast with the earlier plans, in a different atmosphere of security and 
optimism as the colony felt, in its small way, the impact of the general 
wool boom. MacDermott asserted that it was at last possible to accumulate 
sufficient cash to make a bank reserve.57  
   In January 1837 the governor presided over a small meeting in the 
council room to consider a scheme for a bank58 and before the month was 
out a prospectus of the “Bank of Western  
    
Acres 
Year Total Wheat
1833 600 —
1834 1,579 564
1835 2,055 1,156
1836 2,415 1,215
1837 2,501 1,275
1838 2,578 1,436
1839 2,921 1,481
1840 3,515 1,670
1829 652
1830 1,767
1834 1,800
1837 2,025
1838 1,928
1839 2,154
1840 2,311
Year Imports (a) Exports (c) Bills Drawn
1829 £50,284 — £3,140
1830 114,177 — 17,485
1831 67,371 — 20,380
1832 26,581 — 20,908
1833 48,013 — 19,027
1834 36,942 £758 18,941
(a) The Colonial Committee of Correspondence, Report on Statistics of Western 
Australia in 1840, p. 21, declared import figures unreliable because there was no 
Customs House; Hutt to Stanley, 7 December 1843, declares that the import figures 
in the Bluebook for 1843 are the first that can be regarded as accurate. But error in 
the figures quoted, those collected by the Harbour Master, would have been 
understatement and in the present connection is not vital. 
(b) No records survive. 
(c) Report of Committee of Agricultural Society, October 1838, on condition of 
Western Australia, printed in Ogle N., The Colony of Western Australia, London 
1839, p. 130. The figures are presented as official. 
(d) To August. 
   Australia” was published,59 the signatories including the Colonial 
Secretary, Peter Brown, the D.-A.-C.-G., J. Lewis, the government 
Auctioneer, L. Samson, and S. Moore, the secretary of the Agricultural 
Society.60 The capital was set at £10,000 in shares of £10 each of which a 
quarter was to be paid in April and a quarter in October; no further calls 
were anticipated. Notes for £1 were to be issued, and the bank would buy 
and sell bills of exchange and accept deposits (with no interest on current 
accounts). Loans were to be by way of discount of bills not exceeding three 
months at the rate of 121/2 per cent per annum.61 Confident of success, the 
sponsors volunteered publication of a quarterly statement of coin, deposits, 
notes and discounts, and forecast an application for a charter “so soon as 
the affairs of the company shall be in a position to require it”.  
   In view of this specific proposal negotiations, which had been started 
through the Western Australia Association for external aid from some 
other bank than the Australasia, were dropped,62 and so, too, after some 
confusion, was a proposal by MacDermott for a “Lombard Loan Bank” 
made almost immediately after the bank's prospectus appeared. 
(MacDermott was offered the managership of the Bank of Western 
Australia.)63 Subscriptions came in rapidly enough for the first directors to 
be elected in May in time for the bank to open on 1 June.64  
   But it soon became clear that while there were sufficient colonists with 
some ready cash and confidence, they were by no means prepared for 
operations on any except the smallest scale. It was some time before all 
shares were taken up,65 and the reluctance of shareholders to find more 
cash was reflected in decisions to postpone the second 25 per cent 
1835 50,727 1,025 16,456
1836 (b) 2,700 13,413
1837 45,407 6,906 11,672
1838 46,766 6,840 9,730 (d)
instalment of capital, first from October 1837 to January 1838 and then 
indefinitely,66 the first call (of 121/2 per cent) not being in fact made until 
February 1839.67 On each occasion it was explained that no more capital 
was needed, but at the same time the bank had to defend the maintenance 
of its discount rate at 121/2 per cent and its refusal to lend against bills of 
lading for exports or on mortgage, its justification being the inadequacy of 
its capital68 which was, as MacDermott said,69 “simply the credit of their 
names”. A net profit by June 1838 of 141/2 per cent on the paid-up capital 
was no ill return.70 With promises of such profits and an expanding 
unsatisfied demand for loans the bank sought to expand its funds without 
calling on unpaid capital.  
   When Stirling submitted to England a proposal to deposit government 
funds in the Bank of Western Australia he was told it was only permissible 
in the case of a bank incorporated by royal charter or by a local act, and the 
bank appeared to have neither (the local act had not then been received in 
England).71 To a second request Russell replied that he could see no 
advantage to the government and would require far more information 
before he could approve.72 Hutt had already made a bargain with the bank, 
subject to this approval, providing for a government deposit if the bank 
made no charge for keeping the account, met all withdrawals on demand, 
and limited absentee shareholders to one-third of the total.73 Since there 
were only seven absentees out of sixty-four the bank readily agreed,74 but 
so far as available records show Russell's refusal ended the matter.  
   The prospectus plan for savings deposits was implemented with the offer 
of 5 per cent, but with little success;75 ordinary deposits, fixed for three 
months, were offered 71/2 per cent with no better result,76 and at last the 
first call of 121/2 per cent of capital was made.77 Threat of further calls a 
few months later led George Leake to urge as an alternative the issue of 
another 200 shares and the encouragement of current accounts by the 
dropping of the commission charge of 1/4 per cent on the gross amount of 
transactions.78 But the shareholders, who could no more take up new shares 
themselves than pay calls on old ones, were not anxious to admit others to 
the field and unwilling to abandon a certain source of income. The 
proposals were defeated,79 and a second attempt at the beginning of 1840 
had even less consideration.80 But rumour of a branch to be opened by the 
Union Bank81 and the announcement of the definite intention of the Bank 
of Australasia to enter the field82 brought second thoughts. A special 
meeting promptly agreed upon a 50 per cent increase in nominal capital 
(500 shares—at 35s. premium), extended the term of discountable bills to 
six months, voted £300 for the building of an office, and agreed that 
absentees should never exceed one-third of the total number of 
shareholders.83 A little later commission on accounts was abolished.84 
 
   But repentance availed nothing against “Goliah”. The accident of slow 
correspondence reminded the Australasia of the chance it had missed when 
the first reports of local success were being received,85 and it determined to 
open, preferably by amalgamation.86 Its first public move was to notify the 
local bank of its intention to open a branch and offer amalgamation; the 
local directors sought delay by cautiously professing to be awaiting the 
exact terms offered.87 Accordingly the Australasia went ahead until the 
local directors summoned a hurried meeting to consider a definite offer; the 
Australasia then made the issue clear by synchronizing with that meeting a 
notice that it would, in any case, open its branch ten days later.88 In the face 
of this open threat a small majority of shareholders (57 to 51) voted to 
accept the terms, which were that reserves should be distributed amongst 
existing shareholders who should be paid the value of their shares (there 
were now 1,000 taken up) plus £1 per share.89  
   The old bank wound up its affairs promptly (except for the return of 
capital). Notes were called in and depositors given three months to 
withdraw or to transfer to the Australasia.90 The major portion of capital 
was repaid within the same year91 although it was not until 1846 that affairs 
were finally wound up.92 The Australasia meanwhile kept its promise to 
open on 3 May, offering discounts at 10 per cent for three months bills 
compared with the unvarying 121/2 per cent of the old bank and, what the 
old bank could not attempt on any scale, foreign exchange facilities. Bills 
on the London office were offered at 11/2 per cent premium and private 
bills on London would be bought.93 It had originally intended that John 
Lewis, the Commissary, should be manager but on his death immediately 
after the opening MacDermott took his place.94  
   There had been, however, vigorous dissent amongst the shareholders of 
the old bank over the “unnecessary and gratuitous suicide” and the 
minority promptly planned a new venture, the Western Australian Bank.95 
With a capital of £20,000 it proposed to undercut the Australasia in 
discount rates, and to offer cash credits, and forecast entry into the foreign 
exchange market.96 The sponsors soon had their minimum subscription of 
£5,000, despite criticism which was scarcely fair,97 and opened for business 
on 23 June98 in the building used by the old Bank of Western Australia.99 
For their first half year of business they were able to report a gross profit of 
41 per cent and to distribute a dividend of 15 per cent per annum.100  
Depression and Recovery 
   The Australasia branch was established on the eve of depression which, 
however, was much milder than in the east. The colony was free of the 
special factors such as the complications of external government finance of 
South Australia or reductions in local expenditure in New South Wales. In 
common with the east the west suffered from the drop in the price of wool 
but despite this the pastoral industry continued to expand:  
    
   Similar uninterrupted development is shown in agriculture: 
   It was therefore understandable that the Perth Gazette,101 reviewing the 
year 1842, should describe a very minor recession in business, of no 
particular seriousness, involving a few failures and a drop in prices. The 
Australasia branch was an important factor in deferring and masking the 
impact of the general crisis. Its establishment meant that during the latter 
half of 1841 and throughout 1842 a new source of English investment was 
available, offsetting the decline in other sources. Its lending policy, under 
MacDermott, was expansive, for despite a persistent downward trend in 
both note issue and deposits he followed the same generous lending policy 
which twice later on, in South Australia, drew reproof from the London 
board. Loans by the branch reached their peak at the end of 1843, made 
possible by cash remittances from England.102  
   But throughout 1843, despite the rapid expansion of Australasia loans, 
total note issue was falling and in the latter part of the year total deposits 
Wool Exports 
Year No. of Sheep Quantity (lbs.) Value (£) Average Price per lb.
1836 8,119 15,000 1,500 2s. 0d.
1837 10,815 22,180 1,684 1s. 61/2d.
1838 16,816 36,450 1,935 1s. 03/4d.
1839 20,829 36,450 2,278 1s. 3d.
1840 30,961 50,000 2,500 1s. 0d.
1841 44,551 60,000 3,000 1s. 0d.
1842 60,380 84,640 4,252 1s, 0d.
1843 76,191 122,495 6,124 1s. 0d.
1844 86,482 140,155 7,007 1s. 0d.
1845 95,681 144,390 7,219 1s. 0d.
Area 
cultivated 
(acres) 
Year Total Wheat
1839 2,578 1,481
1840 2,921 1,670
1841 3,515 1,899
1842 3,047 2,039
1843 3,858 2,884
1844 4,867 3,283
1845 4,836 3,313
commenced a two-year decline. The decline in overseas investment, a 
dominant factor in the other colonies, was at last taking effect. The only 
quantitative index is recorded trade data:  
    
   By the beginning of 1844 the maintained level of imports in the face of 
declining investment had created a heavy drain of specie in payment for 
imports, mainly from the eastern colonies.103 Some temporary relief had 
been given by the Commissariat making a special issue in 1843 of £5,000 
in bills on the Treasury to retain specie,104 but this only deferred matters 
since the coin was thereby withdrawn from bank reserves. In the eighteen 
months to July 1844 Commissary Drake estimated that the colony's coin 
had been reduced from £25,000 to £9,000 of which £12,500 was lost 
during 1843.105  
   The Perth Gazette106 summarized the contemporary view:  
   At the commencement of [1844] it was found that the amount of specie and 
available means circulated by individuals were nearly exhausted by purchasing and 
improving of lands; the government circulation was too limited for the amount of 
population compared with the taxes imposed; a sudden check was then given to the 
enormous amount of bills afloat which had been previously met wholly or partially; 
the banks and traders then took alarm and most unwisely limited their business 
suddenly to cash payments; every one was pressed for their outstanding debts; 
sheriff's sales and ruinous sacrifices of property of course followed; and then land, 
houses, sheep and stock became of merely nominal value. 
   Its explanations took the usual pattern: excessive imports, especially of 
luxuries; high interest; high wages; failure to develop exports; and the 
effect of the £1 per acre minimum price for Crown land.107 Protection for 
farmers, intermittently discussed in earlier years, was a favourite remedy.108 
Naturally one of the popular demands was reduction of bank discount 
rates.109 The Australasia took the lead, reducing its three months rate from 
10 to 8 per cent in March 1844, being closely followed by the Western 
Australian Bank which maintained its more extended scale of rates.110 
Throughout the 'forties there were no further changes;111 after 1845 there 
Year Imports Exports
1837 £45,407 £6,906
1838 46,766 6,840
(No records available  for intervening years)
1843 37,486 7,089
1844 36,440 13,364
1845 20,350 13,353
1846 25,959 20,223
1847 25,463 24,535
1848 45,411 29,588
was no banking competition.  
   One plan which produced results, although small and temporary, was for 
public works financed by loan money. This began with a proposal by the 
Inquirer for a loan of £50,000 from the British government,112 and 
discussion crystallized around two projects. The first was for a local loan 
of £2,000 to build a gaol, the second for a loan of £10,000 from the British 
Treasury for public works in general. The latter, supported by a memorial 
from the Legislative Council, was bluntly refused.113 The former was 
implemented by a local act114 and the loan raised without waiting for 
British approval, which was in fact refused.115 But the contribution to the 
local depression was slight. However, it coincided with the beginnings of 
recovery. In the latter part of 1845 deposits and note issue commenced a 
steady upward climb while in 1846 wool exports were more than double 
the quantity of 1845 and nearly double the value, although the number of 
sheep had not greatly increased. Sandalwood, wheat, potatoes and timber, 
in modest quantities, had been added to exports.116  
   It was then, with signs of recovery generally evident, that in the middle 
of 1845 it became public knowledge that the London directors had decided 
to close the branch of the Bank of Australasia as unprofitable.117 In 
December the decision took effect, the Bank withdrawing completely, 
paying off deposits and notes, and abandoning its premises to its rival.118 
MacDermott's policy of generous lending in depression was not given a 
chance to show its results, but it is unlikely that they would have been 
profitable to the bank. He had failed to draw upon public funds by 
attracting deposits and by note issue, and had therefore depended upon the 
expensive source of shipments of specie from London, and in doing so had 
provided his rival with expanding deposits of cash. There was more than a 
suggestion too that his loans were amongst the less satisfactory borrowers; 
the Western Australian Bank undercut him in discount rates and would 
presumably have had the better risks; certainly it took the Australasia a 
number of years to secure repayment.119 The Western Australian Bank had 
also secured, by modifying its loan technique, the cream of the new 
business as new export industries signalled recovery.  
   As in the east, the basic method of lending by both banks was by 
discount, mortgage loans being avoided despite frequent pressure. Cash 
credits were promised in the Western Australian Bank prospectus120 and 
would have gone some way to meet complaints, paralleling those of the 
east, that “settlers” (i.e., pastoralists and farmers) were handicapped by the 
emphasis on discounting;121 but it was not until the latter part of 1844 that 
the promise was fulfilled,122 along with the offer of advances against bills 
of lading for exports, mainly wool, whale-oil and bone, and timber.123 But 
bill discounting remained the chief form of loan.  
   The closing of the Australasia branch was the occasion for a still-born 
scheme for a “Commercial Bank of Western Australia” sponsored by G. 
Leake, L. Samson and W. B. Andrews, in fact the active members of the 
local board of the Australasia. It was intended to have a capital of £10,000 
and to limit its advances “to those who are actively engaged in collecting 
or preparing articles for export . . . and every enterprise connected with 
commerce”. If the Australasia would re-open within three months the 
business would be transferred. But the offer was ignored and the plan came 
to nothing,124 leaving the Western Australian Bank in undisputed 
possession of the field. Shareholders of that bank were invited to pay up 
uncalled capital,125 and overseas agencies were extended126 as the bank 
settled down to enjoy its monopoly of the expansion. No further banking 
changes occurred in the 'forties.  
Legislation on Banking 
   The initiative of the planners of the Bank of Western Australia127 gave 
Western Australia its first and, until 1858,128 only legislation on banking, a 
simple and far from onerous measure. The governor responded readily to 
their request and an act was quickly passed to give confidence and status to 
the newly formed bank.129 Framed in general terms the act, while 
preserving partnership liability, authorized banking companies of any 
number of partners, gave an unrestricted right to issue notes or bills and to 
borrow money, and the right to sue or be sued in the name of a nominated 
public officer. The obligations it imposed were slight: returns setting out 
lists of partners, directors, and officers, which anyone might inspect or 
copy on payment of fees, were to be filed; and quarterly returns were to be 
made setting out average notes and deposits. No mention was made of 
publication of these returns nor did the act give any right of inspection; the 
Bank of Western Australia had already undertaken to publish these, 
together with cash and discounts,130 and it did so throughout its life.131 The 
burdens were light and for twenty years bankers in their places in the 
Legislative Council would tolerate no heavier. No report on this act went to 
the Colonial Office, but by accident a copy of the act itself did. No 
objection was raised but assent was withheld until it was amended to 
prohibit notes less than £1 or for fractions of £1.132 An amending act133 
missed the latter part of the instruction and covered only notes under £1 134 
and was replaced by a new act which was finally approved.135  
   Not until 1842 was there any question of extending legislation and then, 
arising from the governor's attempt to apply the 1840 Bank Regulations, 
the bankers demonstrated their determination to have no more control.136 A 
bill based upon the New South Wales act, 4 Vic., No. 13, was introduced in 
July 1842 and they rose in wrath. George Leake declared that it was 
“equally repugnant to the spirit of commercial principles and to every act 
of parliament passed for the regulation of banks”; “no respectable banker 
would submit to such a degradation” as to submit returns for publication. 
William Tanner, declaring the whole bill “totally unnecessary and uncalled 
for”, successfully moved the deletion of the preamble, leaving nothing 
before the Council.137 Sadly the governor reported “without your Lordship's 
positive instructions on this point it would be vain for me to introduce any 
such bill into the Legislative Council”, adding a postscript to stress that the 
critical point was the publication of returns.138  
   The next attempt to legislate was in 1845, the occasion being disputes 
over economic policy in relation to the depression, felt most acutely the 
preceding year. In debates in May centring round the loss of specie abroad, 
the governor and Colonial Secretary defended themselves by pointing out 
that had their 1842 bill been accepted they would have had the necessary 
data on which to base policy.139 Brown seized the opportunity to move for a 
bank bill modelled on the recent English act, 7 & 8 Vic. c. 93, and obtained 
a committee to report,140 the Council refusing to admit a bill until this 
report was available.141  
   The Committee duly submitted a fifty-clause draft bill, replacing the 
existing act and providing in particular for three important additions. No 
bank was to commence until £5,000 had been paid up in cash. Quarterly 
data of both assets and liabilities were to be published (Clause 12). Each 
year one-quarter of the directors must retire and should not be eligible for 
re-election for a year (Clause 16).142 In this last and the debates around it 
there are suggestions of personal conflicts which may explain the genesis 
of the bill and the peculiar manner of its withdrawal. The first reading was 
carried by one vote,143 and the second reading debate concentrated on 
clauses 12 and 16. Council had before it a petition from the Western 
Australian Bank asking that returns be half-yearly only, that Clause 16 be 
deleted, and the whole act operate for three years only “as it is merely 
experimental”.144 The provision for returns was narrowly carried. Leake, 
having lost all his 1842 sense of “degradation”, declared that “all banks of 
issue were dangerous if their assets and liabilities were not published”; but 
the bank champions secured exemption for the Western Australian Bank 
until 1847.145 (The Bank of Australasia had announced its closing and, in 
any case, was obliged by the charter to make returns for publication.)  
   Clause 16 for rotation of directors was deleted. When Council 
reassembled, the governor announced that he withdrew the bill since the 
public was insufficiently informed and in private discussion he was assured 
that the “most vital parts” would be defeated. In the face of protests from 
most of the members he admitted that the “vital part” was clause 16 and 
insisted on his right to withdraw the whole bill.146 The whole atmosphere 
suggested that the only real purpose of the bill had been to substitute as 
directors of the Western Australian Bank Peter Brown and George Leake 
for some of the other members of the Council.147 Whatever may have been 
the personal issues behind the orthodoxy of most of the clauses, no further 
attempt was made to impose controls on Western Australian banking until 
many years later. There was not even any formal legislation on legal tender 
until 1853 and then it was the British Order-in-Council of 1852, not local 
legislation, which provided that British coins should circulate in all 
colonies according to British law on legal tender.148  
The Foreign Exchange Market 
   At the end of 1831, with the establishment of a Commissariat, the bills 
on the Treasury which Stirling was originally authorized to draw were 
replaced by the usual Commissariat bills offered, as in the other colonies, 
at the fixed rate of 11/2 per cent premium. When this rate was generally 
abandoned in 1838 Western Australia followed for several years the 
practice of offering them at fixed prices adjusted from time to time. Thus 
they were at par in 1839149 and 11/2 per cent premium in 1840.150 But in 
February 1843 practice was assimilated to that of other colonies by inviting 
tenders.151 Thereafter for several years tenders were invited at, roughly, 
quarterly intervals requiring, until 1851, that the description of coin offered 
be stated. In that year all foreign coins were rejected, only British coins 
being in future acceptable.152 From time to time details of procedure were 
modified. Thus in 1844 the minimum amount of any bill was raised from 
the small and broken amounts previously permitted to £100,153 reduced in 
1845 to £50,154 In 1847 regular weekly tenders were invited.155 But there 
were no significant differences from the situation in the east except that 
Commissariat bills remained of greater relative importance compared with 
private and bank bills, an importance increased by the expenditure 
involved in the introduction of convicts in 1850.  
   From the beginning there were some private bills; but all through the 
'thirties the emphasis on individual transfers of capital in kind reduced both 
the supply and the need for private bills. Remittances by English residents 
to Western Australia commonly took the form of goods156 or cash157 and 
only the fortunate few among local residents could arrange to deposit cash 
with a London agent against which they could draw bills.158 In any case the 
standing of private bills of any sort was such that they were negotiable only 
at a substantial discount, commonly 3 to 5 per cent, whereas remittances in 
kind, if the goods were shrewdly selected, might show a profit.159 But as the 
'thirties wore on and capital import involved to a less degree the 
immigration of the capitalist, as techniques of remittance were developed 
and personal reputations were established, and as exports grew to modest 
size, the private bill became more common although it remained 
unimportant by comparison with the Commissariat bill.  
   The Bank of Western Australia did not develop overseas connections, 
contenting itself with acting as middleman for bills on the Treasury and 
private bills. Its procedure with the latter was to buy bills at 31/2 per cent 
discount, paying with a three-months promissory note and then re-selling 
the bills.160 The entry of the Bank of Australasia produced a new source of 
bills on London of high repute. As in the other colonies from the beginning 
the branch offered bills on the London office and continued to do so the 
more readily since it relied heavily on its London capital rather than on 
deposits and note issue. The initial offer at 11/2 per cent premium was 
accompanied by notice of willingness to buy private bills.161  
   It was to meet the Australasia on its own ground that the Western 
Australian Bank from the beginning set out to develop exchange business. 
Initially it had to content itself with middleman business only162 but a year 
later it had established a London agency with Mangles, Price & Co. on 
whom it offered bills at 1 per cent premium while it continued to buy 
private bills at 2 per cent discount.163 The arrangement worked well for 
several years until the London firm established a Perth branch (F. Mangles 
& Co.) as importers and shipping agents which proceeded independently to 
offer bills on its London headquarters.164 Accordingly the agency was 
terminated165 and a new arrangement made with Lewis Bros. of London166 
which suffered from irregularities of communication but otherwise worked 
well.167 Meanwhile, other agencies had been established early in 1845 at 
Calcutta, Mauritius and Singapore168 to take over the business relinquished 
by the Australasia, and in 1846 a mutual agency arrangement was 
completed with the Bank of South Australia.169 By 1851, therefore, as in 
other monetary arrangements, the Western Australian exchange market had 
fallen into line with that of the east, Commissariat and bank bills being the 
major form of external remittance but private bills growing as capital 
import revived and exports expanded. Rates were rarely far from par, the 
same mechanism operating to restrain fluctuation within modest limits.170  
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Chapter 12 Savings Banking 
New South Wales 
(a) Campbell's Bank 
   The story of Australian savings banks begins in New South Wales and in 
Tasmania with measures to enforce convict discipline and encourage thrift 
among emancipists. Early in 1819 Macquarie proposed that the property of 
convicts should be placed in the care of the masters of transports bringing 
them to New South Wales.1 Judge Barron Field, however, suggested a 
savings bank as a more complete protection, not only for convicts but for 
others, which should extend beyond the voyage out.2 The Bank of New 
South Wales declined to help, refusing to give interest on such deposits or 
even to take the trouble of keeping the accounts,3 and accordingly a 
different form of organization was adopted. A public meeting4 on 5 June 
1819 deplored that “extravagance and imprudence”, the lack of a place of 
deposit for savings, and payment of wages in kind meant that the poor of 
the colony, having dissipated their wages in drinking or gambling, were 
kept “poor, vicious and unmarried”. A savings bank was proposed in order 
that “these evils would be remedied and habits of economy, industry and 
matrimony generated”. Accordingly, under the governor's patronage such a 
bank was organized,5 the general plan being for voluntary deposits6 of 2s. 
6d. or more on which 71/2 per cent should be payable in the case of 
amounts over £1 left for a full year. Smaller amounts bore no interest—and 
indeed entitled the holder to no receipt—and business was to be transacted 
once a week only at the convenience of the savings bankers. These were 
Robert Campbell, senior, in Sydney, Hannibal Macarthur at Parramatta, 
William Cox, junior, at Windsor and Thomas Moore at Liverpool.7  
   To bring the plan before public notice the report of the meeting was 
reprinted twice in the Sydney Gazette and a “Plain address to convicts on 
their arrival and to the small settlers, mechanics, servants and labourers of 
the colony”, drafted by Field, was printed at government expense for 
distribution. Apart from a quotation from Shakespeare the address was a 
simple, direct explanation of the bank, which made only two additions to 
the original plan.8 New arrivals might deposit at any time instead of once a 
week, and “the money of wives or other women will be received from and 
repaid to them and not to their husbands”. The first day of business was 
later fixed for 17 July 1819.9  
   The initial success of the venture was slight. By the end of 1820 deposits 
in Sydney were £179, in Windsor £30 and in Parramatta £116.10 Field 
admitted that small sums of weekly savings were not being deposited, the 
Sydney deposits ranging from £2 to £50.11 Field attributed this relative 
failure to the absence of “habits of frugality and economy in the lower 
orders”,12 but more reasonable explanations are available. Convicts were 
not, as yet, compelled to deposit, and preferred to use their money in other 
ways as did expirees and free persons. A deposit in the savings bank 
earned no interest if withdrawn before the year was up whereas deposits 
elsewhere might earn interest and be more readily available. Convicts were 
encouraged by their superintendent, Hutchinson, to deposit with him or 
with the Bank of New South Wales while others made purchases or 
investments on their own account.13 Hutchinson was one of the original 
proprietors of the Waterloo Company which accepted convicts' and others' 
deposits for a number of years after.14 Poverty was another part of the 
explanation. So heavily indebted were many settlers that bailiffs regularly 
waited outside the Commissariat store on days when wheat was being 
bought.15 Moreover, after the first announcements the bank received no 
publicity and published no accounts until it was reorganized in 1832.16  
   Amounts deposited in Sydney rose but slowly:17  
    
   In the other three centres the banks appear to have lapsed very early. No 
returns for Liverpool were supplied to Bigge in 1821, although figures for 
Parramatta and Windsor were available,18 and Field counted only these two 
centres and Sydney in his evidence.19 All subsequent references are to the 
Sydney bank only, while Brisbane appears to have enforced deposit of 
convicts' money there and that savings bank was the only survivor in 1832. 
The most reasonable interpretation is that the three smaller banks did not 
survive the period of voluntary deposit.  
   Nevertheless Bigge, while he described the scheme as a “failure,”20 saw 
possibilities in it and recommended that convicts should be deprived of 
money which should be deposited in the savings bank whence it might be 
made available as a reward of good conduct.21 When Brisbane was 
instructed “to put in force . . . at the earliest opportunity” all Bigge's 
recommendations this one was particularly stressed.22 Brisbane did not read 
these instructions as mandatory.23 Reporting progress in 1825 he said that 
the seizure of convicts' money when they arrived was “complied with as 
Year (31 December) For convicts Total
1819 — £46
1820 £8 179
1821 — 316
1822 — 332
far as practicable” and its deposit was “regularly attended to as much as 
possible, but little is deposited”.24 But the necessity to report evidently 
stirred his conscience for deposits rose rapidly that year:  
    
   Meanwhile, the Colonial Office emphasized its instructions when 
Darling succeeded Brisbane. He was directed that convicts were not to be 
allowed possession of money “on any pretence whatever” for at least two 
years after arrival. Then permission to withdraw his money from the 
savings bank, in instalments, should be regarded as a special favour to the 
well-behaved convict.26 Darling found that Brisbane had enforced the rules 
and that the practice had developed of allowing full withdrawal by convicts 
who received tickets of leave “as they are then supposed to be in a 
condition in which its possession may be useful to their pursuits”.27 The 
amount of deposits, especially by government on behalf of convicts, 
increased:  
    
   The large increase between 1825 and 1826 is evidence of the zeal with 
which Darling had pursued the policy. The full extent of his efforts can be 
better seen if amounts of receipts and withdrawals are set beside amounts 
of net deposits.29  
    
   The rise in withdrawals in 1827 and 1828 may be attributed to the two-
Deposits25 
Year  (31 December) Private Government Total
1823 £546 £71 £617
1824 579 197 776
1825 886 1,202 2,088
Deposits 28 
Year (31 December) Private Government Total
1826 £1,776 £2,461 £4,237
1827 2,276 3,922 6,198
1828 1,969 5,189 7,158
1829 2,302 6,191 8,493
1830 2,255 6,465 8,720
1831 2,950 6,746 9,696
Amounts 
Year Received Paid
1826 £3,038 £889
1827 4,451 2,490
1828 3,805 2,844
1829 2,918 1,583
1830 3,095 2,868
1831 2,999 2,010
year waiting period ordered by Bathurst having expired for a number of 
convicts.  
   Until 1832 the history of the bank was uneventful. In 1829 Darling 
strengthened the control over convicts' money by ordering that if any 
convict or member of his family retained possession of money contrary to 
the regulations it should be forfeited to the Benevolent Asylum.30 Public 
interest was slight but when the Australian demanded that accounts should 
be published the Sydney Gazette expounded the virtues of savings banks 
and urged the working class to make more use of the local institution.31 The 
government concentration on convicts' deposits seems to have created an 
impression that convicts or ex-convicts only might enjoy its benefits.32  
   A change in organization followed the attacks of the opposition 
newspaper, the Sydney Monitor. Throughout 1830 and 1831 it missed no 
opportunity to assail the principle of forcing convicts to deposit with a 
private individual for the latter's gain.33 Even the Australian agreed that a 
change was overdue: “The sum total is too considerable to be kept locked 
up any longer as it has been, nobody knows how and scarcely with 
whom.”34 The new governor, Bourke, accepted this view and, in opening 
the 1832 session of the Legislative Council, declared that “the sums lodged 
in the savings bank having reached to a considerable amount, it has 
appeared to me proper that the bank should become a public concern, 
regulated by an act of council. I have directed a bill to be prepared for the 
purpose.”35 The form of his proposals having been criticized, the bill was 
published and finally passed in an amended form.36  
   Bourke required Campbell to transfer to the new Savings Bank of New 
South Wales all convicts' deposits, although he allowed him time to make 
the transfer.37 Free persons might choose, but were apparently not 
encouraged, to make the change, since the new bank offered only 5 per 
cent plus a share in profits as compared with the 71/2 per cent paid by 
Campbell. He had made a good thing out of his bank for, as he told 
Bourke, most of this money on which he paid 71/2 per cent and which 
could not be withdrawn, without loss of interest, for a year, was invested in 
mortgages at 10 per cent.38 A new phase of savings banking was now 
initiated under direct government control.39  
(b) The Savings Bank of New South Wales 
   The act of 1832 recited “that it is desirable for the encouragement of 
frugality that persons possessing small sums of money beyond what they 
require for the supply of their immediate wants should be afforded an 
opportunity of depositing the same on good security, to accumulate at 
compound interest and to form a provision for themselves and families”. 
Accordingly the Savings Bank of New South Wales was created, the 
governor's presidency being more than nominal although management was 
vested in nine trustees appointed by the governor. Deposits from 1s. to £30 
at a time would be received and on all whole pounds interest would accrue 
monthly.40 A minimum of 5 per cent was promised with the prospect of a 
proportionate share in all profits in excess of £200. For convicts no 
maximum limit was set but free persons could receive interest on not more 
than £100. Notice of withdrawal was required for free persons;41 convicts 
needed the governor's approval.  
   As received, funds were to be deposited in a triple-locked iron chest in 
the custody of the Colonial Treasurer, much to his annoyance,42 and loans 
were to be made at least quarterly. Bills might be discounted if they bore 
three names and had less than six months to run, but no bill might exceed 
£500 and the rate must be at least 8 per cent. Mortgages not exceeding 
£500 from one person might be taken to two-thirds the value of the 
property, with minimum interest of 8 per cent.  
   The Trustees proceeded to borrow £100 from the government for initial 
expenses43 and to frame rules44 which consisted mainly of a recital of the 
provisions of the act plus obvious procedural arrangements, but also made 
it clear that Trustees would meet to lend money as often as they might see 
fit; James Chisholm's offer of the use of a room in George Street was 
accepted45 and George Miller, as “a person writing a good hand and well 
qualified to keep accounts”, was appointed as accountant and clerk.46 Thus 
inconspicuously began Miller's long domination of the institution. For his 
£50 a year he had to attend all meetings of trustees, to receive and pay 
money, at first for only two hours on Monday mornings but later also on 
Thursdays and Saturdays,47 and to keep the books; he had to provide 
sureties to a total of £200 and not until 1839 was he given assistance48 
although in due course his salary was progressively raised and he became a 
full-time officer. Yet from the beginning he was the bank and what it 
became he made it.  
   On 18 August 1832 the bank opened for business49 and received a steady 
flow of private deposits50 as well as those of newly arrived convicts. By 
September sufficient had accumulated for loans to be made, the first being 
the discount of two bills for £400 and £155, the rate being 10 per cent.51 As 
funds continued to accumulate more bills were discounted52 and in 
February 1833 the first mortgages, at 10 per cent, were taken.53 The general 
nature of these loans on mortgage is illustrated by those taken on 6 April 
1833 when there were fourteen for a total of £4,670, four being for the 
maximum of £500 and the smallest for £100.54 The major part of the 
£2,782 of private deposits outstanding at the end of the year55 had come 
from the taking over of the Port Stephens Savings Bank.  
   Formed probably late in 1830 this small bank had been designed for the 
benefit of employees of the Australian Agricultural Company.56 By 
September 1831 it was able to invest £215 on mortgage and to discuss 
purchase of shares in the Banks of New South Wales and of Australia,57 
securing some in the latter. But when the Savings Bank of New South 
Wales was created it was decided after three hours' discussion to approach 
that bank with an offer to transfer the business.58 The reply was long 
delayed but when it came it was favourable; the business, then about 
£1,700, would be accepted provided the one mortgage held was 
satisfactory and the Bank of Australia shares held were sold and the cash 
transferred.59 By November 1832 the transfer was complete and the Port 
Stephens Bank ceased to exist,60 the question of its continuance as a branch 
not being discussed.  
   The growth in deposits in Sydney was rapid. Campbell during 1833 paid 
over sums belonging to convicts61 and as ships arrived with new prisoners 
the total continued to grow slowly. Private deposits expanded very rapidly, 
to £7,450 by the end of 1833 and £13,557 a year later. How much of this 
belonged to country residents cannot be said but the question of branches 
became a live one and led to a new act in 1834.62 This made certain 
procedural changes (the iron chest need have only two, not three, locks) 
and the number of trustees was increased to eighteen, but the main changes 
were two. The maximum limit for interest-bearing deposits was raised to 
£200, the right of prisoners to hold more being preserved. Country 
branches were to be permitted in twelve country settlements and any others 
the trustees might choose;63 in each place district trustees and an accountant 
were to be appointed, their function being to collect deposits for remittance 
to the Sydney office.  
   Branches, however, were slow in coming. A proposal for one in Windsor 
in 1835 reached the stage of rules but the plan was dropped64 and it was not 
until 1837 that it was again revived.65 Then in quick succession followed 
branches at Goulburn,66 Parramatta,67 Bathurst68 and Maitland,69 and a little 
later there were proposals, which came to nothing, for further branches at 
Wollongong70 and Yass.71 No further branch was opened until in 1841 
Penrith was added, although the business that resulted was small.72 The 
other branches all showed substantial deposits and steady growth, in spite 
of an unhappy episode in the case of Maitland in 1844; the local accountant 
went bankrupt which, added to his method of conducting the branch, 
“censurable in the extreme” said the trustees, led to hasty closing of the 
branch from April until the following year.73 Gipps whose circular to police 
magistrates had initiated the first group of branches could well feel 
satisfied.74  
   Meanwhile before branches were created deposits had been growing 
rapidly. Those of convicts rose very slowly never reaching £10,000 mainly 
because of the practice of permitting a ticket-of-leave holder to withdraw 
in full.75 For free depositors the figures at the end of each year were: 
   These funds were invested partly by way of discounts but mainly in 
mortgages at 10 per cent in each case: 
   These implied very satisfactory profits and no doubt the depositors were 
very well satisfied when their dividend over and above the guaranteed 5 
per cent rose from 21/2 per cent in 1834 to 33/4 per cent in 1835 and to 5 
per cent in the next six years. But these gains were achieved only because 
of a reserve policy which was extraordinary and which succeeded only 
because in the great boom of those years deposits always and regularly 
exceeded withdrawals. After 1836 cash holdings were over 2 per cent of 
deposits only once, in 1838 (4.5 per cent), and in 1840 were as low as 0.4 
per cent. When the storm came in 1843 the bank was lucky.76  
   The Trustees, however, were not satisfied. In June 1839 they submitted 
amendments to the act, “some of the provisions of which are ineffectual 
and others imperfect”, the points in question being their desire to hold their 
cash not in the Treasury but at interest in a trading bank and to increase the 
maximum size of loan.77 They had their way in a new act,78 which 
contained some minor provisions such as requiring £400 instead of £200 to 
be added to reserves from profits, but which in its main clauses permitted 
deposit in banks and increased the maximum amount of any bill to be 
discounted to £1,000 and of any mortgage to £2,000. A modest but useful 
accession of deposits had already been obtained in the form of intestate 
estates;79 these new provisions appeared to open the way to even greater 
profits. The Trustees were even emboldened to ask for land and money to 
1834 £13,557
1835 24,470
1836 36,718
1837 £49,302
1838 67,725
1839 97,245
Year Discounts Mortgages
1834 £6,316 £15,448
1835 8,167 23,877
1836 14,220 31,305
1837 17,124 42,264
1838 19,048 58,851
1839 43,981 75,825
erect a building but finding the governor unsympathetic dropped the idea.80 
Cash was deposited in the Commercial Bank, presumably at 4 per cent,81 
and the Trustees settled down to enjoy the boom whose approaching end 
they did not foresee.  
   One minor challenge they had to survive. Their 1839 act was referred to 
John Tidd Pratt, “the barrister appointed to certify the rules of savings 
banks” in England.82 The main target of his attack was as old as the 1832 
act and in a sense went back to the origin of Campbell's Bank—the 
position of the governor in relation to the bank. The governor was 
president, appointed and removed trustees, rules were subject to his 
approval, payments from and to convicts were by his order, and so on. That 
was “very objectionable”; depositors might reasonably assume the 
government guaranteed the security of their funds. Trustees ought to be 
elected at public meetings and the governor should merely ensure publicity 
for rules and accounts, the rules being subject to approval by the colonial 
Attorney-General.83  
   Gipps had to take this seriously for Russell directed him to amend the act 
in conformity with the report.84 A report from the trustees, drafted by 
Miller,85 was concerned with generalities and a sweeping assertion of 
“consequences of the most disastrous nature” if government patronage 
were withdrawn. “£100,000 lent on mortgage could only be recovered by a 
severe and certainly in many instances legal pressure on numerous 
individuals and years might be spent in the recovery.” The Attorney-
General, R. Therry, whose opinion Gipps also sought, answered to the 
point.86 He explained that whatever errors depositors might make, the 
government was not liable for the safety of the funds. The existing 
patronage had lasted since 1832 and strong reasons were necessary for 
abolishing it, whereas the arguments were all the other way. The only 
reason trustees act is “that they consider the request of the governor as a 
compliment and distinction which they are reluctant to decline”; they 
would not act at the behest of the sort of public meeting which would 
gather in New South Wales and trustworthy substitutes would be hard to 
find.  
   A Select Committee took the same view,87 adding as its only important 
positive recommendation a proposal for a larger reserve fund.88 Thus 
reassured Gipps let his instructions drop and when in 1841 the act was 
amended to create the Port Phillip Savings Bank the Sydney bank's 
relationship to the governor was repeated in that of the Melbourne bank to 
La Trobe as superintendent.89 The Sydney trustees were content to establish 
a “rest” of £1,600 to be invested in government debentures, an amount 
which proved quite inadequate when on 1 May 1843 a serious run occurred 
as a result of widespread rumours that the governor, after examining the 
bank's securities, had declared them worthless. Remaining open an extra 
two hours the bank repaid more than £12,000 obtained by rediscounting 
bills with the Union and Commercial Banks.90 Next day the drain was 
unabated and more than £10,000 was lost so that the trustees secured a 
week's respite by insisting on due notice of withdrawals.91 The governor 
came to the rescue with the appointment of a Board of Inquiry92 and 
published its reassuring report.93 This found that out of 162 mortgages for 
£116,050 only four, for £3,600, were doubtful and these would realize 50 
per cent even if immediately foreclosed; of 178 bills totalling £50,354 
seven for £1,750 were “decidedly bad” but these were “the accumulated 
refuse of eleven years”. “The savings bank is perfectly solvent,” the 
committee declared, while it was announced that the governor was so 
impressed that he “would recommend to the Legislative Assembly of the 
colony to guarantee to the depositors the repayment of their money”,94 a 
tactful if self-contradictory version of Gipps' conclusion that “very 
essential alterations are required in the constitution of the bank”.95 The 
measures which he eventually took marked a major landmark in the bank's 
development; inspired by a desire to avert a future run they prevented the 
bank from effectively investing its funds.  
   The run did not resume but the immediate result was reform in the bank 
itself. The Herald had attributed the rumours to malicious invention by 
those who resented Miller, as chairman of the Sydney Bank, “having been 
a principal means of detecting and exposing the mismanagement at the 
Bank of Australia”,96 a suggestion supported by the trustees directing him 
to cease connection with outside business and devote his full time to the 
bank.97 It was further determined that no new loans should be made until 
£10,000 in cash had been accumulated, while a sub-committee was 
appointed to draft a statement of accounts to be laid before each meeting at 
which minutes of the previous meeting were to be read and a statement 
made of the amount of withdrawals of which notice had been given.98 The 
implication is obvious; the trustees had been perfunctory in their duties and 
Miller had treated them as rubber stamps.99  
   Meanwhile Elwin on behalf of the Board of Inquiry had proposed 
amendments to the act.100 Gipps retorted promptly with his own draft bill, 
designed to ensure adequate reserves and the holding of assets in more 
liquid form. Its central point was limitation of mortgage lending and 
against this the trustees protested, urging that, instead of one-third, two-
thirds of total funds be permitted. Gipps, as the act showed, was unmoved, 
but he took up a suggestion which the trustees had regarded as 
consequential upon extended mortgage lending—a government 
guarantee—and also abolition of the practice of discounting.101 He was, 
however, sufficiently in doubt to refer the draft to a Select Committee102 
which stressed the danger of reliance on discounts and mortgages, pointing 
out that only £4,000 in cash was held at the time of the run. It read 
depositors a lecture on the theme that their money “cannot at one and the 
same time be out at interest and ready for instant repayment . . . They are, 
in fact, all partners in a joint-stock loan and discount company which, from 
the social and political circumstances of the country . . . has found it 
necessary to place their funds much more beyond its reach than is either 
prudent or necessary in similar establishments in Europe”.103 When, 
however, the committee proposed changes in bank policy it declared them 
“not fit subjects for legislative enactment” notwithstanding which Gipps 
incorporated the important ones of their proposals, with others, in a new 
bill.104  
   As finally passed105 the act required that the “rest” be increased until it 
was one-fourth of deposits,106 while greater liquidity was ensured by two 
highly important restrictions. All new discounts were prohibited although 
old bills might be wholly or partly renewed. No new mortgages might be 
taken so long as those held amounted to more than one-third of total funds. 
Since in October 1843 against deposits of £141,172 the bank held 
mortgages to the value of £109,117 the effect was to prohibit new 
mortgages for a very long time. The realization of its other asset, £35,859 
in bills, would merely reduce income.107  
   Against this the act permitted—if permission were necessary—deposit of 
up to two-thirds of funds in any bank in the colony and offered the 
alternative, impracticable as it turned out, of investment in British 
government securities. This depended upon securing amendment of the 
relevant British act which Gipps requested108 but, as Tidd Pratt was 
delighted to show, the terms were unsatisfactory and no funds were so 
invested. The British government paid only 31/4 per cent and depositors 
could get no more than 3 1/24 per cent and even this did not commence 
until the funds reached England.109 In the light of these conditions it was 
scarcely necessary for Gipps to penalize depositors who closed accounts 
during the year by limiting their interest to 3&frac13; per cent, and to 
extend the notice required for withdrawal.110 Nor was he taking any great 
risk, even if he were unorthodox, in providing that if the trustees had to 
borrow in order to meet repayments such loans, to a maximum of £50,000, 
were guaranteed by the government. Gipps felt particular need to justify 
this step and drew for the benefit of the Colonial Office a picture of 
unemployed depositors clamouring at the doors of a bank unable to meet 
their claims; “consequences might ensue which it is fearful to 
contemplate . . . to support the credit of the bank is a measure absolutely 
necessary for the peace and tranquility of the public”.111 The answer was, 
however, that the Treasury had “ceased to superintend the financial 
operations of the legislature of New South Wales”; if they chose to take the 
risk, let them.112  
   For a time the full implications of the act were not apparent. The year 
1843 was one of acute depression so that, even without the run, a decline in 
deposits was inevitable. Over the year total deposits declined by £43,930 
and the number of depositors by 929. But that was the worst point and the 
tide turned with the following year although it was not until after the 
discovery of gold that deposits passed their pre-slump level. By reducing 
its interest on mortgages from 10 per cent to 8 per cent the bank was able 
to maintain the volume of these loans.113 In spite of a similar reduction in 
the discount rate the volume of bills held slumped heavily since new ones 
could not be taken. From a peak of £74,738 before the run these had been 
reduced to £27,721 by the end of 1843 and a year later were only £12,119, 
a substantial part of this reduction being the writing off of £4,716 as 
irrecoverable.114 Against this the bank had been able to secure substantial 
amounts of colonial debentures commencing with £5,000 in March 1844 
and reaching £23,000 by the end of the year.115 Cash holdings, therefore, 
rose only to £8,344 by the end of 1844 although no interest was received 
on these, the trading banks having abandoned all deposit interest. The act 
of 1843 had left it to the trustees to fix deposit interest retrospectively but 
they were able to maintain 5 per cent.116  
   But it could not last. Mortgage loans could not be increased, bills 
continued to decline, and cash accumulated as deposits grew; by March 
cash was £13,700 and two months later £19,244.117 Debentures could be 
obtained only with difficulty by private negotiation and then in small 
amounts, £1,000 at 1/2 per cent premium and another £600 at 21/2 per 
cent, purchase of more being prevented by high premiums.118 The 
governor's aid was sought in securing more government securities, but 
without success.119 The trustees requested the issue of new government 
debentures for the bank; the governor professed ignorance “of any means 
by which the funds of the bank can be employed, unless it be in the 
purchase of government debentures at the market price”, but invited 
suggestions.120  
   The trustees were not slow to respond.121 Replying, they set out the 
impossibility of any other investment than debentures which were at too 
high a price for them to pay. Their proposal was a special issue of 5 per 
cent debentures, available only to the Savings Banks of New South Wales 
and Port Phillip, to create a “Savings Banks Public Works Fund” for 
expenditure on useful works.  
   In their search for a case for the issue of debentures the trustees even 
used Tidd Pratt's strictures on the act of 1843.122 He had attacked the profit-
sharing principle, urging instead “a certain but low rate of interest”, and 
was very critical of the £50,000 guarantee. The trustees retorted123 that 
they, too, disliked profit-sharing which was “forced upon them by the 
circumstances of the colony”, these circumstances being defined as the 
absence of government securities; let Gipps give them debentures and Tidd 
Pratt could have his way. As for the guarantee, it was unfortunate that it 
was necessary, but its abandonment would only be possible “by the issue 
of government securities for the investment of the whole of its funds”.  
   An application by the city of Sydney for a loan of £6,000 provided the 
occasion for a Select Committee124 to which was referred Gipps' bill to 
permit the loan.125 The trustees, while grateful, had insisted that the relief 
was slight and that “some systematic plan” was “indispensable to [the] 
very existence” of the bank,126 but Gipps had retorted bluntly, refusing “to 
recommend that the government should itself incur a debt for the purpose 
of finding employment for the funds of the Savings Bank”, although his 
own solution, the ineffectual plan of remission of funds to England, was 
unhelpful.127  
   The Select Committee128 distinguished two problems: restricting the 
growth of deposits and finding new investments. As to the first, they 
proposed limiting the amount of deposits to bear interest to £100,129 
allowing either no interest or at most half the ordinary rate on intestate 
estates and then not until ordinary depositors received 5 per cent. Miller's 
proposal for revival of discounting was rejected but the increase of 
mortgages to one-half of deposits was proposed although it was admitted 
that no relief would in fact be given since old mortgages still held were 
equal to two-thirds. Provision for investments in England was meaningless 
and should be repealed, and the loan to the city of Sydney (and one by the 
Port Phillip Savings Bank to Melbourne) would be useful if modest relief. 
The really important proposal was the creation of a special debt of £50,000 
to be used for public works, subscription being limited to the two Savings 
Banks.  
   Gipps adopted every one of these recommendations, save the last, in a 
new act.130 On the question of a special issue of debentures he was 
adamant, although quite satisfied if there were “an intermediate and 
responsible body interposed between the bank and the government”, such 
as the city councils.131 Gipps may well have felt aggrieved at the failure of 
the bank to take up debentures on favourable terms when he had earlier 
reserved the privilege for it.132 The relief therefore, though important, was 
small; only £1,300 more of debentures could be obtained, bill holdings 
were down to negligible figures, and mortgages were declining, although 
slowly, while deposits were growing. By the end of 1845 idle cash was 
£30,012 and the dividend to depositors had to be reduced to 3&frac13; per 
cent.133  
   The replacement of Gipps by FitzRoy in August 1846 was an opportunity 
which the trustees seized within the week. At that time, they pointed out, 
total deposits had reached £159,700; bill holdings were only £5,500; while 
no more than £26,000 of debentures could be got; and mortgages had fallen 
to £93,400; with the result that cash had accumulated, without interest, to 
the amount of £39,000. “Nothing short” of the plan of June 1843, a copy of 
which was forwarded, would meet the case.134 FitzRoy was sympathetic but 
cautious, deciding to refer the matter to England.135 In doing so he pressed 
the trustees' scheme strongly in a passage worth quotation in full.136 
Dismissing Gipps' plan for loans to municipal authorities, he wrote:  
   In the first place, I conceive that the funds of an institution of such 
material consequence to the interests of the poorer classes of the 
community should, on no account, be permitted to be invested in any other 
than in government security, or security over which the government can 
exercise a direct and immediate control. But the government has no control 
over the corporations of Sydney and Melbourne, or over their expenditure; 
and therefore I do not consider that it would be expedient to sanction a loan 
to any large amount to either of these bodies. The other corporate bodies of 
this colony, the district councils, are so entirely inoperative that it is 
unnecessary to take them into consideration.  
   Secondly, even assuming the corporations of Sydney and Melbourne to 
be in a position to give security for the whole or a large proportion of the 
money required to be invested, this money, according to the Savings Bank 
Act (7 Vic., No. 6) could only be invested by the trustees under the 
approval of the governor, and therefore, in the event of either of the 
corporations becoming insolvent, the Legislature or the government would 
scarcely be relieved from the responsibility of securing the bank from loss. 
And I presume that there can be no doubt that, whenever the government is 
either directly or indirectly liable for monies raised under its sanction, it 
must be more advantageous to the public interests that such monies should 
be expended under its immediate supervision, rather than under that of any 
intermediate body whose acts it has not the power of controlling.  
   The response, however, lay in the future and goodwill did little to help 
the bank. Some small aid came from a loan to the city of Melbourne of 
£6,000 at 6 per cent in 1847,137 but this was more than offset when the 
debentures already held matured. FitzRoy declined a request to permit 
them to run on until the British government's reply was known and repaid 
them in November 1847.138 As a result idle cash increased for that year 
from £41,965 to £84,486, not greatly less than the total of interest-earning 
assets, £98,466. The mere safe-keeping of such sums had become a 
problem. When in 1846 the amount approached £40,000 it had been 
divided equally between the four trading banks;139 it was now decided that 
a substantial part, that in excess of £50,000, should be deposited in the 
Treasury.140 This did not, however, increase income, and for 1848 
depositors had to be content with 21/2 per cent. Getting, by the same act, 
the long-sought grant of land for a bank building was small 
compensation.141  
   In the end the British reply came. Unexpectedly Tidd Pratt agreed and 
Grey notified FitzRoy that “it will be advisable to adopt the plan suggested 
by the Trustees” and in addition to eliminate deposits of intestate estates 
and deposits by the Master in Equity.142 A bill to this effect was promptly 
introduced and carried after a stormy passage.143 The reasons for criticism 
were varied: Stuart Donaldson wanted the debentures to be open to the 
public; Murray thought the bank should engage in aggressive mortgage 
lending in competition with the Trust and Loan companies; Dr Bland 
wanted the loans to come from the Land Fund; while Wentworth 
complained of special favours to a bank for which too much had been done 
already. All that they achieved was elimination of a fixed 5 per cent on 
such debentures in favour of a rate fixed for each issue. The act144 simply 
authorized, in general terms, loans by the New South Wales and Port 
Phillip savings banks for public works purposes, provided the works 
should be in their respective districts. Nothing came of suggestions for 
loans for railways,145 or of an earlier proposal in connection with 
immigration.146  
   FitzRoy had estimated at the time that only £14,500 would be borrowed, 
£3,000 from the Port Phillip Bank and £11,500 in New South Wales.147 But 
it was not until a year later that debentures were available when, however, 
the Sydney trustees were able to secure £10,000 at 21/2 per cent premium 
and £50,000 at 3 per cent which ensured an annual net income of £2,376, 
sufficient to maintain 21/2 per cent to depositors.148 Another £20,000 was 
secured in 1850 and the bank's position was assured.  
   Accordingly it took stock of its cash position. All funds had been 
withdrawn from the Treasury and deposits in the banks reduced. Any 
sudden need for cash was provided for by arranging a cash credit of 
£10,000 with the Commercial Bank which for a time was the sole 
banker,149 although later the other banks received a share.150 By May 1851 
mortgages were low enough in relation to deposits for new ones to be taken 
and at the end of the year this type of lending was renewed.151 There were 
troubles ahead but they belong to a new phase of the story, the 
consequences of the gold rushes. For a time at least the bank was in safe 
waters.  
Port Phillip District 
   The story of the Port Phillip Savings Bank is little more than an appendix 
to that of the New South Wales Savings Bank. Originally in 1839 it was 
planned to create a branch of the New South Wales Bank, as permitted by 
the act of 1834, and trustees were appointed but no further action was 
taken.152 When in 1841 a Port Phillip Savings Bank Act was passed, apart 
from organization clauses it extended the New South Wales legislation 
with only minor changes of which special provision for a “Rest or Security 
Fund” was the only one of importance.153 The Superintendent of Port 
Phillip, La Trobe, was president and the bank was to be managed by twelve 
trustees appointed and removable by the superintendent. In practice the 
leading figure was the vice-president, an office held throughout by James 
Simpson.  
   The trustees were appointed in October and speedily completed the 
necessary preliminaries. Rooms free of charge were obtained from the 
Melbourne Fire & Marine Assurance Company; an accountant was 
appointed; the Bank of Australasia was selected as a depository; and rules 
for the conduct of business were framed.154 The bank opened for business 
on 1 January 1842 and the reception it was given is indicated by its ability 
to lend, only a month later, £779 by way of discount of three bills.155  
   Thereafter there is little of interest to record apart from its efforts to 
secure profitable investments. Legislative changes, outlined earlier, applied 
to the Port Phillip Savings Bank as well as to that of New South Wales, 
with an occasional special clause for Port Phillip156 and this legislation was 
carried over, on the separation of Victoria, until that colony provided in 
1853 for the transfer of the bank to the control of commissioners.  
   As in New South Wales the great problem was how to earn an income. 
Initially prospects were rosy and the discount rate was fixed optimistically 
at 121/2 per cent.157 But, as depression deepened, the rate proved too high. 
In September the “Minutes” note briefly, “There not being a sufficient 
choice of bills, no business was done”, while in March of the following 
year no bills whatever were offered and reduction of interest was 
proposed.158 Not until June, however, was the rate reduced to 8 per cent on 
bills to three months and 10 per cent for those to six months.159 The same 
year a new act prohibited the savings banks from discounting except by 
way of renewal.160 
 
   The same act limited loans on mortgage to one-third of total funds. 
Mortgage loans at 121/2 per cent had commenced early,161 but were not 
common until 1843 when they comprised half of total assets. The act 
therefore meant that new mortgage loans were impossible while discount 
income was gone. As a stop-gap £1,500 was placed on three months 
deposit in the Bank of Australasia at 5 per cent while £800 was invested in 
government debentures.162 The trustees turned eagerly to this lifeline. By 
November 1844 £4,300 (including the former bank deposit) had been so 
invested163 but it was not enough. Mortgage loans were only maintained by 
reductions of interest, to 10 per cent in April 1844 and 8 per cent in 
February 1845;164 any large expansion was impossible under the act. A 
search for more debentures proved fruitless.165  
   The bank therefore joined with that of New South Wales in pressing for 
amendments. By August 1845 with deposits at £13,873 the bank held 
£4,300 in debentures of which it could obtain no more and £2,450 in 
mortgages of which more could not with adequate security be taken. Idle 
cash not earning interest in the Bank of Australasia had jumped from 
£2,675 in December 1844 to £7,240.166 Proposals were made to reduce 
deposit interest obligations of which the virtual abolition of interest on 
funds of intestate estates was adopted.167 But the greatest noise centred 
around a demand that, as the New South Wales Bank was to be authorized 
to lend to the corporation of Sydney, the Port Phillip should likewise lend 
to Melbourne.168 A special clause was added to the bill permitting a loan of 
£4,000 but after all the fuss the bank was not prepared to accept the 
security offered.169 However, partly by reducing payments to depositors, 
but more by increasing the permitted proportion of mortgage loans to one-
half of deposits, the act gave other relief. While cash holdings remained at 
unprofitably high levels income expanded so that interest on deposits, 
which had been cut to 11/2 per cent for 1845,170 was restored to 21/2 per 
cent for 1846 and 31/2 per cent for 1847.  
   But in the latest year the government debentures matured and were 
repaid.171 Deposits were still growing steadily so that in spite of more loans 
on mortgage (the only form of income-earning asset) cash was during 1848 
and 1849 roughly equal to mortgage loans.172 Only the maintenance of the 
mortgage rate at 8 per cent permitted deposit interest of 21/2 per cent in 
those two years. Not until new debentures were obtained in 1850 could the 
trustees feel happy.173 Thereafter loans were divided between mortgages 
and debentures, apart from one unlucky attempt to copy the exchange 
speculations of the New South Wales Bank.174  
   Meanwhile branches were being developed, at Geelong and Portland in 
1848, and Belfast in 1850. The chief obstacle was the desire of local 
residents “to keep money in the district”. The Geelong trustees 
unsuccessfully sought guarantees that Geelong funds would be invested in 
Geelong,175 while those of Portland secured the compromise of having 
surplus cash deposited in the local branch of the Union Bank.176 The 
continuance of that branch was for some time in doubt, “the class for 
whose benefit it was established not availing themselves of it”, but the 
reluctance proved temporary.177 The bank was at last firmly established as 
it passed to the new colony of Victoria in 1851.  
Tasmania 
   It is remarkable that Macquarie made no attempt to extend his savings 
bank to Tasmania and that Brisbane evidently believed that “Campbell's 
Bank” was a sufficient compliance with his instructions to implement 
Bigge's recommendation that convicts be deprived of any money in their 
possession. As a result the island colony had no savings bank until 1828 
and not until several years later was there such a bank open to the general 
public. If we ignore an anonymous suggestion in 1824178 the starting point 
is the receipt by Arthur of instructions from Bathurst, directing “that no 
convict shall henceforth be allowed on any pretence whatever to have 
possession of any money or property”. Money was to be deposited in “the 
savings banks” as Bigge had suggested and withdrawals were to be 
permitted as a reward for good conduct, but in the case of “lifers” not 
before the lapse of two years.179  
   Arthur at once gave the necessary orders for surgeon superintendents to 
take possession of all money and property of convicts on board ship, and 
for the superintendent of public works and the government engineer to do 
likewise. These sums were at first paid over to the Commissariat.180 Arthur 
believed a savings bank to be “the most proper depository” but anticipated 
difficulty because “the money brought by the prisoners into the colony is 
very small; their means are generally subsequently derived by orders and 
remittances from their friends to merchants in Hobart Town by whom it is 
vested in property”.181 It is possible that Arthur foresaw that to deprive 
convicts of all money would undermine his system of rewards and 
punishments on which he believed the success of transportation to 
depend,182 for he does not appear to have attempted to compel convicts to 
surrender money except on arrival or when employed on public works or 
lodged in one of the penal settlements. No machinery was provided for 
dealing with convicts assigned to work for settlers, and their freedom to 
hold money would have been in Arthur's eyes one of the inducements to 
good conduct in order to avoid being returned to the custody of the 
government.183  
   To complete the scheme it was necessary to establish a savings bank in 
which the money should be deposited. It was characteristic of Arthur that 
he acted promptly in ensuring that by losing possession of their money 
convicts were made to realize that transportation was a penalty, but saw no 
urgency in the second half of the policy. He referred the matter to the 
existing banks,184 appointed a committee which had been by March 1827 
“long . . . employed in the consideration of this point”, and wrote to 
Sydney to inquire into the operation of the scheme there.185 But this initial 
burst of energy spent itself and by May “the idea of a savings bank seems 
to have subsided”.186 The Bank of Van Diemen's Land considered how such 
a bank might be established, perhaps in response to a request from 
Arthur,187 but did nothing about it, while Arthur was more concerned with 
suggesting that all property of newly arrived convicts “beyond mere 
necessary wearing apparel” should be seized and sold, the proceeds to be 
placed in a still non-existent savings bank.188  
   He was, however, stirred to action by Goderich's reply to his report of the 
specific measures already adopted which took money away from convicts, 
for Goderich passed these over lightly and went on “particularly to 
approve” of the savings bank proposal.189 An arrangement was quickly 
completed with the Derwent Bank by which money taken from other than 
assigned convicts would be deposited in a special savings bank managed 
by the Derwent directors in which also voluntary deposits might be made 
by “those convicts who from good behaviour may be permitted to work for 
their own benefit”, and by expirees. Compulsory deposits were to be drawn 
upon only with the permission of the principal superintendent of convicts; 
voluntary deposits were accepted every Saturday in sums not less than 5s., 
to be withdrawn only after the lapse of four months. Interest, calculated 
fortnightly, was to be paid on deposits at the rate of 10 per cent per annum, 
although it was also provided that the net profit on the investment of 
savings bank funds should be divided pro rata every six months.190 These 
were generous provisions and within a year the Derwent Bank had 
repented. A new contract “with the view of placing the savings bank upon 
a permanent footing” provided that the savings bank should be separately 
organized, although still managed by the Derwent Bank directors.191 
Interest on deposits was reduced to 5 per cent, payable for whole months, 
and voluntary deposits received interest only if they were left for three 
months or more.192 The other conditions were retained.193  
   The subsequent history of the institution is obscure, but unimportant, 
since it does not appear that it ever received any significant amount of 
voluntary deposits. The opening of the savings department of the 
Commercial Bank194 in 1831 and of a totally distinct Derwent Savings 
Bank in 1834 took place in an atmosphere which implied that voluntary 
deposits in the convict bank were unimportant, while after that date the 
high deposit interest of the trading banks offered a more attractive 
investment. When the trading banks abolished interest on deposits in 1844 
the Launceston Bank for Savings already existed and the Hobart Savings 
Bank was being planned by G. W. Walker. As a result the first institution 
retained its original character as a place of safekeeping for the money of 
newly arrived convicts and those in government custody, and its operations 
were never large enough to have any influence on the monetary system.  
   In its first incomplete year deposits received were £853 and repayments 
£104.195 In 1832 repayments, £442, exceeded new deposits, £294.196 The 
bank was still being conducted according to the original arrangement in 
1833.197 By the end of 1843 the balance of deposits had grown to “about 
£3,000” and grew further in the following years when half the wages of 
first-class and two-thirds of the wages of second-class probationer convicts 
were paid into the bank, to be held until they qualified for a ticket of 
leave.198 It seems probable that the division of the convict savings bank into 
“No. 1” and “No. 2” occurred at this time.199 The only other certain 
information relates to the new arrangements which had to be made when 
the Derwent Bank, in October 1849, was forced to admit its insolvency.200 
Deposits were then £4,422 in No. 1 bank and £675 in No. 2.201 These were 
recovered intact by the comptroller-general of convicts, but not until 
December 1850.202 He sought to deposit them in the Hobart Savings Bank 
but finally arranged to lodge them with the Hobart branch of the Union 
Bank.203 The change took effect in August 1851 when £5,000, the property 
of “on the average 10,000” convicts, was transferred on terms which meant 
the virtual abolition of a savings bank for convicts. The Derwent Bank had 
been “allowing latterly 2 per cent on the deposits” (when the reduction 
occurred is uncertain);204 the Union Bank declined to pay interest and 
refused to continue the keeping of individual accounts. In future a single 
deposit was made in the name of “an authorized official” whom the Union 
insisted should “be treated the same in all respects as . . . any other deposit 
customer of the bank”.205 The original savings bank had become no more 
than an instrument of convict discipline and its banking character did not 
extend beyond safekeeping, while with the cessation of transportation to 
Tasmania in 1853 even this limited significance declined rapidly.  
   Meanwhile the needs of assigned convicts, emancipists and free settlers 
had been met by other means. The first of the private savings banks was 
that opened on 1 January 1831 by the enterprising John Dunn. Under the 
title of “General Savings Bank” he added a special branch to the 
Commercial Bank of which he was then sole proprietor. Deposits as low as 
5s. were received and 71/2 per cent per annum was offered on deposits left 
for at least three months.206 The choice of title and the tone of newspaper 
comment suggest that the Derwent Savings Bank was regarded as reserved 
for convicts. Little is heard of Dunn's savings bank after its initial flourish. 
It was still maintained in 1838,207 but disappears thereafter.208 Probably its 
savings bank character went no deeper than the payment of interest on 
small sums lodged on fixed deposit, for Dunn originated payment of 
interest on deposits in Tasmania. When he first opened the Commercial 
Bank in June 1829 interest at 5 per cent per annum was offered on six 
months deposits and continued to be offered until the competition for 
deposits led to the general offer of deposit interest by all the banks after the 
opening of the Union Bank in 1838.209 In the first few years the 
Commercial Bank was eager for new business and its savings bank 
presumably represents no more than a device for attracting funds.  
   The next private savings bank was the Derwent Bank for Savings, 
opened in Hobart on 1 November 1834210 as part of Charles Swanston's 
plans to meet the competition of the new Bank of Australasia.211 This was 
controlled by the Derwent Bank and paid 5 per cent per annum on the 
minimum monthly balance with a limit of £60 on the amount deposited in 
any one year. Deposits as low as 2s. 6d. were accepted and withdrawals 
were allowed only on the first Monday of the month with one week's 
notice.212 This savings department continued all through the 'thirties,213 
survived the conversion of the parent institution into a mortgage bank in 
1841,214 and expired with it when the Derwent Bank went into liquidation 
after October 1849. The only details of its operations which have been 
preserved relate to its final years. The number and amount of deposits were 
then:215  
    
   For this period interest was paid at 4 per cent, the reduction from 5 per 
cent probably occurring when trading bank deposit interest was reduced 
several years before.216  
   A part of the explanation of the small success of these early ventures is 
that at the time of their establishment public interest was slight. The 
Hobart Town Courier, for instance, gave three lines to the New South 
Wales Savings Bank Act217 and the press generally ignored the three local 
Date Number Amount
1847 December 31 232 £7,976
1848 December 31 177 6,168
1849 September 27 (?) 6,165
institutions once they were established. A new chapter was opened with the 
Launceston Bank for Savings in 1835.  
   Casual suggestions for such a bank in Launceston218 had been passed over 
until 1834. A public meeting in September of that year was called to 
consider the relief of distress in the town and resolved on the formation of 
a Benevolent Society.219 A suggestion then made for a savings bank bore 
fruit a few weeks later when a further private meeting resolved to approach 
local citizens who would be likely to help in establishing a savings bank, 
and appointed a sub-committee to draft rules.220 These rules were adopted 
at a further meeting on 2 February 1835. An imposing array of trustees was 
to watch the welfare of the depositors221 and an agreement was completed 
with the Tamar Bank by which this bank would manage the savings bank, 
paying depositors 5 per cent per annum. Deposits as low as 1s. were 
acceptable and interest was payable on each whole ten shillings of the 
minimum monthly balance. Friendly societies and charitable institutions 
were invited to deposit. No person might deposit more than £50 in any one 
year.222 On these terms the bank opened, probably in March 1835.223  
   Minor modifications were made in the next few years. Additional 
facilities for depositing were provided by arranging a roster of trustees, two 
of whom met from 1836 on every Saturday evening to accept deposits to 
be paid into the Tamar Bank.224 In 1841 the maximum interest-bearing 
deposit was fixed at £100.225 A complete overhaul of the bank was 
necessary, however, in 1843–4 because of difficulties arising from the 
policy of depositing the bank funds with another bank. The Tamar Bank 
was absorbed by the Union Bank as from 1 May 1838 and the savings bank 
balance was automatically transferred to it. In June 1840 L. W. Gilles, who 
had been prominent in the formation of the savings bank and successively 
manager of the Tamar Bank and of the Launceston branch of the Union 
Bank, opened a private bank following his resignation from the latter 
position. The savings bank funds were transferred to the new firm Gilles & 
Co. (later Archers Gilles & Co.).  
   This firm at one stage sought to take over the savings bank as its own 
business with responsibility to individual depositors only, a suggestion 
which is explained by the steady growth in deposits. In the first six months 
these had reached £600 and had grown to £3,715 by November 1841.226 
The proposal was rejected although Archers Gilles & Co. were left in 
possession of the funds “as treasurers”.227 Within a short time the firm was 
in financial difficulties and had to abandon its banking activities.228 After 
some anxious days in which it seemed possible that Gilles' individual 
bankruptcy might involve the savings bank, the deposits were rescued229 
and lodged in the Union Bank, although Gilles “kindly consented to act for 
the trustees” in managing the business for the time being.230 At first the 
trustees sought to continue the old sort of arrangement, offering the funds 
in equal shares to the Union Bank and the Bank of Australasia, but only the 
Union would pay interest.231 A manager, Isaac Sherwin, was appointed for 
the first time, remunerated by receiving all profits in excess of 4 per cent 
on deposits to a maximum of £100 per year. As from 1 January 1844 
depositors were to receive 4 per cent.232  
   But the scheme was shortlived for in April the only trading banks 
remaining in Launceston, the Union and Australasia, announced the 
abolition of interest on current accounts and reduction of fixed deposit 
interest from 5 to 3 per cent.233 The trustees at first sought to persuade the 
government to accept a loan of £6,000 at 6 per cent per annum, subject to 
three months' notice. Negotiations dragged on until August when the 
government refusal was final and the trustees turned to mortgage loans.234 
Their plans were cautious. Loans were limited to one-third of the estimated 
value of the security, and not more than three-quarters of deposits were to 
be lent on mortgage, while loans were to be repayable on six months' 
notice from either side. Interest was to be at the rate of 7 per cent per 
annum235 and the “Minutes” contain many references to the personal visits 
of trustees to ensure that borrowers kept their properties in good repair. 
Loans on personal security were to be authorized only by a special meeting 
and this ban was resolutely enforced.236 With the appointment of Henry 
Dowling, junior, as salaried “actuary” when Sherwin resigned the 
managership in October 1844, the reorganization was completed.237  
   The reconstruction of the Launceston bank was soon followed by the 
organization of a similar institution in Hobart, the Hobart Savings Bank. 
This was due to the initiative of the Quaker, George Washington Walker,238 
who described his part in a letter to a friend: “I have for some time past 
been of the mind that few things would tend more even to the moral 
welfare of our working classes here, who have been notorious for their 
recklessness and prodigality, than the establishment of a Savings Bank . . . 
I have induced between twenty and thirty of the most influential 
inhabitants in the town and country to become trustees. But in effecting 
this, I have had to accept the office of Manager, gratuitously, for six 
months; the deposits to be received on my own premises.”239 The formal 
decision to establish the bank was taken at a meeting of seven citizens in 
January 1845.240 Subsequent meetings devised rules; the governor accepted 
the purely ceremonial office of president, the Colonial Secretary that of 
vice-president, while twenty-eight prominent citizens consented to act as 
trustees, including amongst their number Cornelius Driscoll formerly of 
the Colonial Bank and John Dunn of the Commercial Bank.241 An 
executive committee of five and a managing trustee (Walker) did the real 
work. Deposits were to be received in sums as small as one shilling, at 
Walker's shop, but deposit interest was not to be fixed for six months since 
all officers were giving their services free for that period.242 The Bank 
opened for business on 1 March 1845 in a corner of Walker's shop.  
   At first it was planned to begin, as the Launceston bank had done, by 
holding interest-bearing deposits in the trading banks, but like the 
Launceston bank the Hobart trustees found this impossible and turned to 
mortgage lending.243 From then on, with the exception of the minor 
changes imposed by the Savings Bank Act, the bank continued to make 
steady progress, paralleling but outstripping the Launceston Bank for 
Savings.244 Walker continued to manage the institution in his shop until his 
death in 1859,245 in an atmosphere of Quaker morality. At one time he 
“adopted a new method of silently advocating the cause, by exhibiting 
some of the most striking prints and placards, depicting the evils of 
intemperance and the contrasted benefits of total abstinence in the office 
window of the savings bank”;246 while an application for a loan might 
develop into a discussion of theology.247  
   Both the Hobart and the Launceston banks enjoyed a steady increase in 
deposits over the period considered, although the growth of the Hobart 
Bank was much more rapid, mainly because of the larger population and 
the higher interest offered.248 From 5 per cent initially offered the 
Launceston bank reduced its rate to 4 per cent in 1844 and to 3 per cent in 
1846. During two years, from 1850 to 1852, it was raised to 31/2 per cent 
before being reduced to 3 per cent again.249 The Hobart bank aimed at 4 per 
cent from the beginning,250 but had to withdraw from its promise of that 
amount for 1846, and as a consequence adopted the policy of a 
retrospective “dividend on deposits” which did not reach the objective of 4 
per cent until 1848.251  
   From August 1844, when it took over direct management of its own 
affairs, the Launceston bank lent exclusively by way of mortgage.252 The 
managing committee repeatedly declined to discount bills or make loans on 
personal security.253 The Hobart bank followed the same policy of loans 
secured by mortgage. The original plan was to deposit in the trading banks, 
all four of which offered 3 per cent,254 but aiming at higher return the 
trustees turned their attention to mortgage loans at 6 per cent.255 
Concentration on this type of investment was finally chosen in September 
1845,256 a choice confirmed by subsequent refusal of the trading banks to 
pay interest on deposits.257 Thereafter mortgage loans exclusively furnished 
the bank with its income,258 although it did not persist in early competition 
with the Launceston bank in the north of the island.259  
   Policy in relation to reserves was inspired by self-confidence. While 
trading banks held the Launceston funds its trustees had no reserve 
problem beyond the keeping of till money. When active management 
passed to the bank itself in 1844 it was at first decided to hold a reserve of 
25 per cent.260 Within a few months this had been altered to a flat figure of 
£1,000261 which was lowered to £500 later in 1845.262 In fact the reserve 
actually held was usually well above the minimum, fluctuating 
considerably both in amount and as a proportion of deposits.263 The Hobart 
bank had no formal reserve policy until 1847 when a “Rest or Security 
Fund to meet contingent losses” was created264 to which amounts 
determined from time to time were added and which from 1850 was a 
distinct account credited with deposit interest.265 Reserves varied between 
wide limits showing no consistency in amount or as a percentage of 
deposits. Thus they were 12.2 per cent of deposits in February 1847 and 
4.5 per cent in August 1849.266  
   Neither the Launceston nor the Hobart bank extended its activities into 
country districts before the middle 'fifties.267 At Campbell Town in 1837 six 
local residents summoned a public meeting to consider the desirability of a 
Temperance Society and a Savings Bank at which “measures were adopted 
for the establishment of a savings bank” although more importance was 
attached to the Temperance Society.268 No more seems to have happened 
and within a year the Commercial Bank of Tasmania had opened a branch 
and the Union an agency in Campbell Town.269 More successful was a tiny 
savings bank at Longford run by the Rev. R. R. Davies. No records survive 
of its foundation which may well have antedated that of the Launceston 
Bank.270 It was only one of many philanthropic enterprises of the energetic 
parson and when he left for England at the beginning of 1840 its funds 
were transferred to the Launceston Bank for Savings. They then amounted 
to £99 (of which £11 was accumulated interest) the property of sixteen 
depositors.271 Elsewhere local savings banks are unheard of, probably 
because settlement was still restricted mainly to a strip of country between 
Hobart and Launceston.272  
   It was not until 1849 that Tasmanian savings banks were subjected to any 
form of government control and then it was of the lightest. The Savings 
Bank Act of 1848, 12 Vic., No. 1, was the delayed outcome of persistent 
pressure by trustees of the Launceston Bank since 1842, inspired by their 
unfortunate experiences and the fears which these created, supplemented 
after 1845 by the activities of G. W. Walker. The first Launceston move 
was a memorial to the governor in November 1842, asking him to prepare 
an act “for the protection of savings banks in the colony”, which seems to 
have arisen from a realization of the danger of relying on one man (Gilles) 
for the investment of the bank's funds. Temporarily a guarantee from 
Archers Gilles & Co. to carry on the bank in the event of Gilles' death was 
accepted as an adequate safeguard.273 Within a year, however, Gilles was 
bankrupt, the firm was being wound up, and the bank received its funds 
back only because William Archer, Gilles' partner, met the obligation out 
of his own pocket.274 The bank again raised the matter with the governor, 
sending its secretary and then a deputation to Hobart,275 the upshot being a 
conference with the governor on his visit to Launceston in April 1844 at 
which the governor invited the bank trustees to draft a bill.276 After due 
consideration the draft of such a bill was forwarded, based upon the British 
act (9 Geo. IV, c. 92) and on the legislation in New South Wales. In 
particular the bank expressed its approval of the investing of savings bank 
funds in mortgages and government securities, and the prohibition of bill 
discounting.277  
   Meanwhile the bank's fears were sharpened, for Gilles' bankruptcy was 
followed by that of Isaac Sherwin the manager and of Henry Dowling, his 
successor. The Cornwall Chronicle seized the opportunity to attack the 
management of the bank, stressing that Dowling was insolvent when 
appointed, and paid only 2s. in the pound, that accounts were published in 
an abbreviated form and without any certificate of accuracy.278 The bank 
was therefore relieved when it seemed that its “numerous and persevering 
applications”279 were to bear fruit. The governor announced the 
introduction of a savings bank bill, forwarded a draft to the two savings 
banks for their views, and appointed a committee to hear evidence on the 
subject.280 But the bill was not the bill which the Launceston Bank had 
drafted; this one appeared to be designed less to assist the savings banks 
than to protect the trading banks from their competition. Registration of a 
savings bank under the act was to be voluntary, but conferred certain 
benefits and protections. The rules of such a bank acquired legal standing; 
it was entitled to refuse deposits if the owner had an account in another 
savings bank; repayments to a married woman were to be valid; notice of 
withdrawals could be demanded, and, of course, the bank acquired prestige 
by registration. But the restrictions proposed were onerous. Loans, by 
discount or mortgage, could not exceed £500 to any one individual (the 
Launceston Bank had lent four times as much and its average mortgage 
loan since 1844 had always been significantly greater), and the rate of 
interest charged was never to be less than 6 per cent. Individual deposits 
were limited, charitable organizations' to £300 and private persons' to £150 
(or £200 if there was £50 accumulated interest). Moreover the governor 
was empowered to limit the proportion of funds which might be lent. The 
Launceston Examiner selected for special attack the restriction on any 
individual having an account in more than one savings bank; the restriction 
of decisions on loans to the quarterly meetings of trustees; and the 
expensive legal processes for borrowers.281 These rules might appeal to the 
trading banks which were being forced to reduce interest rates, but the 
savings banks opposed the bill and it was withdrawn. Negotiations dragged 
on until a new draft was produced in August 1848 from which the more 
objectionable features were removed.  
   In this latter phase the active part fell to the newly formed Hobart bank, 
which had been very critical of the early draft and, when it appeared that 
the governor would nevertheless go ahead, had successfully enlisted the aid 
of Swanston to oppose the bill.282 But Walker wanted an act, in acceptable 
terms, and the question was persistently raised.283 In the end it was Walker's 
draft, as revised by the bank solicitors, which was substituted for the 
original proposals.284 The obligation to publish half-yearly accounts and the 
limitation on private persons' deposits were retained, but investments by 
way of discount were prohibited. One-tenth of profits was to be set aside 
until the reserve reached a quarter of deposits. But the fixing of interest 
rates and the allocation of loans were left to the discretion of managers.285 
In this form the bill was passed without serious discussion and both the 
Launceston and Hobart banks registered under its provisions.286 The 
formative period of Tasmanian savings banking had ended.  
South Australia 
   A plan for a savings bank within the Bank of South Australia was early 
part of the proposals of the South Australian Company. J. H. Fisher as 
resident commissioner was urged in 1837 to consider it: “The economical 
institution which seems best calculated to promote habits of frugality and 
industry and to bind the working classes to the colony by the ties of interest 
is a savings bank, founded on the principle that no deposits shall be 
withdrawn except in cases of death until after a residence of some fixed 
period, say three years, in the colony.” Compulsory deductions of 2s. per 
week from the wages of government labourers were suggested.287  
   But Fisher was already having trouble with government labourers who 
were hostile to payment in company notes which the company store, as 
well as others, would not always accept.288 He could scarcely have 
welcomed a proposal to add fuel to the fire when in any case the 
organization of such a bank would have been difficult. Nor did Gawler, 
who was advised in identical words (without the deductions clause), do 
anything effective.289 However, in London the company instructed its 
Adelaide bank manager to institute a savings department, receiving “the 
smallest deposits” and paying 5 per cent interest on sums in excess of £1.290 
What steps the bank took is not clear from its surviving records, but they 
came to little although the London board assumed that the instructions had 
been implemented,291 and was still confused in 1842 and 1843, the Reports 
for those years including statistical tables for the South Australian Savings 
Bank as if the company had special interests in it.292 Probably the bank saw 
no reason for any provision other than the acceptance of ordinary interest-
bearing deposits, or did not want the trouble of small accounts; at all events 
no savings bank appeared until 1841 and then without formal connection 
with either the company or the bank.293  
   The origin of the plan which bore fruit is obscure but the first overt move 
was a public meeting, on 21 January 1841 with the mayor presiding, which 
resolved to form a savings bank. The South Australian Assurance 
Company (which was accepting ordinary deposits at interest)294 had 
indicated its willingness to manage the funds of a savings bank and in a 
burst of enthusiasm the meeting nominated the governor patron, six vice-
patrons and no less than 101 “directors”.295 However, second thoughts 
prevailed and a less unwieldy organization was adopted; the Assurance 
Company connection was dropped, an approach being made to the Banks 
of South Australia and Australasia to see if they would give interest on a 
lump-sum deposit; and a committee commenced to draft rules.296  
   The Rules297 declared “that the transactions of the South Australian 
Savings Bank be limited to the safe custody and increase of small savings 
belonging to tradespeople, mechanics, servants, labourers and other 
industrious persons of either sex and for the most advantageous investment 
of the same in such manner as the directors, or a quorum thereof, may 
consider most beneficial, consistent with the due security of the monies 
deposited”. Control was vested in a General Board of Management, 
consisting of a president, two vice-presidents, five trustees, twelve country 
and forty town directors; commonsense dictated a quorum of seven. 
Deposits from a shilling were acceptable. Interest, at the rate of 7 per cent 
reckoned monthly (from the first of the month), was payable on all whole 
pounds to a maximum of £250. Withdrawals required one month's notice.298  
   Under these Rules, applicable throughout its life, the bank opened in 
early March299 and by its first monthly meeting in April had received £130 
from 34 depositors. From then on, with minor fluctuations, both number 
and amount of deposits grew steadily but slowly; the average deposit 
tended to increase but was never large, usually being from £6 to £9.300 
Presently a small branch was opened at Port Adelaide (10 May 1844), 
deposits being received and sent to head office under the guard of a 
mounted trooper thoughtfully provided by the governor; withdrawal 
required attendance at head office.301 
 
   As with other colonial savings banks the great problem was how to invest 
funds to earn interest for depositors. The Rules were vague, prescribing 
investment “upon mortgage or other sufficient security”. But the sums 
received were too small for this type of loan to be safe, nor, if adequate 
reserves were held, profitable. Accordingly arrangements were made for 
deposit in the two trading banks, the South Australia taking the initiative in 
refusing henceforth to pay interest on deposits below £5; the change was 
explained as intended to help the savings bank302 which it did by 
discouraging direct deposit in the trading banks, but it also helped those 
banks by relieving them of the expense of keeping small accounts for 
which, in effect, a block-deposit by the savings bank was substituted.  
   The terms of the bargain with the two trading banks have not survived, 
but later discussions imply that 7 per cent interest was paid, which left no 
margin for incidental expenses.303 Each bank was given roughly half of the 
total funds and the savings bank was able to maintain its payment of 7 per 
cent until 1844, although it must have been a precarious balance, made 
tolerable only by determining interest at the end of each year of operations, 
despite the promise of the Rules.304  
   But as downward trends in general interest rates continued, the manager 
of the Bank of South Australia sought the agreement of the Australasia in 
reducing the rate paid to the savings bank. It was decided that from 1 
March 1844 terms should be 21/2 per cent on the daily balance of a current 
account, with 5 per cent on deposits for three months, the latter being 
treated as current account if drawn earlier.305 Accordingly the savings bank 
warned depositors that interest would in future be lower,306 being fixed at 4 
per cent.307 For a year the situation was stabilized—in each trading bank 
£250 on fixed deposit and a comfortable reserve against repayments in the 
form of current accounts.308 This was favoured treatment compared with 
ordinary depositors who received 4 per cent on three months deposits and 2 
per cent on the daily balance of current accounts.309  
   The same problem recurred, however, in April 1845. From June 1844 
ordinary depositors had received no interest on current accounts from 
either trading bank310 and in March 1845 the rate on three months deposits 
fell to 2 per cent.311 A deputation waited on the governor who was 
sympathetic to a request that he bring forward a special act, while the 
trading banks undertook to continue the former contract as to interest until 
30 June by which time the act would have been in operation.312 The project 
for an act was dropped, a profitable if temporary solution having been 
found in the purchase of £500 of 5 per cent government debentures at 10 
per cent discount, which permitted continuance of 4 per cent interest to 
depositors.313 
 
   But a year later the debentures were paid off and the savings bank found 
itself getting only 3 per cent from the Bank of South Australia (and that by 
special generosity) which it had to supplement from its reserve in order to 
pay depositors 4 per cent.314 In this unhappy fashion matters stood until the 
end of the business year in March 1847. Total deposits were then £1,102 
plus £75 “surplus”, the whole being held, without interest, in the Bank of 
South Australia. Depositors were warned that no interest would be paid 
after 1 May and a scheme for lending two-thirds of the funds on mortgages 
was put forward but, as there was doubt about the personal liability of 
trustees and directors, the governor was again besought to provide for 
“remodelling” by legislation.315 The governor again promised aid, but in the 
event legislation provided not for “remodelling” but for a completely new 
bank, and the old was, when this became known, wound up at the end of 
1847, three months before the new Savings Bank of South Australia 
opened.316  
   The bill to establish the new bank had a rapid and uneventful passage. 
Standing orders were suspended to permit first and second readings at one 
meeting, amendments to fix the minimum deposit at one shilling and the 
maximum at one time at £30, and to permit funds to be deposited in any 
trading bank, were readily accepted, and the bill passed the next day.317 Its 
terms reflect the experience of 1841–47. Organization was simplified: the 
governor (who became president) appointed twelve trustees of whom five 
were a quorum. Deposits were to be accepted from 1s., interest, reckoned 
monthly on whole pounds to a maximum of £200, being determined 
retrospectively by way of dividend.318 Interest was payable only if deposit 
were maintained to the end of the year. (This applied to the whole deposit; 
withdrawal of portion carried no such penalty.) Withdrawals required 
notice, one month for amounts under £50 and three months for more than 
£50. There were rather complicated provisions by which declining 
proportions of profits were to go to build up a “Rest or Security Fund” 
until this equalled one-quarter of deposits at which level it should remain. 
Further security was provided by requiring all receipts to be in the first 
instance lodged in a local bank, and by permitting the governor to 
guarantee loans up to £5,000 to meet repayments. Investments were to be 
by way of mortgage, not more than £500 to any one borrower.  
   The trustees proceeded to formulate rules, largely duplicating the 
provisions of the act, and were ready to open on 11 March 1848.319 Almost 
immediately, however, they faced a problem which was to bother them for 
several years until they learned to trust their accountant. Requiring notice 
for any withdrawals involved hardship, and accordingly the trustee on duty 
was supplied with £20 to pay out, at his discretion, in “cases of sickness, 
accidents and other unforeseen circumstances”.320 This “Emergency Fund” 
was almost immediately amended to £50, not more being available in one 
month,321 and, as experience brought confidence, was raised to £150 which, 
as monthly withdrawals were usually less than this, meant that all ordinary 
repayments could be without notice.322 As business grew it was further 
increased, first to £200323 and eventually in 1851 the practice was adopted 
of determining each month a “Repayment Fund” from which withdrawals 
should be met. The sum was fixed in the light of recent experience to cover 
all probable demands (£1,200 for May, £1,500 for November); in other 
words, for all “normal” repayments the requirement of notice was 
abandoned.324  
   The problem of investing funds presented few of the difficulties which 
had beset the bank's predecessor. The intention was to lend, by way of 
mortgage, an amount equal to two-thirds of deposits, other funds being 
held with one of the local trading banks, although it was naturally 
impossible to keep rigidly to these proportions. Initially the Bank of 
Australasia was selected,325 but the Bank of South Australia offering better 
terms (no interest was being earned) the account was closed, all funds 
being transferred to the latter bank. Two accounts were opened, a six 
months' deposit at 3 per cent and a current account.326  
   The first offer of money on mortgage was made in May 1848, £500 at 10 
per cent; the loan was to be for twelve months certain, thereafter subject to 
six months' notice on either side,327 later reduced to three months.328 On 
these terms the business continued satisfactorily with the trustees, as 
frequent entries in the “Minutes” show, acting as unpaid inspectors to see 
that mortgaged properties were regularly painted and repaired.  
   Meanwhile revision of the act was being proposed from two quarters. 
Inevitably, in due course, there was a report from Mr Tidd Pratt and, of 
course, he objected. His targets were four: the position of the governor as 
president and nominator of the trustees made the bank appear a 
government one; since the governor could be called on to guarantee loans 
up to £5,000 total mortgage loans ought to be limited to that sum; profit-
sharing was objectionable; and proceeds of intestate and insolvent estates 
should not be deposited in the bank. Perhaps the Colonial Office had less 
confidence in him; at least Grey forwarded the report for “information and 
guidance” only and royal assent to the act of 1847 was not withheld.329  
   The trustees were asked to comment and their report indicates that they 
were unimpressed. Tidd Pratt's first point was disposed of by reiterating it: 
of course the bank was “essentially a government institution”. Sections 12 
and 13 required the trustees to invest two-thirds of funds in mortgages, so 
limitation to £5,000 was nonsense.330 They were the less disposed to pay 
much regard to the views of a distant barrister since they had, a year 
before, reviewed their act carefully and secured amendments.  
   Their proposals were: the maximum deposit at one time should be £60, 
not £30; Friendly Societies should be admitted as depositors; and the 
clause permitting the governor to guarantee loans should be clarified to 
ensure that the trustees had power to raise such loans.331 A new act met 
their wishes,332 and the bank settled down to prosperous expansion enabling 
it to pay depositors, after a cautious 3 per cent in 1848, a steady 5 per cent 
dividend.  
Western Australia 
   Within the period studied the Western Australian story is one of half-
hearted attempts which came to nothing. When in 1837 the Bank of 
Western Australia was promoted, it was proposed to offer “to the mechanic 
and labourer all the advantages of a savings bank”,333 but when deposits 
were invited the terms were not advertised, prospective depositors having 
to call to inquire.334 Interest was 5 per cent,335 but other conditions are 
unknown although probably the same as those advertised in 1840.  
   These were that one month's notice of withdrawal be given, and that no 
interest was payable on amounts under £5.336 Country agents, ten of them, 
were established at this time to receive deposits for transmission to Perth,337 
and the bank advertised that “a regulation has been in existence for some 
time past” for payment of interest on deposits.338 Whether this referred to 
deposits in general or to savings deposits is not clear; but interest of any 
sort was so little known that the Inquirer339 assumed that a savings 
department had just been created. What is clear is that deposits under the 
scheme had been negligible, if there had been any at all.  
   There was little opportunity of testing the effect of publicity and country 
agencies, for by April 1841 the bank was being wound up in favour of the 
branch of the Bank of Australasia.340 However, dissident shareholders 
promoted the Western Australian Bank, which incorporated a savings 
department; they did not make the terms more but less enticing. Interest at 
5 per cent was payable on amounts not less than £5 nor more than £500, 
provided deposits were left undisturbed for six months; withdrawal was 
possible at any time, but if made in less than six months involved loss of 
all interest.341 It does not appear that the device of country agents was 
adopted.  
   In these circumstances it is not surprising that no deposits by individuals 
were recorded. They may have been made on a small scale; the returns do 
not distinguish interest-bearing deposits until 1848, but then a mere £150 
was recorded, all “being funds of charitable institutions”.342 It is likely too 
that ordinary interest-bearing deposits were more attractive in the early 
'forties. There is no information on these for the Western Australian Bank, 
but it probably met the competition of the Bank of Australasia which had 
interest-bearing deposits of small but increasing relative importance, 
although on what terms was never announced. But when the Australasia 
withdrew in 1845 there was no need to compete. Plans for promoting 
saving by the thrifty labourer are heard no more until after transportation of 
convicts commenced and then it was a government plan, with little more 
success. An act of 1855 “for the encouragement, safe custody and increase 
of small savings in Western Australia”343 provided for a bank to be 
managed by the Treasurer, but the response being disappointing, it was 
repealed the following year.344 Not till 1863 was a savings bank finally 
established, and then as a Post Office Savings Bank.345  
   Apart from the experiments of the Rev. Joseph Smith at Wendover in 
1799 and of Priscilla Wakefield at Tottenham a year earlier, it is usually 
taken that the first savings bank was the Parish Friendly Society at 
Ruthwell in 1810. The Australian history of savings banking therefore 
begins very early, in 1819, only a year or two after France and U.S.A.; it 
was, however, no accident, for in the years between those two dates 
savings banks had spread rapidly in England and had given rise to an 
extensive pamphlet literature, particularly in 1816, and there the inspiration 
of the Australian innovator, Barron Field, may be looked for.346  
   There was, however, no slavish copying, leaving aside the origins in the 
case of New South Wales and Tasmania, in plans for combining convict 
discipline and financial provision for emancipists' rehabilitation. The same 
motives as in Europe appeared—the paternal desire to promote thrift 
among the poor—but it was genuinely local, springing from sincere, if not 
always attractive, feeling on the subject. The differences from practice 
elsewhere are in any case more striking than the similarities.  
   In spite of the diversity of form and organization of early Australian 
savings banks they have certain fundamental likenesses, and they are alike 
in just those matters in which they differed from the British model. One of 
these is the large part played by governments. The banks for convicts in 
New South Wales and Tasmania were in private hands but owed their 
creation to government initiative and were under government supervision. 
The later savings banks of New South Wales and Port Phillip were entirely 
government institutions, in spite of their arrays of trustees. In Western 
Australia no private experiment succeeded and a savings bank had to await 
government action, just as in South Australia goodwill on the part of the 
government failed to make the first bank live, and success waited on 
positive action. Tasmania is a partial exception, but only partial; both the 
Launceston and Hobart Banks had government patronage from the 
beginning and specific aid in many ways. By contrast the English approach 
was to leave private initiative to operate within a very general legislative 
framework.  
   There was novelty too in the modes of investment adopted. The colonies 
did not offer much scope for the traditional savings bank asset—a gilt-
edged security at modest interest. In Britain government loans were 
available; in Australia they were not, until 1849, apart from a short-term 
issue of debentures in New South Wales in the early 'forties, and then only 
in that colony. The first solution was to arrange, if possible, for deposit in a 
trading bank at interest; the 1819 expedient in New South Wales of deposit 
with Robert Campbell is in substance the same. But this was not always 
possible, and after 1844 no interest was to be had on deposits in any of the 
colonies; even before that it was less profitable than other forms of lending 
and not much less risky. So at a time when mortgage loans were regarded 
as a sign of doubtful practice by a trading bank, mortgage lending came to 
be the chief way in which, in New South Wales, Tasmania, Port Phillip and 
South Australia, the savings banks earned an income. The bank in New 
South Wales, in also discounting bills, was, on its investment side, little 
different from a trading bank.  
   Moreover, the English model was not followed in the general adoption of 
branches. In England the practice was, and long continued to be, the 
formation of small local institutions. In Australia the localized savings 
bank outside the metropolis—Longford, Port Stephens, Campbell Town—
did not survive for much the same reason as, with trading banks, unit banks 
on the English provincial model lost to branch banking. As settlement 
expanded no country centre was large enough to maintain its own savings 
bank, the less so because there was already one in the metropolis and 
government participation in its activities provided the focus for efforts to 
secure a branch. Port Phillip appears to be an exception, but it was 
originally planned as a branch and would have been one but for the 
difficulties of communication.347 When the newly independent Victoria in 
1853 copied England in creating a unit system, it was as conscious and 
deliberate copying, not because of local need.348 Tasmania is not even an 
apparent exception since it has always been a two-metropolis island, while 
even Western Australia with its abortive experiment of country collecting 
agents illustrates the general trend, and in spite of its smallness the first 
South Australian savings bank achieved one tiny branch.  
   The difficulty of finding profitable investments explains another novelty, 
the general but not complete adoption of a system of profit-sharing rather 
than the payment to depositors of interest fixed in advance. The uncertainty 
could not have added to the attractions of deposit in a savings bank. Apart 
from the blandishments of the publican of which the moralists made so 
much, until 1844 trading bank interest was high enough to compete even 
for small deposits. When there are added the general adoption of a low 
maximum deposit and the requirement of substantial notice of withdrawal, 
itself dictated by the nature of the banks' investments, if there is any cause 
for surprise in the early history of Australian savings banks it is their 
success. Moralizing governors and paternal public-spirited citizens could 
justifiably claim that success as evidence that in fostering “habits of 
frugality and economy in the lower orders” they were, according to their 
standards, meeting a social need.  
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Van Diemen's Land Almanac 1832, p. 216. Interest was reckoned monthly on the 
whole pounds. 
207 Hobart Town Almanac, 1838, p. 41. 
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210 Hobart Town Courier, 31 October 1834. 
211 Swanston to Hamilton, 23 October 1834, “Swanston Letter Book”, 1831–8. 
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255 Ibid., 5 May 1845. Rate was raised to 7 per cent, ibid., 4 June 1845, in the hope 
of paying depositors 4 per cent. 
256 Funds had been deposited in Bank of V.D.L. (“Minutes”, 3 March 1845) and 
then in addition in the Commercial and Union which offered 3 per cent on the 
current balance (ibid., 30 June, 1 September 1845). 
257 “Minutes”, 4 October 1845, 9 March 1846. 
258 “Minutes”, 12 May, 2 June 1847 record an isolated six months' deposit of 
£1,000 at 3 per cent with the Bank of V.D.L., and 31 May 1852 a venture in foreign 
exchange which was not proceeded with. This was inspired by the offer of “deposits 
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cent compared with 7 per cent by the bank. 
295 South Australian Register, 23 January 1841. The Register's claim that it all 
started with its leader of 16 January is implausible; probably discussions were 
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Depositors Number Amount
Labourers and artisans 29 £190
Female domestics 3 82
Infants 17 45
Institutions 8 229
Others 2 25
TOTALS 59 £571
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334 Perth Gazette, 26 August 1837. 
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337 Ibid. 
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339 Ibid. 
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341 Ibid., 8 May 1841. 
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343 18 Vic., No. 3, 12 April 1855. 
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Chapter 13 The Foreign Exchange Market 
   TO speak of a foreign exchange market before the abolition of the dollar 
experiment at the beginning of 1826 is, except for the operations of the 
Commissariat, to impose on a miscellaneous collection of minor 
transactions a concept of order and system which they do not justify. Both 
those transactions and the Commissariat's activities were closely 
intertwined with domestic affairs and they have accordingly been so 
presented here. But the defeat of the dollar system and the implementing of 
British policy on a sterling-exchange standard mark the point at which the 
beginnings of an organized exchange market can be recognized.  
The Emergence of a Market Outside the Commissariat 
   As has been seen, with the introduction of the “dollar system”, from late 
1822 in both New South Wales and Tasmania bills on the British Treasury 
were sold by public tender.1 Offers were invited every few months2 until 
the conversion to “sterling”, which was accompanied by British 
instructions that bills were to be sold at the fixed rate of 3 per cent 
premium. Adoption of the new rate in New South Wales was prompt, 
becoming effective from the beginning of 1826,3 but in Tasmania because 
of shortage of British coin—which the English instructions had recognized 
as a reason for discretionary delay—there was a postponement of a few 
months.4 At first the minimum amount of a bill was £100, but this was 
inconvenient to purchasers and therefore interfered with the 
Commissariat's supply of coin, and the British Treasury agreed that bills 
might be drawn for any convenient smaller sum.5  
   The premium was, however, too high and by 1828 it was reduced to 11/2 
per cent, at which level it remained unchanged for eight years.6 An 
important factor in this reduction was the growth of an active market in 
bills of exchange other than bills on the Treasury. In small casual amounts 
these had, of course, been available since the foundation of the colony, but 
in the mid-'twenties with a modest but increasing volume of exports, 
especially wool, and a rising inflow of capital, the market in private bills 
became of some importance. For the most part dealings were private and 
have left no record. But there were recurrent advertisements of bills offered 
for sale by the Australian Agricultural Company,7 the Wesleyan 
Missionary Society,8 the Van Diemen's Land Company9 and others10 in 
both New South Wales and Tasmania, mainly bills on England, but 
occasionally on other places such as India.11 Less frequent were 
advertisements seeking bills to buy—evidently buyers sought out 
recognized sellers.12  
   The nature of these advertisements points to the failure of the banks and 
other firms to organize an effective middleman service. As early as 1829 
the first specialist made a brief appearance, Matthew Gregson, who 
described himself as a “broker”,13 acting as bill and discount broker and 
negotiator of loans,14 and presently stockbroker, dealing, with the approval 
of the Banks of New South Wales and Australia, in their shares and those 
of the Australian Agricultural Company.15 He did not survive the slump, 
and was insolvent a year later.16  
   The original rules of the Bank of New South Wales foreshadowed a 
limited sort of dealing in Treasury bills: “persons possessing Store 
Receipts or Government bills on the Treasury may receive the notes of the 
Bank in exchange for them without any charge or deduction—the said 
Store Receipts and bills on the Treasury being deemed to all intents and 
purposes Cash—or they may deposit such Receipts or bills as cash . . . ”17 
But the stress on the equivalence to cash reflected the real situation. They 
were as good as cash—better than most other forms of cash available to the 
Bank—and the rule expresses the fact that the Bank had to take them, not 
only to secure “cash” but also because they were the principal form of 
money which depositors had to offer. Having taken them, the Bank could 
either pay them out or resell to those seeking foreign exchange. But the 
latter type of business was not actively promoted. In August 1817 what 
was apparently the first application for a Treasury bill led to a 
determination of principle—that the Bank's notes would be paid in dollars 
or Store receipts, and that Treasury bills would be sold for dollars or Store 
receipts at 21/2 per cent premium,18 modified a fortnight later to a premium 
varying from 1 per cent to 2 per cent according to the due date of the Store 
receipts, and again the following year to a flat rate of 1 per cent 
irrespective of term.19 These arrangements might be regarded as a crude 
form of forward exchange, but the Bank clearly saw them as purely local 
transactions dictated by the peculiar forms of local money.  
   Exchange business as such was in fact discouraged. In the beginning bills 
of the Van Diemen's Land Commissariat were only taken by the Bank if 
payable in Sydney,20 and private bills payable in Van Diemen's Land were 
especially mentioned in a rule of 1819 that “no bills whereof the payor is 
not resident at Sydney or this part of the Territory shall be discounted”.21 
When Russian ships visited Sydney in 1820, ducats brought by them were 
exchanged only as a special favour to Robert Campbell, and then after 
clumsy calculations of fair value—a special difficulty being that the Bank 
would probably itself have to ship the coins to London.22 The Bank 
occasionally bought private bills, but this was rare.23 
 
   That the Bank was merely arranging its “cash” holdings in the light of 
local forms of money is shown by the way it adjusted itself to 
Commissariat policy. When Drennan issued his notes in place of Store 
receipts, the Bank accepted them, but resolved not to pay them out, 
preferring to lose interest by holding them for consolidation in order to 
limit competition with their own notes.24 When the dollar was adopted by 
the Commissariat, the Bank accepted it, though not until its local valuation 
had been defined, but then determined to adopt dollars as their basic form 
of cash.25  
   It is true that in 1818 the Bank formally declared its desire to develop 
exchange business:  
   Resolved that it being within the objects contemplated in the 
establishment of the Bank of New South Wales that it should transact 
money concerns of whatever nature, and it appearing that the acting as 
money agents for merchants or others residing in Van Diemen's Land or 
any foreign ports, would be productive of benefit to the public and of 
advantage to this establishment. It is resolved that the Bank will receive 
deposits of approved bills drawn by the Commissariat in Van Diemen's 
Land on the Commissariat at Sydney, and of Store Receipts, and remit the 
amount in consolidations according to order, to whatever persons or places 
their instructions shall direct.26  
   But the minimum amount was limited to £100 and the commission 
chargeable was left undecided. There were occasional references to “when 
consolidations are required”;27 the Bank sometimes tendered for modest 
amounts of Treasury bills,28 but in 1825 resolved on “discontinuing all 
tenders for bills on the Treasury except for the discharge of sterling claims 
on the Bank”.29 Broadly, the Bank was content to leave foreign exchange to 
the Commissariat and to the merchants.  
   Moves by the Bank of New South Wales, the Bank of Australia and 
Cooper & Levey to arrange London agencies were primarily schemes for 
raising capital, with slight reference to exchange business as an incidental 
corollary, and came to little. That by the Bank of New South Wales was 
never more than a wild clutching at straws in its crisis of May 1826. This 
involved a proposal for a loan of £50,000 from some London agent. In 
anticipation of finding such an agent, bills were to be drawn against the 
hypothetical loan and sold for the urgently needed dollars. Not even 
Sydney could take this seriously, and the scheme was stillborn.30  
   More formal success attended, two years later, John Macarthur's plan 
adopted by the Bank of Australia for a London agency, but the success was 
formal only. The main purpose was to secure additional capital (the 
Monitor uncharitably said it was to rescue the Bank from the results of 
excessive lending), as shown by resolutions carried in March 1828. It was 
declared “that to enable this institution to promote the interests of the 
landed, commercial, trading and other interests of this rising community, it 
is expedient a connection should be formed with one or more banking 
houses in London, for the purpose of establishing a credit, by means of 
which it may extend its accommodations to the public in general”, and to 
this end James Macarthur, then about to leave for England, was authorized 
to open London accounts for the Bank and “to treat with one or more 
banking houses, and to engage with it, or them, for advances not exceeding 
£30,000, whenever this institution may require such accommodation”. 
Although the possibility of using the arrangement to facilitate capital 
transfer to Australia by individuals in England was mentioned, only 
migrants were considered, and then only as incidental to the raising of 
additional funds for the Bank.31  
   An agency was established with Herries, Farquahar & Co. but there is 
nothing to suggest that the firm was prepared to advance the £30,000; in 
London the stress was on the opportunity to remit to Sydney by means of 
bills or letters of credit on the Bank of Australia,32 and even for this type of 
business the complete lack of subsequent references implies that it was, at 
best, on a negligible scale. In 1834 the Bank had an inactive credit balance 
of £9 with the London agents, but thereafter the connection seems either to 
have been abandoned or to have been purely nominal.33 Martin's semi-
official Statistics of the Colonies of the British Empire (1839) declared34 
that the Bank “affords no facilities for remittances to Europe or 
elsewhere”, which would have been offered if there had been transactions 
in the reverse direction. The silence of all other sources confirms the 
conclusion that the Bank at no time sought exchange business as such, and 
the account, opened with a view to a loan which was not forthcoming, was 
allowed to languish.  
   The plan of Cooper & Levey, which was earlier in date and more 
ambitious, and probably inspired Macarthur's scheme, had, for a different 
reason, even less result. Solomon Levey went to London aiming at a loan 
of £50,000 to £100,000, again not primarily as an instrument for exchange 
business, but as a source of capital for permanent local investment.35 There 
he became involved in Peel's scheme for the Swan River settlement and 
directed his energies to raising capital for that purpose rather than for the 
Sydney firm.36 No more is heard of Cooper & Levey's plan.  
   Of the colonial banks only one succeeded in developing a substantial 
exchange business before the 'forties. The exception is the Derwent whose 
activities are chronicled elsewhere,37 and it was truly exceptional, the result 
of the aggressive methods of Swanston, coupled with his extensive 
interests as import and investment agent which involved him in continuous 
exchange dealings. The other colonial banks were not active in the field 
because they did not want to be, although they acquiesced in, rather than 
sought, middleman transactions in Treasury and private bills and overseas 
currencies. But these were simply casual purchases from local holders, and 
sales to local buyers; the evidence shows clearly that the same sort of 
transfer was achieved as readily and more extensively through ad hoc 
advertisements in the press by holders and buyers. The colonial banks were 
prepared to leave exchange business to this outside market and the 
Commissariat, until competition changed their views. This inertia was 
another manifestation of their preference, until the belligerent competition 
of the 'thirties, for safeguarding their limited local business rather than 
promoting its expansion; even then it was not until the 'forties that they 
sought to break into the exchange market then dominated by the English 
banks. In the 'twenties emigrants found in England few agencies to handle 
the transfer of capital, and were driven to shipping it in goods for sale, to 
carrying specie with them, to buying dubious bills on colonial merchants, 
or to making deposits with English firms and individuals to be drawn 
against after they landed in the colonies. Had the colonial banks moved 
then, they might have drawn the main exchange business into their hands, 
and might perhaps have discouraged the English bank formations; in the 
event, when capital inflow rose to its greatest heights in the 'thirties the 
“Anglos” were in business and had the great advantage of being in London. 
As sellers of sterling in the colonies they had at their disposal not only their 
own capital awaiting transfer, but the much greater sums remitted through 
them by investors and emigrants; the colonial banks could only look to the 
small share of export bills which they might obtain in unequal competition. 
Disregard of opportunities in the 'twenties meant exclusion from the 
greater exchange opportunities of the 'thirties.  
The Working of a Fixed Commissariat Exchange Rate 
   The policy of a fixed rate on bills on the Treasury contained a latent 
contradiction which soon created difficulty. The fixed rate was designed to 
establish and maintain, in effect, a sterling exchange standard, but this 
could only succeed if the Commissariat were prepared to sell bills at the 
fixed rate without limit, or, alternatively, to be content with whatever 
amount it could sell at that rate.38 Yet the volume of bills which the 
Commissariat needed to sell was conditioned by totally unrelated factors—
the cost of the convict establishment and associated items. As it happened, 
the rising volume of exports and the expanding stream of capital inflow 
raised the issue in the second form of a demand for bills at the fixed rate 
which was chronically deficient. This situation appeared immediately after 
the 1826 rate of 103 was implemented, and led to the adoption of a rate of 
1011/2, the Treasury cautiously admitting “having reason to believe that 
from many stations the money [British coin] can be returned at a less 
charge than 3 per cent”.39 The “many stations” were no doubt nearer 
England than those in Australia, for there is no evidence of any large re-
export of British coin; so far as Australia was concerned the effect was 
shown rather in the rapid export of dollars, in a premium on private bills, 
and inadequate demand for Treasury bills. For colonies nearer England the 
103 rate no doubt did mean export of British coin. The new rate of 1011/2, 
however it may have suited other colonies, was nearer the market rate for 
Australian colonies, and for several years sufficed. A study of detailed 
Commissariat records would probably show some unauthorized rationing 
of buyers of bills; in Tasmania it occurred, as was seen earlier, in the 
preferential arrangement made with the Derwent Bank.  
   In Tasmania this was apparently sufficient to adjust demand at the fixed 
rate to Commissariat needs, when supplemented by Treasury shipments of 
coin to the Commissariat there. But in New South Wales, with its more 
rapidly increasing exports and greater capital inflow, the lower rate soon 
ceased to attract enough buyers, even allowing for direct shipments of coin 
which obviated, to that extent, the need to sell bills. By 1830 private bills 
could be had more cheaply than Treasury bills, the Bluebook for that year 
reporting “Bills of private individuals of undoubted credit are generally 
negotiated at par; if otherwise, at a discount varying from one to five per 
cent”.40 There was, in short, a two-part market with divergent rates which 
were maintained only because the rate in the Commissariat part was fixed 
at the higher level, while the more attractive lower rate for private bills was 
for paper of very varying reliability. The best private bills were cheaper, 
but did not oust the Treasury bill because there were not enough of them; 
an uneasy equilibrium was being sustained by the reliable Treasury bill at a 
premium against the doubtful private bill at a discount. An increase in that 
discount, or a growth in good bills, would eat into the demand for 
Commissariat bills.  
   It is convenient at this point to comment upon the contemporary usage of 
“discount” and “premium”, the question being not the legitimacy of the 
usage but its interpretation. The normal mode of expression was so many 
per cent premium or discount on sterling. Thus if £100 sterling cost £102 
of local money, the rate was expressed as 2 per cent premium; if £99 local 
money, as 1 per cent discount.41 But, however formulated, these rates were 
not true exchange rates since they embodied a very substantial concealed 
interest charge. The buyer of a bill on England, whether from the 
Commissariat or a private source, had to look forward to a mail time to 
England which might be as short as three months but would more 
commonly be four; it might be as much as six. The standard usance of 
bills, Commissariat and private, was 30 days after sight,42 so that at least a 
month must be added to mail time. There was some uncertainty as to 
period, but as a rough rule the remitter of a bill had to reckon on loss of 
interest for six months as the most likely event. What rate of interest 
should be considered is not unambiguously indicated when the spread of 
local rates was so wide, and the difference between local and English rates 
was so great. Contemporary sources give no guide, since there is no 
discussion of the interest element in exchange rates, but the most plausible 
rate to apply would be the colonial minimum of 10 per cent per annum. To 
the indefiniteness of applying such a rate to a period which would often 
vary from four to six months must be added the complication that two 
alternative forms of remittance were available and one was used 
sufficiently to be taken for granted. This was the purchase of wool solely 
for the access to sterling which its sale produced,43 a method of remittance 
which also involved an interest charge for an uncertain period, together 
with freight charges and uncertainty as to selling price. The other lay in the 
local circulation of British coinage and the irregular but sustained modest 
flow of British banknotes brought by immigrants; this mode of remittance 
entailed costs for insurance, offset by the funds being immediately usable 
in England. `To these considerations must be added the wide variation in 
the reliability of drawers of bills and the substance of acceptors, neither of 
which, except in limited numbers of cases, could be accurately assessed by 
colonial bill buyers.  
   In these circumstances it is impossible to be dogmatic about the 
interpretation of contemporary rates of exchange. But as a rough and 
somewhat hazardous judgment, for a completely safe bill (e.g., 
Commissariat or English bank bills) a price of 95 may be taken as 
equivalent to par, the apparent discount being the allowance for interest, 
and any higher actual rate representing a true premium on sterling. On this 
basis sterling was at a modest premium throughout the whole period, 
which accords with a commonsense view of the contemporary situation, 
and makes sense of the frequent quotations of a modest “discount” on even 
the best private bills, and, at times on bills of the English banks and of the 
Commissariat.  
   These comments, however, do not alter the absolute difference between 
rates for Commissariat and private bills in New South Wales in the early 
'thirties, which developed because the Commissariat was charging too high 
a premium—of the order of 6 per cent rather than the nominal 11/2 per 
cent. For a year or two the conflict was threatened rather than actual. In 
1832 the Commissariat received fortuitous aid by repayment of a debt due 
from the Colonial Government.44 At times relief was sought by seeking 
tenders for supplies to be paid for in coin or in bills at the fixed rate, the 
Commissary having the choice,45 but this was evasion of the fixed rate 
rather than relief, since suppliers would adjust tender prices. About this 
time a gap in bill sales was filled by a loan of £10,000 from the Colonial 
Treasury.46 By 1834 this device had to be employed on a large scale and 
repeatedly. It was a fortunate coincidence that the capital inflow and 
growing exports which created the Commissariat's difficulty, also, mainly 
through the land buying which they promoted, swelled the idle balances of 
the local Treasury. It is surprising that the British government was slower 
to draw the moral that a greater share of expenditure might be charged to 
the local government. In the present context this first loan is noteworthy as 
initiating a long-used device for transferring imperial funds to Australia 
and colonial funds to Britain (at par),47 through the agency of the 
Commissariat and the two Treasuries, quite outside the ordinary exchange 
market.  
   For a brief period heavy imports from China and Mauritius, where the 
Treasury bill was virtually the only colonial bill known, produced a 
sufficient demand; during 1833 and the first half of 1834 £32,000 in coin 
was received by the Commissariat and a further £15,000 promised, in 
response to forecasts of further difficulty as exports increased. But by early 
1834 wool exporters were finding it difficult to sell bills privately and the 
Commissariat a few months later was forced to seek a further loan, this 
time of £50,000.48 The difficulty was thought to be merely seasonal but in 
1835 two further loans had to be raised, of £10,000 and £50,000.49 The 
colonists viewed this use of their money with mixed feelings. Bourke 
stressed one attitude, the fear that the alternative was a lower rate on 
Treasury bills and consequential depreciation of private bills of exporters; 
but there were other interests. The Council resolved50 that the attention of 
the British government be drawn to its obligations, and that in any case the 
bills given for this last loan should be sent home to the Colonial Agent-
General to be collected and the proceeds shipped as coin—with all costs 
borne by the British government.51  
   In Tasmania from 1832 the same forces produced the same basic 
contradiction, but the makeshift adjustments were of a different type, as 
has been seen in discussing the continued use of the dollar in the island. 
The Treasury bill was paid to suppliers, implying a concealed reduction in 
the exchange rate through higher nominal prices for supplies, and special 
local currency devices were tried.52  
   The solution adopted in England was to maintain the policy but to lower 
the fixed exchange rate. From February 1835 in New South Wales but not 
until August 1836 in Tasmania, Treasury bills were to be sold at par.53  
The Rise to Dominance of the Banks 
   Dealings in foreign exchange, and in exchange between Australian 
colonies, took a high place in the plans of the Bank of Australasia; such 
dealings were, of course, implicit in its structure, with a London office 
raising capital to be employed in more than one colony. But exchange 
business was promoted as a matter of policy, with the result that almost 
from its commencement the Bank dominated the exchange market in New 
South Wales and Tasmania, and as the path it blazed was followed by the 
Bank of South Australia and the Union Bank, and then by those colonial 
banks which survived the 1841 slump, the exchange market was 
transformed. The Commissariat took second place immediately and its 
fixed rate policy had to go; intermittently it withdrew from the market 
insofar as it contented itself with bulk sales of its bills to one or other of the 
English banks, although it remained an important seller of sterling 
throughout the period, and for most of the time appeared independently in 
the market. The full development of bank dominance was delayed by the 
appearance of the mortgage companies as large sellers of sterling, and the 
dominance was never complete since private buying and selling, and 
professional dealing by large merchants (forerunners of the pastoral 
companies) continued. Transfers between the colonial and British 
governments were, on the model of the loans already recorded to the 
Commissariat, ordinarily managed through it. But within ten years of the 
establishment of the Bank of Australasia the main bulk of exchange 
business and leadership in determination of rates had passed to the banks, 
with primacy held by the English banks, and that development was 
initiated by the Australasia.  
   The London office began the sale of bills on colonial branches, and 
invited emigrants' and investors' remittances, at the earliest possible date.54 
In each colony, as a branch was established, prominence was given in its 
publicity to the sale of bills on the London office, on other branches, and 
on the bank's agents at Calcutta, Bombay, Madras, Canton, the Cape, 
Batavia, Singapore and Mauritius.55 The business was not established 
without some inter-branch conflict, deriving partly from the inexperience 
of local directors, partly from the necessity of evolving some principle of 
co-ordinating the dealings of the various branches. Initially each branch 
had a “London cash account” in which its dealings were recorded 
separately, and the local directors determined rates of exchange. One 
source of possible trouble was revealed immediately, conflict of rates. The 
Hobart board reduced its selling rate on London from 102 to 101, with 
disturbance both to Launceston and Sydney branches. The Hobart selling 
rate on Sydney was similarly reduced, which was especially awkward 
because Commissariat bills were at 101 in Hobart and 100 in Sydney and 
arbitrage followed. Launceston protests failed and Kinnear in Sydney 
could not move Hobart, even though the consequent necessity for adopting 
101 at all branches meant a loss of profit and upset good relations with the 
Commissariat in Sydney.56 Kinnear abandoned, after further experience, 
attempts to maintain the same rates at the various branches, recognizing 
that local market conditions varied too rapidly. Each local board was given 
unfettered discretion, and arbitrage which might otherwise have occurred 
was forestalled by inter-branch transfers,57 although after the first four 
years marked divergences of rates were rare.  
   The other source of difficulty was the disposition of local boards to see 
the sale of bills on London as an inexhaustible source of capital for local 
investment, rather than as one side of a system of transactions which had 
no necessary connection with local investment. Launceston did not actively 
purchase private bills on London (or Sydney) until head office insisted that 
it must reduce its London cash account.58 The Sydney branch, being under 
the Inspector's eye, sought to buy private bills from the beginning,59 but 
London had on more than one occasion to protest at the drain on its 
resources.60 Purchases were restricted in general to bills accompanied by 
shipping documents for exports;61 it was not possible to enforce London 
instructions for a margin of 2 to 3 per cent between buying and selling 
rates.62  
   Kinnear was perhaps a little premature in claiming, after seven months' 
operation, that bank bills dominated the market and had eliminated the 
practice by which persons needing to remit to London toured the merchants 
just before a ship sailed.63 But he repeatedly stressed the necessity of the 
bank maintaining its activities, and in 1838 was claiming that, in Sydney at 
least, the bank had never refused to sell at its published rate, and was 
always ready to buy, at a price.64 But by that date it was already clear that 
the bank would have no monopoly.  
   The approach of the Bank of South Australia to exchange business 
followed naturally from the purposes of the parent company. It was a 
colonization company and therefore gave prominence to arrangements for 
the transfer of funds for migrants and other investors. They were invited to 
deposit funds in London against letters of credit or bills (at 30 days after 
sight) on Adelaide.65 Agents were appointed in St. Helena, the Cape, 
Madras, Calcutta, Bombay, Canton, Ceylon, Mauritius, as well as Sydney, 
Hobart and Launceston,66 while the sale of bills on London and purchases 
of local government and commercial bills, initially at a handsome discount, 
formed part of Adelaide business from the beginning.67  
   Sales by the Adelaide bank of bills on the London office soon reached 
levels which drew from the directors anguished demands for moderation. 
By 1840 instructions for restriction were being sent in a crescendo of 
emphasis, first in general terms, then for a limit of drawings to £1,000 to 
£2,000 per month in excess of Adelaide receipts, followed, as Stephens' 
enthusiasm for colonial development showed no sign of weakening, by a 
blunt direction: “Your remittances must be at least equal to your drafts . . . 
Distinctly understand that for some months to come no further capital can 
be supplied from home, and therefore only draw as you remit.”68 But the 
flow of drafts continued, forcing for the second time a call on capital in 
1841; “the Colonists,” complained the Board, “must think that the 
Company's funds are an exhaustless fountain and that money is only to be 
drawn for and it can be obtained.” Orders of the “most peremptory” were 
that drafts must be kept below remittances; “no more capital than is already 
in the Bank is to be employed, nor is one additional £1 to be drawn from 
England without express authority”.69 More effective than the underlinings 
of London was the result of the shortlived local slump in curtailing demand 
for sterling, and when after 1844 the mining boom brought revival, there 
was no lack of British investment funds to feed South Australian demands.  
   This initial insatiable demand for sterling, creating within the bank the 
same conflict of policy between local board and London directors as the 
Bank of Australasia had experienced in milder form, was easily explicable 
in a new colony. Migrants sought loans whether for “real” investment or 
land-price gambling, while on all sides the demand for goods, virtually all 
of which had to be imported, meant a ready sale for the bills whence were 
mainly derived the funds for lending. A parallel situation developed in 
South Australian government finance, even less controllable.  
   Hindmarsh, the first Governor, found himself with quite inadequate 
official funds for local payments, and even used his own money,70 while 
the second Governor, Gawler, was soon contemplating an apparently 
prosperous colony with a persistent deficit. “The third quarter's salaries are 
still due, the Treasury is absolutely empty, and public debts to a 
considerable amount have been incurred. Urgent demands are made for 
payment, and the credit of Government is therefore injuriously low. The 
Colony itself is most flourishing.”71 After a day's reflection, and 
remembering that against permitted annual drawings of £10,000 he had 
already drawn bills for £12,000, he decided to interpret his authority to 
depart from instructions in an emergency as covering the case, and he 
determined to meet salaries and other essential government expenditure by 
bills on the Colonization Commissioners.72 Having taken the plunge, he 
had few hesitations in drawing more and more as local demands for 
expenditure became more pressing, so that by April 1840 he was willing, 
on leaving Adelaide for a tour, to hand over to the Colonial Treasurer 
signed blank bills for £20,000.73  
   The Colonization Commissioners were forced by lack of funds to 
dishonour Gawler's bills, and he was unceremoniously superseded by Grey 
who found it impossible to avoid a like course. This is not the place to 
unravel the tangled threads of local public finance nor to trace the process 
by which the financial mess led to the taking over by the Crown of full 
responsibility for the colony, with the ultimate payment of the debts which 
were the occasion for these bills.74 The relevance of the episode in the 
present context is the addition to the exchange activities of the Banks of 
South Australia and Australasia of a substantial supply of sterling. It meant 
little however, for the structure of the exchange market, since the major 
part of the bills were initially sold to one or other of the banks, with some 
preference for the South Australia. For the unfortunate ultimate holders of 
Gawler's and Grey's bills loss and difficulty lay ahead; initially there was 
new fuel for the boom. In 1841 dishonour of Gawler's bills was the 
proximate cause of the shortlived financial crisis, but for the foreign 
exchange market the bills meant little more than a greater volume of 
business, and their dishonour a strengthening of the dominant position in 
the business of the two banks.  
   The Union Bank's appearance in the market calls for no special comment. 
With a structure and policy modelled on those of the Australasia, and 
working in the same localities, its activities were on the same lines, and, in 
fact, commonly in formal agreement with that bank.  
   The colonial banks were latecomers to the field, and only the 
Commercial of Sydney succeeded during the 'forties in competing 
seriously with the “Anglos”. The Derwent, as has been seen, was in 
difficulties from 1841 and during its eight years' decline was prevented 
from taking any initiative in exchange by the demands of its absentees for 
repayment. The Port Phillip discussed a London agency as early as 1840,75 
but did not succeed until shortly before the bank closed. The Commercial 
Bank of Sydney arranged a London agency in 1840 with the London Joint 
Stock Bank and another with the Commercial Bank of Scotland, offering, 
as bait to build up overseas funds, that migrants' funds deposited with these 
institutions would be transferred free of charge.76 Soon after it acted as 
agent for the Bank of New Zealand, selling in Sydney by tender bills on 
London drawn by various New Zealand settlers.77 It sought bills drawn 
against exports of wool, whale-oil and tallow78 and tried to make its own 
bills attractive by offering various usances79 , by such means steadily 
building up a secure place in the market, but one still subordinate to that of 
the “Anglos” whose rates it could not successfully challenge.80 Of the 
colonial banks which during the period sought through a British agency a 
wider field of exchange operations than those of a local middleman, the 
last81 to move was the Bank of New South Wales. Inspired by the success 
of the Commercial, it resolved in 1845 to establish a London agency and to 
build up the supply of funds there by purchasing export bills.82 There was 
considerable delay in reaching agreement with a London bank and settling 
formalities, so that it was not until October 1847 that the bank was able to 
announce its active entry into the market, offering bills on the London Joint 
Stock Bank and seeking export bills.83 Having broken the ice, the bank was 
agreeably surprised at the result, the directors reporting in January 1850: 
“by the extension of the business of the Bank in Exchange operations, its 
local business has assumed an improving character . . . It is the intention of 
your Board that this department of business shall be sedulously cultivated 
and if possible, judiciously extended”.84  
Decline of the Commissariat 
   The appearance of the English banks marked the end of the primacy of 
the Commissariat in the foreign exchange market. In Tasmania this was 
clearly foreseen and partly explained the official hostility with which the 
appearance of the Australasia was greeted. Arthur was perturbed at the 
threat of competition by the Australasia's bills with those of the 
Commissariat, and not reassured by Kinnear's undertaking that the bank 
would buy what the Commissariat could not sell elsewhere.85 In New South 
Wales the Commissary sought an arrangement by which that bank would 
take all his bills, but the governor insisted on Treasury approval.86 No 
record of the decision has been found, but apparently the Treasury 
authorized such arrangements generally, not for one bank, if it were clear 
that no better rate could be obtained.  
   The next significant move was a direction from London for reversion to a 
fixed rate of 1011/2 in place of the recently determined par.87 Apparently 
this was prompted by the readiness with which bills could be sold, and 
cash for public services obtained. But the move ignored experience of the 
inadequacy of any fixed rate in a market in which other sellers were free to 
vary rates with changing conditions. Initially it was below the market rate, 
and in New South Wales the Commissary was soon forced to suspend 
selling, having excessive cash.88 In Tasmania the Commissariat allotted 
quotas of bills to the various banks.89 Representations to London bore fruit 
in the virtual abandonment from 1841 of any attempt to maintain a fixed 
rate. The Commissariats were directed to sell bills “at the most 
advantageous rate of exchange” obtainable by public tender, with the 
proviso that if the premium was 5 per cent or higher, bills should be sold at 
105 without limit. The practice of normally selling at a market rate by 
tender, it was explained, was to avoid “a most inconvenient accumulation 
of funds” while the proviso concerning sales at 105 was to give holders of 
British silver “protection . . . against an excess in the circulation of it”.90  
   The proviso was shortlived, because of stupidity in the Hobart 
Commissariat, which read into these instructions a direction for a fixed rate 
of 5 per cent. Announcement of this as the new policy91 brought a storm of 
protest and a hasty change of front.92 Reference to England yielded new 
instructions for sale by tender without any restrictions or qualifications.93 
The Treasury no longer saw any reason for “protection” to holders of 
British silver, arguing logically that the cost of shipping coin to England 
was not more than 5 per cent and between Australian colonies less, so that 
local depreciation of the silver would be held within narrow limits. A 
Tasmanian plea for acceptance for bills of all coins legally circulating in 
the colony was turned by conceding the privilege to the sovereign (so that 
British gold coin for the first time was given official acceptability in the 
colonies) and reading the colonists a homily on the desirability of 
climinating the dollar.94 Thereafter for a year or so the Commissariat 
offered bills weekly, and then at intervals convenient to itself; the practice 
developed of selling, when the rate appeared favourable, more than 
sufficient to supply immediate needs for cash, and then suspending 
drawings if the market were adverse.95  
   Sometimes judgment erred, or the difficulties were too great, and then 
the Commissariat fell back on aid from its competitors, the banks. Thus in 
1844 the Commissary in Sydney found himself short of funds and able to 
sell his bills only at a discount of 5 per cent; in Tasmania the situation was 
much the same. Asked for help the Union and Australasia offered to buy 
Commissariat bills up to £12,000 per month in New South Wales and 
£22,000 in Tasmania (divided equally between the two banks) at 11/2 per 
cent discount, provided that these two banks should receive all available 
bills.96 The agreement ran to the end of the year and the banks at first did 
well out of it, reselling the bills at 2 per cent premium in Tasmania.97 But 
they burned their fingers, for in the last third of the year the exchange rate 
showed a heavy discount on sterling,98 while when the agreement expired 
the Commissary was still without expected remittances of coin and was 
forced to sell bills in competition with the banks, at a heavy discount.99 A 
new solution was reached by the two banks lending the Van Diemen's 
Land Commissariat cash directly, £60,000 (half each) for six months at 6 
per cent per annum, a precedent followed again the next year.100 It was little 
more than ten years since, in a market with no English banks, the 
Commissariat could announce its fixed rate with a take-it-or-leave-it air; its 
collapse to a minor place in the exchange market was so complete that it 
had to appear as a suppliant to its chief rivals.  
   The main factor in that decline was the vastly increased volume of 
London funds101 derived from investment from Britain, and the new high 
level of export proceeds, operating through a growing number of banks and 
other agencies. The decline was to be accentuated by the cessation of 
transportation, to New South Wales in 1840 and to Tasmania in 1853, with 
the consequent reduced expenditure to be made by bills. In South Australia 
and Western Australia, where no convicts were being sent, expenditure 
was small and the Commissariats were never important in exchange 
dealings.102 While the various Commissariats continued for many years to 
offer small and declining amounts of bills, they never again counted for 
much in the foreign exchange market.  
   A further factor in removing them from the public exchange market was 
their use for inter-governmental transfers which did not therefore come 
into the general market. The precedents for this had been set in the earlier 
loans from the New South Wales government to the Commissariat.  
   Systematic arrangements for inter-government transfers first developed 
in connection with the finance of the activities of the Agents-General of the 
several colonies in London. A minor source of sterling for their use was the 
practice adopted in the early 'thirties by which they assisted the less well-
to-do migrants to transfer their funds by taking them in London for 
payment by the colonial government at par. This came to be frowned upon, 
but the system was continued in restricted form for those migrants (but 
only those) who wished to purchase land, sums paid to the Agents-General 
being credited in the colonies for land purchase.103 But sums so received 
were not sufficient to meet the Agents' expenditure, especially in 
connection with assisted immigration, and there came to be accepted as 
normal and regular arrangements by which the British Treasury advanced 
sums to the Agents and the colonial government concerned repaid the local 
Commissariat, thus reducing its need to sell bills. Though the colonies 
were at first dilatory in repayment, the system worked well and was 
maintained.104  
   The principle thus established, this mode of transfer became normal for 
many forms of inter-government payments. When bounty payments for 
immigrants were revived after the slump, the same method was used for 
payment in England of bounties due by the colonies.105 New South Wales 
used it to pay interest on its debentures held in England and to repay 
principal.106 South Australia used the same procedure to purchase materials 
for the Adelaide and Port Railway.107 That colony saw the fullest 
development of this method of making immigration payments. Because of 
its late settlement and mining boom, land purchase was heavy in the late 
'forties and the local accumulations in the Land Fund were more than the 
local Commissariat108 required. The practice developed, with English 
blessing, that any surplus in the Fund was paid to the Commissariat which 
shipped the specie to other colonial Commissariats in need, especially that 
in New Zealand, the amount being credited to the colony's account with the 
Land and Emigration Commissioners in London.109 Resort was still had to 
the alternative of buying bills from one or other of the banks if they offered 
them at a discount (the Commissariat dealings were all at par) or if, as 
happened on occasions, the amounts exceeded Commissariat requirements.  
   In these various ways very substantial sums were transferred outside the 
general market, and to that extent the rapidity of the decline in 
Commissariat exchange dealings was exaggerated. But the transactions 
were not fully separated from the ordinary market, for, as has been noted, 
the use of the facilities of the banks was always a possible alternative, used 
if the rate were more favourable. There was, in this, a part of the 
explanation why the ordinary market rate was kept within a narrow range 
of variation from par, since the Commissariats and local governments 
might, and did, enter or withdraw from that market if rates diverged 
substantially from par, and the volume of their combined transactions was 
large enough to affect the level of rates.  
The Outside Market 
   The banks were far from monopolizing the market, for there continued an 
“outside market” made up of mortgage companies, bill and share brokers, 
individuals and firms handling exports, especially wool, and various 
individuals and firms who might at any time buy or sell exchange outside 
the banks if that were the more profitable course. Although the market 
increased in absolute size in the 'forties as compared with earlier periods it 
was, except for the foundation stage of the mortgage companies, of small 
dimensions compared with the operations of the banks. What was 
important was that it could expand at any time at the expense of the banks 
if their rates were in conflict with market realities, and that potential 
competition kept a substantially free market in exchange.  
   In the early 'forties the mortgage companies temporarily made substantial 
inroads into the exchange position of the banks. Boyd's Royal Bank added 
to its minor note issue only one other banking function, that of selling bills 
on London, which was Boyd's technique of transferring the funds extracted 
from his victims.110 These continued to be offered for some years, until the 
crash was imminent. For a brief period in 1847 the Bank of Australasia, 
ever willing to contain the activities of exchange competitors, took all the 
Royal Bank's bills, about £3,000 per month, but the London Court, better 
placed to catch the whispers, forbade any such purchases unless the bills 
were fully secured by bills of lading.111  
   In these dealings, the Royal was the flamboyant forerunner of the Trust 
and Loan Companies and their imitators. All were, in their establishment 
years, important sources of London funds, for their capital had to be 
transferred to the colonies for lending. Hence they were through most of 
the 'forties substantial sellers of bills on London, thus initiating a branch of 
the exchange market which was to be important for another half-century, 
reaching its climax in the multifarious investment companies promoted in 
Britain in the 'eighties. Their chief importance in the present context is that 
they were serious competitors in the banks' growing control of the market, 
the more obviously so since they sold their bills by tender instead of 
announcing a rate as did the banks, and do not appear ever to have joined 
the intermittent bank agreements on rates which the Australasia and Union 
promoted.112 But of necessity once their funds were transferred and 
invested, their place in the exchange market became a minor one, and the 
banks dominated the field from the mid-'forties until the discovery of gold 
in 1851, subject always, however, to the threat of the outside market.  
   Some participants in the outside market were merely casual dealers. Thus 
the French Consulate on occasions offered bills by tender in preference to 
dealing through the banks,113 and there were others who occasionally 
offered bills by public advertisement, and, rarely, those who sought them 
by the same method. More regular dealers comprised three main groups. 
There were first, on a small scale, offices whose primary business was in 
exchange. Baring Bros. were reported in 1840 to be appointing a Sydney 
agent, who would issue letters of credit and sell bills of exchange, but his 
operations, if any, left no mark.114 In June 1841 the Bank of Asia opened a 
Sydney agency, restricted to foreign exchange business, which would, it 
assured the public, “therefore not interfere with existing establishments”.115 
In the late 'forties there was a “bullion office” opened by Birnstingl and 
Co. actively seeking the business of money changing and apparently 
getting it on a substantial scale.116 
 
   The second group comprised those whose main business was as brokers, 
arranging dealings in shares, mortgages and other loans, who found it a 
natural extension to buy and sell bills on England, and occasionally 
elsewhere. In Sydney in the 'forties it is possible to identify in this group, 
as illustrative of the general situation, Charles Beilby, S. & S. Speyer, 
Abercrombie & Co., B. S. Lloyd and J. W. Barrett, and there were others 
who were probably of the same group.117  
   The third group was made up of dealers in exports. As was noted earlier, 
outright purchase and shipment of wool was a recognized technique of 
remittance and it continued to be important. But there was also a growing 
number of firms, the earliest form of the pastoral companies, who, in 
addition to their business as merchants selling imports mainly to 
pastoralists and buying or advancing on wool and handling its export, 
adopted the practice of dealing in export bills. This grew naturally out of 
loans to woolgrowers in which the common practice came to be that loans 
in the form of liens on the growing wool could, in effect, be extended until 
the wool was sold in London. The formal procedure was to discount bills 
for the pastoralist, secured by bills of lading for the wool, which it was 
usually insisted should be consigned to a specified English agent. The 
dealings of Swanston have already been noted, but he was only one of 
many. Thus a single issue of the Sydney Herald chosen at random in the 
mid-'forties shows eleven firms in Sydney seeking this type of business, as 
well as many wanting outright purchase of wool.118  
   In all these various ways the banks had to face competition in exchange. 
Those noted here are only samples of the dealings which achieved the 
publicity of advertisement, and much business must have been done by less 
formal and less public methods. Moreover, this “outside market” was 
obviously capable of rapid expansion and the banks had therefore to lead a 
market to which they could not dictate.119  
   By the end of the 'forties, then, the exchange market had taken the shape 
it was to hold for half a century. In a dominant but not exclusive position 
were the banks, acting with some measure of agreement as to rates,120 but 
subject always to the competition of a heterogeneous “outside market” in 
which the major part was taken by pastoral companies dealing in exports 
and by investment companies feeding the economy directly with London 
funds.121 Except for the dollar episode of the 'twenties, the linking of the 
Australian pound to sterling was never questioned. Already there were 
signs of the development into a system of the practice of substituting 
fluctuations in London funds for movements in specie, and, through the 
mechanism of a close relation between London funds and domestic lending 
policy, keeping exchange variations within narrow limits. This mechanism 
was, at this stage, most obvious in the case of the English banks which 
were prepared to hold large excess London funds and, if necessary, 
reduced them by remitting coin in preference to a large discount on sterling 
if the balance could not be restored by letting local boards have their heads 
in lending; depleted London funds were replenished by the converse 
alternatives. The practice was supplemented by the domestic use of British 
coin, and the continuous supply of British notes brought by immigrants 
which were available for export if exchange rates became unfavourable, 
and by the activities of the Commissariat, linked with local government 
finance in the later 'forties. There were, in fact, considerable movements of 
specie by the banks and, in the 'forties, by the Commissariat, which 
operated in the traditional gold standard manner to maintain a rough 
stability of exchange rates. But such movements of gold were much less 
than would have occurred had it not been that the English banks and those 
colonial ones which established London offices were content to see their 
London funds vary widely.  
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table of Trust Company bills offered from its beginnings to the end of 1843: 
The list may not be quite complete; bill sales were thereafter suspended because, in 
view of the slump, further capital was not required. 
113 E.g., Sydney Herald, 15 September 1847, 4 April 1848, 1 August 1850. 
114 Sydney Herald, 7 September 1840. 
115 Ibid., 8 June 1841 and Bank advertisement, ibid., 17 June 1841. 
116 Sydney Herald, 15 May, 7 June, 3 September 1849. The firm sought to buy 
gold, silver, foreign coins, English, Irish and Scotch bank-notes and French 
Government bills, and could offer 1,500 “dollars for California”. Business was 
apparently mainly with ships' crews and immigrants. 
117 For illustrative advertisements, Sydney Herald, 3 December 1842 (Beilby); 14 
November 1842 (S. & S. Speyer, buying dollars); 6 March 1843 (Abercrombie & 
Co., selling Calcutta bills); 19 June 1843 (B. S. Lloyd); 14 May 1847 (J. W. Barrett). 
118 18 December 1845, advertisements by: R. Towns, T. Agars, Ramsay & Co., 
Rowland M`Nab & Co., Buchanan & Co., Lyall Scott & Co., John Rostron, Griffiths 
Fanning & Co., Gilchrist & Alexander, Smith & Campbell, J. W. Gosling. Most of 
these (and others) advertised regularly. 
119 This situation was long-lived. The most recent occasion on which the outside 
market (made up of very much the same elements even if in modern dress) forced 
Amount Sydney Herald
£ ? (30 days sight) 26/7/41
25,000 22/9/41
25,000 19/1/42
25,000 3/3/42
20,000 5/5/42
8,000 3/6/42
20,000 8/9/42
£25,000 5/10/42
10,000 17/11/42
10,000 31/3/43
10,000 31/5/43
20,000 24/6/43
10,000 8/8/43
the banks to modify exchange policy was in 1929–31. Not until the introduction of 
complete exchange control in 1939 did the banks occupy the whole market, and then 
only as agents of the Commonwealth Bank. 
120 See below. 
121 In the last third of the century borrowings in London by colonial governments 
were heavy and frequent; transfer of the funds, however, was usually handled by an 
individual bank or a syndicate of banks operating in Australia. 
Chapter 14 Banking Practice and Policy 
   THE formal organization and structure of the colonial banks does not call 
for detailed discussion. The Australasia, the Union following the same 
model, and the South Australia adapting it to the case of a bank with one 
colonial office,1 were all special cases. If the fiction of incorporation in the 
Bank of New South Wales charter be ignored, until the case of the 
Commercial of Sydney in 1848 every colonial bank was in law a 
partnership, and, with minor exceptions, in organization a joint-stock 
company with unlimited liability.2 As such they comprised shareholders 
(commonly then called proprietors) who elected directors in whom real 
control resided, but who always had to reckon with insubordinate general 
meetings every half year.3 For voting purposes the standard practice was to 
limit the power of large shareholders by a scale of declining votes-shares 
ratios, but to offset this to some degree by making the holding of a number 
of shares a qualification for a director. Throughout the period directors' 
meetings exercised close control over day-to-day business—normally it 
was directors who approved bills for discount, for instance—but from the 
time of the 1830 Derwent experiment salaried full-time managers4 became 
the general rule and necessarily as business grew more and more routine 
matters were disposed of by managerial authority.  
   The technique of capital raising presented more novelty. Face value of 
shares5 was high in the 'twenties, reflecting the absence of a market for 
capital in any useful sense of the term market. Flotations, as has been seen, 
were usually the work of cliques, even where there was a show of public 
offer of shares. By contrast in the 'thirties share values were low and public 
subscriptions were genuinely invited. These were inevitable consequences 
of the scramble for capital, but went along with and were made possible by 
the development in primitive form of a capital market and the germ of a 
stock exchange. The 'thirties saw many other joint-stock companies beside 
banks, but banks remained the most important group and their shares the 
dominant element in the share market; moreover, the growth of 
organization for trading in shares was especially important to banks in a 
period of repeated increases in bank capitalization and new bank 
formations. It is therefore necessary to trace in outline the emergence of a 
share market.  
   In the 'twenties it was non-existent. Not only were original capital-
raisings semi-private, but dealings in shares were primarily by individual 
negotiation, their most public form being the ad hoc newspaper 
advertisement of shares offered or wanted. In its time of need in 1828, for 
example, the Bank of New South Wales found it necessary to call a public 
meeting to consider the best way of disposing of unsold shares.6 To this 
period belongs the practice, continued through the 'thirties by the Banks of 
New South Wales and Australia, of voluntary subscriptions. For later 
banks the rule was for successive calls, payment of which was enforced (by 
forfeiture), but these two continued exceptions. Thus in 1834 Bank of New 
South Wales shareholders were “at liberty” to pay up £15, those of the 
Australia £10, both banks repeating the permission the following year; the 
result was that individual shareholders held shares paid to all degrees.7 
Such practices complicated not only calculation of dividends, but, more 
importantly, share dealings, and were not followed by banks formed in the 
'thirties.  
   The most common method of transfer of bank shares in the early 'thirties 
was by public auction, although sales by private treaty are recorded and no 
doubt many more occurred. Some degree of specialization showed itself, as 
for example W. Barton who described himself in 1835 as “agent for the 
transfer of shares”,8 James & Co. who a year or two later were regularly 
offering to sell or to buy bank and insurance shares,9 or W. P. Burne who in 
1837 opened a broker's office dealing in shares and arranging mortgage 
loans.10 The first suggestion of an embryo stock exchange was, in the same 
year, the opening by Isaac Simmons & Co. of a “Chamber of Commerce” 
where they undertook to maintain lists of share prices as a basis for 
dealings which the public were invited to undertake there.11  
   It was a very imperfect market, as the wide variations in price, even for 
the same shares in a short period, suggest:12  
    
Date Bank Premium per cent on amount paid up
11/6/33 Australia 1121/2
31/8/33 N.S.W. 50
12/10/33 N.S.W. 80
16/11/33 Australia 70
16/12/33 Australia 621/2
6/3/34 Australia 110
5/4/34 Australia 75
22/7/34 Australia 75
21/8/34 N.S.W. 70
6/9/34 N.S.W. 95
6/9/34 Australia 771/2
15/1/35 Commercial 15
9/3/35 N.S.W. 50
28/3/35 N.S.W. 731/2
12/5/35 N.S.W. 65
23/5/35 Commercial 60
   The general level of these premiums reflects the size of dividends, and to 
some degree the fluctuations may be explained by sales with and without 
dividend, but the main explanation is the absence of a regular market and 
the small number of shares usually changing hands.  
   By the early 'forties, although ad hoc advertisements and sales by auction 
were still common, regular sharebroking was practised by a few specialists, 
the two most important in Sydney being Barton and Charles Beilby. Barton 
was describing himself as a “sharebroker” or “share and money broker” 
regularly offering to buy and sell shares in banks and other companies; by 
1844 he had a printed share list for regular distribution to customers.13 
Beilby was also very active until the middle 'forties.14 Complete 
specialization was still to come; both Beilby and Barton still arranged 
mortgage loans, sold goods on commission and discounted on their own 
account. But they and their less important and less specialized competitors 
(for the most part primarily auctioneers) illustrate how extensive and 
regular dealings in bank and other shares had become. Other illustrations 
are the production by Barton of the first guide for investors,15 and the 
publication by the Sydney Herald of a regular share price list from 1839 
until the slump.  
Banking Policy 
(a) Note Issue 
   All the banks were assiduous in seeking to promote note issue. Typical is 
the early exhortation of J. T. Campbell to shareholders in the Bank of New 
South Wales: “It cannot, Gentlemen, be unknown to you, that one direct 
mode of increasing our disposable funds, is the throwing as many as 
possible of our Bank Notes into circulation. This is an object worthy of the 
attention of every individual subscriber to the Bank.”16 Equally assiduous 
were the attempts to suppress the notes of private firms and the promptness 
with which notes of rivals were presented for clearing. Beyond this it is not 
possible to detect any conscious note issue policy. The view uniformly and 
continuously held was that the volume of note issue was determined simply 
and directly by the demand of the public; nowhere is there even a hint of 
recognizing a connection between advances and note issue.  
   Thus in 1831 in a joint reply to queries by the governor, the Derwent and 
Van Diemen's Land Banks declared that note issues “may be said to 
regulate themselves. No exertion of ours, or of all the banks combined, can 
make the public keep more bank notes in their hands than they have 
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occasion for”. The Cornwall took the same view.17 The same opinion was 
still generally held in the 'forties. Thus Hart of the Australasia declared: 
“The Banks in this Colony have not the power, as in England, of forcing 
their notes into circulation; for if an issue beyond the legitimate wants of 
trade were attempted, the excess of issue would find its way back in one 
week, and would have to be met by a payment of specie in the settlement 
with the other banks, which is made every Monday, on the principle of the 
‘clearing house’ in London . . . the circulation of Bank notes in this Colony 
is governed entirely by the demand of its trade; it cannot be forced into 
excess by the banker, and the fluctuations in it have not, I think, been 
greater than they would have been, had it been a purely metallic 
currency”.18 The Sydney Herald was just as certain: “The Banks are the 
mere agents of the Colonists, moved at their bidding. Bank notes are not 
forced upon the people; they are merely issued on demand, and on demand 
they are converted into coin of the realm. The contraction and expansion of 
the currency are the acts of the public; controlled and regulated by the 
necessities and convenience of business.”19 This was a comfortable view in 
colonies in which there was no legal tender law, no central bank, no legal 
control over the total volume of bank loans, and only a very primitive 
control by the banks themselves through a loosely applied rule of thumb 
concerning reserves against all liabilities.  
   It may perhaps be added that in the latter part of the 'forties the banks 
were beginning to doubt the value of note issue. Thus the Inspector of the 
Union Bank thought the trouble and expense outweighed the profits, and 
would have welcomed abandonment if a readily convertible substitute had 
been available.20 The manager of the Commercial of Sydney thought “the 
banks would be better off without a note circulation if the effect were to 
allow us to do business unrestricted”.21 Nevertheless, the only bank to 
abandon note issue was the Derwent, and it only because of conversion to 
mortgage banking; it took the prohibitive tax of 1911 to eliminate trading 
bank note issues.  
(b) Lending Policy 
   The establishment of the Bank of New South Wales led, as has been 
noted, to the substitution of the bill of exchange for the promissory note, 
and the discount of bills was the main part of the bank's lending, although 
it admitted other forms of loan. The original rules22 provided that discounts 
should be limited to three months bills, with preference for those of two 
months. Mortgages were not to exceed twelve months, nor in total more 
than 20 per cent of the bank's capital. Loans against bullion or plate to half-
value, might be made for nine months, but deposit of the bullion was 
required as well as a promissory note, and little business resulted. Loans of 
any type to any one individual or firm were limited to £500. These were 
cautious rules, but they were made more restrictive as business began. Bills 
for discount must bear three names and be either drawn by or payable to a 
Sydney resident; bills under £20 were not taken.23 No town mortgages were 
taken, nor mortgages on buildings without the land; the amount of a 
mortgage loan was limited to 5s. per acre for uncleared land and 10s. for 
improved.24 The rules were not always observed. Thus the limit of £500 on 
bills for discount and the requirement of three names had to be re-
affirmed.25  
   The restrictions on mortgages were relaxed in the light of their small 
amount. The total limit was raised from one-fifth to one-half of the capital, 
and loans on town allotments were permitted.26 Nevertheless they 
continued to be only a modest part of the business: 
   For the failure of this type of loan to expand there are good reasons. The 
limit of advance per acre meant that each loan was modest. The number of 
those who could offer satisfactory security was small. Most land occupiers 
did not own their land, and of those who did many had titles which were 
far from clear, and many were already involved in mortgages to individuals 
and merchants. In short, very few of those who could have satisfied the 
scrutiny of the bank's solicitor of their titles were in need of loans of such 
small dimensions (and some of these were not the people to bind 
themselves by such a solid form of security). The bank therefore readily 
accepted, after these early years, the transplanted convention that mortgage 
lending was not sound banking, and concentrated on discounting.  
   This convention found formal expression in various pronouncements of 
the British government. The policy of hostility to bank loans on the 
security of real estate was crystallized in the discussions of the Bank of 
Australasia charter and the first Colonial Bank Regulations. The Bank of 
Australasia was prohibited from making such loans although it might 
BALANCE SHEET 
FIGURES27 
Date Bills Receivable Mortgages
13/1/18 £5,693 £1,381
30/6/18 11,949 1,082
31/12/18 25,745 2,539
30/6/19 28,908 3,622
21/7/19 ? 1,280
11/1/20 23,095 4,132
30/6/20 19,479 1,239
30/12/20 19,405 4,172
dispose of lands taken in settlement of debt, a proviso which opened a 
loophole of some importance. The Colonial Bank Regulations28 embodied 
the same prohibition, which had taken high place in all the discussions and 
had been applied to specific cases in other than Australian colonies.29 But 
the impact of these regulations on Australian banks was negligible, for they 
were directions as to the provisions which colonial governors should insert 
into local acts relating to banks which might be passed in the future, and 
did not command amendments in existing acts. Since almost all the banks 
already had individual acts or operated, as in Western Australia, under a 
general law, no change was involved until such acts were amended or 
replaced, and by then it was the 1846 Regulations which applied.  
   The Bathurst Bank was unfortunate in that its act was received in London 
after the Regulations had been issued, and contained explicit power to 
make loans on real estate. For this reason, although it had been enacted 
before the Regulations were adopted, it was summarily disallowed,30 
although the same despatch allowed the Union Bank Act of the New South 
Wales Council which, being silent on the point, did not exclude such loans. 
This was not an isolated case of apparent inconsistency, for similar acts 
had been regularly allowed during the late 'thirties, that is, after British 
policy was settled; presumably the British view was that it was 
unnecessary to prohibit what was not part of “the ordinary business of 
banking”.  
   In the colonies, however, the opposite view was taken; what was not 
prohibited was allowed. Of the various individual bank acts in New South 
Wales those for the Bank of Australia (1827 and 183331 ), of New South 
Wales (1828), Commercial of Sydney (1835), Union (1839), Sydney and 
Port Phillip (1840) contained no prohibition of lending on real estate. In 
Tasmania acts for the Bank of Van Diemen's Land, Derwent, Cornwall 
(1830), Commercial of Tasmania, Tamar (1833), Union (1838) and 
Colonial (1840) were silent on the point, as was the consolidating act (5 
Vic., No. 17) which replaced all these. In South Australia the act for the 
South Australian Company (1840) and the act which followed the 
separation of the bank from the Company (1843) did not prohibit real 
estate loans, even though the latter followed the issue of the Regulations. 
In Western Australia the general act of 1837, under which the Bank of 
Western Australia and the Western Australian Bank in turn operated, 
likewise contained no explicit restriction.  
   Following the 1846 revision of the Regulations, in New South Wales the 
occasion was taken, as individual acts were amended or replaced, to insert 
the prohibition: Commercial of Sydney (1848) and New South Wales 
(1850). The Bank of South Australia, by acquiring a charter incurred the 
same restriction as the Australasia, but there was no change in Tasmania or 
Western Australia. Broadly, then, until almost the end of the period, all the 
banks except the Australasia had, by colonial interpretation of the absence 
of a prohibition, the power to lend on mortgage, although only the Derwent 
used it extensively, at least for direct loans.  
   In this caution the orthodox banking tradition was reinforced by the risks 
of mortgage lending in the colonies, and the substantial competition. The 
activities of the Savings banks and, in the 'forties, of the mortgage 
companies have been traced. Insurance and similar companies were 
another source of competition,32 as were a host of individuals, including 
especially solicitors with trust funds and investment agents, whose 
advertisements offering loans were matched by a constant stream of 
advertising borrowers.  
   The result was that the banks (other than the Derwent) nearly withdrew 
from direct mortgage lending. The Bank of Australia first seriously 
considered mortgage loans in 183033 but its entry into the field was 
negligible.34 The Bank of New South Wales virtually abandoned them in 
the 'thirties,35 although it and the Commercial re-entered the field in a small 
way with one-year mortgages in 1845.36 The Bathurst Bank did not lend on 
mortgage unless possibly in the brief interval between the passage of its act 
and the absorption of the bank.37 The Union Bank did not lend on mortgage 
at all until 1846.38 Prior to its charter, the Bank of South Australia sought to 
avoid mortgage loans, but could not do so entirely, and compromised by 
taking first (but not second) mortgages as collateral.39 Neither the Bank of 
Western Australia nor the Western Australian Bank appears to have taken 
mortgages directly, unless in the disguise of the “specialty securities” 
which were a small part of the modest amount of cash credits of the latter.40 
In Tasmania, the Bank of Van Diemen's Land, Commercial and minor 
banks appear to have avoided direct mortgage loans.  
   But legal form and reality did not necessarily march together. The New 
South Wales Bluebook for 1851 declared:41 “All money lent by the banks is 
on bills—mortgages are merely collateral security”. There were many 
cases in which the statement might have been inverted with truth: what was 
legally the collateral security was in fact the basis of the loan. Cash credits 
normally had collateral attached, a mortgage if this was what the borrower 
had to offer; and the same was true of discounts. The extreme case 
suggests how widespread the practice was, even though quantitative 
evidence does not exist. The Bank of Australasia by its charter was 
forbidden loans on real estate. Yet it rediscounted bills for the Bank of 
Australia, knowing that the true security was the real estate of the 
shareholders and major debtors of that bank. Nor did it stop at an isolated 
special instance, but devised as a regular form of evasion the “secured 
account” by which loans were legally made in authorized forms, discounts 
and at various times cash credits, but real security was given by the 
borrower executing a mortgage to “trustees” acting on behalf of the Bank.42  
   To the general principle of loans by discount the cash credit was, 
quantitatively, a more important exception than the mortgage. As has been 
seen it was introduced by the Derwent in Tasmania and then by the 
Commercial of Sydney on the mainland, but it was an innovation regarded 
with caution by the banks. Apart from the dominance of nineteenth-century 
doctrines of self-liquidating bills, cash credits were mostly used by—
perhaps designed for—primary producers, and even though nominally 
repayable at any time were in fact long-term loans which it would have 
been unrealistic to seek to terminate except at annual intervals. Even the 
Commercial of Sydney which developed this form of loan to the greatest 
extent had few of them except to primary producers.43 The Bank of South 
Australia, finding cash credits were used mainly by sheep farmers, insisted 
on annual repayment from the proceeds of wool exports.44  
   Other banks were reluctant to develop the business. The Bathurst Bank, 
although in a rural area, did not lend in this way.45 The Bank of Van 
Diemen's Land, despite competition from the other Hobart banks, held out 
against cash credits until 1839,46 while the Derwent abandoned them on its 
conversion to a mortgage bank.47 In Western Australia they were kept to 
small dimensions,48 while the Bank of Australasia alternately permitted and 
abolished them. Initially it was directed that no one credit should exceed 
£500, nor in all £8,000 for New South Wales.49 In 1837 they were all 
recalled in Launceston, but offered again two years later,50 while London 
re-imposed the £500 limit which had been exceeded in Launceston and 
Melbourne.51 In 1847 they were withdrawn in all colonies on instructions 
from London, and offered again in 1851 as a tentative experiment.52 Once 
introduced the cash credit did not die out, but it was not a loan popular 
with bankers generally.  
   The other form of loan meriting notice is that of advances against 
exports, in form discount of bills payable in England from the proceeds of 
sale, and secured by bills of lading. This developed late and most banks 
were somewhat nervous of the risks involved, only the Commercial of 
Sydney actively seeking53 a type of business which they regarded as more 
properly one for the merchants who had until the early 'forties almost a 
clear field. The Australasia would touch only well-established staple 
articles.54 The Bank of South Australia, in a colony whose exports were not 
dominated by wool, illustrates more clearly the anxious advance into 
strange territory. London directors did “not approve of the Bank's making 
advances on produce the sale of which it may have to undertake, and 
probably the insurance and management—they prefer bills with really 
good names and all mercantile transactions to be left to merchants”, but 
they were presently arranging insurance on wool shipments which were the 
subject of advances.55 Advances against wheat were strictly forbidden, and 
permitted almost at once; the objection was that wheat was subject to 
damage but could only be insured against total loss, but the permission 
required only that the parties be sound financially. By 1845 London was 
prepared to authorize generally advances against the export of 
“imperishable goods”.56 In this typically hesitant manner all banks with 
London offices or agencies entered the business.57  
   The attraction to the banks of this type of loan was that it opened scope 
for loans to primary producers in the form (discount of bills) familiar to 
them, coupled with effective control through bills of lading over the 
material security. The lien on wool and mortgage on stock had made for 
easier borrowing by primary producers from merchants and individuals, 
but they were not much used by the banks, partly because they were 
novel—bankers always suspect novelty—partly because the security was 
on four legs and distant from bank supervision of its movements, partly 
because the alternative of export bills secured by bills of lading avoided 
both difficulties.58  
   Throughout the period the banks were very reluctant to make extensive 
loans direct to “settlers”, i.e., primary producers, and preferred the 
interposition of a merchant. As early as 1826: “discounts at the Banks are 
effected merely by a few favoured dealers, many of them without any real 
property, to the prejudice of farmers and graziers, who are obliged to pay 
to these very dealers an exorbitant premium for advances made to them, in 
the price of goods taken on credit”.59 In the upsurge of the boom the banks 
were less cautious, but with the slump the policy was reasserted.  
   Evidence given by bankers before the Select Committee on Monetary 
Confusion was particularly explicit. McLaren of the Union declared: “It is 
a principle of our Bank to confine its dealings to commercial transactions, 
but it has occasionally discounted paper for settlers. They are not, however, 
so punctual in meeting their bills as mercantile men.” He was followed by 
a director, Griffiths (who was formerly Inspector of the Australasia): “The 
paper of merchants and shopkeepers is preferred to that of settlers . . . 
because their operations are more under our cognizance; then parties are 
supposed to afford accommodation themselves to settlers . . . we rather 
avoided settlers' accounts . . . I believe the object of discounting mercantile 
bills in preference to settlers' is that the Bank believes the merchants are 
better acquainted with the resources of the settler than the Bank can 
possibly be.” Wentworth of the Bank of New South Wales took a similar 
line: “Mercantile paper is preferred in our bank, but they occasionally 
oblige settlers; not that they are in good odour with us . . . they are 
certainly a very irritating set of persons, as regards the payment of their 
promissory notes and bills; they think if they pay them three or four 
months after they become due they behave tolerably well; the Bank is of a 
different opinion.” Other bankers joined the chorus.60  
   The critics had other explanations. Bradley, a grazier, commented, “I 
imagine the reason why the settler had so small a share of accommodation 
granted by the banks arose from the bank directors being themselves 
merchants”, a view that was widespread.61 The truth is that both the banks 
and their critics were right. Pastoralists and farmers were exploited by the 
close relationship between the banks and the merchants; but they were 
slow payers and in general the security they had to offer was unattractive.62  
(c) Reserve Policy 
   Bank reserves had, of necessity, to be held in the form of cash, since 
other forms of highly liquid asset were unavailable. Of the various forms of 
bank loans, discounts lent themselves, on the surface, to the arrangement of 
maturities in order of date, so that at any time there would be a flow of bills 
becoming due for repayment. But in fact the conventions about total or 
partial renewal, and the normal coincidence of a bank need for increased 
cash with the inability of debtors to pay severely limited recourse to this 
banking rule of thumb as a genuine reserve in case of emergency. 
Nevertheless it is apparent from bank minute books that the practice was 
followed, although it may be suggested that however bankers may have 
rationalized their policy, it was designed less to ensure a constant flow of 
repayments in cash than to avoid large and irregular fluctuations in 
lending.  
   Other forms of investment were even less suitable as a second-line 
reserve. Mortgages obviously were not readily realizable; nor were cash 
credits for those banks which used them, for they were chiefly loans to 
rural producers. Until the 'forties there were no government securities, and 
after that, in the only important case, New South Wales, the volume of 
securities was so small, their market so irregular and uncertain, that the risk 
of loss if it became necessary to sell them was so great, that the banks were 
not interested in them either as a source of income or a form of reserve. “If 
only a small amount were issued,” said Hart of the Australasia, “they might 
find their way into the Banks, but they would not be of much service to 
those institutions, because they could not be immediately converted into 
money in an emergency, as Exchequer bills could be in England. If the 
Banks could at any time take them to the Treasury and obtain an advance 
on them it would answer their purpose to hold them, but as a mere 
investment for money they would not remunerate the Banks,” and his 
views were echoed by other bankers.63  
   The prudent banker must therefore look to cash as his only short-term 
reserve, and modify both the total volume and, as far as he could, arrange 
the types of loans and sequence of maturity dates in the light of his cash 
position. The limited initiative open to him in the latter direction would 
tend to throw the main burden of adjustment to revised views of the future 
on to the volume of loans, and one would expect the short-run effect to be 
frequent variations in the ratio of cash to liabilities to the public (notes and 
deposits). Students of the modern Australian banking system are familiar 
with the variability of disclosed percentages of liquid assets and some of 
the same factors were operative a century ago. There were the same well-
understood seasonal variations, much more accentuated by a heavier 
dependence upon exports, mainly but not only wool. There was the 
accountancy custom by which in each colonial capital all banks balanced 
(for clearing purposes, and therefore for making the average official 
returns) on the same day of the week (usually Monday), so that “window-
dressing” was not practised to reduce the apparent variability of reserves. 
In any case, with the limitations of the local security market, it would have 
been practicable only by rediscounting of bills between the banks, and this 
was avoided except in emergency. Moreover, the limited development of 
branches, between which in any event communication could only be slow, 
meant that the averaging out of individual branch variations by aggregation 
was negligible. Finally, the “English” banks commonly imported specie, 
necessarily in large isolated instalments, as one mode of transmitting their 
capital, leading to a temporary large rise in cash. For all these reasons, one 
would expect reserve ratios to be, to modern eyes, high and very variable.  
   Judged by their own statements, the bankers were definite upon the 
importance of the reserve ratio and upon the proper level of reserves; in 
fact their ideas upon this matter are the only general principles of lending 
which found contemporary expression.64 Thus the Sydney Bank directors 
defended themselves against charges of negligence when failure came, by 
explaining that they were always guided by the reserve ratio in determining 
loan policy, and these figures had been falsified by the senior staff.65 The 
proper ratio, it was generally agreed, was one-third cash to the sum of 
deposits and notes, although the Commercial was inclined to think a 
smaller figure adequate except in emergencies.66 One-third became so 
much a formula that the Sydney Herald commenced in 1846 to apply what 
it called “The Bank Test” to the quarterly returns, finding the banks sound 
if they had more than this proportion.67  
   If protestation is set against performance by the only available evidence, 
that of the official returns, it appears that some attempt was made to apply 
the formula as a minimum reserve target, with considerable fluctuations, 
usually above the minimum, for reasons outlined above.68 For Western 
Australia the data for each bank are over too short a period to support 
definite conclusions. In South Australia the figures for the Bank of South 
Australia give no lead, fluctuations range from 22.5 per cent in 1842 to 
90.5 per cent in 1847, but the Australasia was evidently aiming at the one-
third minimum. In Tasmania, in the 'thirties, all banks were obviously 
adhering to the formula as did the Australasia and Commercial of 
Tasmania in the 'forties. The Union's ratio was generally very high, 
indicative of its capital imports in specie, while in the same period that of 
the Derwent was negligible in size, as was appropriate for a mortgage 
bank; for the 'forties there is no sign of consistency in the Van Diemen's 
Land figures. In New South Wales the Commercial and Australia appear to 
have had a target of one-fourth in the 'thirties. For the other banks and for 
the later period clear conclusions are obscured by the high and variable 
Australasia and Union ratios (because of specie imports), and the generally 
high ratios of all banks during and immediately after the slump, but if these 
are taken as special distorting factors it would appear to be safe to conclude 
that in general the one-third formula applied in practice.  
Relations Between Banks 
(a) Competition and Agreement 
   Relations between the banks may be described variously as co-operation, 
competition and combination. By co-operation is here meant all those 
arrangements for amicable joint action which neither in fact nor in 
intention restricted competition. Amongst these were major matters such as 
clearing and mutual agency agreements, as well as minor ones such as 
agreements for uniformity in bank holidays69 or for distinctive colours in 
note issues.70  
   Such arrangements easily merged into those which did involve restriction 
of competition, without formal agreement. An example of a minor sort was 
the intermittent ban on cheques less than £5 (occasionally a smaller 
sum71 ), a practice copied from England, designed partly to avoid 
“unnecessary trouble,” partly with the idea that bank note circulation 
would be promoted. The rule was laxly enforced, and was commonly 
announced by a single bank, but it suited all to conform more or less 
without formal agreement.72 A similar minor action was the agreed 
prohibition in the 'forties of any except “bearer” cheques, justified on 
grounds of convenience but really to limit the legal obligations of the 
banks.73 Another was the proposal of the Commercial of Sydney for a 
charge for keeping accounts, not pursued because other banks would not 
act in concert.74  
   Formal agreements of more importance related to rates of business, and 
in these, as in so many other directions, the Australasia took the lead. The 
attitude it normally adopted was euphemistically stated by Kinnear: “The 
only competition I encourage is in civility, prudence and impartiality,”75 a 
tactful way of describing the bank's readiness to compete à l' outrance 
combined with its equal readiness to promote agreement on rates of interest 
and exchange. When the Union was established the London directors 
publicly declared their “anxious care to prevent their branches running any 
imprudent race of competition with the new establishment”,76 a care which 
soon bore fruit in an agreement to “act in concert” with the new bank as to 
rates both in London and the colonies, to be implemented in the colonies 
by secret conferences of the two Inspectors, who were to communicate 
orally only. (The Australasia Inspector was instructed to seek similar 
arrangements with the colonial banks.)77  
   In operation, the agreement had mixed success, mainly because the local 
boards of the Union were prone to vary exchange rates without 
consultation.78 Yet the evidence of the records of the two banks and of the 
correspondence in dates and terms of their advertisements is that on the 
whole they did act in concert most of the time.  
   Somewhat similar was the record of the Australasia-Bank of South 
Australia understanding in Adelaide, except that the repeated breaches in 
the later 'forties were the result of the pushing competition of MacDermott 
of the Australasia. Common action was invited by the South Australian 
Company—which had the example of its no-competition agreement with 
the Union—at the outset,79 and it was soon able to report friendly 
relations.80 When the Bank of South Australia was separated from the 
Company in 1842, an agreement for common action on terms of business 
was negotiated with the Australasia,81 and in general this was adhered to 
loyally.82 Divergences when they occurred most commonly related to 
exchange rates.83  
   Paradoxically, a major limitation on the ability of the “Anglos” to 
maintain a united front amongst themselves was the effect of their entry in 
forcing the colonial banks to draw together. The English banks with their 
large resources were feared by the local banks, and that fear found 
reflection not only in some measure of common action but also in the 
running criticism and occasional diatribes of the press. The Cornwall 
Chronicle set the tone in describing the Australasia as “a corporation of 
foreigners, . . . in direct and uncompromising hostility to all the local 
banks”, or, a little later:  
Fe . . . Fo . . . Fum . . .  
I smell the blood of a colonial chum; 
Let it be S[wanston] or Mc[Lachlan] or D[unn] 
I'll swallow them up as sure a gun— 
As for the Tamar and poor little G[illes], 
I'll gulp him down also, small as the pill is. 
Prostrate yourselves before him Van Diemen's Land, 
Derwent, and Commercial—down on your knees little 
Tamar, and thank your stars that Goliah condescends 
to be merciful!—mercy, indeed,—aye—even with 
such mercy as the cat shows the mouse.84  
   The tone was moderated with the years, but the criticism derived from 
fear continued.  
   Self-defence forced the local banks to a united front on occasions. Thus 
in New South Wales the Commercial, Australia and New South Wales met 
and formally agreed to meet the Australasia on its own ground by offering 
interest on current accounts.85 In Tasmania the Derwent, Van Diemen's 
Land and Commercial agreed on interest rates.86 The Australasia, which 
regretted having initiated current account interest, found itself, along with 
the Union, forced to continue it because the colonial banks would not agree 
to abandon the practice.87 The New South Wales and Commercial of 
Sydney fought back against rising deposit rates promoted by the 
Australasia, by depositing in all £45,000 with it in the names of individual 
directors.88 By 1848 the Australasia was able to negotiate a general bank 
agreement on rates in Tasmania, but was unsuccessful in New South 
Wales, “the local banks being more forceful and having greater 
influence”.89 It was, however, becoming clear that self-interest dictated 
elimination of the cruder forms of competition in rates, and agreements 
were easier to make and more complete in their range. Thus when the 
Union entered South Australia, all three banks met and negotiated an 
agreement,90 and from then on open or tacit understandings on terms of 
business were the general rule in all the colonies, often broken, but always 
renewed.  
   Nevertheless it remained true of the period studied that competition was 
far more important than any agreements. The agreements, it has been seen, 
were repeatedly disregarded if it suited the interests of one of the banks. 
Moreover, despite the obvious difficulty of any one bank maintaining 
interest and discount rates at variance with the general level, divergences 
did occur, while the measure of uniformity which prevailed was achieved 
less by agreement than by the necessity to follow a change made by a 
competitor.91 The situation was fairly summarized by Knox of the 
Commercial of Sydney, in evidence before the Select Committee on 
Banking:  
 
Q. 93—“The exchanges upon England are arbitrary? I cannot say arbitrary; they 
have been settled by the banks with reference to existing circumstances.  
Q. 94—“Have they not been settled by combination of the banks? The banks are 
generally obliged to adopt the same rates of exchange.  
Q. 95—“The Directors of the banks meet together and settle the rate of exchange, do 
they not? One bank determines to alter the rate of exchange, and the others must 
generally follow the example.  
Q. 96—“Is not this operation generally done by agreement among the banks? No, it 
is not; the English banks, generally speaking, have hitherto taken the lead in 
regulating the exchange.  
Q. 97—“And the colonial banks have, in fact, been obliged to follow the rate they 
have established? Not always; at the time the rate of exchange was fixed at 71/2 per 
cent discount it was the refusal of the colonial banks to go down to that rate which 
obliged the others again to raise it. No rate of exchange differing materially from 
that adopted by a majority of the banks could, for any length of time, be adhered to 
by one institution.”  
   The avoiding of an admission of agreements was not very skilful, but the 
general picture was accurate. Agreements did not survive if competition 
offered more immediate profit, and on the whole competition was still very 
active.  
(b) Clearing 
   Early clearing arrangements between banks were ad hoc bilateral affairs, 
and any bank had to reckon with the possibility of a rival deliberately 
embarrassing it by presenting a large volume of cheques, or, more 
important, notes. A good example of how the uneasy understandings about 
clearings might flare up into conflict, and thereby lead to systematic 
agreement is provided by the Launceston story. Following the 
establishment of the Tamar Bank it and the Cornwall competed vigorously, 
each demanding frequent settlement of clearing balances in specie. Neither 
achieving its purpose, they agreed to require specie only for balances in 
excess of £5,000; balances less than £1,000 were carried forward without 
interest, those between £1,000 and £2,000 bore 10 per cent and above 
£2,000 II per cent.92  
   When the Australasia succeeded the Cornwall Bank the old clearing 
arrangement was retained with reluctance on both sides.93 But six months 
later, finding the balance consistently against the Tamar, the Australasia 
demanded daily clearing in gold. For three months the battle continued, 
and then the Tamar tried what was apparently a desperate appeal to public 
opinion, with success. Finding its adverse clearing balance, late in October, 
to amount to £1,877, more coin, it declared, than there was in all 
Launceston, it demanded, on threat of immediate closure, a more 
satisfactory arrangement. It claimed that it had reduced its loans to remedy 
the clearing situation, had sent to London for specie, and had appealed to 
the government. The Australasia refused to re-establish the old clearing 
agreement and offered to rediscount £5,000 in bills if the Tamar could 
prove that unintentional overlending was the cause of the trouble. This the 
Tamar refused, and closed immediately, demanding payment of all debts 
due either in its own notes or coin. A meeting of depositors and 
shareholders endorsed the action, the depositors undertaking to make no 
abnormal withdrawals. The Australasia gave way as much because of 
hostile public opinion as because of the threat of a drain on its own coin, 
and made a loan of £5,000 for twelve months. With the aid of this the 
Tamar was able to re-open94 just one week after it had closed, and the old 
arrangement was revived.95  
   In the case of the Bathurst Bank, as has been seen, the Australasia had 
more success with a similar technique. A decade later it had a taste of its 
own prescription in Adelaide. The local branch of the Australasia had been 
lending too freely and found the weekly clearing in gold a serious drain. 
The Bank of South Australia refused to accept settlement in drafts on 
London, and would go no further than to offer to sell the Australasia coin 
for London bills at the current exchange rate.96  
   In general, however, the banks settled down to regular weekly 
settlements, normally in gold. An important factor in the adoption of this 
practice in Sydney was the requirement of published returns. Being 
compelled to make up weekly balances, the banks preferred to show “coin 
and bullion” rather than “balances due from other banks”.97 From Sydney 
the Australasia succeeded in getting the practice copied in Hobart and 
Launceston.98 In Hobart the practice of the local banks had been to strike 
clearing balances daily, and to exchange receipts for the balances which 
were allowed to accumulate until they reached £1,000 when bullion was 
transferred.99 This was the earliest, and for several decades the nearest, 
approach to a clearing house for all participating banks.100  
   Clearing settlements were in coin and, as soon as imports of gold were 
sufficient, in sovereigns. On occasions there might be other modes. Apart 
from the special Adelaide case noted above, in Melbourne at first, with a 
shortage of coin, settlements were by specie or drafts on Sydney or 
Tasmania at the option of the debtor. The Australasia, which received the 
government account, sought to exploit the situation by insisting on coin; it 
failed to gain any advantage because the government account was divided, 
but it achieved the extension of the Sydney system of weekly specie 
payments,101 and the general adoption of the firm convention that gold 
should be used for inter-bank payments.102  
(c) Agencies 
   With the appearance of banks in the various colonies and in country 
towns within those colonies, mutual agency arrangements were an 
inevitable development, as much for the clearing of notes issued by or 
cheques drawn on distant banks as for “exchange” business in the sense of 
the issue of drafts on other centres. The first of these arrangements were 
those between the Derwent and Cornwall in Tasmania, with their 
chequered story,103 but the pattern became normal. The Van Diemen's Land 
had earlier acted for a brief period as agent of the Cornwall for the cashing 
of notes which residents remitted to Hobart, but soon substituted the 
cashing of drafts issued by the Cornwall.104 During its brief career the Port 
Phillip Bank had mutual agencies with the Australia105 in Sydney, with the 
Derwent106 and with Archers Gilles & Co.107 in Launceston, being chosen 
obviously because the only other banks in Melbourne, the Union and 
Australasia, were also operating in Sydney, Launceston and Hobart, and 
competitors were unwelcome as agents. The Bank of South Australia 
initially had branches of the Union as its agents in other colonies, and acted 
for them in Adelaide,108 but when the latter bank opened there, the South 
Australia sought new arrangements with the New South Wales in Sydney 
and the Commercial of Tasmania in that colony,109 and the Union joined 
the Australasia as a competitor in all colonies, except Western Australia, 
and therefore outside the growing network of agencies. Even Western 
Australia was drawn in with arrangements between the Western Australian 
Bank and the Bank of South Australia.110  
   In all these agreements the terms were similar: each party cashed notes of 
the other, accepted cheques for collection, bought and sold drafts on the 
other, and performed ad hoc services.111 Debits and credits carried the same 
rate of interest,112 usually the normal short-term bill rate, and balances were 
allowed to accumulate to some pre-arranged limit. As banks spread, so the 
network extended, so that by the mid-'forties anyone resident in a centre 
where there was a bank (or having a bank account) could remit to any of 
the colonies to anyone in a similar position with comparative ease, and 
could safely accept payment by cheque or draft on a distant bank—subject 
to the normal business risk of the drawer's ability to pay.  
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Chapter 15 Government Policy and Legislation on 
Banking 
   So far as there was any active policy in relation to banking which found 
expression in legislative restrictions it was English and not local policy. 
Local governments would probably not, in any case, have been permitted 
to develop policies markedly different from the doctrines currently 
accepted in England. There, in domestic banking affairs, the period studied 
coincides roughly with the interval between the Bank Restriction and the 
1844 Bank Act, characterized by the transition from a passive attitude to 
acceptance of the view that some active monetary policy was essential and 
the 1844 victory for the policy of minimum interference and automatism. 
In colonial policy the later stages of the period saw the emergence of an 
attitude to colonial banks which, as enshrined in the Colonial Bank 
Regulations, reflected the same ideas as those behind domestic English 
legislation.1 Outside these regulations, the British government developed a 
definite but simple policy on government banking business in the colonies, 
and for the rest contented itself with intervening only to prevent the 
legalizing of banking business regarded as improper, as in its disallowance 
of formal authority for the Bathurst Bank to lend on real estate.  
   The policies of colonial governments had to be formulated against this 
background. Moreover, governors and members of legislative councils 
were men of their time, and mostly staunch adherents of non-intervention. 
Gipps, for instance, declared “the principle that all trade no less in money 
than anything else should be left unshackled and unrestricted”,2 and other 
governors expressed similar views. In any case, the composition of 
legislative councils was such that once banks appeared, a majority of 
members were at least shareholders, if not directors, in banks, and most 
were indirectly interested as traders. At times the power was used crudely 
and openly. In debates on the Union Bank bill in 1839 Gipps bluntly 
reminded the Council that only himself and the Bishop of Australia were 
not directly interested parties;3 on another occasion in 1843 he hinted 
plainly enough that the banks were influencing votes by reminding 
members of their indebtedness.4 In South Australia both Gawler and Grey 
complained of the influence exerted on the government by the banks,5 
while the activities of the Derwent Bank were notorious.6  
   While therefore colonial governments implemented, not always with 
enthusiasm or vigour, British instructions, their own policies were naturally 
enough those of aid and non-restriction. The aid was forthcoming when 
banks found themselves in difficulties, as with the Bank of New South 
Wales in 1826 and 1828; or the facility with which the Bank of Australia 
lottery secured legal sanction; or in the placing of large cash deposits at the 
disposal of the banks in the thirties; or, as will be seen, in non-compliance 
with or weakening of British instructions. Its other chief form lay in the 
passage of acts simplifying legal proceedings, which made practicable 
joint-stock ventures by large numbers of partners.7  
   The first such act, that for the Bank of Australia in 1827, was on the 
model followed consistently until the 'forties.8 The essential point in all of 
them was the provision that the bank concerned might sue or be sued in the 
name of a specified public officer, a valuable privilege which carried no 
other obligation than that of recording officially the names of the public 
officer concerned and the directors. Without such a provision large 
partnerships were impracticable since in any legal proceedings it would 
have been necessary to join each of a large number of partners whose 
shares could and did change hands privately and publicly without any 
ceremony; in the Australia case, as the act recites, there were even then 
more than a hundred shareholders some of whom lived in England and 
many outside Sydney.  
   Thereafter, with the exception of the Australasia which enjoyed a royal 
charter, every bank secured its act in New South Wales, Tasmania and 
South Australia. Western Australia followed the unusual course of a 
general act, although the difference was formal, and in practice 
unimportant, since only one bank operated under it.9 These acts, it must be 
noted, gave no other privileges (although no doubt some prestige) than that 
of simplified legal proceedings. Incorporation and limited liability were 
privileges which colonial legislatures would not have been permitted to 
grant at a time when they were jealously restricted in England, and the acts 
normally contained a denial of these privileges.10  
   It is necessary to realize that limited liability had a different aspect for 
the English banks and for their colonial competitors. To prospective 
English investors in distant and often unknown colonies it was almost 
essential as an assurance of limited commitments, and therefore the Bank 
of Australasia based its plans from the start on a charter; the South 
Australian Company did likewise, although its charter was delayed, and the 
later separated Bank of South Australia secured a charter as quickly as 
possible; the Union Bank was fortunate in succeeding despite a refusal of a 
like privilege. But to colonial investors of the time, and still more of the 
place, the limited risks of shareholders were less important than the limited 
rights of creditors, especially depositors. The twentieth century has 
reversed the emphasis, but the contemporary discussion of the advantages 
of unlimited liability was sound enough, for the advantages were not solely 
to creditors but also to shareholders, in the very important negative sense 
that an association of local men who limited their liability would be viewed 
with suspicion. Much of the newspaper reference to the strength and 
security of the partnership colonial banks, by contrast with the Australasia, 
could be written off as special pleading inspired by the fear of competition, 
but it had a basis of truth.11  
Government Banking Business 
   An incidental result of the inquiry into the Bank of New South Wales 
affairs in 1826 was the discovery that the Colonial Treasurer was using 
government funds to his own profit, with the consequent adoption of a 
policy of government hoarding which was to have long-term results.  
   The Board of Inquiry found that Balcombe, the Colonial Treasurer, had, 
on the board's appointment, hastily deposited in his account with the bank 
amounts totalling $96,743, his balance having been a mere $2,722.12 He 
then drew a cheque and had it “accepted” by the cashier of the bank, 
slightly exceeding his credit, to place in the Treasury to balance his books 
there.13 Darling commented: “It is impossible to account for his having 
placed this money in an establishment apparently on the very verge of 
bankruptcy, otherwise than by supposing, as it was not forthcoming when 
the inspection of the Treasury took place, that his intention was to conceal 
the fact of his having been in the habit of discounting the bills of 
individuals, hoping, as may be presumed, that the money appearing to be in 
the Bank at the time of the examination of that establishment, that his 
previous transactions would not be enquired into or discovered.”14 
Balcombe, challenged to explain his depositing in a bank in danger and his 
using public money for private profit, claimed that his instructions required 
him only to produce funds “at a moment's notice”, and that his discounting 
was merely a form of safe deposit which he had adopted, after a recent 
robbery, in preference to hiding the funds under his bed.15  
   The episode itself was trivial; the reaction in England was a set of 
instructions for the local treasury which entailed that the government hold 
the major part of its balance in hard cash, which, in the 'thirties, was to 
mean that the Treasury acted unwillingly and to some extent unconsciously 
as a brake on the boom. The instructions16 required that all sums collected 
by officials be paid to the Treasury promptly—weekly for Sydney 
collections and monthly for out-stations—and placed in a three-lock vault, 
keys being held severally by the Treasurer, Auditor and Colonial Secretary, 
to be used only on a governor's warrant. The Treasurer was permitted to 
hold cash for his immediate needs for payments under £5 and was to 
maintain an account at each of the two banks, “so long as they remain in 
credit and their notes payable in metallic currency upon demand”. All 
payments over £5 were to be by cheques upon those accounts, distributing 
business as far as practicable equally. Should the balance in either bank 
exceed £5,000, or the Treasurer's holdings £10,000, the surplus was to be 
deposited in the vault.  
   The sum of £10,000 which is to be suffered to remain as the balance of 
the Treasurer's accounts in the two banks, should be considered as the 
maximum which should so remain; and . . . if upon any monthly account 
the balance should be reduced even considerably below that amount, the 
vault should not be opened to make up the balance to that or any other 
given amount unless you shall be satisfied that the same will be actually 
wanted to pay the current demands upon the Treasurer before the 
commencement of the ensuing month.  
   Bathurst made it clear that the purpose was not merely to prevent the 
improper private use of public funds, but also to ensure that the 
government did not provide the cash base for expansion of bank loans.17  
   There the matter rested until in 1831 the British Treasury, considering 
deposit of Commissariat funds in colonial banks, sought information from 
governors as to “the constitution, regulations, capitals and resources of the 
several banking establishments at present existing in those colonies, and . . 
. the nature and extent of the securities they might be prepared to offer”. It 
was added, “As such an arrangement would naturally conduce in a certain 
degree to an increase of the paper issues of the respective banks, it is 
particularly important to obtain precise information as to the principles 
upon which those issues are regulated; and it is also desirable to learn what 
accommodations or benefits, superior to those granted to private 
depositors, the Banks might be disposed to afford to the public in 
consideration of the larger amount of the funds that might be expected to 
be entrusted to them on the behalf of the Government”.18  
   This was followed by endorsement of Darling's action in re-establishing 
the limited government deposit in the Bank of New South Wales which 
was accompanied by the requirement of published returns as the price of 
the deposit:  
   it would be no less advisable that this statement [the half-yearly returns 
reported by Darling] should not only be transmitted to the Governor, but 
should also be published for the information of the community at large. It 
is right that those who would be so deeply affected by the mismanagement 
of these establishments should have the fullest means of judging whether 
their business has been properly conducted, and you will not, therefore, in 
any manner afford the countenance of the Government to any banking 
establishment which shall decline to comply with this rule, which 
experience has proved to be so greatly to the advantage of all parties 
concerned.19  
   Despite the fact that both banks in New South Wales agreed to 
publication of returns, they were not published for another five years;20 
nevertheless, the principle enunciated was, from this time on, a settled 
British policy; taking a government deposit carried the liability to supply 
returns for publication.  
   Darling's reply to the request for information was not very illuminating.21 
The Banks of New South Wales and of Australia were prepared to accept 
deposits but would give no interest. The security each offered was “the 
credit of the establishment”, which Darling considered sufficient since they 
were partnerships composed of “the most wealthy inhabitants”. (He had a 
conveniently short memory as to the Bank of New South Wales.) He 
missed entirely the point of the inquiry as to the issue of notes, which he 
answered: “It appears that the issue of notes is regulated only by the 
demands of the public for them, and that an increase of deposits would not 
materially conduce to an increase of paper issues.”22  
   In Tasmania Arthur was, as usual, thorough and systematic in inquiry 
and report,23 and it is possible to get a clear picture of the situation. Prior to 
the establishment of the Derwent Bank the government account had been 
kept in the Van Diemen's Land.24 After the dispute over discrimination in 
favour of the Derwent Bank, already discussed, the practice was for 
government officers handling funds to hold a minimum of £5,000 in the 
notes of each of the Van Diemen's Land and Derwent which was 
equivalent to a fixed deposit, free of interest, of this sum. The request of 
John Dunn for equal privileges for the Commercial Bank was repeatedly 
refused on “the opinion of this government that the Colonial Treasurer 
should not take the notes of private bankers”.25  
   Since the inquiry from England related to Commissariat deposits, a 
Board of Inquiry was constituted from officers to report on the desirability 
of depositing in the banks.26 The Derwent and Van Diemen's Land Banks 
offered to take £10,000 each at 5 per cent payable half-yearly and reckoned 
on the daily balance;27 the Commercial Bank offered 71/2 per cent on the 
whole deposit,28 while the Cornwall offered none.29 The Board reported 
against making deposits because of the excessive demands for bills on the 
Treasury which they foresaw would follow, and because they expected a 
large increase in bank lending to follow the accession of cash.30 To the first 
of these the banks replied that the Commissariat should announce publicly 
that bills would not be offered in excess of weekly cash needs and the 
banks would undertake to resell bills at the premium which they 
themselves obtained.31 
 
   Arthur supported the banks and criticized the Report on the grounds that 
the problem of excess demand for bills on the Treasury had been solved by 
the bank proposal, and that the Board's fears of overlending were 
misplaced, since the banks could be trusted to look after their own 
interests.32 The Board, however, was not intimidated and reiterated its 
views,33 and Arthur referred the question to England so far as it concerned 
Commissariat deposits.34 But locally the banks maintained their pressure 
for the deposit of colonial funds, the Derwent and Van Diemen's Land 
offering to take each £5,000 at 5 per cent subject to three months' notice, 
provided each also received a “floating balance” of £5,000.35 In October 
1832 this plan was adopted with the addition that in future the Treasurer 
was not to hold £10,000 in bank notes but to exchange them regularly for 
specie.36 In practice this amounted to giving each a fixed deposit of 
£10,000 at an average interest of 21/2 per cent, for the “floating balance” 
was not allowed to fall below £5,000.37  
   Consideration in England of the evidence as to the situation in the 
colonies was delayed by discussion of the questions of principle involved 
in the grant of a charter to the Bank of Australasia. The Treasury endorsed 
Arthur's arrangements, subject to the publication of half-yearly averages of 
the statements which the Van Diemen's Land and Derwent were to make 
available to the Governor, and indicated that on the banks agreeing the 
Treasury would sanction the deposit of Commissariat funds with them.38 It 
was decided, further, that when the Bank of Australasia opened in New 
South Wales the banks in that colony should be required, as a condition of 
retaining government deposits, also to supply returns for publication.39  
   These instructions had not been received by Bourke, Darling's successor, 
before the establishment of the Commercial Bank led him to lodge £5,000 
in that bank and to forecast a similar deposit in the Australasia when it 
commenced.40 This was Bourke's interpretation of the 1826 instructions for 
a deposit of £5,000 in each of the local banks, then only two. But he was 
uneasy at the accumulation of specie in the Treasury vault, which he 
attributed to his disinclination at a time of “very considerable expenditure 
of private capital . . . to have added considerably to the cost of mechanical 
skill and labour by entering into competition with individuals”.41 The reply 
by implication approved of the policy of giving all banks an equal share, 
but went on to apprize the officers administering the Government of New 
South Wales and Van Diemen's Land that in all arrangements relating to 
the employment of local banks, they are to consult the exigencies of the 
public service and the proper accommodation of the public departments 
and subject to the regulation respecting the publication of explicit 
periodical statements of assets and liabilities, and to the obviously 
indispensable preliminary requisite of the undoubted credit of the 
establishment; that they are to avail themselves of the assistance of those 
banks which may offer the most unquestionable security and the most 
advantageous terms for the deposit of the public business. In regulating the 
amount of any deposits with the banks or the conditions on which they are 
to be held, the Governors must be guided solely by considerations of public 
convenience; and although they should be enjoined to take especial care 
that no undue preference is shown to any of the legally constituted banking 
establishments within their respective governments, they are not to extend 
the public banking transactions in any manner that may involve deposits of 
public money to an inconvenient amount.42  
   In New South Wales these instructions had two results. Publication of 
returns began and was insisted upon to the point of temporarily depriving 
the Australasia of its government deposit until it agreed to supply, in 
addition to the returns required by its charter, separate returns in the form 
prescribed for colonial banks.43 The other was an increase, made as a 
deliberate decision of policy, in the size of government deposits which, as 
they grew over the next four years, provided an expanding cash base for 
the inflation of bank loans. Bourke's first step was to inquire what rate of 
interest the banks would give, and on receiving similar offers of 21/2 per 
cent, the rate allowed the Commissariat, from all four banks (New South 
Wales, Australia, Commercial and Australasia), directed the Colonial 
Treasurer to deposit £12,500 in each, and to use these accounts for all 
future receipts and payments.44  
   The next step derived from the rapid accumulation of specie in the 
Treasury against which the banks complained, urging that steps be taken to 
release it for general circulation; suggesting various ways: suspension of 
sales of land; acceptance of tenders for public works “even at a high rate”; 
assisted immigration; all government payments in specie; an interest-free 
loan to the banks.45 Bourke yielded temporarily by directing that (from 2 
November 1836) no more specie should be placed in the vault which then 
held £218,000, half the estimated total in the colony. But he felt “much at a 
loss how to proceed” for the future. He was not prepared to spend money 
on public works at high prices. The accumulation was mainly due to land 
sales to stop which “would either check the extension of a most profitable 
pursuit, the depasturing of flocks and herds, or augment the unauthorized 
occupation of Crown Lands to a most inconvenient degree”. Reduction of 
other revenue was impossible since the only large item was the duty on 
spirits, reducing which was “a measure as yet quite uncalled for upon any 
other grounds and might be injurious to morals and policy”. The only 
expenditure he had found practicable was that on bounties on immigration, 
although he proposed to use “all favourable opportunities for returning to 
the public” accumulated surpluses.46 The immigration-bounty plan did 
absorb considerable funds, but Bourke was not required to resolve his 
perplexity; he was succeeded by Gipps who was averse neither to large 
expenditure nor to large balances in the banks.  
   In Tasmania there was no such boom in revenue (land sales were small 
because of Arthur's great alienations in 1831–247 ); before long the colonial 
government was borrowing from the Commissariat and the Commercial 
Bank. But the British instructions of July 1835 provided full authority for 
the exclusion from government banking of the Commercial and the 
Australasia. The scheme for restricting the business to the Van Diemen's 
Land and Derwent nevertheless had to survive a minor local challenge and 
an apparent threat from overseas.  
   The local challenge was a proposal by the Treasurer that all government 
transactions be in cash, but its obvious inconveniences led to its being 
dropped.48 The apparent threat was the rumour that the British government 
was giving exclusive rights to government banking business to the 
Australasia. For this there was some foundation: the Bank had 
contemplated asking for the privilege and had only abandoned the idea as a 
matter of temporary diplomacy;49 the story was spread by Potter Macqueen 
who had left London while it was still under discussion.50 Arthur forecast 
the stand which he would take: he would give the business to the new 
company, unless directed to do so, only if it offered better terms than the 
Van Diemen's Land and Derwent.51 The July 1835 instructions came after 
the assurance that there was no intention of giving the Australasia a 
monopoly of government business,52 but it was left to Franklin, Arthur's 
successor, to implement the interpretation of the instructions which Arthur 
foreshadowed in reporting his acquiescence in all the local banks sharing in 
the government deposit on the same terms as the Van Diemen's Land and 
Derwent.53 Franklin made no secret of his dislike of the Australasia and his 
fear of the effect of its exchange transactions on the sale of Commissariat 
bills, and, stressing the limited liability and mainly absentee shareholders 
of the Australasia, steadfastly refused a deposit, although the Commercial 
was at last given one.54 Spring Rice in England refused to intervene.55 
Meanwhile instructions had been received, following Arthur's reference to 
England in May 1832, for the deposit of Commissariat funds in the local 
banks, and Arthur had informed the Van Diemen's Land and Derwent with 
the comforting assurance that the Australasia was to have no privileges.56  
   The next development derived from an application by the new Colonial 
Bank in Hobart for its share in the deposit of colonial funds. Franklin 
objected, partly because of its small paid-up capital, partly because he 
believed an automatic agreement would amount to a bounty on bank 
flotations, partly because too many public accounts were a nuisance.57 The 
Colonial Office reply went further than he asked and applied also to New 
South Wales.58 Each governor was directed to “abstain from employing any 
additional banks for the deposit of the balances belonging to the Colonial 
Chest, without having first obtained the sanction of Her Majesty's 
Government”. Moreover, Franklin was directed to insist that 5 per cent 
interest must be obtained on colonial funds as it was already on deposits of 
the Commissariat, a demand “founded on a public notice issued by these 
banks stating their readiness to allow interest at the rate of 5 per cent on 
any sums that might be deposited with them by private individuals”. No 
relaxation of requirements about publication of returns was to be allowed 
as the price of interest. Gipps, having no new banks to worry about and 
having already gone further than England in the matter of returns, had no 
action to take, and in 1843 simply reported “a balance in, and a current 
account with, each of the principal banks in the colony”.59 He had already 
insisted on the government deposits carrying, instead of 21/2 per cent, the 
rates given to private depositors: 4 per cent on the daily balance of current 
accounts and 7 per cent on deposits subject to three months' notice.60  
   Franklin, however, changed his mind about the Colonial Bank and gave 
it a share and at the same time reported having made to all the banks an 
offer in terms already suggested by Dunn of the Commercial Bank: the 
government would be content with no interest if all deposit interest was 
abolished and the discount rate reduced to 8 per cent.61 This was Franklin's 
substitute for the usury law for which he was being pressed and which he 
had refused to sanction.62 The British Treasury, while blessing his attitude 
to a usury law, gave short shrift to his plan for reducing interest. He was 
directed that he was to insist upon 5 per cent on government deposits and 
withdraw in specie, for deposit in the Treasury, balances in any bank which 
declined. Once a bank was so excluded from sharing in the deposits, it was 
not again to be admitted without English authority. Conditions for holding, 
a deposit were made more onerous involving government right of 
inspection and the amounts were, in any case, to be reduced to what was 
sufficient for current payments only, the surplus being deposited in the 
Treasury.63 These instructions paid no regard to conditions in the island, 
where depression had reduced the deposits to a size which made them of 
little importance to the banks, and the payment of such interest impossible. 
Accordingly the banks jointly refused to pay any interest and surrendered 
their deposits.64 For some years the Tasmanian government had no other 
bank account except its cash credit with the Commercial, as a reward for 
which assistance that bank became the sole depository.65 
 
   Franklin's report on the Colonial Bank had meanwhile produced separate 
instructions to the Commissariat officers in both New South Wales and 
Van Diemen's Land.66 “A needless multiplication of accounts, an increased 
risk of mistake, and a necessity on the part of the Commissary of keeping 
all the different balances as nearly as possible at the same amount in order 
to prevent the imputation of unfairness' were cited as objections to keeping 
accounts in several banks. The two Commissaries were accordingly 
directed to use banks (if they were willing) in annual rotation according to 
date of establishment, holding only a small balance on current account, free 
of interest, never to exceed £5,000. Thus at the very bottom of the 
depression both colonial and Commissariat funds had to be held in hard 
cash out of the banks, on English instructions which were framed by 
Treasury officers unaware of the depression, remedy of which would have 
dictated the opposite policy.67  
   In South Australia from the beginning the Bank of South Australia held 
the accounts of the Colonization Commissioners and of the local 
government.68 But in 1843 Grey was angered by the discovery that the 
bank held £9,000 to the credit of the Colonization Commissioners which 
should have been remitted to England. The bank had kept silent about the 
amount, while taking Grey's bills at a discount, and refused to pay it to the 
Colonial Revenue account, arguing that it was held as security against 
Gawler's dishonoured bills, and later disputing as to whether it was really 
held by the South Australian Company or the now separate Bank of South 
Australia.69 Grey's complaint crossed authorization from England to use 
any bank he chose for government business, the exclusive agency for the 
Colonization Commissioners held by the Bank of South Australia having 
been terminated.70  
   This permitted the exaction of a penalty. The Land Fund, which was a 
transient deposit remitted to England for immigration payments, was 
divided between the Australasia and the South Australia, but all other 
government business was given to the Australasia.71 In 1845, however, 
Robe was disturbed at the extent to which land sales maintained a 
continuously high balance which provided the cash base for speculative 
finance of the mining boom, and he determined to hold all land receipts in 
specie. To avoid public misconceptions he agreed to accept bank notes at 
sales, on condition that the banks undertook to convert them on demand. 
(He planned, without telling the banks, to present all notes in excess of 
£1,000.)72 These arrangements were approved in England.73 An application 
for a share in government business by the Bank of South Australia was 
refused on the ground that it was not a chartered bank,74 and, that objection 
being removed, a second application was rejected, first because of the 
waste of two accounts, and secondly because of the episode of the £9,000. 
“When once a banking establishment has employed its power to control the 
acts of a government that has employed it”, wrote Robe, “it is no longer 
entitled to any further share of the confidence of that government.”75 But 
by 1851 the local government was prepared to let bygones be bygones and 
adopted the policy of using each of the two chartered banks in turn.76  
   There were occasions when colonial governments sought loans from 
banks, but these raised no special problems or issues of policy. All were 
isolated instances of borrowing to cover short-term needs. Thus in 1844 the 
New South Wales Commissariat sought a cash credit of £60,000 to obviate 
the necessity of drawing bills at unfavourable rates,77 and the same type of 
loan was discussed as an alternative to the issue of colonial debentures in 
1841.78 The Bank of South Australia advanced £10,000 secured by three 
months promissory notes,79 and there were other such episodes. They were 
more common in Tasmania where the government repeatedly sought aid 
from the Commissariat and the banks during the middle 'forties to cover 
deficits, with the unwilling acquiescence of the British government.80  
   Radical reform of the banking system during the depression was not 
seriously considered; even the modest proposal for a government bank 
with a monopoly of note issue, though ably argued by a number of 
pseudonymous writers, was never an active issue. Nevertheless, the views 
of these writers have a modern ring and illustrate the reaction of critics of 
the system.  
   First in point of time was “Scrutator” who started from premises that 
“money in its character, with regard to commercial transactions, differs 
materially from every other commodity” and derived its value “from a 
universal conventional law of society, maintained and enforced by the 
government of every country”. In New South Wales, however, the 
government allowed fluctuations in value to occur according to “the 
discretion of the comptrollers of a half-dozen manufactories called 
banks”.81  
   So long as the the smashers (banks as they are called) of this place have 
the power of expanding and contracting the measure of value, or, in plainer 
terms, so long as there be a privileged few who are authorized to pluck the 
many by dealing in variable weights and measures, and, strange to say—
yet not more strange than true—make the very persons so dealt with, pay 
then for practising this iniquity, this colony will have to undergo a 
periodical depletion, to satisfy the cankerous cravings of insatiable 
avarice . . . The power of coining, or what is in effect the same thing, of 
making money ought never to be delegated to others [than the 
Government], especially when a piece of paper can be converted into a 
pound with a farthing's worth of labour, and five shillings' worth of credit; 
as well might the Government confer the power to levy taxes on the 
community to a company of consuming adventurers as concede the 
authority of unlimited coining to the Sydney banks.82  
   This was closely followed by the ranting of Mr. Justice Willis of 
Melbourne who produced in October a plan, “strongly illustrative of the 
harangues which [he was] in the habit of delivering from the bench”, for 
exclusive government note issue.83  
   These assaults prompted a series of letters from “A True Briton” who 
urged a government bank, capitalized at £1 million, with the sole right of 
issue of notes, which should be legal tender, and convertible in amounts 
not less than £1,000 to £2,000. This bank he proposed should lend on 
land.84 Such a bank was the best means of reducing interest: he suggested 
to 5 per cent on mortgages and bills.85 “Why should private moneyed 
powers be permitted to spring up and enslave a whole colony, and blast its 
fair prospects as often as they will?”86 A third propagandist, “F.E.”, urged 
the establishment of a bank on something like Bank of England lines, with 
a monopoly of note issue.87 These notes, he urged, should depreciate 5 per 
cent each year to prevent hoarding.88 “The paper currency of a country 
should be solely a government one, in all its international aspects, a ‘legal 
tender’ rateable in current wealth with, but irredeemable by, gold, except at 
the option of the government.”89  
   We have here no “national debt”, no “stock”, no “funds”, no “consols”; 
and as his Excellency might emphatically express himself “no nothing” 
wherein a prudent merchant can invest his surplus funds. A joint-stock 
bank is, therefore, all he has to trust to—a bank, which, in its most perfect 
state, is altogether based upon an erroneous system of banking, and, as 
experience bears witness to us here, is adequate to no other purpose than a 
“loan company”, to the ruin of the shareholders, the depreciation of 
property, and the confusion of all mercantile transactions; but all this the 
superintendence of a Government control might easily and effectually 
prevent. One thing I would wish most seriously to impress upon the minds 
of all who give this subject their consideration, viz., the absolute necessity 
of abolishing the system of a private bank issue, and the substitution of a 
government paper currency . . . Let the government then so come forward 
for our good. Let it issue its colonial Bank notes—let it abolish the right of 
private issue—let there be none other than Government paper mediums—
one sole controlling power to investigate these Bank accounts, their 
“discounts”, “deposits”, “securities”, and “bullion”. Let it make its notes 
for such time as our wants require and its means will allow a legal tender—
and the very root of our evils will be undermined, the effects of our present 
depression alleviated, and its original cause, Bank speculation, imprudent 
and ruinous discounting, would be for the future obviated.  
   This National Bank, as a measure of immediate relief, was to lend on 
mortgage at 71/2 per cent with annual repayments spread over forty years.90 
There was a petition from the Hunter District for a government bank, 
which the Council received,91 and John Curr had a more elaborate scheme 
for a bank issuing notes “secured on the waste lands of the colony” for the 
purpose of executing public works.92  
   Despite the cautious support of Wentworth,93 such national bank plans 
did not become practical politics; the colonists wanted immediate relief, 
not long-term reform, and turned to interest reduction, government 
mortgage loans, and new modes of borrowing for squatters. Some 
newspaper debate followed an 1847 proposal by a correspondent of the 
Sydney Herald94 while in 1850 Wentworth, as a member of the Select 
Committee on Banking, again toyed with the idea.95 It is possible that the 
private banks would not have objected to a Government bank of issue only, 
since they were by no means sure that the issue of notes was then as 
profitable as it had been,96 but the question was not yet one of practical 
politics. The idea of a government or “national” bank, however, lived on in 
the literature of discontent, to find its ultimate realization in the foundation 
of the Commonwealth Bank.97 The true origin of the idea was clearly a 
somewhat confused notion of the Bank of England as a note issue 
authority, and in this origin is some part of the explanation of the emphasis 
on note issue in the final stages of the campaign which produced the 
Commonwealth Bank. In this discussion of a government bank and the 
intermittent references to the relationship between total bank loans and 
government holdings of coin the colonies made the nearest approach, a 
very remote one, to any consideration of central banking even of the most 
primitive sort.  
Colonial Bank Regulations of 1840 
   The protracted discussions of a decade reached final form in Colonial 
Bank Regulations circulated to colonial governors in May 1840.98 These 
laid down the following requirements for banks operating in the colonies: 
capital should be a determinate amount and must be fully subscribed within 
a period not exceeding eighteen months; until capital was fully subscribed 
and half paid up business was not to commence; capital was to be fully 
paid up normally within two years. Total debts owed by the bank were not 
to exceed three times the paid up capital leaving out of account such 
deposits as were made “in specie or government paper”. All notes were to 
be payable on demand in specie at the place of issue, failure to do so for a 
total of sixty days in any year entailing forfeiture of incorporation, and 
notes were to be for not less than £1. If the bank became insolvent, 
shareholders should be liable for not less than twice their subscriptions. A 
bank might not hold its own shares or lend against them; loans to directors 
or officers must not exceed one-third of total loans; advances against real 
estate, ships or merchandise were to be prohibited, as was trade except in 
precious metals. Dividends could be made only out of profits. Returns in a 
prescribed form (that required in the Australasia charter) were to be 
supplied half-yearly and yearly for publication. Capital increases might be 
provided for subject to approval by the British Treasury.99  
   No new views on banking were embodied in these regulations; they were 
in substance the conditions imposed on the Bank of Australasia seven years 
earlier. Nor did the accompanying one-sentence despatch make plain to 
governors how far new policy was involved. The Regulations were 
described as “certain rules and conditions prescribed by the Lords 
Commissioners of the Treasury for observance in Charters or Legislative 
Enactments for incorporating Banking Companies in the Colonies”. But 
the words “prescribed” and “observance” were softened by the statement 
that the regulations were forwarded for “your information and guidance, 
and that of the Legislative Bodies and Local Authorities in the Colony 
under your Government”. Any governor might be excused for being a little 
uncertain as to whether he was required to act, and if so whether he was 
required to insist on these conditions in future bank acts (the Regulations 
were silent on the past), or merely to urge their observance.  
   In practice the effect of the Regulations in the Australian colonies during 
the six years of their operation, 1840–46, was negligible. This was not 
solely due to the fact that the only new bank of local origin was the 
Western Australian, which was established under that colony's 1837 Act. 
The governors of New South Wales and Tasmania at least thought some 
show of retrospective application was necessary. In Tasmania the 
procedure followed was to repeal all the individual bank acts and to 
substitute a general joint-stock companies act. As originally drafted this 
would have done no more than permit companies to sue and be sued in the 
name of a public officer without having an individual act.100 But the revised 
version as passed included special clauses for banks echoing some of the 
regulations.101 A bank was not to operate until half its capital was paid up 
(the other capital clauses of the regulations would have been embarrassing 
to several of the banks); quarterly returns, not averages, and less 
informative than the form in the regulations, were required of note-issuing 
banks (the Derwent thus being exempt); and notes issued at a branch were 
to carry the name of the branch and to be payable there or at head office. 
None of the other restrictions set out in the regulations were included and 
the passage of the bill was not contentious.  
   Gipps in New South Wales followed a different course. It is at least 
possible102 that he was aware of the terms of the regulations when in 
August 1840 he introduced a bill to require improved bank returns, but 
which did not cover any of the other matters in the regulations.103 The 
regulations (whatever the time at which he received them) were ignored 
until a year later when he tabled them in the Council, with a commentary 
which can hardly be regarded as sincere.104 The regulations, he said, were 
inapplicable since no banks had local charters; this was relying on a narrow 
meaning of the word and in any case ignored the phrase which followed it 
in both the regulations and the covering despatch, “or legislative 
enactments”. The colony, he said, had legislation more far-reaching than 
the regulations, except in the requirement that all capital be paid up within 
two years. This was simple untruth, for none of the local bank acts went 
beyond simplifying legal proceedings. Finally, said Gipps, the recent act of 
1840 already required a return similar to that in the regulations. This was 
the only true statement he made, and the whole performance, coupled with 
the dates involved, warrants a belief that his 1840 Act was to forestall 
regulations the general terms of which were known. In any event nothing 
was done to apply the regulations to existing banks and no new ones were 
formed.  
   In South Australia there was more excuse since of the two banks existing 
at the time the regulations were received the Australasia operated under its 
English charter and the South Australia was still part of the South 
Australian Company. When the South Australia separated two years later it 
was still an English company and all that was needed in the colony was an 
act facilitating local legal proceedings. Accordingly the governor contented 
himself with publishing the regulations “for general information”, and with 
securing returns from the South Australia by agreement.105 Western 
Australia had the most cause for action since it alone among the colonies 
had a general act for banking companies, imposing as practically the only 
obligation a requirement for returns on a scantier plan than those in the 
regulations. Moreover, within a few months of the receipt of the 
regulations a new bank was formed, the obvious occasion for application 
of the regulations. Not then, but the following year, the governor sought to 
introduce the type of return demanded in New South Wales, but was totally 
defeated, and the 1840 regulations were allowed to accumulate dust.106 This 
was the crudest case of local bankers preventing the operation of the 
regulations, but there can be little doubt that the show of action to little 
practical effect in New South Wales and Tasmania represented more 
skilful exercise of the same influence.  
   This effective evasion of unwanted restrictions drew no comment from 
England, and local criticism of the banks in depression spent itself in other 
directions, especially in the attempts to secure a usury law.107 Proposals for 
any form of control of banks were unimportant, a fair sample being a 
motion by one Hagen in the South Australian Council “that a license of 
£50 should be required for banks issuing notes, but would not object to 
£100, because while they were making large profits they were protected by 
law, contributed nothing to the revenue, and were, therefore, fair subjects 
for taxation”.108 Local legislatures and local commercial opinion wanted no 
government control of banking.  
Colonial Bank Regulations of 1846 
   By 1846 the British Treasury had prepared a revised set of regulations 
with some minor variations of the 1840 set. The limit on total debts 
contracted by the bank was modified to exclude from “debts” all deposits, 
thus eliminating the curious and unworkable restriction to deposits made in 
specie or government paper. The direction to omit from charters and acts 
details of internal management was replaced by a requirement that 
adequate provision be made, either by recital of a deed of settlement or 
clauses for election of directors, for proper management. Otherwise the 
original regulations were continued with some important additions. The 
additions were: banks were to be incorporated, for a definite period of 
years normally not exceeding twenty-one, and note issue was not to exceed 
the amount of paid-up capital.109  
   The covering despatch left no room for doubt as to how governors were 
to act:  
   These regulations are forwarded to you, not of course as inflexible rules 
to be in all cases insisted on, but as embodying the general principles to be 
observed in the preparation of colonial acts for the incorporation of 
banking companies; and Her Majesty's Government consider a compliance 
with all the more material conditions and restrictions as of much 
importance to the security of the communities in which such banks may be 
established, and more especially to the poorer classes of such communities. 
I must, therefore, impress on you the necessity of using all your legitimate 
influence to procure their introduction into any bills which may be brought 
into the legislature of the colony under your Government, for the 
incorporation of banking companies; and with this view it might be well 
that you should communicate with the promoters of any such bills in which 
these conditions may be omitted, and point out to them that the instructions 
which you have received from Her Majesty's Government would place you 
under considerable difficulty in assenting to any such bill . . .  
   These directions clearly related to the future and were as precise as could 
be for instructions to be applied in diverse colonies.  
   Only in New South Wales, however, were there any important results.110 
In Western Australia the sole tangible result was an improved statistical 
return from the Western Australian Bank. In South Australia there was no 
immediate occasion to apply the regulations; the Bank of Australasia had 
an English charter and the Bank of South Australia was in process of 
receiving one, and in any case these were not new banks. When occasion 
did arise with the Union Bank in 1850 the regulations were ignored, and a 
simple legal proceedings act was passed.111 This might have been defended 
on the ground that the Union was incorporated under English law, but such 
a view is weakened by the act requiring returns in the prescribed form. In 
Tasmania the only result, there being no new bank to consider, was the 
resumption of publication of bank returns in a fuller form.112  
   The New South Wales position was different since there were first 
amending acts for the Commercial of Sydney and the Union, and then new 
acts for the reconstructed Commercial and New South Wales. The 
amending acts were of slight importance and show no trace of the 
regulations,113 but with the new Commercial Banking Company of Sydney 
Act of 1848 the regulations were fully implemented,114 for the act is, with 
the insertion of appropriate specific figures, a complete and faithful 
translation into statutory form of all the clauses in the regulations. It was 
followed two years later by a similar act for the Bank of New South 
Wales,115 the only other bank of local incorporation remaining.  
   New South Wales was distinguished too by a series of local moves, 
which came to nothing, against the banks. Discontent and hostility towards 
the banks had flared up in the depression and had simmered during the 
years of recovery. Formal attempts at action in the Council were prompted 
by the pressure for realization of the assets of the Bank of Australia after 
the Privy Council case, the action of the Australasia—required as a matter 
of business by its position and as a matter of law by its charter— of selling 
off properties taken in settlement of debts, and the collapse of the Royal 
Bank.  
   The first move was by James Martin who introduced a bill “to regulate 
banking in New South Wales” of which the main clauses provided: that 
returns distinguish New South Wales business from that of other colonies; 
that for amounts above £2 paid by a bank gold only should be legal tender; 
that “foreign” banks, defined so as to include the Australasia and Union, 
must hold a gold reserve of one-third of liabilities; that no bank should 
have more than five directors of whom not more than two should be 
merchants. After some skirmishing the bill was allowed to lapse at the first 
reading stage.116 Immediately T. Murray moved a resolution which would 
have required public deposits to be reserved for colonial banks and which 
he supported with a long attack on the “foreign” banks. His motion was 
lost by one vote only—the bank spokesmen could not be unanimous on 
this issue—and the Herald commented fairly that there was more to come; 
this was only “preparing the field for action”.117  
   The bankers evidently feared so too, for John Lamb, the bank director 
who had led the opposition to Martin and Murray, took the initiative by 
successfully proposing the time-honoured device for side-tracking 
reformers: a committee of inquiry, to include Martin and Murray. The 
terms of reference directed it to investigate “the system of banking now 
prevailing in the Colony”, and especially the adequacy of the form of 
return, the suitability of the several banks as holders of public funds, the 
“state of the currency”, and the need for legislation on note issue by banks 
and by individuals.118 As is the habit of committees of inquiry, it diligently 
accumulated a great deal of evidence of value to the student, but its report 
proposed no revolutions. No changes were needed in the law relating to 
currency and no action should be taken to prevent payment of wages by 
“orders”. So far as banking was concerned it was recommended that 
country storekeepers and others who issued notes should be obliged to 
make returns and that the ordinary bank returns should distinguish 
government deposits and government securities. Beyond that the 
committee saw no scope for state action, “a result”, said the Herald 
“which, while it is creditable to the discrimination and good sense of the 
Select Committee must be satisfactory to the colonial public, as showing 
that their monetary system is conducted in a way so safe, so prudent, so 
unobjectionable as to merit their entire confidence in the bodies who work 
it, as well as in the system itself”.119 Reforming zeal had spent itself in 
inquiry, and those who might not have shared this confidence were content 
to dissent in silence; the Council showed no interest in even the minor 
reforms proposed, and general legislation on banking was not discussed 
until the discovery of gold had completely altered both the dimensions and 
the nature of the issue.  
Legal Tender 
   The question of legal tender after the adoption of a sterling exchange 
standard does not seem to have been raised in Tasmania120 or Western 
Australia; in New South Wales and South Australia, where it was raised it 
was settled by custom and convenience not by law that the only legal 
tender was British silver coin, and that to any amount. The only legislation, 
the New South Wales act, 7 Geo. IV, No. 3 (1826) provided that British 
copper coin should be legal tender to one shilling, but was otherwise silent. 
No one bothered about the law until depression developed and even then 
interest was academic. An inquirer writing to the Sydney Herald in 1842 
asking whether bank notes above £5 must be paid in gold stirred no more 
than an editorial opinion that payment in coin was enough,121 and a year 
later the Herald could declare without exciting reply that there was no 
legal tender law in New South Wales.122 In that year the Committee on 
Monetary Confusion was repeatedly assured by the banks that so far as 
they knew the local legal tender was British silver coin, but they were 
vague as to statutory authority. A typical view was that of Griffiths, a 
director of the Union, and formerly Inspector of the Australasia: “The 
banks are not bound to pay in gold . . . I believe that to be the law; I believe 
silver is a legal tender to any extent . . . I am not able to speak as to any 
particular law; I believe the public has always considered that such was the 
case; all Commissariat transactions have invariably been in silver; and, in 
fact, I could not, now, purchase a Commissariat bill for gold under the 
Treasury regulations.”123  
   No one seemed to see any need to clarify the law, if there were one, or to 
fill the gap, if the view generally adopted was correct. Even when, two 
years later, a committee on the Masters and Servants Act brought to light a 
remarkable extension of the bankers' doctrine by the magistrates, a purely 
ad hoc enactment was thought sufficient. The “orders” by which wages 
were often paid, especially in the country, were frequently dishonoured, 
and the magistrates held, some of them unwillingly, that the giving of an 
“order” even if it were subsequently dishonoured, was a valid discharge of 
the debt, and an employee had no legal redress.124 An amending Act gave 
employees the right to sue for a dishonoured order,125 but the general 
question of legal tender was ignored.  
   No more practical results followed the questionings of the 1850 
Committee on Banking. The bankers, who had long been pondering the 
point, were still of the same view, with some show of legal authority. Knox 
of the Commercial insisted that he could pay his notes in gold or silver as 
he chose, supporting this with a flat denial that the English act of 1828 (9 
Geo. IV, c. 83) had extended British legislation, particularly 56 Geo. III, c. 
68, to the colony, and by the curious argument “By the 7 Geo. IV, No. 3 
British silver is made a legal tender for any amount of dollars; and if legal 
in payment for dollars then I think it is so for anything else”.126 Baillie of 
the Bank of New South Wales virtuously pointed out that his bank always 
paid in gold if requested but disowned legal obligation to do so, and 
became voluble in arguments against legislation to that effect. He too had a 
legal authority: the 1828 Act extended only laws which were applicable to 
the colony, and English law that gold was legal tender could not then have 
applied since there was little in the colony. Falconer, for the Australasia, 
merely denied any obligation to pay gold; while Miller of the Savings 
Bank held that both gold and silver were legal tender to any amount. 
Fletcher of the Union produced the ace of trumps, a formal opinion (dated 
in 1847) by a barrister, W. Foster.  
   Foster declared without argument that British gold coin was legal tender 
for any amount, an opinion in conflict with his following argument about 
silver, since that rested on the non-application of current British law to 
New South Wales. He quoted the New South Wales act of 1826 concerning 
copper coin, and devoted most space to an ingenious proof that silver was 
legal tender to any amount. The proof lay in ignoring the inconvenient Act 
of 1828 with its awkward extension of British laws to New South Wales; 
insisting that 56 Geo. III, c. 68 was explicitly limited to the United 
Kingdom; and dismissing, with a “no doubt”, “14 Geo. III, c. 42 and other 
statutes” by which England had limited the legal tender of silver. Having 
thus cleared away all limitations on the tender of silver in English law by 
transferring the argument to a period before Cook explored the Pacific, 
Foster arbitrarily applied English law of that period to New South Wales in 
1850. This was an ace indeed, for the banks were not only well-satisfied 
with things as they were, but nervously anxious to avoid the heavy cost of 
importing gold coin beyond the modest sums which they used between 
themselves for clearing. It is to be hoped that Mr Foster satisfied himself 
that the fee for this legal ingenuity was paid in legal tender.  
   In South Australia legal tender law did not exist, although by custom 
silver was treated as legal tender to any amount. The London office of the 
Bank of South Australia in 1845 directed the Adelaide office to pay in 
silver if possible, but sought advice as to the existence of any local law, 
receiving the correct reply that custom not law made silver legal tender to 
any amount.127 In 1848 the Australasia notified the Bank of South Australia 
that it had obtained legal advice that British silver was legal tender to any 
amount in either South Australia or New South Wales.128 There the point 
rested without, apparently, ever having been seriously challenged or 
decided in court.  
   It was left to the Order in Council of 16 October 1852 to put the matter 
beyond doubt in all four colonies by applying (current) British law under 
which silver was legal tender to 40s. only.  
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   Australian  
(a) Despatches 
   Historical Records of New South Wales, 7 vols.  
   Historical Records of Australia, Series I, 1788–1848, 26 vols.; Series III, 
1803–29, 6 vols.; Series IV, 1786–1827, 1 vol.  
   All published. Series I contains New South Wales despatches to 1848, in 
and out; Series III the same for Tasmania to 1827 and for Western 
Australia to 1829; and in Series IV the volume is the beginning of a 
collection of legal papers.  
Bigge, J. T., 
Reports:
(a) State of the Colony of New South Wales, 1822.  (b) Agriculture and Trade in New South Wales, 
1823.  (c) Judicial Establishments of New South Wales, 1823.
Evidence: Portions have been printed in H.R.A., relating to Tasmania and to judicial establishments. For the 
remainder copy used was Bonwick Transcript in Mitchell Library, cited as Manuscript Evidence.
   “Tasmanian Despatches”, MSS. in Chief Secretary's Archives, Hobart.  
   Used for period after 1827. They are bound in volumes which have been 
re-numbered following the discovery of new volumes. The only 
unambiguous number for all volumes is that used in the typed index which 
is not that on the spine of some of the volumes, but that written inside the 
front cover. This is the number used in references.  
   “South Australian Despatches”: Inwards, 1840–52; Outwards, 1837–52.  
   Copy used was typed transcript in Mitchell Library.  
   “Western Australian Despatches”.  
   Inwards: Two sets are available in Perth: (a) at Government House, the 
originals from 1829, in bundles, a few despatches and many enclosures 
missing; (b) Public Library, bound set of duplicates from 1834, filling 
some gaps in the first set, but many enclosures missing.  
   Outwards: Two sets of copies: (a) at Government House, the original 
letterbooks; indexed and complete, but enclosures were not copied; (b) 
Public Library, set of the original duplicates sent to the Colonial Office; 
most of the enclosures are missing.  
   (These are the poorest despatches of all the colonies; the Western 
Australian governors often did no more than transmit enclosures and none 
of them wrote at length on economic matters.)  
(b) Government Gazettes 
   New South Wales Government Gazette, 1833–52. From 1803 to 1832 the 
Sydney Gazette fulfilled this function, see below under newspapers.  
   Hobart Town Gazette, semi-official 1816–27, official 1828–52.  
   South Australian Government Gazette, 1839–52.  
   Western Australian Government Gazette, 1836–52.  
(c) Legislative Council Papers 
   Votes and Proceedings of the New South Wales Legislative Council, 
1824–52.  
   For 1824–37 these, prepared for publication all at one time, are almost 
entirely confined to a bare record of the formal proceedings. Thereafter 
they are much fuller and incorporate Reports of Select Committees and 
Statistical Registers.  
   Papers of the Legislative Council of Van Diemen's Land, 1840–52.  
   From 1833 Votes and Proceedings were printed in Hobart Town Gazette.  
   South Australian Parliamentary Papers, 1851.  
   Acts. The more important are listed in Teare's Digest, but see the 
comments below. They were normally printed in Government Gazettes, but 
various compilations exist.  
   Debates, in the period studied, must be sought in the newspapers, there 
being no official reports. For New South Wales 1843–49 there is an official 
printed index to the Sydney Herald reports.  
(d) Departmental Papers 
   New South Wales  
   For the period there are in Mitchell Library “Colonial Secretary In-
Letters”, 1789–1854:  
 
(a) 1789–1826, bound and indexed;  
(b) bundles in original (chronological) order, 1827–32. To this section there is a 
modern MS. subject index;  
(c) bundles broadly grouped by subjects or office of origin 1833–48. For 1834–48, 
except 1835 and 1843, there is a bundle labelled “Banks”; other labels used were 
“Commissariat”, “Treasury”, “Debentures”. The original registers survive but are 
useless for locating material in this period. Use is made more difficult because from 
time to time all the letters on a subject have been assembled for reference and have 
then been filed with papers in the year of reference.  
(d) 1849– bundles in original chronological order without index. “Governor's 
Correspondence”, 1822–33. Outward Letterbooks.  
   Tasmania  
   The Archives, Hobart, have several hundred volumes covering the period 
to 1851 of “Chief Secretary's Correspondence” (a series still current). 
There is an original register, somewhat complicated in use but still 
applicable to the files, which are here cited to accord with that register by 
name of governor and number of file. The card index to the Archives is 
unreliable and incomplete.  
   Western Australia  
   The Public Library has Colonial Secretary's In-Letters from 1829, bound 
in volumes each labelled “C.S.O. Records”. They are in chronological 
order until 1839 when a few subjects were picked out and papers grouped. 
Thereafter the range of classification extends, “Banks” becoming a section 
in 1842 (but not for 1848). Letters bear only sweeping endorsements, 
rarely the gist of the reply. There is no index.  
   The Public Library has also transcripts of “Swan River Papers” from 
Public Record Office.  
   South Australia  
   The Archives have “Correspondence” of the Resident Commissioner and 
of the Chief Secretary, as well as various other departmental papers. There 
is an excellent central index prepared by the archivist, the only fault of 
which is that there is no other way of consulting the papers, and one is 
therefore forced to rely on its completeness which, it is fair to say, seems to 
be of a very high order.  
(e) Statistics 
   For each colony there are Bluebooks, i.e., printed forms of return which 
had to be filled in in duplicate, one copy going to the Colonial Office and 
one being retained by the governor.  
   New South Wales in Mitchell Library, 1822–51, except 1824. Binder's 
title is The Colony of New South Wales in . . .  
   Tasmania available in the Archives are 1826, 1827, 1836, 1839–45, 
1847–9.  
   Western Australia the only copy surviving seems to be 1843, at 
Government House.  
   South Australia in Archives, 1840–7.  
   Additional statistical material is collected in:  
   New South Wales Statistical Registers which in this period are part of 
Votes and Proceedings. Commencing in 1838 the volume and quality of 
statistical material rapidly improved.  
   South Australia, Statistical Registers, 1845, 1859.  
   Statistics of Tasmania. With this binder's title the Mitchell Library and 
the Parliamentary Library, Hobart, have bound together the following 
serial publications (all Government Printer, Hobart): Statistical Account of 
Van Diemen's Land, 1804–23; Statistical Returns of Van Diemen's Land, 
1824–39; Statistics of Van Diemen's Land, 1838–41; 1842–4; 1844–6; 
1847; 1848; 1849; 1844–53.  
   Archer, W. H., Statistical Notes on the Progress of Victoria, 1835–60 
(Melbourne, n.d.) incorporates some statistical material carried back 
beyond the separation of Victoria.  
   Report on the Statistics of Western Australia in 1840, by the Colonial 
Committee of Correspondence (Perth 1841). Technically unofficial, but the 
statistics are official.  
   For other statistical material relating directly to banking, see the notes in 
the statistical appendix.  
(f) Miscellaneous 
   Beginnings of Government in Australia, Commonwealth Parliamentary 
Library Committee, 1913. A small collection of facsimiles of 
miscellaneous documents. The cynic may relate the title with the presence 
of copies of Bank of New South Wales accounts.  
Newspapers 
   The newspapers are invaluable for three main classes of information: (a) 
bank and similar advertisements, including, in the earlier years, 
government announcements; (b) “straight” news items; and (c) editorial 
comment and contributed items (including letters, many of which would 
today appear as “special correspondent” articles). In assessing the value of 
the newspapers as a source it must be remembered that they differed 
greatly from the modern press. They were published in small communities 
whose main interest in news was directed overseas, while all really 
important local news was common knowledge in a few hours, which meant 
that, with papers published once, twice or thrice a week, by publication day 
such items might not be worth printing. Consequently local news was, to 
modern eyes, oddly reported. A major event, for example the 1843 bank 
failures, might get scant notice at the time, while intimate gossipy items 
took large space. Much information which would never appear in a modern 
paper was thus preserved, and incidentally provides the check of 
circumstantial evidence on more direct accounts of important events. A 
further check comes from the standard of journalistic controversy. Editors 
were editors then, and the correction of a rival's error, however trivial, was 
a work of glee in which it seemed to be assumed that nothing one editor 
could write of another could possibly be libellous. In the process, once a 
dispute commenced, it usually became clear on questions of fact where the 
truth lay. Because the press was the only medium of communication of 
importance, a fact underlined by circulations which, considering 
populations and subscription rates, were astonishing, bank announcements 
were fuller and more precise than those of today, for instance on terms of 
business. (Competition was keener too, which may have had something to 
do with it.)  
   Naturally, in view of the large number of newspapers and the period 
covered, they differ widely in quality, reliability and comprehensiveness. 
Until the 'twenties the Sydney Gazette and Hobart Town Gazette were little 
more than advertising sheets and media for official notices, but at this 
period they developed into full newspapers and were supplemented by 
competing journals. Each paper tended to have its hobby; in the 'twenties, 
for example, the Sydney Gazette under the vigorous editorship of Robert 
Howe gives most of the important material on money and banking. In the 
same period the Australian did little more than flare up on particular 
issues; on the other hand it is better than the Gazette on trade and trade 
policy and on other questions appropriate to an opposition newspaper.  
   Collections of newspapers are very good but complete sets in any one 
library are rare and the researcher must piece them together in the various 
places. This is important in tracing the minutiae of economic development 
since one issue of one newspaper may contain the only record of some 
particular point; for example, I have found only one published reference to 
the Port Stephens Savings Bank but it was from that that the MS. material 
was found. The method followed has been: (a) for each main centre a 
search has been made of the advertising columns of one newspaper, not 
necessarily the same one for the whole period, for example the Sydney 
Gazette was used 1803–35 and the Herald thereafter; (b) the other 
important papers were searched for news and views; and (c) on some 
points minor papers were consulted around likely dates. In the process it is 
hoped that few vital facts have been missed but small type, few or no 
headlines and constantly changing make-up render the missing of some 
items inevitable.  
(a) Sydney 
   Sydney Gazette, 1803–42 (until 1833 incorporated the official Gazette)  
   The Australian, 1824–48  
   Howe's Weekly Commercial Express, 1825  
   The Monitor (from August 1828 Sydney Monitor), 1826–41  
   The Sydney Herald (from August 1842 the Sydney Morning Herald), 
1831–51  
   The Colonist, 1835–40  
   Commercial Journal, 1835–45  
   Sydney Chronicle, 1839–48  
   Colonial Observer, 1841–4  
   Sun and New South Wales Independent Free Press, 1843  
   The Atlas, 1844–8  
(b) New South Wales—Country 
   Hunter River Gazette, 1841–2  
   Maitland Mercury, 1843–51  
   Bathurst Free Press, 1844–51  
   Moreton Bay Courier, 1846–51  
(c) Hobart 
   Van Diemen's Land Gazette, 1814 (M.L.)  
   Hobart Town Gazette, 1816–27 (later the official Gazette, 1827–51)  
   Colonial Times, 1825–51  
   Tasmanian, 1827–39  
   Hobart Town Courier, 1827–48  
   Colonial Advocate, 1828  
   Austral-Asiatic Review, 1828–43  
   The Colonist (later True Colonist), 1832–44  
   Hobart Town Advertiser, 1839–49  
(d) Launceston 
   Launceston Advertiser, 1829–46  
   The Independent, 1831–35, succeeded by  
   Cornwall Chronicle, 1835–50  
   Launceston Examiner, 1842–50  
(e) Melbourne 
   Melbourne Advertiser, 1838 (P.L.V.)  
   Port Phillip Gazette, 1838–48  
   Port Phillip Patriot, 1838–48  
   Port Phillip Herald, 1840–9  
   Argus, 1846–51 (there is an index in P.L.V.)  
(f) Perth 
   Perth Gazette, 1833–52  
   Swan River Guardian, 1837  
   The Inquirer, 1842–51  
(g) Adelaide 
   South Australian Register, 1836–51  
   South Australian, 1838–47  
   Adelaide Chronicle, 1839–42  
   Adelaide Examiner, 1841–3  
   Adelaide Observer, 1843–9  
Bank Records 
(a) Manuscript 
   In a number of cases records of no value for this study, for example 
detailed account books, exist. It is likely also that other records have not 
been located but these, while they would fill out the details for individual 
banks, are unlikely to alter the main lines of the general story in view of 
the representative nature of those which have been found.  
   Bank of New South Wales:  
   Mitchell Library: “Bank of New South Wales Papers”, a small collection 
of various early records.  
     
   Union Bank:  
     
   Bank of Australasia:  
     
   Consulted in microfilm, provided by the bank at its expense.  
   Bathurst Bank:  
   At Head Office of Commercial Banking Company of Sydney:  
   “Outward Letter Book”, 1834–40.  
   “Minute Book”, 1834–40.  
   Savings Bank of New South Wales:  
   At Head Office of Commonwealth Savings Bank:  
   “Outward Letter Book”, 1832–54.  
   “Minute Book”, 1832–55.  
   Port Phillip Bank:  
   In P.L.V.: “Outward Letter Book”, 1839–42. There should be another 
book covering the liquidation but its location is unknown.  
   Port Phillip Savings Bank:  
   Head Office of State Savings Bank of Victoria:  
   “Minute Book”, 1841–53.  
   Commercial Bank of Tasmania:  
   In Hobart Office of E. S. & A. Bank:  
   Deed of Settlement, original of 26 September 1832 with amendments of 
Head 
Office:
Some early balance sheets, “Minute Books”, 1816 onwards. As explained in preface, consulted in the 
form of extensive extracts.
Melbourne 
Office:
“Reports” of Launceston Manager, 1849–53;  “London Letter Book”, 1849–53;  “Portland Branch 
Letter Book”;  “Inspector's Reports”, Sydney 1842–50,        Launceston 1845–54,        Melbourne 
1844–53,        Hobart 1845–54.
Hobart 
Office:
“Minute Books” (2) of local board, 1838–55.
Launceston 
Office:
“Minute Book” of local board, 1835–40.
Melbourne 
Office:
“Inspectors' Letter Book”, 1835–6;  “Private Letter Book”, 1847–58;   “Inspectors' Circulars Book”; 
 Hobart “Minutes”, 1835–6.
London 
Office:
“Minute Books”, 1 to 6, 18 April 1833 to 13 February 1851;  “Minute Book”, Bank of South Africa, 29 
October 1835 to 1 February 1836;  “Minute Book”, Bank of South Africa, 29 October 1835 to 1 
February 1836;  Letters between London Board and Inspectors (or Superintendents) complete from 
beginning. Cited as “Letters to London” or “Letters from London”;  “Private Letter Book”, 1845–75; 
 “Secret Letter Book”;  Miscellaneous early letters; Perth “Minutes” (extracts).
28 August 1839.  
   Tamar Bank:  
   Launceston Office of Union Bank:  
     
   Derwent Bank:  
   Royal Society, Hobart:  
   “Derwent Bank Letter Books”, 1829–37; 1842–5; 1845–54.  
   “Swanston Letter Books”, 1831–8; 1838–45, foreign; 1842–7, domestic.  
   Public Library of Victoria:  
   “Letter Book” containing outward letters of Launceston agency, June 
1832 to August 1833; Melbourne agency, February 1838 to June 1839.  
   Mitchell Library: “Swanston Letter Book”, 1838–45, domestic.  
   Launceston Bank for Savings:  
   Colonial Bank:  
   At Head Office of Hobart Savings Bank:  
   “Outward Letter Book”, 1843–7 (covering winding up).  
   Hobart Savings Bank:  
   At Head Office: “Minute Book”, 1845–58.  
   Savings Bank of South Australia:  
   Head Office: “Minute Book”, No. 1, 1848–62.  
   Bank of South Australia:  
   Union Bank, Melbourne and Adelaide Offices:  
   South Australia Archives: “Returns Relative to Bank Notes issued”, 
1836–7. Detailed statement of all Kingscote issues.  
   Western Australian Bank:  
   Bank of New South Wales, Perth Office: Small collection of MS. 
statements for use at general meetings during later 'forties.  
(b) Printed Records 
   Many reports, etc. were printed in newspapers and similar sources.  
   References to these will be found in footnotes.  
   Bank of New South Wales, Charter (as varied 1823), Sydney 1826 
(M.L.).  
   Bank of Van Diemen's Land, Charter, Hobart 1825.  
Two 
letters:
L. W. Gilles to Assistant Treasurer, reporting closure of Tamar, 26 September 1836;  Directors of Tamar, 
authorizing negotiations for merger with Union Bank, 10 October 1836.
At Head Office: “Minute Book”, 1835–55;  “Balance Book”, 1844–62.
“Minute 
Books”,
No. 1, 1842–4 (Melbourne);  No. 3, 1846–8 (Adelaide);  No. 4, 1848–51 (Adelaide).
“Letter 
Books”:
To London, 1837–44 (Melbourne);        1844–52 (Adelaide).  From London, 1836–9 (Melbourne); 
       1840–7 (Adelaide).
   Bank of Australia, Deed of Settlement, Sydney 1833 (M.L.).  
   Sydney Banking Company, Draft of the proposed Deed of Settlement, 
Sydney 1839.  
   South Australian Banking Company, Annual Reports, 1842–7.  
   Commercial Banking Company of Sydney, Reports, 1848–1910, Sydney 
1911. A complete set of reports and balance sheets for the period stated.  
   Charters granted to Colonial and Australian Banking Establishments, 
London 1837. A House of Commons return, containing charter of Bank of 
Australasia.  
   Bank of Australasia, Reports, 1835–44, London 1844 (Melbourne and 
Adelaide offices).  
   Reports, 1835–57, London 1857 (M.L.).  
   South Australian Savings Bank, Rules. (Forming part of a pass book. 
State Savings Bank of South Australia, Adelaide.)  
   Regulations of the New South Wales Savings Bank, Sydney 1819 (M.L.).  
   Rules and Regulations of the Savings Bank of New South Wales, Sydney 
1832, 1834, 1838, 1843, 1844 (M.L.).  
   Union Bank, Prospectus and Reports, London 1840 (M.L.).  
   Reports 1839–89, London 1889 (M.L.).  
   Rules and Regulations of the Savings Bank of Port Phillip, Sydney 1843 
(M.L.).  
   Australian Investment Bank, Prospectus, n.d. (M.L. cat. A272).  
   Australian Agricultural Bank, three Prospectuses, n.d. (Adelaide 1838) 
(M.L. cat. A272).  
(c) Histories of Individual Banks 
   These are included as bank records because it happens that all are 
published by or sponsored by the banks in question. On the whole 
Australian banks have not shown much interest in their own history and 
such studies as have appeared have been more in the nature of highbrow 
advertising than serious historical studies, and, as a result, of lesser 
advertising value.  
   A Century of Banking—The Commercial Banking Company of Sydney, 
Sydney 1934. Advertisement of a centenary rather than history. Gives only 
the sketchiest outline of the bank's development which, for the early 
period, seems to have been drawn from an incomplete selection of the 
bank's published announcements. (Internal records for this period have 
practically all disappeared.)  
   Cooch, A., The State Savings Bank of Victoria, Melbourne 1934. A very 
useful and substantially accurate account by the then general manager.  
   Davidson, A. C., Three addresses, privately printed, on the early history 
of the Bank of New South Wales, by the then general manager:  
   The Founding of the First Bank, Sydney 1940.  
   Early Years of the First Bank, Sydney 1940.  
   The First Bank Grows Up, Sydney 1941.  
   Duncan, J., A Century of Thrift—The Launceston Bank for Savings. 
Launceston 1935. An official centenary history. Slight but based mainly 
upon the Minute Books and accurate as far as it goes.  
   Griffiths, N., History of the Government Savings Bank of New South 
Wales, Sydney 1930. Inaccurate in some details and based almost 
exclusively for early years on H.R.A. and Votes and Proceedings, giving 
only a snapshot history. Useful as a preliminary source to mark out the 
main lines but needs much supplementing.  
   The Hobart Savings Bank—Historical Sketch, Hobart, n.d., anon. 
(Privately printed, 1925. Written for bank by J. Moore-Brabazon.) An 
anniversary celebration; gossipy items from the Minutes.  
   The Centenary of the Hobart Savings Bank, Hobart 1945. A useful 
outline narrative of the growth of the bank, but with only slight discussion 
of policies and problems.  
   Melbourne's First Bank (cover title) (Bank of Australasia opened . . . 
1838), Melbourne 1938. A lavish centenary advertisement of little 
historical value.  
   Savings Bank of South Australia—History and Progress, Adelaide 1928. 
Very slight.  
   Views of the Premises of the Bank of New South Wales, Sydney 1907. 
(This is binder's title, the one commonly cited; that on the title page is 
“Photographs of the Premises . . . ”.) The book consists mainly of 
photographs, but is prefaced by an historical sketch with no more rose-
colour than is legitimate in an institutional autobiography. But sources are 
rarely cited and the original documents do not need to be supplemented by 
material given here.  
Contemporary Books and Pamphlets 
   These are, on the whole, disappointing and undeserving of the 
importance they have been accorded as sources for Australian history. For 
the early years the works of Collins, Hunter and others of similar standing 
are invaluable, but most of the books are little more than travellers' books 
and in any case weak on economic history. For events not observed by the 
writers they have clearly relied on hearsay, and even when writing from 
observation they commonly rely on no more than that. (Westgarth, for 
instance, wrote his books to beguile the tedium of the long voyage to 
England and could not have had much reference material by him.) In any 
case the books were, with few exceptions, written for English readers who 
were curious about the flora and fauna, the aboriginals and the convicts and 
the face of the country, and not much concerned about those aspects of 
economic and commercial development which presented no striking 
novelties. Much of that development in a primitive fashion paralleled that 
of England closely. To take specific instances, the savings bank, the bill 
broker, the branch bank, or legal action by the public officer of a company 
were, except as rarities, nearly as new in England as in Australia, and 
excited little comment from writers who had small interest in such matters. 
Those who were interested—Wentworth, Lang, or Macarthur for 
instance—wrote as propagandists, with their attention fixed on matters in 
dispute. So far as economic development goes, therefore, the majority of 
the books are uninformative, incomplete or unreliable. Those listed have 
proved of some use, often slight, in the present account; commonly that use 
has been either in suggesting lines of inquiry or in expressing 
contemporary ideas as to what the facts were or policy should be.  
     
Baker, C. J., Sydney and Melbourne, London 1845.  
Bartlett, T., New Holland, London 1843.  
Barton, W., Particulars of Joint Stock Institutions in New South Wales, Sydney 1838. (The first investor's guide.)  
Baxter, A. B., Banking in Australia, London 1883.  
Bennett, J. F., South Australia, London 1843.  
Betts, T., An Account of the Colony of Van Diemen's Land, Calcutta 1830.  
Bischoff, J., Sketch of the History of Van Diemen's Land, London 1832.  
Bond, G., A Brief Account of the Colony of Port Jackson in New South Wales, 4th ed., London, 1806.  
Braim, T. H., A History of New South Wales, 2 vols., London 1846.  
Buckton, T. J., Western Australia, London 1840.  
Capper, H., South Australia, London 1839.  
Collins, D., Account of the English Colony in New South Wales (ed. Collier) Christchurch, n.d. (1910).  
Collisson, M., South Australia in 1844–45, Adelaide 1845.  
Courtney, E., Letter to the Proprietors of Stock of the Commercial Banking Company, Sydney, Sydney 1847.  
Cunningham, P., Two Years in New South Wales, London 1827.  
Curr, E., Account of the Colony of Van Diemen's Land, London 1824.  
Curr, J., Statistics of Banking in New South Wales (with a separately published Appendix or Review of Reviewers), Sydney 1843. 
(P.L.V.)  
Davidson, G. F., Trade and Travel in the Far East, London 1846.  
Dixon, J., The Condition and Capabilities of Van Diemen's Land, London 1839.  
Dutton, F., South Australia, London 1846.  
Gill, W., Western Australia, London 1842.  
Griffith, C., The Present State and Prospects of the Port Phillip District of New South Wales, Dublin 1845.  
Hall, E. S., The State of New South Wales in December 1830, London 1831.  
Harris, A., Settlers and Convicts, London 1847.  
Haydon, G. H., Five Years' Experience in Australia Felix, London 1846.  
Haygarth, H. W., Recollections of Bush Life in Australia, London 1861.  
Henderson, J., Observations on the Colonies of New South Wales and Van Diemen's Land, Calcutta 1832.  
Hughes, W., The Australian Colonies, London 1852.  
Hunter, J., Historical Journal of the Transactions at Port Jackson and Norfolk Island, London 1793.  
Irwin, F. C., The State and Position of Western Australia, London 1835.  
James, T. H., Six Months in South Australia, London 1838.  
Kentish, N. L., Political Economy of New South Wales, Sydney 1838.  
Labilliere, F. P., Early History of the Colony of Victoria, London 1878.  
Lang, J. D., An Historical and Statistical Account of New South Wales, London 1834, 1837, 1852, 1875.  
Macarthur, James, New South Wales, London 1837.  
McCombie, T., The History of the Colony of Victoria, Melbourne 1858.  
MacDermott, M., A Brief Sketch of the Long and Varied Career of Marshall MacDermott, Esq., J.P., Adelaide 1874.  
Macqueen, T. P., Australia as She Is and as She May Be, London 1840.  
Mann, D. D., Present Picture of New South Wales, London 1811.  
Martin, R. M., Statistics of the Colonies of the British Empire, London 1839. Contains statistical tables compiled from Bluebooks, 
some of which are unavailable in Australia, but they end in 1836.  
Melville, H., The History of the Island of Van Diemen's Land, London 1835.  
Present State of Australasia, London 1851.  
Moore, G. F., Diary of Ten Years Eventful Life of an Early Settler in Western Australia, Sydney 1884.  
Morehead, R. A. A., Some words for and to Capitalists and Shareholders in Banks, Sydney 1843.  
Murray, R. D., A Summer at Port Phillip, Edinburgh 1843.  
Ogle, N., The Colony of Western Australia, London 1839.  
O'Hara, J., The History of New South Wales, 2nd ed., London 1818.  
Parker, H. W., Rise, Progress and Present State of Van Diemen's Land, 2nd ed., London 1834.  
Russell, George, The Narrative of, (ed. P. L. Brown), London 1935.  
Stephens, J., History of the Rise and Progress of . . . South Australia, 2nd ed., London 1839.  
Tench, W., Complete Account of the Settlement at Port Jackson, London 1793.  
Therry, R., Reminiscences of Thirty Years Residence in New South Wales and Victoria, London 1863.  
Waugh, D. L., Three Years Practical Experience of a Settler in New South Wales, Edinburgh 1838.  
Wentworth, W. C., Statistical, Historical and Political Description of the Colony of New South Wales, London 1819.  
Statistical Account of the British Settlements in Australasia, London 1824 (3rd ed. of former).  
West, J., The History of Tasmania, 2 vols., Launceston 1852.  
Widowson, H., Present State of Van Diemen's Land, London 1829.  
Wilkinson, G. B., South Australia, London 1848.  
Other Contemporary Printed Sources 
     
   These are the nearest equivalent to a business directory. With varying 
titles and issuers they appeared, once the ice was broken, annually with a 
few gaps. All sorts of information are recorded but little of importance for 
the present study.  
   South Australian Company, Reports, annually 1836–49.  
   Archer, W. H., Facts and Figures, Melbourne. Issued periodically 
commencing June 1857.  
   Western Australian Association, First Report, London 1836;  
   Second Report, London 1837.  
   Westgarth, W., Reports on Port Phillip. Half-yearly reports on economic 
conditions in Victoria in the middle 'forties. Sixth and last to July 1846. 
M.L. and P.L.V. both have 4th, 5th and 6th reports.  
   New South Wales Magazine, 1833, 1843.  
   South Australian Magazine, 1841–3.  
Private Papers 
(a) Published 
     
     
Backhouse, J. and Tylor, C. (eds.), Life and Labours of George Washington Walker, London 1862.  
Bride, T. F. (ed.), Letters from Victorian Pioneers, Melbourne 1899.  
   Chiefly letters collected by La Trobe for a history of Victoria which was 
never written.  
   Early Records of the Macarthurs of Camden, (ed. S. Macarthur Onslow) 
Sydney 1914.  
(b) Manuscript 
   In Mitchell Library unless otherwise stated. These collections contain 
letters, etc., commenting on current economic developments, records of 
business transactions, samples of contemporary bills and notes and other 
business records.  
   “Banks Papers” (especially vol. iv)  
   “Berry Papers”  
   “Collie Letters” (National Library, typescript copies in various libraries)  
   “Henty Papers”  
   “Macquarie Papers” (especially Memoranda and Diary)  
   “Journal” of Sir Edward Parry  
Almanacs: New South Wales, 1813–52;  Tasmania, 1829–50;  South Australia, 1840–51.
   “Piper Papers”  
   “Riley Papers”  
   “Letters” of Sir James Stirling, 1828–38 (typescript copy)  
   “Wentworth Papers”  
   “Brown Papers”, 1837–49 (South Australia Archives)  
Modern Works 
   “Modern” is taken to include some nineteenth-century items where the 
author is writing after the events he records and not from personal 
knowledge.  
   Monetary Histories. (See also above, Bank Histories.)  
(a) Books 
     
     
Andrews, A., Australasian Tokens and Coins, Sydney 1921. The best account of its restricted subject with many plates.  
A Brief History of Australian Banking, Rural Bank of New South Wales, Sydney 1936. A twenty-page summary for popular 
consumption.  
Arndt, E. H. D., Banking and Currency Development in South Africa, Capetown, 1928. Gives part of the story, available only from 
English sources, of the formation of the Bank of Australasia.  
Baster, A. S. J., Imperial Banks, London 1929. Useful for English policy on colonial banking and for the very liberal quotations 
from MSS. not available in Australia.  
Chalmers, R. C., History of Currency in the British Colonies, London 1893. An historical account based on Colonial Office records. 
Very imperfect, but a useful first reference.  
Ewens, L. J., The South Australian Savings Bank, Adelaide, n.d. (1947). Published after Chapter 12 was completed. A short account 
supplementing that given here by its emphasis on personalities.  
Gill, T., Coinage and Currency of South Australia, Adelaide 1912. A layman's sketch.  
Hyman, C. P., Account of the Coins, Coinages and Currency of Australasia, Sydney 1893. Collector's account of coins and notes, 
but much the best of these.  
Mackay, A. L. G., Australian Banking and Credit System, London 1931. Inadequate and extremely inaccurate.  
Rolleston, C., Lecture on History, Progress and Advantages of Savings Banks, Sydney 1857. Poor stuff and inaccurate in its facts.  
Teare, H. E., Digest of the Banking and Currency Acts, Proclamations, Orders, etc., of Australia and New Zealand, Sydney 1926. A 
useful finding list of Orders, Proclamations and Acts but there are omissions and errors in its primary field while the scattered 
historical notes are often quite wrong.  
Walker, J. T., Some Remarks on Australian Banks . . . , Australian Economic Association, Paper No. 4, Melbourne 1888. Uneven 
and discursive, but contains some information obtained from personal recollections.  
(b) Periodicals 
     
     
Gardner, F., “Early Paper Currency of Australia”, Victorian Historical Magazine, vol. vii, January 1919. A collector's account.  
Henderson, J., “Colonial Currency, some Notes on the Economic History of New South Wales”, March 1888; “A Short History of 
the Currency in New South Wales”, July 1889, Australian Economist (M.L.). A discursive and slight account.  
Marks, P. J., “History of Paper Currency in Australia”, Journal of Royal Australian Historical Society, vol. v, 1919. A collector's 
account, primarily useful for its illustrations.  
Marks, P. J., “Rum and Wheat Currency in New South Wales”, Journal of Royal Australian Historical Society, vol. xxvi, 1940. 
Scraps from secondary sources, valueless.  
Reynolds, J., “Notes on the Currency of Early Tasmania, 1803–25”, Papers and Proceedings of the Royal Society of Tasmania, 
1925. Useful for illustrations.  
Other Modern Material 
   General histories are included not as such but for their contribution to 
monetary history which is, in most cases, slight; they have been of most 
service in providing clues to follow and propositions to examine.  
(a) Books 
     
     
Battye, J. S., Western Australia, Oxford 1924. An amateur in economic history but one who reports faithfully and therefore marks 
the signposts.  
Boys, R. D., First Years at Port Phillip, Melbourne 1935. A chronological account of “events” to 1842.  
Coghlan, T. A., Labour and Industry in Australia, London 1918. Vol. i is useful as a preliminary source but the tracing of the 
frequent errors and misinterpretations is made difficult by the almost complete absence of references.  
Fitzpatrick, B., British Imperialism and Australia 1783–1833, London 1939;  
The British Empire in Australia, 1834–1939, Melbourne 1941. A fair amount of information of uneven quality and reliability. No 
connected monetary history but the most serious attempt to relate monetary to general economic development.  
Hodder, E., George Fife Angas, London 1891;  
The History of South Australia, London 1893.  
Hodder had access to Angas' Diary which has since disappeared.  
Learmonth, N. F., Portland Bay Settlement, Melbourne 1934. For the Hentys generally, with a little on them as bankers.  
Phillips, M., A Colonial Autocracy, London 1909. Still the best account of the economic policy of Macquarie.  
Roberts, S. H., The Squatting Age in Australia, 1835–47, Melbourne 1935. Chapter VIII is a lively account of the boom of the 
'thirties and of the slump of the 'forties, based mainly on the despatches of Gipps and seen almost exclusively as an affair of the 
squatters.  
Shann, E. O. G., Economic History of Australia, Cambridge 1930. The chapter on “Governor Macquarie's Bank” is a spirited if 
misleading version of the traditional account.  
Sutherland, G., The South Australian Company, London 1898. Slight and unduly reticent for a work based on company records.  
Wood, G. L., Borrowing and Business in Australia, London 1930. For the relevant period a brief sketch introductory to its main 
study.  
(b) Periodicals 
     
     
Bryan, C. P. and Bray, F. I., “Peter Nicholas Brown”, Journal of Western Australian Historical Society, vol. ii, 1935. An outline 
biography with some rather vague material on his banking activities.  
Kenyon, A. S., “The Port Phillip Boom and its Results”, Journal Royal Australian Historical Society, vol. xii, 1926. A collection of 
contemporary opinions about the slump of the 'forties.  
Watson, J. H., “Benjamin Boyd, Merchant”, Journal Royal Australian Historical Society, vol. ii, 1912.  
(c) Miscellaneous 
     
    
Law Book Company, Australian Digest 1825–1933. For legal decisions on relevant matters.  
Australian Encyclopaedia, Sydney 1925–6. For reference on many points of detail, but few bankers get biographies and then in 
other capacities.  
Pitt, G. H., The Crisis of 1841; its causes and consequences, Typescript (1927) in South Australian Archives. A study of South 
Australian experience, but not relating it to the slump in other colonies.  
Appendix II Statistics 
   General  
   This appendix brings together all the statistical data relating to banking 
operations to 1851 which are known to survive, other than fragmentary 
material not suitable for tabulation. The figures have been drawn from a 
wide variety of sources scattered all over Australia—Government Gazettes, 
MS. returns in government archives, newspapers, bank records and the like. 
Many of these, apart from the manuscripts, are not readily accessible; rare 
issues of Gazettes for example have furnished a number of items. No one 
should ever again have to do that scavenging; nor should anyone again 
have to face the hours of drudgery piecing together and rearranging data 
becoming available in a variety of forms, to make reasonably clear 
tabulations, which lie behind the tables that follow. For this alone their 
publication is fully justified, even if it were not necessary to supply the 
statistical basis for statements in the text.  
   To each table is attached a statement of sources as detailed as 
considerations of clarity make possible, together with such explanatory 
notes as seem desirable. It has not been thought necessary to indicate 
where figures (for example totals) are the result of computations by the 
writer. The tables of ratios (cash to deposits and notes and advances to 
deposits) were, of course, not part of the original data.  
   Tables are grouped by colonies and each group is prefaced by a note on 
the sources of the material, designed to facilitate estimation of its reliability 
and generally to assist interpretation. These notes are in part supplementary 
to the discussion in the main text of government policy in relation to the 
making and publishing of returns.  
   Many gaps remain which other workers may later be able to fill. All 
figures have been checked, but the complexity of that task means that some 
errors have almost certainly been missed; it is hoped they are few.  
   Lack of information is indicated by a blank in the tables; a dash (—) 
indicates that the item is zero. All items are presented as whole pounds 
which explains occasional slight divergences in totals. Ratios have been 
calculated correct to the first decimal place.  
List of Banks to 1851 
   Banks listed in capitals are still (1951) in existence; those in italics were 
proposed but did not function actively. Proposed banks are included only if 
a definite and serious project can be identified.  
     
1817 BANK OF NEW SOUTH WALES
1819 New South Wales Savings Bank (replaced 1832 by Savings Bank of New South Wales).
1822 Waterloo Company [Sydney] (abandoned banking 1834).
1823 Bank of Van Diemen's Land [Hobart] (failed 1891).
1826 Bank of Australia [Sydney] (failed 1843).
1826 Sydney Commercial Bank
1826 Tasmanian Bank [Hobart] (closed 1829).
1827 Derwent Bank [Hobart] (failed 1849).
1828 Cornwall Bank [Launceston] (absorbed by Bank of Australasia 1835).
1828 Bank of Newcastle (banking abandoned 1829).
1829 Convict Savings Bank [Hobart, attached to Derwent Bank] (business transferred to Union Bank 1851).
1829 Commercial Bank [of Tasmania] [Hobart] (absorbed by E. S. & A. Bank 1921).
1830 Port Stephens Savings Bank (business transferred to Savings Bank of New South Wales 1832).
1831 General Savings Bank [Hobart, attached to Commercial Bank] (perhaps abandoned 1838).
1832 Savings Bank of New South Wales (business later transferred to Government Savings Bank of New South 
Wales, which in 1932 was absorbed by Commonwealth Savings Bank).
1834 Tamar Bank [Launceston] (absorbed by Union Bank 1838).
1834 COMMERCIAL BANKING COMPANY OF SYDNEY
1834 Derwent Savings Bank [Hobart] (closed 1849 when Derwent Bank failed).
1834 Sydney Bank
1835? Longford Savings Bank (absorbed by Launceston Bank for Savings, 1840).
1835 LAUNCESTON BANK FOR SAVINGS
1835 Bathurst Bank (absorbed by Union Bank 1840).
1835 Bank of Australasia [London] (merged with Union Bank to form Australia and New Zealand Bank 1951).
1836 Bank of South Australia (absorbed by Union Bank 1892).
1836 Goulburn Bank
1837 Bank of Western Australia (absorbed by Bank of Australasia 1841).
1837 Union Bank of Australia [London] (merged with Bank of Australasia to form Australia and New Zealand 
Bank 1951).
1838 British and Australian Bank [London] (project abandoned 1841).
1838 Australian Agricultural Bank
1839 British Colonial Bank and Loan Company (did not proceed with banking).
1839 Royal Bank of Australia [London] (closed 1850).
1839 Hunter's River Bank [Maitland]
1839 Sydney Banking Company (failed 1843).
1839 Port Phillip Bank [Melbourne] (failed 1843).
1840 Bank of Wollongong
1840 Windsor and Hawkesbury Banking Company
1840 Tradesmen's Bank of Melbourne and Geelong
1840 Archers Gilles & Co. [Launceston] (abandoned banking 1843).
1840 Maitland Tradesmen's Banking Company
1840 Colonial Bank [Hobart] (closed 1843).
1840 Agricultural Bank of Tasmania
1840 Scottish Australian Bank [Glasgow]
1841 South Australian Savings Bank (closed 1847).
1841 Western Australian Bank (absorbed by Bank of New South Wales, 1927).
List of Tables 
     
1841 Australian Society for Deposits and Loans
1841 Adelaide Loan Company
1841 Port Phillip Savings Bank (now STATE SAVINGS BANK OF VICTORIA).
1845 HOBART SAVINGS BANK
1845 Commercial Bank of Western Australia
1848 Savings Bank of South Australia (now STATE SAVINGS BANK OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA).
1849 Bank of Ipswich
A. NEW SOUTH WALES 
1. Bank of New South Wales: Page
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   (b) Assets 1817–51 589
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3. Bank of Australia:
   (a) Liabilities 1827–42 593
   (b) Assets 1827–42 594
4. Commercial Banking Company of Sydney:
   (a) Liabilities 1836–51 595
   (b) Assets 1836–51 597
5. Bank of Australasia:
   (i) Local averages:
      (a) Liabilities 1836–51 599
      (b) Assets 1836–51 601
   (ii) Charter averages:
      (a) Liabilities 1836–51 603
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6. Union Bank of Australia:
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   (b) Assets 1839–51 607
7. Port Phillip Bank:
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12. Bank Dividends 1818–51 618
13. Bank Interest Rates:
   (a) Deposits 621
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14. Exchange Rates:
   (a) Commissariat 1826–51 623
   (b) Banks 1835–51 625
15. Bank Ratios 1836–51:
   (a) Cash to deposits and notes 627
   (b) Advances to deposits 629
16. New South Wales Savings Bank—Deposits 1819–31 631
17. Savings Bank of New South Wales 1832–51:
   (a) Number of depositors 632
   (b) Amount of deposits 633
   (c) Interest rates 634
   (d) Cash holdings 635
   (e) Loans and other assets 636
   (f) Profits and reserves 637
18. Port Phillip Savings Bank 1842–51:
   (a) Number of depositors 638
   (b) Amount of deposits 638
   (c) Profits and reserves 639
   (d) Loans and cash 639
   (e) Interest rates 640
B. VAN DIEMEN'S LAND 
19. Bank of Van Diemen's Land:
   (a) Liabilities 1824–51 646
   (b) Assets 1835–51 648
20. Derwent Bank:
   (a) Liabilities 1828–49 650
   (b) Assets 1836–49 652
21. Cornwall Bank—Note Issue 1830–5. 653
22. Commercial Bank of Tasmania:
   (a) Liabilities 1830–51 654
   (b) Assets 1836–51 656
23. Tamar Bank:
   (a) Liabilities 1835–7 657
   (b) Assets 1836–7 657
24. Bank of Australasia:
   (a) Liabilities 1836–51 658
   (b) Assets 1836–51 659
25. Union Bank of Australia:
   (a) Liabilities 1840–51 660
   (b) Assets 1840–51 661
26. Colonial Bank—Liabilities and Assets 1840–3 662
27. Bank Dividends 1825–43 663
28. Bank Interest Rates:
   (a) Deposits 1829–44 664
   (b) Loans 1824–52 665
29. Bank Ratios:
   (a) Bank of Van Diemen's Land 667
   (b) Derwent Bank 668
   (c) Commercial Bank of Tasmania 669
   (d) Bank of Australasia 670
   (e) Union Bank of Australia 671
   (f) Colonial Bank 672
30. Launceston Bank for Savings 1835–51:
   (a) Deposits 673
   (b) Loans, reserves and cash 674
   (c) Interest on deposits 675
   (d) Mortgage interest 675
31. Hobart Savings Bank 1845–51:
   (a) Deposits 676
   (b) Mortgage loans 677
   (c) Cash and reserve fund 677
C. WESTERN AUSTRALIA 
32. Bank of Western Australia—Assets and Liabilities 1837–41 680
33. Bank of Australasia:
   (a) Liabilities 1841–5 681
   (b) Assets 1841–5 681
34. Western Australian Bank:
   (a) Liabilities 1841–51 682
   (b) Assets 1848–51 684
35. Bank Dividends 1838–51 685
36. Bank Interest Rates 1837–51 686
37. Bank Ratios 1837–51 687
D. SOUTH AUSTRALIA 
38. Bank of South Australia:
   (a) Liabilities 1841–51 690
   (b) Assets 1841–51 691
39. Bank of Australasia:
   (a) Liabilities 1839–51 692
   (b) Assets 1839–51 693
40. Bank Interest Rates 1837–51:
   (a) Deposits 694
   (b) Loans 695
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43. South Australian Savings Bank 1841–7:
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44. Savings Bank of South Australia:
   (a) Deposits 704
A. New South Wales 
   For the early years banking statistics are of an occasional sort. Bigge's 
inquiry, a newspaper report, the difficulties of the Bank of New South 
Wales and similar events led to the recording of isolated data at irregular 
intervals. Nor was the situation much improved by the inclusion of figures 
in the Bluebooks. In that for 1823 note issues for an unspecified date were 
recorded for the Bank of New South Wales and the Waterloo Company. 
Similar figures, for 31 December and including the Bank of Australia, were 
given in 1829 and the following year began the regular practice of 
recording average note issues of each bank. The Bluebook for 1832 
initiated the regular inclusion of the holdings of coin for each bank at 31 
December. In 1835 note issues ceased to be averages and related also to 31 
December, the two sets of figures appearing each year until 1841 when 
they were dropped, presumably because of the fuller data then published 
quarterly under the local statute.  
   These Bluebook figures after 1830 were derived from special returns 
which originated in the 1828–9 crisis in the Bank of New South Wales. In 
addition to the statistics supplied in 1828 and published in H.R.A.1 returns 
were obtained during 1829 and a few have survived.2 Darling made half-
yearly statements a condition of again giving the bank a share of the 
government deposit,3 and Goderich directed that such returns should be 
obtained from all banks seeking a government deposit and should be 
published.4 But while both the Bank of New South Wales and the Bank of 
Australia agreed to publication,5 the returns were not published and not all 
have survived. Those which have, in form condensed half-yearly balance 
sheets, are incorporated in the tables below, where their precise location in 
“Colonial Secretary In-Letters” is recorded.6 Similar returns including each 
new bank which sought government deposits were obtained for a number 
of years but after 1836 the published data make it unnecessary to record 
them, except in respect of paid-up capital. In all, the pre-1836 data are a 
very miscellaneous collection which are of value in giving the order of 
magnitude of banking operations and a rough measure of the more striking 
changes; they cannot form the basis of any precise or detailed analysis.  
   Continuous series of figures began in 1836 as a result of Treasury 
instructions on the occasion of the chartering of the Bank of Australasia.7 
That bank was required by its charter to supply half-yearly averages in a 
   (b) Profits and reserves 704
   (c) Assets 705
   (d) Interest rates 705
form of return based upon that used in New Brunswick, the items being:  
     
   This return was regularly supplied and published.8 Bourke was instructed 
to require half-yearly returns in the same form, for publication, as a 
condition of giving any bank a government deposit. But for reasons which 
are not clear a much simpler return was adopted requiring only few items: 
note issue; total deposits; coin and bullion; securities. These items were to 
be averages for each calendar half-year, commencing with the first half of 
1836.9 Only the Bathurst Bank, having no government deposit, declined to 
supply any information,10 but the Australasia sought to escape. It supplied 
the first return when the governor declined to accept the charter return as a 
substitute and offered the second on condition it was not published. But 
Bourke was adamant and withdrew its government deposit early in 1837, 
albeit gradually, refusing to wait until the London directors had been 
consulted. The London board in due course approved the supplying of the 
return for publication and the deposit was restored next year,11 the 
intervening returns being supplied and published.12  
   The point at issue was the period covered by the return. The charter 
return of the Australasia was for an odd period with terminal dates in April 
and October; the local return was for calendar half-years. Bourke's victory 
had the fortunate result of giving a continuous series of data on a uniform 
basis for all banks, regularly published in the Government Gazette.13 No 
other colony obtained other than charter returns from the Australasia. To 
permit inter-colonial comparisons as well as inter-bank ones for New 
South Wales both Australasia series are recorded here.  
   The statistics were considerably improved as a result of the British 
Treasury's 1840 regulations for colonial banking.14 This directed that any 
colonial incorporation of a bank should require for publication a return on 
the Australasia charter model, “half-yearly or yearly”. But Gipps had 
meanwhile decided to go further and a local act was more stringent than 
the regulations.15 It applied to “every company firm or individual engaged 
in the ordinary business of banking by receiving deposits and issuing bills 
Liabilities
      Notes in circulation, distinguishing those bearing interest.
      Bills in circulation, distinguishing those bearing interest.
      Balances due to other banks.
      Deposits, divided into those bearing and those not bearing interest.
      Total liabilities.
Assets
Gold and silver. Balances due from other banks.
Landed property. All other debts due to the bank.
Bills of other banks. Total assets.
or notes payable to the bearer at sight or on demand”, and not merely to 
banks which accepted government deposits or those which were 
incorporated locally although, in fact, neither the Royal Bank nor the 
“petty bankers” who still flourished in country towns made returns. A 
statement, in the Australasia charter form, was to be made up each Monday 
and averaged quarterly, not “half-yearly or yearly”; to this had to be added 
figures for: capital paid up at the end of each quarter; rate of last dividend; 
amount of last dividend; amount of reserved profits at time of declaring 
dividend.16 So was born the return which, with minor variations, was the 
basis of the New South Wales and later Commonwealth statistics for a 
century.  
   The Bank of Australasia again sought exemption because of the 
obligations of the charter, but did not persist when Gipps bluntly retorted 
that his act “when confirmed by the Queen is quite equal to a charter”.17 
The act was unaffected by new British Regulations of 1846 which merely 
repeated the less onerous requirements for publicity of those of 1840.18 The 
return also survived efforts in 1850 to ensure greater detail. A bill which 
would have required the return to distinguish New South Wales business 
from that in England and elsewhere was accorded so hostile a reception 
that it did not go to a first reading.19 The critics of the banks thereupon tried 
the alternative of a Select Committee, the first of whose four references 
related to the return.20 It proposed only that government securities and 
deposits held be recorded separately from others and nothing came even of 
that modest proposal.21  
   Apart from any criticisms which might be made of the return its 
usefulness is somewhat impaired by the interpretations of bank 
accountants. One ambiguity was cleared up at the beginning. The item 
“amount of reserved profits at the time of declaring dividend” could have 
been taken to mean after paying that dividend, as most of the banks did 
take it; the Union made its first return before paying dividend. However the 
matter was corrected immediately.22 It is claimed also in Moore's Almanac 
for 1852 that in the early years “bills in circulation” was a miscellaneous 
omnibus item and only in the late 'forties was it limited to bills drawn for 
overseas or inland exchange purposes.23 Another item should be noted—
“balances due from other banks”. Clearing balances were always settled 
weekly before making up the return and only negligible amounts of this 
type would be included. The item referred rather to amounts held in 
London or with agents in other colonies which meant that the “English” 
banks, with London offices and branches in most Australian colonies 
showed low or nil figures for this item.24 More serious was the manner of 
recording doubtful debts. The writer in Moore's 1852 Almanac claims that 
the Bank of Australia recorded as “bills in circulation” its re-discounts with 
the Australasia, while the latter bank gave no hint in its returns that one-
third of its securities consisted of the debt of the Bank of Australia which 
was more than doubtful for several years, being recovered only on appeal 
to the Privy Council.25 Occasional unacknowledged deficiencies should 
discourage reliance on precise accuracy. Thus data for the Melbourne 
branch of the Union for the last quarter of 1839 were lost on the voyage up. 
The bank supplied a return omitting Melbourne and Gipps directed “Let it 
be published in the usual manner”; no note was attached in the Gazette.26 
Nevertheless for its time and place it was a good return, regularly 
published in Government Gazette.27  
   For savings bank statistics sources are simple. When Campbell's Bank 
was wound up, he furnished a detailed statement of deposits which was 
published in Government Gazette, V.P.N.S.W. and the press and is 
reproduced below. The Savings Bank Act of 1832 required half-yearly 
balance sheets to be published in Government Gazette although, in fact, 
only yearly ones appeared. These have the defect of relating only to one 
day in each year but give considerable detail. Similar statements were 
required of the Port Phillip Savings Bank. After 1850 they appeared, of 
course, in the Victorian not the New South Wales Government Gazette, 
while that for 1842 was never published. Because of formal criticisms by 
George Miller this first return was revised, both the original and the 
revision being preserved in manuscript, the latter being embodied in 
statistics below.28  
   For exchange rates on bills on the Treasury the source is Bluebooks 
where precise information was recorded. For bank exchange rates and 
interest rates the main source is notices in newspapers supplemented by 
miscellaneous sources such as bank records which are detailed in 
appropriate places in the tables.  
Table 1 (a) BANK OF NEW SOUTH WALES LIABILITIES 1817–51 
   Figures in £. Those in brackets are original dollar figures converted at 4s. 
4d., shown under the computed figures.  
     
Single Day Figures 
Date or period Notes in circulation Deposits Total
(a) 1817: 31 December 5,635 1,859
(b) 1818: 30 June 10,308 13,136
(b) 31 December 11,577 23,459
(b) 1819: 30 June 10,195 32,282
(c) 31 December 7,212 26,498
     
(a) Views of Premises.  (b) Balance sheets preserved at Head Office.  (c) “Minutes”, 
11 January 1820 for December 1819, 16 January 1821 for December 1820.  (d) 
Bluebook 1823, date not given.  (e) May, July and August, H.R.A., I, xii, 304–5; 
December, Sydney Gazette, 26 January 1826.  (f) 27 February to 10 May, H.R.A., I, 
xii, 304–5; 17 May and 30 December, Monitor, 22 January 1827. Figures for 17 
May quoted as “currency” (i.e., originally in dollars).  (g) Australian, 25 July 1827. 
 (h) Sydney Gazette, 30 December 1828.  (i) 9 March to 4 May, “Colonial 
Secretary's Papers” (M.L.) File No. 29/3412. Figures for intervening weeks are 
quoted in the text, those selected here being first figures available in each month. 
December, Bluebook, 1829.  (j) H.R.A., I, xv, 734.  (k) Period (i) is average for first 
six months, H.R.A., I, xvi, 310; period (ii) is average for whole year, Bluebook, 
1831.  (l) Bluebooks. From 1836 to 1851, from New South Wales Government 
Gazette.  
     
(b) 1820: 30 June 5,439 31,413
(c) 31 December 5,902 26,868
(d) 1823: 13,499 ($62,304)
(e) 1825: 9 May 20,508 ($92,575) 40,466 ($188,764)
      11 July 24,904 ($114,940)
      22 August 19,994 ($92,280)
      31 December 25,120 ($115,940) 64,384 ($297,159)
(f) 1826: 27 February 28,870 ($133,245)
      13 March 86,391 ($398,727)
      10 May 27,055 ($124,869) 61,272 ($282,794)
      17 May 22,938 68,450
      30 December 16,131 23,967
(g) 1827: 30 June 13,775 33,318
(h) 1828: 26 December 10,665 17,707
(i) 1829: 9 March 8,426 13,646
      13 April 9,114 7,115
      4 May 7,681 6,892
      31 December 22,300
(j) 1830: 30 June 6,047 17,044
(k) 1831: (i) 7,926 29,974
      (ii) 11,000
(l) 1832: Av. 15,000
(l) 1833: Av. 20,077
(l) 1834: Av. 30,000
(l) 1835: 31 December 31,209
Half-yearly Averages 
Date or period Notes in circulation Deposits Total
1836: January—June 32,138 120,480
      July—December 27,665 161,292
1837: January—June 28,875 180,655
     
      July—December 26,209 198,169
1838: January—June 25,486 173,337
      July—December 24,909 194,422
1839: January—June 26,771 212,836
      July—December 28,498 223,643
1840: January—June 34,222 272,702
      July—December 31,712 265,213
(1841–51 overleaf)
Quarterly Averages 
Date Notes in 
circulation
Bills in 
circulation
Balances due to 
other banks
Deposits Not 
bearing interest
Deposits Bearing 
interest
Deposits 
Total
1841: 
March
31,637 4 252,407 252,407
   June 29,467 238,586 238,586
   September 27,925 227,978 227,978
   December 28,694 207,012 207,012
1842: 
March
27,015 220,977 220,977
   June 26,885 215,046 215,046
   September 26,898 202,746 202,746
   December 26,213 194,122 194,122
1843: 
March
25,126 6,725 198,109 204,834
   June 25,256 3,716 194,712 198,428
   September 23,879 5,359 158,528 163,888
   December 22,880 6,293 136,347 142,640
1844: 
March
23,078 352 2,904 137,992 140,895
   June 21,808 481 2,282 153,903 156,186
   September 20,165 481 158,555 158,555
   December 20,330 481 175,117 175,117
1845: 
March
23,606 481 207,089 207,089
   June 25,785 481 222,266 222,266
   September 25,614 496 229,477 229,477
   December 27,387 580 241,547 241,547
1846: 
March
28,922 580 250,481 250,481
   June 28,791 178 255,444 255,444
   September 28,435 258,767 258,767
   December 27,508 244,787 244,787
1847: 
March
30,643 232,617 232,617
   June 33,847 242,478 242,478
   September 33,470 257,232 257,232
   December 34,709 251,324 251,324
1848: 35,071 243,706 243,706
Table 1 (b) BANK OF NEW SOUTH WALES ASSETS 1817–51 
   Figures in £. Those in brackets are original dollar figures converted at 4s. 
4d., shown under the computed figures.  
     
March
   June 33,459 253,374 253,374
   September 32,659 235,982 235,982
   December 31,368 238,311 238,311
1849: 
March
34,519 225,767 225,767
   June 35,348 224,246 224,246
   September 32,460 217,534 217,534
   December 32,366 217,619 217,619
1850: 
March
35,203 398 35 226,512 226,512
   June 35,078 634 687 240,165 240,165
   September 36,371 520 252,225 252,225
   December 16,945 997 14,648 253,372 253,372
1851: 
March
33,016 611 290,607 290,607
   June 42,651 223 2,720 338,070 338,070
   September 68,044 1,230 4,222 361,827 361,827
   December 121,503 953 1,350 409,175 409,175
Single-day Figures 
Date of 
period
Coin Landed 
property
Notes and bills of 
other banks
Balances due from 
other banks
Notes and bills 
discounted
(a) 1817: 15 
July
7,434 1,316
(b)    31 Dec. 3,613 7,074
(b) 1818: 30 
June
16,719 12,977
(b)    31 Dec. 14,346 28,284
(b) 1819: 30 
June
18,432 32,530
(c)    31 Dec. 18,396 27,227
(b) 1820: 30 
June
24,573 25,100
(c)    31 Dec. 22,428 23,577
(d) 1825: 9 
May
42,553 ($196,397)
   15 August 8,186 ($37,781)
   31 Dec. 33,454 ($155,171) 67,493 ($311,504)
(e) 1826: 30 
Jan.
35,958 ($165,959)
   27 Feb. 20,224 ($93,343)
   3 April 26,635 ($122,933)
     
(a) Views of Premises. Main item in “coin” was bills on Treasury, £6,268. 
     
(b) Balance sheets preserved at Head Office. Mortgages included with discounts: 
(c) “Minutes”, 11 January 1820 for December 1819, 16 January 1821 for December 
1820. Mortgages included with discounts: 
Data for December 1820, also in Bigge, Manuscript Evidence, Box 27, p. 6,286. 
(d) May and August, H.R.A., I, xii, 304–5; December, Sydney Gazette, 26 January 
1826. December discounts include $20,296 mortgages. 
(e) 30 January to 10 May, H.R.A., I, xii, 304–5; 17 May and 30 December, Monitor 
27 January 1827, the figures for 17 May being described as “currency” (i.e., as 
having been originally in $). Discounts included mortgages, £4,720 on 17 May, and 
£2,837 on 30 December. 
(f) Australian, 25 July 1827. Discounts included £2,070 mortgages. 
   1 May 19,461 ($89,818)
   10 May 1,027 ($4,739) 95,408 ($440,344)
   17 May 958 105,077
   30 Dec. 11,076 47,867
(f) 1827: 30 
June
11,280 57,243
(g) 1828: 26 
Dec.
342 59,853
(h) 1829: 9 
March
5,261 44,148
   13 April 2,657 43,351
   4 May 4,329 42,522
(i) 1830: 15 
June
6,804 36,828
(j) 1832: 31 
Dec.
20,000
(j) 1833: 31 
Dec.
35,019
(j) 1834: 31 
Dec.
49,866
(j) 1835: 31 
Dec.
53,159
December 1817 £1,381 
June 1818 1,028 
December 1818 2,539 
June 1819 3,622 
June 1820 4,382 
December 1819 £4,132 
December 1820 4,172 
(g) Sydney Gazette, 30 December 1838. Discounts included mortgages £270. 
(h) “Colonial Secretary's Papers” (M.L.), File No. 29/3412. Figures for intervening 
weeks are quoted in text, those selected here being first figures available in each 
month. Mortgages £270 included with discounts in each case. 
(i) H.R.A., I, xv, 734. Discounts included mortgages £6,220. 
(j) Bluebooks. 
     
Remaining figures 1836–51 from New South Wales Government Gazette.  Until the 
'thirties “coin” included bills on the Treasury and a few miscellaneous cash items.  
     
Half-yearly Averages 
Date of period Coin Landed 
property
Notes and bills of other 
banks
Balances due from other 
banks
Notes and bills 
discounted
1836: January—
June
56,027 192,824
   July—
December
69,789 222,787
1837: January—
June
75,355 245,196
   July—
December
78,809 267,596
1838: January—
June
57,848 265,720
   July—
December
79,608 281,128
1839: January—
June
85,852 314,255
   July—
December
81,078 339,266
1840: January—
June
114,336 372,065
   July—
December
95,411 391,218
Quarterly Averages 
Date of 
period
Coin Landed 
property
Notes and bills of other 
banks
Balances due from other 
banks
Notes and bills 
discounted
1841: March 85,041 251 390,701
   June 78,104 30 393,347
   September 72,094 31 154 390,262
   December 72,043 214 385 376,190
1842: March 84,008 108 373,945
   June 83,417 8 377,316
   September 82,261 23 371,165
   December 66,303 15 384,673
1843: March 76,175 20 378,575
Table 2: Waterloo Company Note Issue 
     
(a) At 31 December. 
   June 72,802 3 2,892 374,922
   September 68,851 2,382 341,924
   December 69,874 102 2,057 319,219
1844: March 83,151 15 300,991
   June 101,823 13 295,377
   September 109,240 14 288,106
   December 112,312 26 254,583
1845: March 120,929 93 225,157
   June 124,199 38 240,071
   September 160,189 3 211,232
   December 189,210 196,527
1846: March 200,748 195,592
   June 185,017 3 216,176
   September 163,943 242,308
   December 146,977 259,478
1847: March 141,173 256,155
   June 158,137 12,915 256,368
   September 150,589 12,915 269,219
   December 143,982 12,148 1,738 271,760
1848: March 128,863 10,369 23,749 257,934
   June 127,459 10,027 36,720 262,817
   September 140,250 7,554 24,631 240,583
   December 173,708 8,191 5,740 227,144
1849: March 157,565 12,571 5,600 225,794
   June 136,845 12,528 20,069 232,079
   September 128,332 13,810 17,504 233,545
   December 127,276 15,256 43 9,493 241,585
1850: March 112,000 15,256 200 53,761 224,718
   June 107,624 14,434 667 80,808 218,512
   September 102,071 13,636 880 60,856 257,704
   December 111,571 1,543 20 37,108 248,334
1851: March 87,969 1,678 3,629 80,749 275,761
   June 166,710 2,035 141 104,582 245,494
   September 188,333 2,919 49 87,968 295,928
   December 152,108 3,489 89 155,101 367,504
1823 (a) $8,400 £114
1829 (a) £5,000
1830 (b) 3,000
1831 (b) 3,000
1832 (b) 3,000
1833 (a) 1,000
(b) Average for year. 
     
Source: Bluebooks. The figures are evidently rough estimates. 
Table 3 (a) BANK OF AUSTRALIA LIABILITIES 1827–42 (£) 
     
     
     
Bluebook Data 
Date or 
period
Notes in 
circulation
Bills in 
circulation
Balances due to 
other banks
Deposits Not 
bearing interest
Deposits Bearing 
interest
Deposits 
Total
1827 (a) 11,915 (a) 18,836
1828 (a) 18,100 (a) 40,361
1829 (b) 7,700
1830 (c) 20,000
1831 (c) 26,000 (d) 58,000
1832 (c) 25,000
1833 (b) 33,357
1834 (c) 36,000
1835 (b) 36,017
Half-yearly Averages 
Date or 
period
Notes in 
circulation
Bills in 
circulation
Balances due to 
other banks
Deposits Not 
bearing interest
Deposits Bearing 
interest
Deposits 
Total
1836: 
Jan.—June
35,939 108,066
July—Dec. 33,632 121,151
1837: 
Jan.—June
30,113 126,845
July—Dec. 26,424 138,205
1838: 
Jan.—June
27,437 131,150
July—Dec. 27,764 156,296
1839: 
Jan.—June
30,319 181,055
July—Dec. 30,436 180,126
1840: 
Jan.—June
32,146 215,065
July—Dec. 25,724 196,074
Quarterly Averages 
Date or 
period
Notes in 
circulation
Bills in 
circulation
Balances due to 
other banks
Deposits Not 
bearing interest
Deposits Bearing 
interest
Deposits 
Total
1841: March 25,162 — 77 1,164 171,776 172,940
June 24,244 — 1,087 2,598 170,454 173,051
September 20,782 — 10 1,306 158,248 159,554
December 19,021 — 109 1,566 118,451 120,017
1842: March 18,533 — 781 3,633 108,078 111,711
(a) At 31 March, Sydney Gazette, 31 March 1828. 
(b) At 31 December. 
(c) Average for year. 
(d) Average for first six months, Darling to Goderich, 26 July 1831, H.R.A., I, xvi, 
310. 
     
Source: Bluebooks 1828–35, and New South Wales Government Gazette. 
Table 3 (b) BANK OF AUSTRALIA ASSETS 1827–42 (£) 
     
     
June 18,058 1,163 1,387 2,133 101,200 103,333
September 17,118 20,723 — 2,806 118,466 121,272
December 16,622 46,884 14 1,837 99,001 100,838
Balance Sheet Figures 
Date or period Coin Landed property Balances due from other banks Notes and bills discounted
1827 (end March) 33,505
1828 (end March) 62,404
Bluebook Data 
Date or period Coin Landed property Balances due from other banks Notes and bills discounted
1832 (at 31 December) 25,000
1833 (at 31 December) 36,418
1834 (at 31 December) 28,275
1835 (at 31 December) 37,969
Half-yearly Averages 
Date or period Coin Landed property Balances due from other banks Notes and bills discounted
1836: January—June 39,208 192,827
   July—December 43,284 208,340
1837: January—June 40,913 220,479
   July—December 40,041 239,272
1838: January—June 43,871 237,868
   July—December 46,356 273,176
1839: January—June 63,068 286,520
   July—December 47,882 338,091
1840: January—June 65,254 367,053
   July—December 41,284 387,110
Quarterly Averages
1841 March 23,097 — 350 387,815
   June 30,978 — 152 390,848
   September 31,176 — 507 383,365
   December 22,366 — 409 357,892
1842 March 21,623 — — 345,754
     
Source: Sydney Gazette, 31 March 1828 (1827–28). Bluebooks and New South 
Wales Government Gazette. 
Table 4 (a) COMMERCIAL BANKING COMPANY OF SYDNEY LIABILITIES 
(£) AVERAGES OF WEEKLY FIGURES 
     
     
   June 18,253 — 294 345,178
   September 20,004 — 1,721 371,779
   December 16,156 46,884 1,633 343,936
Half-yearly Averages 
Period Notes in 
circulation
Bills in 
circulation
Balances due to 
other banks
Deposits Not 
bearing interest
Deposits Bearing 
interest
Deposits 
Total
1836: Jan.–
June
28,160 — — — — 90,340
   July–
Dec.
32,049 — — — — 104,914
1837: Jan.–
June
40,522 — — — — 124,828
   July–
Dec.
45,946 — — — — 129,522
1838: Jan.–
June
47,229 — — — — 126,448
   July–
Dec.
50,130 — — — — 150,338
1839: Jan.–
June
59,855 — — — — 195,596
   July–
Dec.
62,190 — — — — 219,170
1840: Jan.–
June
74,193 — — — — 269,274
   July–
Dec.
70,382 — — — — 257,536
Quarterly Averages 
Period Notes in 
circulation
Bills in 
circulation
Balances due to 
other banks
Deposits Not 
bearing interest
Deposits Bearing 
interest
Deposits 
Total
1841: 
March
63,544 2,867 8,291 — 216,319 216,319
   June 62,057 4,776 13,428 — 201,712 201,712
   Sept. 58,393 4,244 3,351 — 205,817 205,817
   Dec. 53,592 2,921 — — 174,537 174,537
1842: 
March
52,482 3,453 126 — 189,510 189,510
   June 52,723 6,434 — 54,208 126,881 181,089
   Sept. 47,759 18,376 6,755 151,621 16,548 168,168
   Dec. 45,444 42,077 82 128,245 17,096 145,340
1843: 44,682 21,783 70 134,552 18,183 152,735
     
Source: New South Wales Government Gazette. 
Table 4 (b) COMMERCIAL BANKING COMPANY OF SYDNEY ASSETS (£) 
March
   June 44,389 2,841 — 75,107 63,536 138,643
   Sept. 40,207 1,688 — 10,103 124,415 134,518
   Dec. 37,641 851 — 8,775 109,494 118,270
1844: 
March
40,176 362 — 23,445 128,283 151,729
June 38,621 213 — 17,826 134,972 152,798
Sept. 33,861 221 5,871 108,408 53,207 161,615
Dec. 33,947 28,420 38 161,583 3,972 165,554
1845: 
March
37,714 13,280 60 162,302 — 162,302
June 40,788 1,009 27 177,239 — 177,239
Sept. 40,842 8,935 164 188,846 — 188,846
Dec. 39,821 8,578 93 196,044 — 196,044
1846: 
March
44,902 935 93 213,867 — 213,867
June 47,004 44 69 203,814 — 203,814
Sept. 43,819 39 69 183,502 — 183,502
Dec. 43,966 51 1,205 170,760 — 170,760
1847: 
March
47,025 39 97 174,569 — 174,569
June 48,476 7,742 — 187,254 — 187,254
Sept. 45,620 3,336 — 166,433 — 166,433
Dec. 43,721 7,341 — 158,349 — 158,349
1848: 
March
46,541 1,026 — 156,804 — 156,804
June 45,855 87 — 154,042 — 154,042
Sept. 14,323 — — 143,221 — 143,221
Dec. 23,214 — 17 144,987 — 144,987
1849: 
March
31,226 — — 152,735 — 152,735
June 38,002 — 123 165,410 — 165,410
Sept. 36,805 — 73 159,491 — 159,491
Dec. 37,399 — 9,375 145,250 — 145,250
1850: 
March
41,832 — 5,028 161,539 — 161,539
June 45,031 — — 179,785 — 179,785
Sept. 42,969 — — 181,244 — 181,244
Dec. 44,148 — — 186,746 — 186,746
1851: 
March
49,927 — 358 212,324 — 212,324
June 54,627 — — 225,671 — 225,671
Sept. 56,696 — — 241,566 — 241,566
Dec. 81,579 — 240 261,497 — 261,497
AVERAGES OF WEEKLY FIGURES 
     
     
Half-yearly Averages 
Period Coin Landed 
property
Deposits Notes and bills 
of other banks
Deposits Balances due 
from other banks
Deposits Notes and bills 
discounted
1836: 
January—June
45,168 — — — 182,804
July—
December
44,674 — — — 223,518
1837: 
January—June
49,229 — — — 266,001
July—
December
42,672 — — — 295,860
1838: 
January—June
53,649 — — — 295,185
July—
December
61,318 — — — 327,255
1839: 
January—June
64,802 — — — 393,069
July—
December
62,643 — — — 437,242
1840: 
January—June
81,068 — — — 497,706
July—
December
53,353 — — — 532,425
Quarterly Averages 
Period Coin Landed 
property
Deposits Notes and bills 
of other banks
Deposits Balances due 
from other banks
Deposits Notes and bills 
discounted
1841: 
March
57,660 2,819 1,680 526 487,377
June 75,062 2,850 1,621 555 465,632
September 66,357 3,049 1,793 3,562 461,839
December 63,568 3,118 1,590 5,727 424,697
1842: 
March
82,862 3,277 2,529 19,443 400,846
June 82,429 3,277 1,942 10,647 404,289
September 82,017 3,277 1,970 1,168 414,407
December 71,745 3,277 1,299 1,625 418,638
1843: 
March
69,452 3,277 1,965 492 409,250
June 65,675 5,584 1,907 6,820 369,150
September 60,272 6,277 1,712 16,315 354,015
December 72,962 6,277 886 16,583 319,684
1844: 
March
101,104 6,277 1,080 16,792 287,003
June 108,353 6,277 94 19,850 251,675
September 119,807 6,277 12 5,591 224,992
December 136,108 6,282 46 2,212 214,171
     
Source: New South Wales Government Gazette. 
Table 5 (i) (a) BANK OF AUSTRALASIA LIABILITIES (£) AVERAGES OF 
WEEKLY FIGURES (N.S.W. BUSINESS) 
     
1845: 
March
123,878 6,378 137 1,098 214,082
June 153,187 6,410 36 4,997 187,930
September 159,710 6,410 3 16,065 188,919
December 185,328 6,563 189 1,031 183,305
1846: 
March
143,200 6,713 37 25,361 218,226
June 113,307 6,713 4 47,659 217,372
September 76,282 6,713 4 29,532 249,704
December 73,445 6,884 3 2,700 268,865
1847: 
March
86,226 7,149 56 4,469 261,939
June 100,027 7,342 — 1,039 274,538
September 75,106 7,426 — 554 264,057
December 78,027 7,426 — 885 254,649
1848: 
March
74,274 7,426 — 6,700 249,493
June 66,113 7,426 — 27,438 232,668
September 73,526 — 3,465 32,505 107,107
December 76,245 — 45 13,848 152,546
1849: 
March
90,958 3,600 48 12,772 152,567
June 89,593 3,600 62 29,233 158,043
September 82,638 3,600 1 17,833 184,374
December 87,149 3,600 — 3,221 194,228
1850: 
March
81,677 3,615 — 7,252 215,847
June 80,950 3,658 — 33,777 207,972
September 78,933 3,600 — 34,772 215,917
December 84,500 3,600 — 17,227 237,576
1851: 
March
93,498 3,600 — 32,432 247,988
June 92,129 3,600 — 42,797 262,962
September 97,810 6,347 — 36,885 277,362
December 120,822 7,567 — 30,021 310,861
Half-yearly Averages 
Period Notes in 
circulation
Bills in 
circulation
Deposits Not bearing 
interest
Deposits Bearing 
interest
Deposits 
Total
1836: January—
June
11,895 — — — 47,523
July—December 12,781 — — — 76,276
     
1837: January—
June
14,771 — — — 74,467
July—December 16,751 — — — 62,742
1838: January—
June
17,149 — — — 132,214
July—December 18,799 — — — 178,525
1839: January—
June
25,769 — — — 225,977
July—December 30,820 — — — 246,915
1840: January—
June
42,543 — — — 355,449
July—December 48,530 — — — 339,162
Quarterly Averages 
Period Notes in 
circulation
Bills in 
circulation
Deposits Not bearing 
interest
Deposits Bearing 
interest
Deposits 
Total
1841: March 53,370 30,641 — 268,012 268,012
June 54,314 34,763 — 260,446 260,446
September 50,596 28,266 — 259,918 259,918
December 47,538 37,334 — 239,137 239,137
1842: March 52,034 36,496 — 245,530 245,530
June 49,233 25,102 — 256,078 256,078
September 46,789 29,354 — 270,667 270,667
December 44,540 37,661 — 289,964 289,964
1843: March 49,781 40,362 — 305,630 305,630
June 49,671 31,005 — 309,352 309,352
September 51,379 28,822 — 342,889 342,889
December 54,472 31,212 — 361,456 361,456
1844: March 57,525 29,160 36,411 331,292 367,704
June 57,225 29,755 83,727 269,808 353,535
September 51,948 31,322 149,959 224,994 374,953
December 55,108 30,209 357,980 43,167 401,147
1845: March 65,993 21,775 377,215 — 377,215
June 65,950 14,581 379,830 — 379,830
September 61,434 11,529 382,162 — 382,162
December 61,112 13,590 413,697 — 413,697
1846: March 71,241 14,212 446,684 — 446,684
June 73,039 8,705 430,695 — 430,695
September 72,717 13,875 404,469 — 404,469
December 71,224 12,264 408,496 — 408,496
1847: March 79,338 11,741 428,415 — 428,415
June 81,690 8,786 437,198 — 437,198
September 77,670 10,435 414,855 — 414,855
December 77,449 12,212 396,149 — 396,149
1848: March 83,166 15,013 397,848 — 397,848
June 77,825 11,402 369,690 — 369,690
September 74,468 7,361 351,131 — 351,131
(a) Exclusive of Port Phillip business. 
     
Source: New South Wales Government Gazette. 
Table 5 (i) (b) BANK OF AUSTRALASIA ASSETS (£) AVERAGES OF 
WEEKLY FIGURES (N.S.W. BUSINESS) 
     
     
December 70,469 9,148 346,820 — 346,820
1849: March 79,561 13,118 354,782 — 354,782
June 82,218 12,182 370,250 — 370,250
September 76,733 12,536 362,540 — 362,540
December 73,754 24,088 364,810 — 364,810
1850: March 86,186 18,798 417,581 — 417,581
June 87,837 14,742 441,748 — 441,748
September 84,866 8,021 450,610 — 450,610
December 85,999 13,238 480,695 — 480,695
1851: March 100,706 10,789 537,893 — 537,893
June 104,210 9,744 527,499 — 527,499
(a) 
September
57,353 6,553 253,870 — 253,870
(a) 
December
67,093 5,607 281,584 — 281,584
Half-yearly Averages 
Period Coin Landed property Notes and bills of other banks Notes and bills discounted
1836: Jan.—June 34,792 — — 78,417
   July—Dec. 37,830 — — 157,534
1837: Jan.—June 39,778 — — 141,217
   July—Dec. 20,617 — — 161,548
1838: Jan.—June 91,294 — — 200,898
   July—Dec. 126,926 — — 261,583
1839: Jan.—June 127,763 — — 318,910
   July—Dec. 114,642 — — 453,285
1840: Jan.—June 123,519 — — 632,425
   July—Dec. 91,316 — — 704,470
Quarterly Averages 
Period Coin Landed property Notes and bills of other banks Notes and bills discounted
1841: March 87,607 11,083 4,447 658,891
   June 111,844 11,699 3,681 645,952
   September 104,809 12,899 4,515 635,053
   December 103,724 13,594 3,224 625,050
1842: March 123,935 13,833 4,594 621,440
   June 127,652 14,190 3,408 627,348
   September 144,025 14,228 3,849 638,838
(a) Exclusive of Port Phillip business. 
     
Source: New South Wales Government Gazette. 
Table 5 (ii) (a) BANK OF AUSTRALASIA LIABILITIES (£) AVERAGES OF 
WEEKLY FIGURES (N.S.W. BUSINESS) 
   Returns made in accordance with the Charter. Period I—mid-October of 
   December 130,485 14,331 3,042 687,685
1843: March 131,339 14,413 3,807 749,486
   June 109,468 14,805 2,177 833,752
   September 116,189 14,822 3,696 860,044
   December 128,351 14,822 2,476 857,887
1844: March 125,628 14,822 2,200 830,594
   June 113,071 14,642 2,347 783,873
   September 113,528 14,609 3,269 766,413
   December 124,762 13,399 1,817 764,466
1845: March 165,224 12,491 2,366 742,857
   June 142,905 12,516 1,940 733,042
   September 131,246 12,538 1,975 742,376
   December 131,895 13,263 1,229 757,732
1846: March 137,938 15,292 2,051 764,678
   June 180,897 15,360 1,287 782,690
   September 215,079 15,443 2,510 816,060
   December 237,848 15,718 804 799,654
1847: March 174,120 15,738 1,203 829,248
   June 173,019 15,755 1,033 842,497
   September 185,926 15,757 969 853,275
   December 179,223 15,757 1,030 810,174
1848: March 190,292 15,757 1,752 771,812
   June 172,419 15,773 769 730,642
   September 154,917 15,786 1,688 754,731
   December 154,221 15,796 1,007 785,539
1849: March 146,775 15,820 1,377 779,241
   June 169,493 15,851 1,480 749,200
   September 173,816 15,887 2,076 727,702
   December 153,854 15,941 1,021 721,064
1850: March 174,245 16,093 1,895 644,042
   June 179,552 16,199 1,730 552,495
   September 193,270 16,348 2,224 570,104
   December 214,545 14,939 1,562 581,649
1851: March 240,036 14,957 2,129 488,512
   June 255,919 14,274 1,977 522,293
   (a) September 115,169 9,750 874 298,297
   (a) December 137,075 9,519 377 276,851
preceding year to mid-April of year specified; period II—April to October.  
     
(a) Exclusive of Port Phillip business from 30 June. 
   Note: The return also contained entries for “Bills and Notes in circulation 
bearing interest” and “Balances due to other banks”, but these were always 
zero.  
     
Source: New South Wales Government Gazette. 
Table 5 (ii) (b) BANK OF AUSTRALASIA ASSETS (£) AVERAGES OF 
Period Notes in 
circulation
Bills in 
circulation
Deposits Not bearing 
interest
Deposits Bearing 
interest
Deposits Total
1836 I 6,756 2,509 24,500 10,107 34,607
   II 11,847 1,696 21,990 45,521 67,511
1837 I 14,352 2,115 649 76,533 77,182
   II 16,244 5,939 — 59,770 59,770
1838 I 16,752 11,935 — 80,025 80,025
   II 17,781 15,294 — 154,175 154,175
1839 I 22,679 27,504 — 183,265 183,265
   II 28,746 21,308 — 202,287 202,287
1840 I 36,883 25,043 — 294,272 294,272
   II 47,609 24,995 — 337,990 337,990
1841 I 51,341 32,860 — 270,582 270,582
   II 51,834 31,257 — 259,354 259,354
1842 I 50,137 36,387 — 243,554 243,554
   II 47,545 28,487 — 264,553 264,553
1843 I 47,783 39,212 — 299,866 299,866
   II 50,532 28,454 — 331,406 331,406
1844 I 56,671 29,681 27,182 338,218 365,400
   II 53,978 30,840 138,073 227,895 365,968
1845 I 61,785 25,611 372,584 16,284 388,868
   II 62,993 12,782 382,057 — 382,057
1846 I 67,151 13,676 433,924 — 433,924
   II 72,625 11,698 413,896 — 413,896
1847 I 76,400 11,771 421,374 — 421,374
   II 79,071 9,857 422,663 — 422,663
1848 I 80,746 13,551 396,856 — 396,856
   II 75,154 8,933 359,081 — 359,081
1849 I 76,293 11,457 351,757 — 351,757
   II 78,471 12,679 363,769 — 363,769
1850 I 81,320 22,185 398,497 — 398,497
   II 85,610 10,408 449,233 — 449,233
1851 I 95,204 11,922 515,645 — 515,645
   II (a) 77,228 7,818 368,854 — 368,854
WEEKLY FIGURES (N.S.W. BUSINESS) 
   Returns made in accordance with the Charter. For explanation of period 
see note to table of Liabilities.  
     
(a) Exclusive of Port Phillip business from 30 June. 
   Note: “Bills of other banks” were always nil; for “Balances due from 
other banks”, there is only one entry of £429, for the first return.  
   Source: As for Liabilities.  
Table 6 (a) UNION BANK OF AUSTRALIA LIABILITIES (£) AVERAGES OF 
WEEKLY FIGURES (N.S.W. BUSINESS) 
Period Coin Premises Discounts, etc.
1836 I 25,257 — 60,486
   II 50,005 — 117,266
1837 I 35,192 — 164,504
   II 26,091 — 145,100
1838 I 50,802 — 179,713
   II 120,847 — 245,479
1839 I 136,860 — 286,800
   II 115,438 192 390,304
1840 I 121,432 4,808 556,644
   II 107,854 7,100 689,949
1841 I 84,667 10,872 669,724
   II 108,880 12,458 642,336
1842 I 116,625 13,771 627,261
   II 135,026 14,226 639,535
1843 I 129,285 14,412 735,522
   II 114,060 14,815 852,328
1844 I 126,413 14,813 839,312
   II 111,939 14,602 774,478
1845 I 148,556 12,790 754,167
   II 135,440 12,530 740,812
1846 I 137,766 14,493 764,330
   II 202,937 15,428 803,418
1847 I 200,869 15,734 818,420
   II 180,828 15,757 847,864
1848 I 185,585 15,757 784,730
   II 161,664 15,782 747,827
1849 I 148,459 15,814 783,145
   II 172,309 15,878 736,357
1850 I 167,118 16,037 669,441
   II 188,785 16,247 563,287
1851 I 231,581 14,858 529,024
   II (a) 173,949 11,635 395,562
     
     
Half-yearly Averages 
Period Notes in 
circulation
Bills in 
circulation
Balances due to 
other banks
Deposits Not 
bearing interest
Deposits Bearing 
interest
Deposits 
Total
1839: July–
Dec.
18,261 — — — — 99,365
1840: Jan–
June
34,506 — — — — 131,525
   July–
Dec.
39,382 — — — — 188,901
Quarterly Averages 
Period Notes in 
circulation
Bills in 
circulation
Balances due to 
other banks
Deposits Not 
bearing interest
Deposits Bearing 
interest
Deposits 
Total
1841: 
March
27,706 15,770 544 — 167,824 167,824
   June 29,685 13,971 66 — 168,925 168,925
   Sept. 30,231 17,847 51 — 168,652 168,652
   Dec. 27,783 24,254 91 — 162,639 162,639
1842: 
March
27,259 23,942 140 — 167,549 167,549
   June 29,107 22,545 46 — 174,701 174,701
   Sept. 27,964 20,104 169 — 186,981 186,981
   Dec. 26,668 30,465 81 — 191,439 191,439
1843: 
March
30,852 19,862 19 — 178,676 178,676
   June 33,589 18,033 805 — 164,889 164,889
   Sept. 34,146 16,335 450 — 171,306 171,306
   Dec. 34,063 16,161 40 — 185,568 185,568
1844: 
March
40,045 17,230 62 — 213,729 213,729
   June 37,157 21,711 163 — 225,630 225,630
   Sept. 35,834 22,639 656 — 253,218 253,218
   Dec. 39,333 23,416 538 286,859 — 286,859
1845: 
March
50,228 21,381 — 320,199 — 320,199
   June 51,170 13,108 137 321,607 — 321,607
   Sept. 49,197 11,554 1,912 334,112 — 334,112
   Dec. 51,739 8,074 2,318 378,714 — 378,714
1846: 
March
61,692 6,776 527 422,209 — 422,209
   June 62,910 4,594 349 400,086 — 400,086
   Sept. 63,190 4,816 2,414 385,776 — 385,776
   Dec. 65,771 6,686 149 386,092 — 386,092
1847: 
March
76,769 2,968 — 424,503 — 424,503
   June 77,384 2,949 — 432,163 — 432,163
   Sept. 74,086 4,630 326 416,345 — 416,345
   Dec. 80,718 5,302 1,674 427,591 — 427,591
(a) Exclusive of Port Phillip business. 
     
Source: New South Wales Government Gazette. 
Table 6 (b) UNION BANK OF AUSTRALIA ASSETS (£) AVERAGES OF 
WEEKLY FIGURES (N.S.W. BUSINESS) 
     
     
1848: 
March
91,384 6,109 789 450,210 — 450,210
   June 83,130 6,109 2,166 450,579 — 450,579
   Sept. 75,732 6,011 2,384 413,407 — 413,407
   Dec. 74,194 6,146 508 396,822 — 396,822
1849: 
March
90,369 7,804 212 412,070 — 412,070
   June 87,491 7,193 939 421,456 — 421,456
   Sept. 78,552 6,201 1,660 433,078 — 433,078
   Dec. 82,859 7,392 958 462,240 — 462,240
1850: 
March
101,289 6,905 1,780 540,538 — 540,538
   June 99,708 7,322 1,714 533,676 — 533,676
   Sept. 94,612 6,336 1,238 537,378 — 537,378
   Dec. 97,543 8,503 726 600,909 — 600,909
1851: 
March
117,930 6,610 757 702,634 — 702,634
   June 115,872 6,922 385 652,091 — 652,091
   (a) Sept. 80,683 7,590 — 271,328 — 271,328
   (a) Dec. 136,679 9,883 — 324,391 — 324,391
Half-yearly Averages 
Period Coin Landed 
property
Notes and bills of other 
banks
Balances due from other 
banks
Notes and bills 
discounted
1839: July—
December
31,052 — — — 299,900
1840: January—
June
53,373 — — — 349,350
   July—December 51,227 — — — 470,072
Quarterly Averages 
Period Coin Landed 
property
Notes and bills of other 
banks
Balances due from other 
banks
Notes and bills 
discounted
1841: March 69,086 7,997 1,920 2,180 455,667
   June 65,709 8,025 — 4,025 471,841
   September 93,612 8,124 — 4,015 469,165
   December 120,874 8,134 — 1,603 476,000
1842: March 138,026 8,238 — 1,518 446,572
   June 153,250 8,258 — 1,158 430,401
(a) Exclusive of Port Phillip business. 
     
Source: New South Wales Government Gazette. 
Table 7 (a) PORT PHILLIP BANK LIABILITIES (£) 
   September 128,647 9,034 — 2,569 511,555
   December 123,099 9,569 — 2,213 558,007
1843: March 131,206 10,619 — 3,733 541,550
   June 126,678 11,507 — 1,277 465,724
   September 148,000 12,274 — 442 444,828
   December 145,952 13,569 — 773 422,276
1844: March 123,213 14,349 — 1,094 390,569
   June 100,165 15,359 — 2,179 355,549
   September 97,751 15,965 — 599 360,944
   December 145,642 16,327 3,107 745 349,918
1845: March 197,789 16,710 — 997 305,994
   June 216,638 16,891 — 400 289,355
   September 240,014 17,275 — 337 282,056
   December 244,481 19,484 — 203 310,518
1846: March 262,674 19,390 — 759 297,582
   June 260,927 20,048 — 1,734 313,178
   September 256,631 20,789 — 1,128 359,942
   December 267,987 22,340 — 1,302 357,962
1847: March 311,306 23,373 — 5,466 320,820
   June 309,061 24,168 — 5,632 354,184
   September 252,050 26,467 — 2,871 426,711
   December 192,656 27,048 — 503 496,140
1848: March 185,411 27,831 — 1,218 472,641
   June 221,248 29,058 — 271 434,697
   September 229,215 28,540 — 54 466,104
   December 204,079 29,086 — 375 522,440
1849: March 245,611 27,018 — 3,022 467,159
   June 241,324 14,958 — 3,509 432,657
   September 253,457 8,681 — 1,535 490,073
   December 226,683 7,944 — 607 538,921
1850: March 230,098 6,154 — 2,047 519,930
   June 204,491 6,243 — 746 499,195
   September 210,479 5,523 — — 539,451
   December 245,388 6,045 — 106 598,755
1851: March 254,728 5,193 — 142 631,829
   June 227,014 4,516 — 538 643,175
   (a) 
September
168,863 905 — 158 354,546
   (a) 
December
175,331 825 — — 366,404
     
     
Source: New South Wales Government Gazette. 
Table 7 (b) PORT PHILLIP BANK ASSETS (£) 
     
     
Source: New South Wales Government Gazette. 
Table 8 (a) SYDNEY BANKING COMPANY LIABILITIES (£)—AVERAGES OF 
WEEKLY FIGURES 
    
Period Notes in 
circulation
Balances due to other 
banks
Deposits Not bearing 
interest
Deposits Bearing 
interest
Deposits 
Total
1841: 
March
3,792 738 — 15,717 15,717
   June 4,111 688 — 28,302 28,302
   September 4,981 579 — 25,625 25,625
   December 4,663 1,460 — 23,113 23,113
1842: 
March
3,969 527 — 12,928 12,928
   June 3,710 1,069 — 8,404 8,404
   September 3,527 4,271 — 10,893 10,893
   December 2,496 2,606 — 2,519 2,519
1843: 
March
1,005 93 4,033 — 4,033
   June 393 — 3,080 — 3,080
Quarterly Averages 
Period Coin Premises Notes of other banks Balances due from other banks Notes and bills discounted
1841: March 3,246 2,488 627 6,735 56,678
   June 4,511 2,981 1,331 12,150 63,988
   September 5,186 3,583 966 5,937 67,407
   December 2,859 4,333 1,179 3,958 69,861
1842: March 4,463 4,548 1,740 4,372 55,845
   June 4,835 4,627 1,616 2,547 55,065
   September 2,534 4,607 783 1,178 64,930
   December 2,394 4,607 882 2,713 52,413
1843: March 3,038 4,607 926 6,601 45,423
   June 593 1,555 415 12,174 37,927
Quarterly Averages 
Quarter ending Notes in circulation Deposits (a) Capital paid up
1841: March 17,591 30,417 143,846
   June 19,730 29,716 146,305
   September 20,155 21,954 147,941
(a) All bearing interest. 
   Note: Bank issued no bills, and settled all clearing balances immediately.  
     
Source: New South Wales Government Gazette. 
Table 8 (b) SYDNEY BANKING COMPANY ASSETS (£)—AVERAGES OF 
WEEKLY FIGURES 
     
   Note: Bank owned no premises; clearing balances were settled 
immediately.  
     
Source: New South Wales Government Gazette. 
Table 9 (a) ALL BANKS—NEW SOUTH WALES LIABILITIES (£) AVERAGES 
OF WEEKLY FIGURES (N.S.W. BUSINESS) 
     
   December 19,037 20,897 149,679
1842: March 18,955 27,606 150,821
   June 19,409 27,135 152,257
   September 19,052 27,829 152,798
   December 19,669 26,571 153,020
1843: March 19,605 59,515 153,720
   June 16,744 39,202 153,808
Quarterly Averages 
Quarter ending Coin Notes and bills of other banks Notes and bills discounted
1841: March 16,401 785 178,170
   June 17,881 533 184,881
   September 15,338 199 181,539
   December 18,624 477 178,707
1842: March 19,729 343 185,627
   June 19,029 388 188,938
   September 16,529 569 189,795
   December 23,314 383 179,820
1843: March 16,955 489 215,939
   June 4,851 495 195,358
Half-yearly Averages 
Period Notes in 
circulation
Bills in 
circulation
Balances due to 
other banks
Deposits Not 
bearing interest
Deposits Bearing 
interest
Deposits 
Total
1836: Jan.–
June
108,132 — — — — 366,409
   July–
Dec.
106,127 — — — — 463,633
     
1837: Jan.–
June
114,281 — — — — 506,795
   July–
Dec.
115,330 — — — — 528,638
1838: Jan.–
June
117,301 — — — — 563,149
   July–
Dec.
121,602 — — — — 679,581
1839: Jan.–
June
142,714 — — — — 815,464
   July–
Dec.
170,205 — — — — 969,219
1840: Jan.–
June
217,610 — — — — 1,244,015
   July–
Dec.
215,730 — — — — 1,246,886
Quarterly Averages 
Period Notes in 
circulation
Bills in 
circulation
Balances due to 
other banks
Deposits Not 
bearing interest
Deposits Bearing 
interest
Deposits 
Total
1841: 
March
222,802 49,278 9,654 1,164 1,122,473 1,123,637
   June 223,608 53,510 15,268 2,598 1,098,140 1,100,738
   Sept. 213,062 50,356 3,990 1,306 1,068,192 1,069,498
   Dec. 200,328 64,508 1,660 1,566 945,785 947,351
1842: 
March
200,247 63,891 1,575 3,633 972,177 975,810
   June 199,126 55,244 2,502 56,341 909,445 965,786
   Sept. 189,106 88,557 11,195 154,427 834,129 988,556
   Dec. 181,652 157,087 2,784 130,082 820,710 950,792
1843: 
March
171,051 82,007 182 145,310 760,112 905,422
   June 170,042 51,879 805 81,903 771,691 853,594
   Sept. 149,611 46,845 450 15,462 797,139 812,601
   Dec. 149,056 48,225 40 15,068 792,866 807,934
1844: 
March
160,824 46,751 414 62,760 811,296 874,057
   June 154,810 51,678 644 103,835 784,313 888,149
   Sept. 141,808 54,182 7,008 416,922 531,419 948,341
   Dec. 148,719 82,045 1,056 981,539 47,139 1,028,677
1845: 
March
177,542 56,436 540 1,066,806 — 1,066,806
   June 183,693 28,698 644 1,100,943 — 1,100,943
   Sept. 177,087 32,018 2,572 1,134,598 — 1,134,598
   Dec. 180,059 30,241 2,991 1,230,003 — 1,230,003
1846: 
March
206,757 21,922 1,200 1,333,260 — 1,333,260
   June 211,744 13,343 596 1,290,040 — 1,290,040
   Sept. 208,162 18,729 2,482 1,232,514 — 1,232,514
(a) Exclusive of Port Phillip business from 30 June. 
     
Source: New South Wales Government Gazette. 
Table 9 (b) ALL BANKS—NEW SOUTH WALES ASSETS (£)—AVERAGES OF 
WEEKLY FIGURES (N.S.W. BUSINESS) 
     
   Dec. 208,469 19,001 1,354 1,210,133 — 1,210,133
1847: 
March
233,775 14,749 97 1,260,104 — 1,260,104
   June 241,038 19,478 — 1,299,092 — 1,299,092
   Sept. 230,846 18,401 326 1,254,864 — 1,254,864
   Dec. 236,597 24,855 1,674 1,233,413 — 1,233,413
1848: 
March
256,162 22,148 789 1,248,568 — 1,248,568
   June 240,268 17,597 2,166 1,227,684 — 1,227,684
   Sept. 197,182 13,373 2,384 1,143,740 — 1,143,740
   Dec. 199,245 15,294 525 1,126,941 — 1,126,941
1849: 
March
235,675 20,922 212 1,145,354 — 1,145,354
   June 243,059 19,375 1,062 1,181,363 — 1,181,363
   Sept. 224,550 18,737 1,732 1,172,643 — 1,172,643
   Dec. 226,378 31,480 10,333 1,189,919 — 1,189,919
1850: 
March
264,511 26,102 6,843 1,346,170 — 1,346,170
   June 267,655 22,698 2,402 1,395,373 — 1,395,373
   Sept. 258,819 14,877 1,238 1,421,457 — 1,421,457
   Dec. 244,636 22,738 15,374 1,521,721 — 1,521,721
1851: 
March
301,579 18,010 1,115 1,743,458 — 1,743,458
   June 317,360 16,889 3,105 1,743,331 — 1,743,331
   (a) Sept. 262,777 15,373 4,222 1,128,591 — 1,128,591
   (a) Dec. 406,853 16,443 1,591 1,276,648 — 1,276,648
Half-yearly Averages 
Period Coin Landed 
property
Notes and bills of other 
banks
Balances due from other 
banks
Notes and bills 
discounted
1836: January—
June
175,195 — — — 646,872
   July—
December
195,577 — — — 812,179
1837: January—
June
205,275 — — — 872,893
   July—
December
182,139 — — — 964,276
1838: January—
June
246,662 — — — 999,671
     
   July—
December
314,208 — — — 1,143,142
1839: January—
June
341,485 — — — 1,312,754
   July—
December
337,297 — — — 1,867,784
1840: January—
June
437,550 — — — 2,218,599
   July—
December
332,591 — — — 2,485,295
Quarterly Averages 
Period Coin Landed 
property
Notes and bills of other 
banks
Balances due from other 
banks
Notes and bills 
discounted
1841: March 342,138 24,388 9,709 9,790 2,615,299
   June 384,088 25,554 7,196 16,882 2,616,489
   September 388,570 27,655 7,504 14,175 2,588,630
   December 404,059 29,179 6,683 12,081 2,508,397
1842: March 474,646 29,896 9,313 25,334 2,430,028
   June 488,865 30,352 7,363 14,646 2,428,535
   September 476,018 31,146 7,195 7,337 2,562,468
   December 433,497 78,668 5,620 8,184 2,625,172
1843: March 428,165 32,916 7,206 10,826 2,340,222
   June 380,066 33,450 4,997 23,163 2,276,832
   September 393,312 33,372 5,408 19,140 2,000,810
   December 417,140 34,667 3,464 19,413 1,919,066
1844: March 433,096 35,447 3,295 17,885 1,809,157
   June 423,411 36,277 2,454 22,029 1,686,473
   September 440,327 36,851 3,296 6,190 1,640,455
   December 518,824 36,007 4,996 2,957 1,583,137
1845: March 607,821 35,579 2,597 2,095 1,488,089
   June 636,929 35,818 2,014 5,397 1,450,398
   September 691,159 36,224 1,981 16,402 1,424,583
   December 750,914 39,309 1,418 1,234 1,448,083
1846: March 744,560 41,395 2,088 26,120 1,476,077
   June 740,149 42,121 1,295 49,393 1,529,416
   September 711,935 42,945 2,513 30,661 1,668,014
   December 726,258 44,943 807 4,002 1,685,959
1847: March 712,825 46,260 1,258 9,935 1,668,162
   June 740,245 60,180 1,033 6,671 1,727,587
   September 663,671 62,565 969 3,425 1,813,262
   December 593,889 62,379 1,030 3,127 1,832,723
1848: March 578,839 61,383 1,752 31,666 1,751,880
   June 587,239 62,283 769 64,429 1,660,825
   September 597,909 51,880 5,153 57,190 1,568,525
   December 608,253 53,073 1,053 19,964 1,687,668
1849: March 640,909 59,010 1,425 21,394 1,624,761
   June 637,255 46,937 1,541 52,811 1,571,980
(a) Exclusive of Port Phillip business from 30 June. 
     
Source: New South Wales Government Gazette. 
Table 10 NEW SOUTH WALES BANKS CAPITAL PAID UP (£) 
     
   September 638,243 41,979 2,077 36,872 1,635,695
   December 594,962 42,741 1,064 13,322 1,695,797
1850: March 598,021 41,117 2,095 63,060 1,604,537
   June 572,617 40,535 2,398 115,330 1,478,174
   September 584,753 39,107 3,104 95,628 1,583,176
   December 656,004 26,126 1,582 54,441 1,666,314
1851: March 676,230 25,427 5,758 113,323 1,644,089
   June 741,772 24,426 2,117 147,917 1,673,924
   (a) 
September
570,176 19,921 923 125,012 1,226,133
   (a) 
December
585,336 21,400 466 185,122 1,321,620
Date N.S.W. Australia Commercial Australasia Union Port Phillip Sydney
(a) 1817 April 3,625
(b) 1818 Jan. 3,625
(b)     June 6,275
(b)     Dec. 6,725
(b) 1819 June 7,550
(b) 1820 June 12,500
(c)     Dec. 12,600
(d) 1825 Dec. 9,360
($43,200)
(e) 1826 May 11,860
(e)     Dec. 17,462
(f) 1827 March 12,000
(g)     July 20,145
(f) 1828 March 16,716
(h)     Dec. 17,000
(i) 1830 June 19,053
(j) 1831 June 24,571 35,000
(k) 1834 June 44,000
   Dec. 62,325 55,690
(l) 1838 June 120,225 170,056
1841 March 183,850 202,390 238,260 600,000 373,338 48,472 143,846
   June 185,675 212,040 238,305 600,000 444,845 49,152 146,305
   Sept. 189,265 221,460 240,875 600,000 444,845 49,152 147,941
   Dec. 190,435 221,540 241,050 600,000 542,788 49,602 149,679
1842 March 196,375 223,670 242,090 600,000 575,930 51,865 150,821
(a) Views of Premises. 
(b) Surviving balance sheets. 
(c) Bigge, Manuscript Evidence, B.T. Box 27, p. 6285 
(d) Sydney Gazette, 26 January 1826. 
(e) Monitor, 27 January 1827. 
   June 199,965 223,890 243,695 600,000 575,930 52,890 152,257
   Sept. 206,235 224,670 244,880 675,000 575,930 52,890 152,798
   Dec. 206,505 224,950 245,030 675,000 743,525 53,915 153,020
1843 March 208,465 245,355 675,000 743,525 52,915 153,720
   June 208,465 245,475 750,000 780,515 52,965 153,808
   Sept. 208,465 245,560 750,000 780,515
   Dec. 208,545 245,560 750,000 806,130
1844 March 208,545 184,215 900,000 806,130
   June 208,545 184,217 900,000 820,000
   Sept. 208,545 122,846 900,000 820,000
   Dec. 104,272 122,865 900,000 813,730
1845 March 104,272 122,948 900,000 813,730
   June 104,272 122,962 900,000 820,000
   Sept. 104,272 123,102 900,000 820,000
   Dec. 104,272 123,128 900,000 820,000
1846 March 104,272 123,192 900,000 820,000
   June 104,272 123,192 900,000 820,000
   Sept. 104,272 124,085 900,000 820,000
   Dec. 104,272 125,435 900,000 820,000
1847 March 104,272 125,755 900,000 820,000
   June 104,272 125,755 900,000 820,000
   Sept. 104,272 125,755 900,000 820,000
   Dec. 104,272 125,795 900,000 820,000
1848 March 125,127 125,795 900,000 820,000
   June 125,129 125,795 900,000 820,000
   Sept. 125,275 70,773 900,000 820,000
   Dec. 125,279 71,765 900,000 820,000
1849 March 125,283 72,955 900,000 820,000
   June 125,283 75,026 900,000 820,000
   Sept. 125,284 89,004 900,000 820,000
   Dec. 125,284 90,000 900,000 820,000
1850 March 125,286 92,850 900,000 820,000
   June 125,286 94,635 900,000 820,000
   Sept. 125,286 102,153 900,000 820,000
   Dec. 108,950 102,997 900,000 820,000
1851 March 122,120 107,447 900,000 820,000
   June 126,400 108,072 900,000 820,000
   Sept. 129,540 109,802 900,000 820,000
   Dec. 142,280 119,044 900,000 820,000
(f) Sydney Gazette, 31 March 1828. 
(g) Australian, 25 July 1827. 
(h) H.R.A., I, xiv, 551. 
(i) H.R.A., I, xv, 734. 
(j) H.R.A., I, xvi, 310. 
(k) “Colonial Secretary In-Letters”, “Banks”, 1834. 
(l) Ibid., “Banks”, 1838. 
     
For 1841–51 from New South Wales Government Gazette. 
     
Notes: (i) Early data should be treated with reserve since amounts included sums 
represented by bills given by shareholders.  (ii) Figures must not be added 
horizontally (as for example Gipps did frequently) since Australasia and Union also 
operated in other colonies. 
Table 11 NEW SOUTH WALES BANKS RESERVES (£)—HELD AT END OF 
EACH QUARTER 
     
Period N.S.W. Australia Commercial Australasia Union Port Phillip Sydney
1841 I 3,000 4,000 11,540 48,383 16,946 264 2,120
   II 3,000 5,000 11,540 48,383 24,288 264 2,120
   III 4,500 5,000 8,678 64,293 24,288 610 2,159
   IV 4,500 5,000 9,378 64,293 32,689 610 2,159
1842 I 6,000 5,000 10,453 64,293 32,689 1,030 2,516
   II 6,000 5,000 9,698 64,293 38,984 1,030 2,516
   III 6,500 6,500 9,092 68,318 38,984 1,392 3,147
   IV 6,500 6,500 10,661 68,318 46,789 1,392 3,147
1843 I 7,000 9,802 68,318 46,789 1,392 3,308
   II 7,000 10,119 68,318 55,730 3,308
   III 11,851 7,474 87,413 55,730
   IV 11,851 7,474 87,413 58,639
1844 I 6,240 6,512 87,413 58,639
   II 6,240 6,512 87,413 62,632
   III 6,240 6,512 87,855 62,632
   IV 6,240 6,562 87,855 52,305
1845 I 7,283 6,562 87,855 52,305
   II 7,283 6,833 87,855 55,244
   III 8,219 6,833 75,966 55,244
   IV 8,219 7,709 75,966 58,699
(a) Including bonuses, for which see dividend table. 
     
Source: New South Wales Government Gazette. 
Table 12 NEW SOUTH WALES DIVIDENDS (per cent per annum) 
     
1846 I 8,333 7,717 75,322 58,699
   II 8,333 7,412 75,322 63,074
   III 8,333 7,412 75,322 63,074
   IV 8,333 8,068 109,307 65,558
1847 I 24,229 8,068 109,307 65,558
   II 24,229 2,048 109,307 70,343
   III 34,209 2,048 — 70,343
   IV 34,210 3,861 — 63,086
1848 I 35,402 3,853 — 63,086
   II 35,402 3,861 — 71,091
   III 16,403 — 53,452 71,091
   IV 16,403 — 53,452 77,931
1849 I 17,150 (a) 993 53,452 77,931
   II 17,150 (a) 993 53,452 77,667 (a)
   III 13,728 2,022 68,519 77,667 (a)
   IV 13,728 2,022 68,519 85,517
1850 I 13,979 3,352 68,519 85,517
   II 13,979 3,352 68,519 93,494
   III 16,982 4,770 50,718 93,494
   IV 4,770 50,718 100,284
1851 I 6,000 32,718 100,284
   II 7,377 6,000 32,718 106,105
   III 7,377 9,065 36,256 106,105
   IV 6,320 5,314 36,256 111,044
Period N.S.W. Australia Commercial Bathurst Australasia Union Port Phillip Sydney
1818 II 12
1819 II (a) 18
1820 I (a) 12
   II (a) 12
1821 II 24
1822 I 20
   II 12
1823 II 16
1824 I (b) $16 p.s.
   II (b) $30 p.s.
1825 I (b) $24 p.s.
   II (b) $37 p.s.
1826 I (c) 17&frac13;
   II 14
1827 I 14 6
   II 12 14
1828 I 16
   II (d) 16
1829 I 6 162/3
   II 17
1830 I 14
   II 14 12
1831 I 16 17
   II 15 17
1832 I 16 17
   II 19 191/4
1833 I 20
   II 15 23
1834 I 25
   II
1835 I 24 15
   II 20 22 15 343/4
1836 I 18 21 15 341/2
   II 171/4 13 311/2
1837 I 14 33 }8
   II 16 14 23
1838 I 16 13 22 }8
   II 16 13 21
1839 I 16 13 20 }8
   II 20
1840 I 14 }8 25s.-p.s.
   II 14 16 13 10 10
1841 I 15 14 13 }8 10 10 12
   II 14 12 13 10 11
1842 I 14 12 12 }8 10 10 11
   II 14 10 12 10 11
1843 I 14 12 }8 10
   II 8 10
1844 I 8 6 }8 6
   II 4 6
1845 I 71/2 8 }3 6
   II 10 8
1846 I 10 8 }3 6
   II 10 10
1847 I 10 10 }— 6
   II 10 6
1848 I 10 (i) 4 }— 6
   II 10 (i) 10
1849 I (e) 8 10 }3 (f) 6
   II 10 10
(a) These are dividends according to “Minutes”; Bigge, Manuscript Evidence, B.T. 
Box 27, p. 6290 has these: 
(b) Not converted to percentages since amount of paid-up capital ambiguous. That 
for 1825 I was approximately 40 per cent; that for 1825 II was 531/2 per cent. See 
text above. 
(c) Not distributed, but added to capital. Sydney Gazette, 22 July 1826. 
(d) 10 per cent was declared by “Minutes”, 13 August 1829, at same time as next 
dividend of 6 per cent for 1829 I. 
(e) Plus 5 per cent bonus. 
(f) Plus 5s. per share, and for colonial shareholders 7d. in £ (amount of English 
income tax). 
(g) Plus 7s. 6d. per share, and, for colonial shareholders, 7d. in £. 
(h) Plus 10s. per share on fully paid shares. 
(i) 4 per cent is final dividend of “old” bank, 10 per cent first dividend of 
reorganized “new” bank. 
   “p.s.”—per share  
     
Sources: From 1841, Government Gazette. 
     
For earlier years, 
Table 13 (a) BANK DEPOSIT INTEREST NEW SOUTH WALES TO 1851 
     
1850 I 10 10 }3 (g) 6
   II 10 10
1851 I 10 10 }4 (h) 6
   II 10 10
August 1818—February 1819: 12
February 1819—August 1819: 12
August 1819—February 1820: 9
February 1820—August 1820: 6
August 1820—January 1821: 6
Bank of New South Wales : to 1825, “Minutes”; 1826–40, partly “Minutes”, partly newspaper items. 
Australia Commercial :Newspaper items
Bathurst :“Minutes”
Australasia Union :Annual Reports
Bank making change Date Current account daily Ten days' Three months' Fixed Source (g) 
(a) If actually left 3 months; no contract or notice required. 
(b) Date of commencing business. 
(c) Not given. 
(d) Sydney only. 
effective balance notice notice period
Commercial 17/11/1834 — — 3 (a) — S.H. 
17/11/34
Australasia (b) 14/12/1835 — — 5 — S.H. 3/12/35
Australasia 28/1/1836 4 — 5 — S.H. 1/2/36
N.S.W. 8/2/1836 4 — (c) — S.H. 8/2/36
Australia 28/2/1836 4 — (c) — S.H. 11/2/36
Australasia 1/2/1838 4 7 (c) — S.H. 29/1/38
Union 2/1/1839 4 (c) (c) — S.H. 
26/12/38
Australasia 1/3/1839 4 5 (c) — S.H. 5/2/39
Commercial 1/4/1839 4 4 4 4 S.H. 13/3/39
Australasia 23/6/1840 4 5 7 — S.H. 26/6/40
Union 20/8/1840 4 5 7 — S.H. 21/8/40
Commercial 18/9/1840 4 (c) 7 7 S.H. 25/9/40
Australia 25/9/1840 4 7 7 7 S.H. 25/9/40
N.S.W. 15/10/1840 4 (c) 7 — S.H. 
15/10/40
Commercial 1/6/1842 nil 3 5 (c) S.H. 14/5/42
N.S.W. 2/7/1842 4 4 (c) — S.H. 2/4/42
Australasia and 
Union
1/4/1843 3 (c) 5 — S.M.H. 
24/3/43
Commercial 1/4/1843 3(d) 5 5 5 S.M.H. 
25/3/43
N.S.W. 1/4/1843 3 (c) (c) — S.M.H. 
25/3/43
Sydney 1/4/1843 3 (c) (c) — S.M.H. 
30/3/43
Union and 
Commercial
1/10/1843 2 (c) 3 (c) S.M.H. 
28/9/43
Australasia 1/3/1844 2 (e) (c) 3 — S.M.H. 
29/2/44
N.S.W. 1/4/1844 2 (e) (c) 2?(f) — S.M.H. 
13/3/44
N.S.W. 30/6/1844 nil nil nil nil S.M.H. 
8/6/44
Commercial 1/8/1844 nil nil nil nil S.M.H. 
24/7/44
Australasia and 
Union
31/8/1844 nil (c) 3 (h) — S.M.H. 
26/8/44
Australasia and 
Union (i) 
30/11/1844 nil nil nil nil S.M.H. 
26/8/44
(e) Minimum monthly balance. 
(f) Advertisement ambiguous. 
(g) Bank notices; S.H.—Sydney Herald; S.M.H.—Sydney Morning Herald. 
(h) Existing deposits only; nil for new deposits. 
(i) Other banks followed; no deposit interest was paid during remainder of period. 
Table 13 (b)—BANK LOAN RATES—NEW SOUTH WALES 1817–51 
     
Bill 
Discount 
Rate
Mortgage
Bank making 
change
Date 
effective
Not more 
than 60 
days
Over 60 
days
Not more 
than 3 
months
Not 
more 
than 
100 
days
Over 
100 
days
Renewals Overdrawn 
accounts
Under 
1 year 
(a) 
Source 
(b) 
N.S.W. 8/4/17 (c) 10 (d) (g) (g) Charter, 
etc.
N.S.W. 24/1/26 
(e) 
8 (g) (g) S.G. 
26/1/26
Australia 23/10/27 10 (f) (g) (g) S.G. 
17/10/27
Australasia 14/12/35 
(c) 
10 (g) 10 S.H. 
3/12/35
Australasia 27/6/38 8 10 12 12 12 S.H. 
28/6/38
Union 2/1/39 8 10 (g) (g) S.H. 
26/12/38
Australasia 8/7/40 (g) 10 12 12 12 S.H. 
8/7/40
Union 20/8/40 (g) (g) 10 12 (g) (g) S.H. 
21/8/40
N.S.W. 15/10/40 (g) 10 12 12 12 S.H. 
15/10/40
Commercial 1/6/42 8 10 10 10 S.H. 
14/5/42
N.S.W. (h) 1/4/43 6 8 8 (k) (g) S.M.H. 
13/3/43
Australasia 1/4/43 8 10 (g) (g) S.M.H. 
24/3/43
Commercial 
& Union
1/10/43 6 8 (g) 8 (i) S.M.H. 
28/9/43
Australasia 11/2/45 6 (g) (g) S.M.H. 
11/2/45
Commercial 4/12/45 (g) (g) (g) (g) 6 (j) S.M.H. 
4/12/45
N.S.W. 1/1/46 (g) 6 (l) (g) (g) 6 S.M.H. 
31/12/45
   Blank = rate not published; probably type of loan not made at the time.  
(a) In 'twenties and early 'thirties business on a minor scale, rate usually same as for 
3 months' bills. 
(b) Usually notice by bank concerned. S.G.—Sydney Gazette; S.H.—Sydney Herald; 
S.M.H.—Sydney Morning Herald. 
(c) Date of commencing business. 
(d) Usual minimum rate earlier 8 per cent. This and third and fourth entries assume 
three months' bills, since this was usual tenor. But early bank practice was elastic. 
See, e.g., S.G., 21 February 1818. 
(e) 10 per cent rate had lasted since 1817. New rate adopted by Bank of Australia 
when it opened in July 1826. 
(f) Followed by Bank of N.S.W.; rate continued until at least 1838. 
(g) Not recorded; indicates dropping of a rate formerly quoted, or probability that 
business was done at a rate not quoted. 
(h) Followed by Sydney Bank on same day; S.M.H., 30 March 1843. 
(i) Not announced; inferential from S.M.H., 16 July 1845. 
(j) First time this type of loan offered publicly. 
(k) Not announced; inferential from S.M.H., 18 September 1843. 
(l) Bills not more than 6 months. 
Table 14 (a) New South Wales Exchange Rates. Commissariat Bills on London 
   Rates are quoted as £'s Australian paid for £100 sterling.  
     
     
Fixed Rates 
Fixed Rates
1826 1 January
to 103
1828 24 May
to 1011/2
1835 28 February
to 100
1838 13 August
to 1011/2
1839 5 August
Tender Rates 
1839 5 August to 31 December 1011/2–1061/2
1840 1 January to 4 March 1011/2
1840 4 March to 9 December 105
1840 9 December to 31 December 1011/2
1841 12 January to 9 April 1011/2
9 April to 7 May 100
7 May to 7 July no bills drawn
7 July to 30 September 1011/2–1031/2
13 October 101–1021/2
15 November 100–1011/2
1842 4 January 100
8 February 971/2–99
8 June 103–105
23 July 1031/2–104
1843 3 January 1011/2
16 January 1011/2
1 February 1011/2–102
15 February 103
1 March 103 7/8–104
15 March 1031/2–104
1 April 103–1031/2
15 April 1031/2–104
1 May 1031/2–104
15 May 103–1031/2
15 June 102
27 June 101–103
4 July 1011/2
11 July 1011/2
18 July 100–1011/2
25 July 100
8 August 100
29 August 100
5 September 100–104
12 September 100
19 September 100
3 October 981/2–100
17 October 100
31 October 971/2–981/2
7 November 971/2–981/2
14 November 981/2
28 November 971/2–98
12 December 971/2
19 December 971/2
1844 whole year (a) 981/2
1845 27 February 981/2
1 April to 31 July 100
1 August 1001/4–1011/2
5 August 100
8 August to 5 September 100–101
(a) “Under arrangements made with the Bank of Australasia and Union Bank of 
Australia”. 
     
Source: Fixed rates from Government notices; tender rates from Bluebooks. 
Table 14 (b) NEW SOUTH WALES—BANK EXCHANGE RATES 
   Expressed as £A for £100 sterling. Selling rates are for bills payable 
thirty days after sight.  
     
5 September to 31 December 100
to 100
1846 whole year 100
1847 1 January to 31 January 100
31 January to 28 February 101
28 February to 31 August no bills drawn
31 August to 31 October 103
31 October to 30 November 1011/2–103
30 November to 31 December 100–1003/4
1848 1 January to 31 January 100
31 January to 30 June no bills drawn
30 June to 31 August 102–1031/2
31 August to 31 December 103
1849 1 January to 31 January 101–103
31 January to 31 October 103
31 October to 30 November no bills drawn
30 November to 31 December 101
1850 1 January to 31 January no bills drawn
31 January to 28 February 101
28 February to 31 March 1011/2
31 March to 30 April 1011/2–103
30 April to 31 May 103
31 May to 30 June 101
30 June to 31 July 1011/2
31 July to 31 December no bills drawn
1851 1 January to 31 May no bills drawn
31 May to 30 June 1011/2
30 June to 30 November no bills drawn
30 November to 31 December 100
Date Australasia Union Commercial N.S.W.
Sell Buy Sell Buy Sell Buy Sell Buy
1835 14 December 991/2
1837 9 November 98
1838 28 June (a) 99
1839 5 April 105
   9 October 1021/2
1840 9 March 104
   28 September 1031/2
   16 October 1031/2
   5 November 1011/2
   10 December 99
   14 December 100
1842 February 1021/2 100
   29 September 102 102
   13 October 1011/2
   29 October 1011/2 1011/2
1843 24 July 100 100
   9 September 100
   27 October 981/2 981/2
   4 December 961/2 95 961/2 95
   20 December (b) 961/2
1844 7 June (b) 1011/2
   21 August 100 100
   24 August (b) 100
   11 October 981/2 981/2
   15 November 961/2 961/2
   23 December 94 93 94 93
1845 18 January 94
   25 January 96 94 96
   15 February 95
   23 July 991/2
   3 September 991/2
   October 100 98
1847 January 101 98 101 98
   February 101 100
   25 February 102 101 101
   10 December 100
   13 December 101 100 101 100
1848 14 August 103
   22 September 103
1849 4 January 1001/2
   13 January 1011/2
   24 January 102
   9 November 103 102
   16 November 101
   21 December 100
1850 6 February 100
   12 February 1001/2 991/2
   16 February 100
   21 May 102
   31 May 102
(a) Rate of 98 maintained from 9 November 1837. 
(b) Rate of bills 1 day after sight. Other Commercial selling rates are for 1 month 
after sight. 
   Sources: Mainly bank advertisements in press, supplemented by news 
items, and by “Minutes” of Bank of Australasia. The absence of entries 
does not imply no business but reflects the intermittent nature of 
announcements.  
Table 15 (a) NEW SOUTH WALES RATIO PER CENT OF CASH TO 
DEPOSITS AND NOTES 
     
     
   14 June 101 101
   18 June 100
   20 September 98 97
   29 November 98
1851 14 February 101 1021/2
   11 August 1001/2 99
   23 August 99 971/2 99 971/2
Half-yearly 
Period N.S.W. Australia Commercial Australasia (a) Union Sydney Port Phillip All Banks
1836 I 36.7 27.2 38.1 58.6 61.1 36.9
   II 36.9 28.0 32.6 42.5 63.0 34.3
1837 I 36.0 26.0 29.7 44.6 38.4 33.0
   II 35.1 24.3 24.3 25.9 34.3 28.3
1838 I 29.1 27.7 30.8 61.1 52.5 36.2
   II 36.3 25.2 30.5 66.0 70.3 39.2
1839 I 35.8 29.8 25.3 50.8 66.4 35.6
   II 32.2 22.7 22.2 41.3 50.0 26.4 29.6
1840 I 37.3 26.4 23.6 31.0 36.7 32.1 30.0
   II 32.1 18.6 16.2 23.6 28.0 22.4 22.7
Quarterly 
Period N.S.W. Australia Commercial Australasia (a) Union Sydney Port Phillip All Banks
1841 I 29.9 11.7 20.6 27.3 26.3 35.3 34.2 16.6 25.4
   II 29.1 15.7 28.4 34.5 33.1 36.2 13.9 29.0
   III 28.2 17.3 25.1 33.8 35.0 47.1 36.4 16.9 30.3
   IV 30.6 12.8 27.8 36.2 63.5 46.6 10.3 35.2
1842 I 33.9 16.3 34.2 41.6 39.7 70.8 42.3 26.4 40.4
   II 34.5 15.0 35.2 41.8 75.2 40.9 39.9 42.0
   III 35.8 14.4 37.9 45.4 43.3 59.8 35.3 17.6 40.4
   IV 30.1 13.8 37.6 39.0 56.4 50.4 47.7 38.3
1843 I 33.1 35.1 37.0 37.2 62.6 21.4 60.3 39.8
   II 32.5 35.8 30.5 63.8 8.7 17.1 37.1
(a) The first series is based upon the returns made on the same basis as the other 
banks; the second is based upon Charter averages, entered to centre the average as 
nearly as possible on the same period. 
Table 15 (b) NEW SOUTH WALES RATIO PER CENT OF ADVANCES TO 
DEPOSITS 
     
   III 36.7 34.4 29.5 29.9 72.0 40.9
   IV 42.2 46.8 30.8 66.4 43.6
1844 I 50.7 52.7 29.5 30.0 48.6 41.8
   II 57.2 56.6 27.5 38.1 40.6
   III 61.1 61.3 26.6 26.6 33.8 40.4
   IV 57.5 68.2 27.3 44.6 44.1
1845 I 52.5 61.9 37.3 33.0 53.4 48.8
   II 50.1 70.3 32.0 58.1 48.4
   III 62.8 69.5 29.6 30.4 62.6 52.7
   IV 70.4 78.6 27.8 56.8 53.2
1846 I 71.9 55.3 26.6 27.5 54.3 48.3
   II 65.1 45.2 35.9 56.4 49.3
   III 57.1 33.6 45.1 41.7 57.2 49.4
   IV 54.0 34.2 49.6 59.3 51.2
1847 I 53.6 38.9 34.3 40.4 62.1 47.7
   II 55.9 42.8 33.3 60.6 48.1
   III 51.8 35.4 37.7 36.0 51.4 44.7
   IV 50.3 38.6 37.8 37.9 40.4
1848 I 46.2 36.5 39.6 38.8 34.2 38.5
   II 44.4 33.0 38.5 41.4 40.0
   III 52.2 46.7 36.4 37.2 46.9 44.6
   IV 64.4 45.3 37.0 43.3 45.9
1849 I 60.5 49.4 33.8 34.7 48.9 46.4
   II 50.8 44.0 37.4 47.4 44.7
   III 51.3 42.1 39.6 39.0 49.5 45.7
   IV 50.9 47.7 35.1 41.6 42.0
1850 I 42.8 40.2 34.6 34.8 51.4 37.1
   II 39.1 36.0 33.9 32.3 34.4
   III 35.4 35.2 36.1 35.3 33.3 34.8
   IV 41.3 36.6 37.8 35.1 37.1
1851 I 27.2 35.6 37.6 37.9 31.0 33.1
   II 43.8 32.5 40.5 29.6 36.0
   III 43.8 32.8 37.0 39.0 47.9 41.0
   IV 28.7 35.2 39.3 38.0 34.8
Half-yearly 
Period N.S.W. Australia Commercial Australasia (a) Union Sydney Port Phillip All Banks
1836 I 160.0 178.3 202.4 165.0 174.8 176.5
   II 138.1 171.9 213.0 206.5 173.7 175.2
     
1837 I 135.7 173.9 213.1 189.6 213.1 172.2
   II 135.0 173.2 228.4 257.5 242.8 182.4
1838 I 153.3 181.3 233.4 151.9 224.6 177.5
   II 144.6 174.8 217.7 146.5 159.2 169.0
1839 I 147.6 158.2 200.9 129.2 156.5 161.0
   II 155.2 187.8 199.5 183.6 192.9 301.8 192.7
1840 I 136.4 170.7 184.8 177.9 189.2 265.6 178.3
   II 147.5 197.3 206.7 207.7 204.1 248.8 199.3
Quarterly 
Period N.S.W. Australia Commercial Australasia (a) Union Sydney Port Phillip All Banks
1841 I 154.8 224.4 225.3 245.8 247.5 271.5 585.8 360.4 232.8
   II 164.9 225.8 230.8 239.7 279.5 622.0 226.1 237.7
   III 171.2 240.2 224.4 244.3 247.7 291.2 827.7 263.1 242.0
   IV 181.7 298.3 243.3 261.4 292.7 855.1 306.6 264.8
1842 I 169.2 309.6 211.5 253.1 257.5 266.5 672.2 432.6 249.0
   II 175.5 334.3 223.2 245.0 246.4 696.1 655.2 251.4
   III 183.1 306.6 246.4 236.0 241.7 273.6 682.2 596.1 259.2
   IV 198.2 341.4 288.0 237.2 291.5 677.0 208.1 276.1
1843 I 184.8 267.9 245.2 245.3 303.1 362.7 110.1 258.5
   II 188.9 266.2 269.5 282.4 498.4 123.1 266.7
   III 208.6 263.2 250.8 257.2 259.7 309.9
   IV 223.8 270.3 237.3 227.6 237.5
1844 I 213.6 189.2 225.9 229.7 182.7 207.0
   II 189.1 164.7 221.7 157.6 239.1
   III 181.7 139.2 204.4 211.6 142.5 173.0
   IV 145.4 129.4 190.6 122.0 153.9
1845 I 108.7 131.9 196.9 193.9 95.6 139.5
   II 108.0 106.0 193.0 90.0 131.8
   III 92.0 100.0 194.2 193.9 84.4 125.6
   IV 81.4 93.5 183.2 82.0 117.7
1846 I 78.1 102.0 171.2 176.1 70.5 110.7
   II 84.6 106.6 181.7 78.3 118.6
   III 93.6 136.1 201.7 194.1 93.3 135.3
   IV 106.0 157.4 195.8 92.7 139.3
1847 I 110.1 150.0 193.6 194.2 75.6 132.4
   II 105.7 146.6 192.7 81.9 133.0
   III 104.7 158.6 205.7 200.6 102.5 144.5
   IV 108.1 160.8 204.5 116.0 148.6
1848 I 105.8 159.1 194.0 197.7 105.0 140.3
   II 103.7 151.0 197.6 96.5 135.3
   III 102.0 74.8 214.9 208.3 112.7 137.1
   IV 95.3 105.2 226.5 131.6 149.8
1849 I 100.0 99.9 219.6 222.6 113.4 141.8
   II 103.5 95.5 202.3 102.6 133.1
   III 107.4 115.6 200.7 202.4 113.2 139.5
(a) The first series is based upon the returns made on the same basis as the other 
banks; the second is based upon the Charter averages, entered to centre the average 
as nearly as possible on the same period. 
Table 16 NEW SOUTH WALES SAVINGS BANK DEPOSITS 1819–31 (£) 
     
   Note: Deposit interest, on amounts left for full year, 71/2 per cent; all 
funds invested in mortgages at 10 per cent, at discretion of Robert 
Campbell, to whom profits accrued.  
     
Source: Votes and Proceedings, New South Wales Legislative Council, 1832. 
Table 17 (a) SAVINGS BANK OF NEW SOUTH WALES NUMBER OF 
DEPOSITORS 
     
   IV 88.2 133.7 197.6 116.6 142.5
1850 I 99.2 133.6 154.2 168.0 96.2 119.2
   II 91.0 115.7 125.1 93.5 105.9
   III 102.2 119.1 126.5 125.4 100.4 111.4
   IV 98.0 127.2 121.0 99.6 109.5
1851 I 94.9 116.8 90.8 102.6 89.9 94.3
   II 72.6 116.5 99.0 98.6 96.0
   III 81.8 114.8 117.5 107.2 130.7 108.6
   IV 90.0 118.9 98.3 113.0 102.8
Amounts 
lodged
Withdrawals Deposit balances, 31 
December
Year Free Convict Total Free Convict Total Interest 
paid
Free Convict Total
1819 53 — 53 7 — 7 — 46 — 46
1820 158 8 166 25 8 33 1 179 — 179
1821 236 — 236 99 — 99 7 316 — 316
1822 238 — 238 222 — 222 16 332 — 332
1823 510 71 581 296 — 296 30 546 71 617
1824 505 126 631 472 — 472 22 579 197 776
1825 1,080 1,118 2,198 773 113 886 54 886 1,202 2,088
1826 1,701 1,337 3,038 811 78 889 33 1,776 2,461 4,237
1827 2,321 2,130 4,451 1,822 669 2,490 153 2,276 3,922 6,198
1828 2,099 1,706 3,805 2,406 439 2,844 140 1,969 5,189 7,158
1829 1,482 1,437 2,918 1,149 435 1,583 104 2,302 6,191 8,493
1830 1,802 1,292 3,095 1,849 1,018 2,868 338 2,255 6,465 8,720
1831 2,378 621 2,999 1,683 341 2,010 408 2,950 6,746 9,695
Free Depositors
At 31 Dec. Convicts Sydney Parramatta Windsor Bathurst Maitland Penrith Singleton Total
(a) Branch temporarily closed. 
Table 17 (b) SAVINGS BANK OF NEW SOUTH WALES AMOUNT OF 
DEPOSITS (£) 
     
1832 55 120 — — — — — — 120
1833 2,300 248 — — — — — — 248
1834 2,300 390 — — — — — — 390
1835 2,175 584 — — — — — — 584
1836 2,084 840 — — — — — — 840
1837 — 1,071 — — — — — — 1,071
1838 — 1,606 17 58 5 2 — — 1,688
1839 — 2,078 37 107 11 26 — — 2,249
1840 — 2,531 76 131 19 31 — — 2,788
1841 — 2,852 81 119 22 34 5 — 3,113
1842 — 3,409 95 113 30 58 5 — 3,710
1843 — 2,496 94 103 34 51 3 — 2,781
1844 — 2,828 102 89 43 (a) 5 — 3,067
1845 1,157 3,229 112 98 50 34 7 — 3,530
1846 1,046 3,459 110 99 61 82 6 — 3,817
1847 998 3,796 116 92 71 86 6 — 4,167
1848 1,025 3,606 115 88 78 89 4 — 3,980
1849 1,152 3,378 119 89 70 85 5 — 3,746
1850 1,170 3,964 134 91 75 107 5 10 4,386
1851 1,170 4,380 129 114 101 119 5 15 4,863
Free 
Depositors
At 
31 
Dec.
Convicts Sydney Parramatta Windsor Bathurst Maitland Penrith Singleton Total Hibernia 
fund
Intestate 
estates
1832 199 2,782 — — — — — — 2,782 — —
1833 7,698 7,450 — — — — — — 7,450 107 —
1834 7,851 13,557 — — — — — — 13,557 113 —
1835 8,024 24,470 — — — — — — 24,470 122 —
1836 8,026 36,718 — — — — — — 36,718 132 —
1837 8,275 49,302 — — — — — — 49,302 145 —
1838 8,409 67,725 108 1,554 73 89 — — 69,579 160 146
1839 8,760 97,245 480 4,961 789 1,008 — — 104,483 176 2,604
1840 9,585 128,885 1,649 7,127 880 1,415 — — 139,956 — 3,442
1841 8,826 143,124 2,083 6,757 977 1,795 101 — 154,837 — 3,791
1842 8,393 156,778 2,551 6,040 1,229 2,638 121 — 169,357 — 3,793
1843 7,295 113,945 1,287 3,955 1,717 2,204 105 — 123,312 — 7,576
1844 6,410 122,260 2,221 2,809 2,222 (a) 192 — 129,704 — 6,818
1845 5,869 136,874 2,266 3,347 2,866 815 214 — 146,382 — 5,070
1846 5,000 138,906 2,394 2,978 2,218 3,095 183 — 149,828 — 6,128
1847 4,943 149,830 2,510 2,641 2,701 2,727 166 — 160,575 — 7,433
(a) Branch temporarily closed. 
(b) New deposits prohibited by 11 Vic., No. 40. 
Table 17 (c) SAVINGS BANK OF NEW SOUTH WALES INTEREST RATES 
(PER CENT) 
     
(a) From 1 April: Sydney Morning Herald, 5 March 1844. 
(b) Bank thereafter not allowed to discount, except renewals. 
(c) Intestate estates, 3 per cent only. 
(d) Intestate estates and Master in Equity, 3 per cent only. 
(e) From this date rate fixed at discretion of Trustees. 
(f) Provisions of 7 Vic., No. 6 operated to prevent supplementary payments to 
depositors. 
1848 4,913 142,105 2,287 2,497 3,077 2,501 121 — 152,588 — 5,043
1849 4,981 133,561 2,556 2,565 2,606 2,193 134 — 143,615 — 3,664
1850 5,523 153,066 3,521 2,621 2,781 2,852 138 140 165,149 — 2,868
1851 5,765 193,497 5,180 4,213 4,636 3,794 119 465 211,904 — 2,620
Loan Deposit
Year Mortgage Discount Statutory Supplementary Total Maximum deposit bearing interest ((g) )
£
1832 10 10 5 — 5 100
1833 10 10 5 21/2 71/2 100
1834 10 10 5 21/2 71/2 200
1835 10 10 5 33/4 83/4 200
1836 10 10 5 5 10 200
1837 10 10 5 5 10 200
1838 10 10 5 5 10 200
1839 10 10 5 5 10 200
1840 10 10 5 5 10 200
1841 10 10 5 (c) 5 10 200
1842 10 10 5 (d) 33/4 83/4 200
1843 10 (b) (h) 5 (f) — 5 200
1844 (a) 8 — (h) 5 — 5 200
1845 8 — (h) 3&frac13; — 3&frac13; (i) 100
1846 8 — (e) 3&frac13; — 3&frac13; (j) 100
1847 8 — 3&frac13; — 3&frac13; 100
1848 8 — 21/2 — 21/2 100
1849 8 — 21/2 — 21/2 100
1850 8 — 3&frac13; — 3&frac13; 100
1851 8 — 3&frac13; — 3&frac13; 100
(g) Deposits on behalf of convicts, Intestate estates and Master in Equity bore 
interest without limit. But see note (i) below. 
(h) Deposits withdrawn before and of year 3&frac13; per cent only: provision 
repealed 1846. 
(i) Intestate estates and Master in Equity to receive no interest until ordinary deposits 
receive more than 5 per cent; then to have half ordinary rate, without limit on 
amount. 
(j) Friendly Society balances henceforward bore interest without limit. 
Table 17 (d) SAVINGS BANK OF NEW SOUTH WALES CASH HOLDINGS (£) 
     
Table 17 (e) SAVINGS BANK OF NEW SOUTH WALES LOANS AND OTHER 
ASSETS (£) 
     
Banks
At 31 Dec. Commercial Union Australasia N.S.W. Total Treasury In hand Grand total
1832 — — — — — 418 — 418
1833 — — — — — 1,408 — 1,408
1834 — — — — — 652 — 652
1835 — — — — — 2,007 — 2,007
1836 — — — — — 1,510 — 1,510
1837 — — — — — 909 — 909
1838 — — — — — 3,527 — 3,527
1839 1,076 — — — 1,076 — — 1,076
1840 659 — — — 659 — — 659
1841 1,289 — — — 1,289 — — 1,289
1842 2,103 — — — 2,103 — — 2,103
1843 744 969 — — 1,713 — 473 2,186
1844 4,376 3,624 — — 7,990 — 344 8,344
1845 15,224 14,763 — — 29,987 — 25 30,012
1846 11,476 10,000 10,160 10,000 41,636 — 329 41,965
1847 13,851 13,500 14,241 14,000 55,592 28,800 94 84,486
1848 12,000 10,000 10,414 10,185 42,599 28,800 107 71,506
1849 751 — — — 751 — 439 1,190
1850 8,514 — — — 8,514 — 387 8,901
1851 11,316 1,116 1,236 1,236 14,905 — 730 15,635
Loans
At 31 Dec. Bills Mortgages Government securities Local govt. securities Total Cash Total assets
1832 1,915 673 — — 2,589 418 3,007
1833 2,324 11,836 — — 14,159 1,408 15,567
1834 6,316 15,448 — — 21,764 652 22,416
1835 8,167 23,877 — — 32,043 2,007 34,050
(a) Discounts, other than renewals, prohibited. 
(b) Including premises, £2,597. 
(c) Including premises, £3,000. 
Table 17 (f) SAVINGS BANK OF NEW SOUTH WALES PROFITS AND 
RESERVES (£) 
     
1836 14,220 31,305 — — 45,526 1,510 47,036
1837 17,124 42,264 — — 59,387 909 60,296
1838 19,048 58,851 — — 77,899 3,527 81,426
1839 43,981 75,825 — — 119,805 1,076 120,881
1840 54,656 104,254 — — 158,910 659 159,569
1841 61,679 112,830 — — 174,509 1,289 175,798
1842 74,738 114,667 1,600 — 191,005 2,103 193,108
1843 (a) 27,721 116,872 1,600 — 146,193 2,186 148,379
1844 12,119 106,698 23,000 — 141,827 8,344 150,161
1845 7,173 102,771 25,900 — 135,843 30,012 165,855
1846 4,480 98,258 26,000 — 128,738 41,965 170,703
1847 3,196 95,269 — — 98,466 84,486 182,952
1848 3,040 92,094 — 6,000 101,133 71,506 172,639
1849 2,748 89,943 60,000 6,090 158,780 1,190 (b) 162,567
1850 2,351 82,811 80,000 6,090 171,252 8,901 (c) 183,153
1851 1,662 82,150 122,409 6,090 212,311 15,635 (c) 230,946
At 31 December Surplus after paying statutory interest Expenses other than interest Net surplus Reserve fund
1832 81 55 26
1833 466 153 312
1834 1,062 167 895
1835 1,759 324 1,435
1836 2,512 352 2,159
1837 2,984 410 2,574
1838 3,818 655 3,163
1839 5,679 821 4,858
1840 7,800 1,213 6,587
1841 9,670 1,326 8,345 (a) 1,600
1842 10,858 1,487 9,371 3,400
1843 6,851 1,563 5,288 (b) 
1844 5,358 1,527 3,831 1,642
1845 6,758 1,649 5,109 1,642
1846 6,538 1,524 5,014 3,033
1847 7,476 1,537 5,939 3,033
1848 7,595 1,532 6,064 3,033
1849 7,680 1,370 6,309 3,033
1850 4,549 1,391 3,158 5,521
1851 4,339 1,452 2,887 6,807
(a) Reserve Fund first disclosed; 1832–9 required to be £200; 1839–41 to be £400, 
but these not in separate fund. 
(b) Not given. 
Table 18 (a) PORT PHILLIP SAVINGS BANK NUMBER OF DEPOSITORS 
     
(a) Plus three convicts. 
   Source: New South Wales and Victorian Government Gazettes and Bank 
Minute Book. For 1842 MS return “Colonial Secretary In-Letters”, 
“Banks”, 1844 File 44/2349.  
Table 18 (b) PORT PHILLIP SAVINGS BANK AMOUNT OF DEPOSITS (£) 
     
(a) Including £4 held for three convicts. 
Table 18 (c) PORT PHILLIP SAVINGS BANK PROFITS AND RESERVES (£) 
     
At 31 Dec. Melbourne Geelong Portland Belfast Total
1842 226 226
1843 295 295
1844 399 399
1845 496 496
1846 513 513
1847 584 584
1848 598 52 8 658
1849 622 80 9 711
1850 775 89 8 17 889
1851 (a) 1,168 136 49 32 (a) 1,385
Individuals
At 31 Dec. Melbourne Geelong Portland Belfast Total Intestate estates Registrar in Equity Grand total
1842 4,162 4,162 65 4,227
1843 5,561 5,561 1,105 6,666
1844 8,509 8,509 1,226 9,735
1845 13,066 13,066 2,467 15,533
1846 14,045 14,045 594 469 15,108
1847 16,808 16,808 1,599 18,407
1848 19,752 1,091 167 21,010 1,477 22,487
1849 20,017 2,048 262 22,327 1,053 23,380
1850 24,388 2,717 512 648 28,265 1,044 29,309
1851 (a) 45,570 4,150 562 1,541 51,823 874 52,697
At 31 Dec. Gross profit Expenses Net profit Paid as interest Transferred to reserve Balance of reserve fund
(a) After paying interest on deposits. 
(b) Had been reduced to £349 during year. 
(c) Reduced to £773 during year. 
(d) Reduced to £906 during year. 
Table 18 (d) PORT PHILLIP SAVINGS BANK LOANS (a) AND CASH (£) 
     
(a) Including interest due to 31 December. 
(b) Ceased to bear interest 20 November 1847. 
Table 18 (e) PORT PHILLIP SAVINGS BANK INTEREST RATES 
     
1842 201 12 12
1843 (a) 167 123 (a) 80 ? 80 92
1844 608 146 462 214 248 340
1845 490 231 259 162 97 437
1846 681 267 414 240 174 (b) 523
1847 802 291 511 383 128 651
1848 808 317 491 358 132 783
1849 889 335 534 389 145 (c) 918
1850 1,297 371 925 734 192 (d) 1,098
1851 1,833 484 1,349 969 380 1,478
Cash
At 31 Dec. Mortgages Bills Debentures Bank In Hand
A'sia. Union Melb. Geelong Portland Belfast Total
1842 1,240 2,775 — 411 — — — — — 411
1843 3,334 1,573 — 1,951 4 — — — — 1,955
1844 2,404 601 4,367 2,675 — — — — — 2,675
1845 4,299 271 4,366 7,009 — — — — — 7,009
1846 6,139 100 4,366 4,940 — — — — — 4,940
1847 9,163 — (b) 4,300 5,579 — — — — — 5,579
1848 11,749 — — 5,899 5,079 59 457 16 — 11,511
1849 12,078 — — 6,080 5,933 — 44 153 — 12,210
1850 13,821 — 10,249 2,842 2,845 — 214 288 — 6,189
1851 20,289 — 13,631 10,948 8,396 — 498 251 — 20,143
Deposit
At 31 December Discount per cent Mortgage per cent Rate per cent Maximum bearing interest (£)
1842 121/2 (b) 121/2 (e) 5 200
1843 (a) 8 121/2 5 200
1844 (c) 10 3&frac13; 200
1845 (d) 8 11/2 200
1846 8 (f) 21/2 100
(a) From 14 June 1843. On bills over three months 10 per cent. Bank ceased to 
discount this year. 
(b) First loans in August. 
(c) From 1 April. 
(d) On new loans from 31 January; on old loans from 1 April. 
(e) Plus 21/2 per cent for individuals. 
(f) Individuals only; henceforth no interest on government deposits. 
B. Van Diemen's Land 
   In Tasmania the available bank statistics make a poor collection. None of 
any real value for a study of the operations of the banks are to be had 
before 1836 and after that year they are still very imperfect. Changes in the 
period and form of compilation make the identification of any but large 
changes hazardous. Moreover, the failure to collect figures for the Bank of 
Australasia on the same basis as those for other banks makes it impossible 
to present accurate total figures.  
   Montagu's Return  
   “Arthur File” 18,399 (Chief Secretary's Archives, Hobart) contains in 
manuscript a set of banking figures compiled by John Montagu, the 
Colonial Secretary, in 1836. For the Derwent Bank and Bank of Van 
Diemen's Land these give annual figures for (i) number of shares, (ii) 
issued capital, (iii) paid-up capital and (iv) notes in circulation. For the 
Commercial, Tamar and Cornwall, figures for notes only are given.  
   These were collected as part of the data for Statistical Returns of Van 
Diemen's Land from 1824 to 1836,1 and Montagu found it impossible to 
collect full information.2 Consequently in the collected tables there is none 
for banks, Montagu explaining this as due to his “inability to obtain 
sufficient information in detail to complete a return of the banking 
establishments”.3  
   Montagu's reluctance to publish is understandable, for his figures have a 
narrow range and there is no record of the part of each year to which they 
referred, although this was probably December. Yet they are almost the 
only figures obtainable; for the Cornwall there are no others. As an 
indication of order of magnitude, therefore, they are worth rescuing from 
1847 8 3&frac13; 100
1848 8 21/2 100
1849 8 21/2 100
1850 8 4 100
1851 8 4 100
obscurity, but no great weight can be placed on any movements which they 
show.  
   A few pieces of information are available to supplement Montagu. 
“Arthur File” 11,866 contains balance sheets of the Bank of Van Diemen's 
Land at 30 June 1835 and 30 June 1836, and of the Derwent at 30 June 
1836, together with a few other items which are noted below in the tables. 
These balance sheets evidently are the sole survivors of the returns 
required of banks in which government money was deposited in the years 
1832–6. The same file contains the covering letters for a number of similiar 
balance sheets, but the statements themselves are missing and a search of 
other Arthur files failed to disclose them. They may be discovered 
ultimately when the Tasmanian Archives are indexed.  
   Bluebooks  
   In the period before the publication of regular statistics Bluebooks exist 
for the years 1826, 1827 and 1836 as well as for each of the years from 
1839, except 1846, all in manuscript in the Chief Secretary's Archives, 
Hobart. Such bank statistics as they give are nearly useless. Bluebooks for 
1826 and 1827 gave no figures. From 1836 on the figures for coin and 
notes were given for each bank but the period to which these relate is not 
given and clearly varies where a check is possible. In 1840, 1843, 1844, 
1845 the figures are for December; those for 1841 and 1842 are certainly 
not for December. Those for 1836 are the averages for the second half of 
the year, while for the Bank of Australasia sometimes the figures are the 
charter averages, sometimes they are not, special data evidently being 
supplied. Australasia averages are added to single-day figures for other 
banks to give “totals”. Over the whole period better figures are available 
elsewhere, except for the Commercial Bank in 1836.  
   Official Returns  
   The making of returns for publication was, in 1835, required of all banks 
in which public money was deposited, in all colonies.4 Arthur's 
arrangements for the use of banks in government transactions were 
approved, provided balance sheets, which the banks had agreed to supply,5 
“should be made out in such a manner as to afford full information 
respecting their assets and liabilities, and that half-yearly abstracts . . . shall 
be made public by insertion in one or more of the colonial newspapers”.6 
The form prescribed was the same as in New South Wales.  
   The new rule was adopted,7 commencing with the year 1836. The old 
form of non-published balance sheets was abandoned8 and half-yearly 
averages for the Bank of Van Diemen's Land and Derwent Bank replaced 
them in June 1836, published in the Hobart Town Gazette. The Tamar 
Bank was included six months later, having received a government deposit, 
but the Bank of Australasia continued to publish only the returns, for 
different periods, prescribed by the charter; no return was obtained from 
the Commercial which held no government deposit.  
   With the arrival of Franklin in 1837 a change was made, apparently 
without authority. The figures ceased to be averages and related solely to 
the last day of each half year, while the range of the figures was narrowed. 
Liabilities included capital, notes and deposits, the latter not divided; assets 
included coin and treasury bills, bills discounted and bank premises. Other 
items appeared only if the banks chose to give them; thus the Derwent 
distinguished cash credits from bills discounted and there were other minor 
variations. The Commercial, having received a government deposit, was 
included.  
   This was clearly a much poorer sort of return and in particular the 
transfer to single-day figures left scope for “window-dressing”, and thus 
destroyed the purpose of the return which was to enable the soundness of 
the banks to be checked by those responsible for public funds. The Union 
Bank was excluded until June 1840 when it published a set of half-yearly 
averages for the same period as the Bank of Australasia and with the same 
items. Evidently this was based on the belief that the bank would secure 
the charter for which it hoped.  
   After the publication of the June 1840 returns no further information was 
published until 1846. “The statements forwarded by the banks being purely 
confidential”,9 the governor refused to allow them to be printed or to 
disclose any part of them. For such a declaration there was no authority 
and, at least so far as those banks holding government deposits were 
concerned, it was contrary to the instructions discussed above. 
Nevertheless the attitude was maintained in spite of the act of 1841,10 and a 
repetition of the instructions in 1843.11  
   The 1841 act required the making, but not the publication, of a quarterly 
return by all banks. It was a very poor return. Figures related to one day 
only, the last of each quarter, so that there was considerable scope for 
“window-dressing”; only four items were required: coin and bullion held, 
securities, notes in circulation and deposits. Yet for the whole of the rest of 
the period studied— and for many years thereafter—these were the only 
statistics required of banks in Tasmania; even these were not demanded of 
the Bank of Australasia which continued to make its charter returns so that 
no total bank figures of any sort could be compiled except by way of 
estimate.  
   Publication was resumed in 1846 without warning. Thereafter the official 
Gazette carried the quarterly return for all trading banks except the 
Australasia and the Derwent. Swanston as managing director flatly 
objected to the publication of the Derwent's return.12 He gave no reason, 
but Statistics of Van Diemen's Land for 1848 explained the refusal: “as it is 
not a bank of issue”.13 The return was still supplied though not published 
and some copies have survived,14 making a complete series from 
September 1848 to the closing of the bank at the end of 1849.  
   There remained the gap from 1840 to 1846. In response to a motion for 
these figures the governor tabled them in the Council in August 1846.15 
Whether these were the full quarterly return or not is uncertain, but when 
they were published16 December figures only were given for 1840–5 and 
June figures for 1846.17 Persistent search at Parliament House, the Chief 
Secretary's Archives and other public offices in Hobart has failed to reveal 
any other figures for these years or the original return as tabled.  
   It may be noted that the items given from 1846 on vary somewhat as 
between the banks. Thus in March 1846,18 for instance, the Union return 
refers to “gold, silver and other metals”, the Commercial to “British silver, 
gold etc.” and the Van Diemen's Land to “amount of specie in Chest”. But 
these variations are unimportant, and are ignored in the tables below.  
   Newspapers  
   Newspapers provide, as on the mainland, the only satisfactory source for 
interest rates paid and charged by the banks since they carried bank 
advertisements. In almost all cases the rates tabulated below are extracted 
from such notices and are therefore reliable. Dividend rates are preserved 
but much less completely in the same sources; the table for these thus has 
many gaps. Newspapers have furnished in addition a few other items 
indicated in the tables.  
   Savings Banks  
   Statistics were required of the savings banks from 1849 onwards and 
those for the Hobart Bank were promptly published; the Launceston 
figures did not appear in the Gazette regularly until 1851. For the latter 
bank, however, a useful set of data can be obtained from the bank's “Half-
Yearly Balance Book” from March 1844 and these are summarized below. 
Before that date it is necessary to make do with a few items from the local 
press and “Minutes”.  
   For the Hobart Bank complete series are available, the bank's own 
records filling the gap before 1849, although these are less detailed than in 
the Launceston case. The only data for the Derwent Savings Bank are those 
published in Statistics of Van Diemen's Land for 1847–9 in terms of the 
act. These are given in the text above (chapter 12) and are not reproduced 
here.  
1 Ultimately published under that title, with tables extended to 1838, Hobart 1839. 
2 See letter accompanying the return, “Arthur File” 18,399. 
3 Montagu to Arthur, 10 October 1836, printed in Statistical Returns of Van 
Diemen's Land, 1824–39. 
4 Glenelg to Arthur, 9 July 1835, “Inwards Despatches”, Vol. 28, pp. 365–9. Not all 
the enclosures are preserved there; the same ones, however, went to Bourke in New 
South Wales and are printed in H.R.A., I, xviii. 
5 Arthur evidently reported the arrangement in despatch of 9 April 1833, a copy of 
which has not been preserved in Hobart nor amongst the Mitchell Library 
transcripts. 
6 Stewart to Lefevre, 25 July 1834, H.R.A., I, xviii, p. 16. The instructions were 
reiterated in Glenelg to Arthur, 31 July 1835, “Inwards Despatches”, Vol. 28, p. 524. 
7 Arthur to Glenelg, 28 October 1835, “Outwards Despatches”, Vol. 20, pp. 741–7. 
8 Bank of Van Diemen's Land to Colonial Secretary, 1 August 1836, “Arthur File” 
11,866. 
9 Minutes of Legislative Council, 22 August 1840. 
10 5 Vic., No. 17, passed 4 November 1841. 
11 Stanley to Wilmot, 5 July 1843, “Inwards Despatches”, Vol. 64, pp. 39–48. 
12 Swanston to Colonial Secretary, 24 April 1846, “Derwent Bank Letter Book” 
1845–54. 
13 p. 22. 
14 “Denison File” 6, Chief Secretary's Archives. 
15 Hobart Town Gazette, 1 September 1846. Tabled on 18 August. 
16 Legislative Council Papers, 1846, and press. 
17 For 1840 coin and note issue only given. 
18 Hobart Town Gazette, 28 April 1846. 
Table 19 (a) BANK OF VAN DIEMEN'S LAND LIABILITIES (£) 
     
Date or period Notes Deposits Capital paid up Due other banks
   (a) 1824 6,607 3,731
   1825 9,062 5,282
   1826 9,066 6,001
   1827 13,730 8,300
   1828 11,198 15,532
   1829 8,863 17,658
   1830 13,241 24,331
   1831 (b) 12,617 (b) 29,897
   1832 12,786 37,978
   1833 11,276 39,915
   1834 13,533 39,981
   (d) 1835 10,868 (c) 40,000
Half-yearly Averages
(f) 1836: January—June 11,091 (e) 43,886 897
   July—December 11,232 (e) 45,226 1,120
Single-day Figures
1837: 30 June 10,444 54,652 50,550
   31 December 10,225 52,867 61,000
1838: 30 June 8,182 52,983 61,500
   31 December 10,880 51,453 61,500
1839: 30 June 8,317 60,165 61,500
   31 December 8,961 65,877 61,500
1840: 30 June 7,504 57,741 86,000
   31 December 7,449
1841: 31 December 5,239 37,454
1842: 31 December 6,045 37,099
1843: 31 December 5,740 30,058
1844: 31 December 8,081 62,918
1845: 31 December 7,977 68,097
1846: 31 March 9,797 69,846 186
   30 June 10,177 67,282 —
   30 September 10,584 72,016 412
   31 December 9,965 78,243 —
1847: 31 March 12,191 70,047 817
   30 June 12,026 67,875 —
   30 September 11,570 65,383 679
   31 December 11,919 67,547 — 
1848: 31 March 11,975 55,983 1,868
   30 June 10,114 56,381 —
   30 September 9,629 53,852 1,047
   31 December 10,024 54,487 —
1849: 31 March 10,661 55,479 2,603
   30 June 10,417 47,145 —
   30 September 10,549 42,497 1,259
   31 December 11,189 55,658 —
1850: 31 March 10,641 62,531 284
   30 June 9,068 52,557 —
   30 September 8,084 53,911 —
   31 December 10,223 66,761 —
1851: 31 March 11,712 73,953 —
   30 June 10,871 86,126 —
   30 September 11,179 88,132 525
   31 December 12,105 92,993 —
(a) Part of year uncertain for this and other years to 1835; probably December. 
(b) In latter half of year, average note issue £11,000, average deposits £23,000. 
Letter from Bank in “Arthur File” 11,866. 
(c) For first time paid-up capital equalled issued capital. 
(d) At 30 June 1835: 
(e) Including £5,000 bearing interest. 
(f) At 30 June 1836: 
     
Sources: 1824–35, Montagu's return, “Arthur File” 18,399.     1836–June 1840, 
Hobart Town Gazette.     December 1840–5, Legislative Council Papers 1846. 
    1846–51, Hobart Town Gazette. 
Table 19 (b) BANK OF VAN DIEMEN'S LAND ASSETS (£) 
     
Notes £10,365 
Deposits 44,542 
Capital paid up 39,981 
Notes £8,616 
Deposits 45,470 
Capital paid up 40,000 
(“Arthur File” 11,866). 
Date or period Coin and bullion (a) Discounts and cash credits Premises Due from other banks
Balance Sheet Figures
1835: 30 June (b) 27,076 68,373 2,120 322
1836: 30 June (c) 22,401 71,846 2,075 220
Half-yearly Averages
1836: January—June (d) 22,306 70,499 2,120 2,869
   July—December (e) 20,034 74,799 2,250 2,787
Single-day Figures
1837: 30 June 24,189 88,907 2,550
   31 December 24,284 97,257 2,550
1838: 30 June 22,006 98,109 2,550
   31 December 28,169 93,114 2,550
1839: 30 June 38,611 88,821 2,550
   31 December 21,877 (f) 111,910 2,550
1840: 30 June 20,668 (g) 128,027 2,550
   31 December 20,211
1841: 31 December 11,575 119,790
1842: 31 December 13,395 108,345
1843: 31 December 11,175 106,235
1844: 31 December 32,482 122,971
(a) Including bills on British Treasury and orders on local Commissariat. 
(b) Including Treasury bills, £450. Of the total £25,536 was held in Spanish dollars. 
(c) Including Treasury bills, £329; Commissariat orders £140. Spanish dollars held 
were £16,228. 
(d) Including Treasury bills, £1,502. 
(e) Including Treasury bills, £1,642. 
(f) Cash credits granted for first time in 1839. 
(g) Including Cash Credits, £22,913. 
(h) Plus Bills on London, £120. 
(i) Including Treasury bills, £1,300. 
(j) Including Treasury bills, £500. 
   Sources: As for Liabilities, except for 1835 and 30 June 1836, from 
“Arthur File” 11,866.  
Table 20 (a) DERWENT BANK LIABILITIES (£) 
1845: 31 December 39,117 121,568
1846: 31 March (h) 23,665 128,294 1,850 9,366
   30 June 28,563 133,974 1,850 331
   30 September 30,668 127,395 1,850 5,722
   31 December (i) 37,586 134,309 1,500 2,455
1847: 31 March 21,041 144,496 1,500 1,301
   30 June 12,249 154,645 1,500 1,112
   30 September 23,060 136,129 1,500 2,502
   31 December 9,699 159,212 1,500 189
1848: 31 March (j) 13,087 141,448 1,500 631
   30 June 19,476 137,453 1,500 267
   30 September 20,761 128,295 1,500 2,652
   31 December 25,342 131,125 1,500 43
1849: 31 March 17,664 136,539 1,500 5,129
   30 June 18,129 133,047 1,500 159
   30 September 16,183 126,465 1,500 3,458
   31 December 31,105 130,155 1,500 197
1850: 31 March 43,308 120,855 1,500 2,260
   30 June 27,142 130,042 1,500 130
   30 September 16,946 135,950 1,500 815
   31 December 34,504 138,281 1,500 1,435
1851: 31 March 46,704 133,601 1,500 816
   30 June 62,746 132,058 1,500 409
   30 September 60,403 131,397 1,500 2,830
   31 December 61,048 137,414 1,500 6,230
     
(a) Part of year not recorded; not averages. Figures to 1835 compiled on same basis. 
(b) “Arthur File” 11,866 gives average issue for year as £10,000, average deposits 
as £23,500. (Letter from bank, 26 September 1831). These figures can only be taken 
as approximate. 
(c) At 30 June 1836: 
Date or period Notes in circulation Deposits Capital paid up
   (a) 1828 7,500 13,225
   1829 5,392 13,225
   1830 11,220 14,950
   1831 (b) 16,577 (b) 19,925
   1832 8,843 33,450
   1833 9,426 33,850
   1834 11,610 50,175
   1835 12,381 61,875
Half-yearly Averages
(c) 1836: January—June 11,840 (d) 60,930
   July—December 11,274 (e) 59,254
Single-day Figures
1837: 30 June 10,321 79,461 70,137
   31 December 10,137 74,195 73,432
1838: 30 June 13,898 65,156 77,318
   31 December 11,835 68,965 84,494
1839: 30 June 10,524 80,119 90,820
   31 December 9,499 88,735 106,793
1840: 30 June 9,936 90,395 107,358
   31 December 7,764
1841: 31 December 4,456 77,698
1842: 31 December 1,156 53,510
1843: 31 December 896 62,251
1844: 31 December 793 69,400
1845: 31 December 736 61,285
1846: 30 June 513 73,622
1848: 30 September 471 (f) 43,721
   31 December 469 38,694
1849: 31 March 464 35,868
   30 June 459 35,146
   30 September 459 33,669
   31 December 459 17,402
Notes £10,600 
Deposits (bearing interest) £16,271 
(not bearing interest) £41,743 
(Total) £58,014 
Capital paid up £62,475
   “Arthur File” 11,866.  
(d) Bearing interest £14,849. 
(e) Bearing interest £14,969. 
(f) At 31 December 1847 total liabilities, exclusive of capital, (i.e., almost entirely 
deposits) were £59,471; at 30 June 1848 £52,675. Legislative Council Papers 1848. 
     
Sources: 1828–35, Montagu's Return, “Arthur File” 18,399.     1836, returns 
published in Hobart Town Gazette.     1837–June 1840, returns published in Hobart 
Town Gazette.     December 1840–June 1846, Legislative Council Papers 1846. 
    September 1848–December 1849, original MSS. returns (signed by Swanston), 
“Denison File” 6.     The “Files” cited are in Chief Secretary's Archives, Hobart. 
Table 20 (b) DERWENT BANK ASSETS (£) 
     
Loans
Date or period Coin, etc. Bills of other 
banks
Due from other 
banks
Premises
Bills, etc. Cash 
credits
Total
Half-yearly 
Averages
(a) 1836: Jan–June (b) 
20,861
3,853 119,366 3,459
   July–Dec. (c) 
15,394
3,862 121,083 3,476
Single-day Figures
1837: 30 June 31,461 77,212 47,404 124,616 3,841
   31 December 20,412 80,395 53,076 133,471 3,881
1838: 30 June 19,269 69,932 63,245 133,177 3,925
   31 December 26,096 73,315 62,043 135,358 3,840
1839: 30 June 35,431 69,224 72,923 142,147 3,886
   31 December 39,814 82,326 79,078 161,404 3,810
1840: 30 June 19,762 96,288 87,759 184,047 3,880
   31 December 16,026
1841: 31 December 89 171,295
1842: 31 December 148 173,572
1843: 31 December 21 190,083
1844: 31 December 22 177,867
1845: 31 December 121 141,823
1846: 30 June 14 124,573
1848: 30 September 173 630 (d) 8,984 (e) 
114,172
2,188
   31 December 2 81 9,739 111,480 2,162
1849: 31 March 134 977 10,690 104,569 2,163
(a) At 30 June 1836: Coin £14,145; Bills £68,637; Cash credits £53,680; Temporary 
advances £2,835; Total loans £125,152; Premises £3,063. “Arthur File” 11,866. 
(b) Including £3,491 Bills on Treasury and Commissariat Orders. 
(c) Including £2,118 Bills on Treasury. 
(d) This and following entries are deposits made by Derwent Bank; probably began 
in 1841. 
(e) Total assets at 30 December 1847 were £149,980; at 30 June 1848 £139,545. 
Legislative Council Papers 1848. 
   Sources: As for Liabilities.  
Table 21 CORNWALL BANK NOTE ISSUE 
     
(a) In October “about £6,000”. Letter from bank, 12 October 1831, “Arthur File” 
11,866. 
(b) Absorbed by Bank of Australasia as from 1 January 1836. 
   Source: Montagu's return, “Arthur File” 18,399. Part of year to which 
figures relate not recorded. No other statistics for this bank are available.  
Table 22 (a) COMMERCIAL BANK OF TASMANIA LIABILITIES (£) 
     
   30 June 318 39 8,181 109,729 2,131
   30 September 193 911 3,170 109,621 2,131
   31 December 38 423 1,705 100,604 2,120
£
1830 5,184
1831 (a) 8,554
1832 2,446
1833 2,446
1834 3,266
(b) 1835 4,489
Date or period Notes in circulation Deposits Capital paid up
(a) Yearly Figures
1830 3,371
1831 4,173
1832 5,011
1833 6,212
1834 8,500
1835 7,400
1836 7,021
(a) Period of year not stated; presumably single-day figures, except 1836, which is 
average for second half of year. 
     
Sources: 1830–5: Montagu's Return, “Arthur File” 18,399.     1836: MS. Bluebook, 
(Chief Secretary's Archives, Hobart).     1837-June 1840: Hobart Town Gazette. 
    1841–5: Legislative Council Papers, 1846.     1846–51: Hobart Town Gazette. 
Single-day Figures
1837: 30 June 7,021 48,364 39,235
   31 December 6,385 50,777 45,243
1838: 30 June 6,213 49,447 50,690
   31 December 10,842 60,267 60,130
1839: 30 June 16,127 81,935 81,352
   31 December 18,073 107,648 98,804
1840: 30 June 20,808 110,173 105,755
   31 December
1841: 31 December 11,264 83,108
1842: 31 December 9,659 82,742
1843: 31 December 9,572 61,320
1844: 31 December 7,848 60,324
1845: 31 December 10,375 73,815
1846: 31 March 12,202 98,580
   30 June 12,534 94,413
   30 September 13,193 92,551
   31 December 11,931 88,199
1847: 31 March 16,141 86,024
   30 June 14,577 107,853
   30 September 14,944 93,977
   31 December 15,458 93,547
1848: 31 March 15,077 90,942
   30 June 15,091 86,558
   30 September 14,824 102,402
   31 December 13,306 90,995
1849: 31 March 14,017 82,014
   30 June 13,659 78,246
   30 September 13,117 76,097
   31 December 13,295 86,123
1850: 31 March 14,261 98,253
   30 June 13,081 100,624
   30 September 14,098 92,175
   31 December 13,819 103,444
1851: 31 March 15,087 110,732
   30 June 18,146 118,024
   30 September 18,956 134,633
   31 December 22,882 130,395
Table 22 (b) COMMERCIAL BANK OF TASMANIA ASSETS (£) 
     
(a) Average for second half of year. 
(b) Probably included only furniture until 1840. 
Date or period Coin Discounts, etc. Premises
(a) 1836 10,500
Single-day Figures
1837: 30 June 24,041 70,478 (b) 100
   31 December 19,431 82,874 100
1838: 30 June 28,287 77,963 100
   31 December 23,346 107,692 200
1839: 30 June 28,713 150,400 300
   31 December 35,194 189,030 300
1840: 30 June 24,797 210,539 1,400
   31 December
1841: 31 December 19,249 203,069
1842: 31 December 25,590 196,897
1843: 31 December 20,770 180,640
1844: 31 December 31,409 164,863
1845: 31 December 36,274 170,839
1846: 31 March 57,256 173,224 4,500
   30 June 49,276 176,747 4,500
   30 September 49,598 169,442 4,500
   31 December 39,077 175,302 4,500
1847: 31 March 37,549 176,867 4,500
   30 June 50,372 186,643 3,815
   30 September 36,111 185,969 3,815
   31 December 35,455 185,404 5,000
1848: 31 March 25,446 189,152 5,000
   30 June 23,425 188,405 5,000
   30 September 35,615 189,920 5,000
   31 December 29,544 184,606 4,500
1849: 31 March 35,008 168,405 4,500
   30 June 32,817 166,170 4,500
   30 September 30,907 163,960 4,500
   31 December 42,798 164,536 4,160
1850: 31 March 58,047 160,453 4,160
   30 June 66,179 154,892 3,410
   30 September 61,107 147,792 3,410
   (c) 31 December 66,814 154,304 3,410
(c) 1851: 31 March 68,412 158,996 3,410
   30 June 79,144 162,121 3,110
   30 September 82,131 171,086 3,110
   31 December 72,501 185,020 3,110
(c) Amounts due from other banks were given for the following dates only: 
   Source: As for Liabilities.  
Table 23 (a) TAMAR BANK LIABILITIES (£) 
     
(a) Date uncertain; figure for notes may have included £4,000 in bills. 
(b) Half-yearly averages. £433 was due to other banks. 
(c) None of these bore interest. 
     
Sources: Figure for notes in 1835 from Montagu's return, “Arthur File” 18,399; 
remainder from Hobart Town Gazette. 
Table 23 (b) TAMAR BANK ASSETS (£) 
     
(a) Half-yearly averages. Balances due from other banks, not included above, 
totalled £6,716. 
(b) Including £5,000 “remitted for importation of specie”. 
     
Source: From Hobart Town Gazette. 
Table 24 (a) BANK OF AUSTRALASIA TASMANIAN LIABILITIES (£) 
   These figures are half-yearly averages of weekly figures. In each year 
(except 1836) period I covers from mid-October of the preceding year to 
mid-April of the year in question; period II covers April to October. Period 
1850: December £626; 1851: March £ 997
   June 124
   September 4,770
   December 2,008
Date or period Notes in circulation Interest-bearing bills in circulation Deposits Capital paid up
(a) 1835 11,722
(b) 1836: July-Dec. 8,002 4,000 (c) 34,699
1837: 30 June 8,946 4,000 49,436 19,050
   31 Dec. 9,271 — 50,715 19,050
Date or period Coin, Treasury bills, etc. Premises Bills discounted, etc.
(a) 1836: July-Dec. 13,526 2,216 45,168
1837: 30 June (b) 25,291 2,216 53,924
   31 Dec. 22,275 2,449 54,312
I in 1836 begins on 1 January 1836, the date on which the Bank opened in 
Hobart.  Figures cover all liabilities due in Tasmania, except such shares in 
the bank as may have been held by residents.  
     
(a) Not bearing interest. 
(b) Due to other banks £610. 
(c) Due to other banks £163. 
     
Source: Hobart Town Gazette, returns made in accordance with Charter. The return 
Deposits
Period Notes in circulation Bills in circulation (a) Not bearing interest Bearing interest Total
1836 I (b) 8,740 2,173 38,562 3,641 42,203
   II (c) 13,335 4,108 39,724 11,014 50,738
1837 I 15,643 4,499 41,603 14,638 56,241
   II 13,898 2,938 43,886 13,308 57,194
1838 I 13,635 4,137 39,040 10,954 49,994
   II 13,305 3,881 29,786 17,470 47,256
1839 I 13,900 7,506 — 52,917 52,917
   II 16,461 3,817 — 73,414 73,414
1840 I 15,292 5,893 — 86,650 86,650
   II 15,272 5,550 — 100,124 100,124
1841 I 13,544 3,432 — 88,720 88,720
   II 10,363 4,268 — 76,709 76,709
1842 I 12,321 3,343 — 77,727 77,727
   II 14,143 4,202 4,544 66,506 71,050
1843 I 15,281 3,864 29,152 47,814 76,966
   II 16,679 3,184 — 74,553 74,553
1844 I 18,559 5,390 474 85,359 85,833
   II 17,804 9,351 68,375 18,073 86,448
1845 I 16,723 5,134 81,630 10,595 92,225
   II 16,306 5,124 97,104 3,548 100,652
1846 I 17,965 4,036 99,666 — 99,666
   II 18,083 3,530 103,935 — 103,935
1847 I 16,555 3,161 120,854 — 120,854
   II 17,024 2,073 117,195 — 117,195
1848 I 17,669 2,196 102,103 — 102,103
   II 16,868 3,077 88,040 — 88,040
1849 I 15,818 4,290 78,807 — 78,807
   II 15,437 7,804 73,554 — 73,554
1850 I 14,438 6,145 72,409 — 72,409
   II 12,901 4,744 71,516 — 71,516
1851 I 14,520 4,559 77,011 — 77,011
   II 17,396 5,759 91,759 — 91,759
included items, “Notes and bills in circulation bearing interest”, of which none was 
issued, and “Balances due to other banks”, of which the only amounts are given in 
notes (b) and (c) . 
Table 24 (b) BANK OF AUSTRALASIA—TASMANIAN ASSETS (£) 
   For explanation of period for which figures are averages see note at head 
of table of Liabilities. All assets in Tasmania are included.  
     
(a) Due from other banks, £1,676. 
(b) Due from other banks, £1,231. 
Period Coin and bullion Discounts, etc. Premises
1836 I (a) 32,571 76,884 —
   II (b) 43,483 115,235 1,308
1837 I 30,486 141,123 2,000
   II 28,866 133,964 2,000
1838 I 30,256 152,826 2,000
   II 32,541 184,087 2,000
1839 I 42,986 196,240 2,000
   II 57,113 196,338 2,002
1840 I 30,366 251,717 2,048
   II 33,285 306,120 2,048
1841 I 33,483 302,273 2,048
   II 29,666 295,334 2,048
1842 I 28,742 308,496 2,048
   II 28,306 329,810 2,048
1843 I 32,574 364,598 2,302
   II 32,552 387,346 3,015
1844 I 25,905 407,898 4,214
   II 34,762 393,020 4,689
1845 I 36,775 363,206 4,539
   II 59,081 346,985 6,679
1846 I 46,970 347,235 6,835
   II 56,048 357,849 6,919
1847 I 70,087 367,572 7,053
   II 53,920 375,853 7,107
1848 I 66,987 369,527 7,117
   II 58,342 373,037 7,105
1849 I 51,188 362,046 7,092
   II 41,336 361,207 7,080
1850 I 43,648 325,798 7,080
   II 47,941 238,784 7,070
1851 I 47,335 216,080 7,070
   II 41,671 221,430 7,069
     
Source: Hobart Town Gazette, returns made in accordance with the Charter. The 
return included items, “Bills of other banks”, which are always nil, and “Balances 
due from other banks”, of which the only amounts are given in notes (a) and (b). 
Table 25 (a) UNION BANK OF AUSTRALIA TASMANIAN LIABILITIES (£) 
     
(a) All bearing interest. 
     
Date or period Notes in circulation Bills in circulation Deposits
Half-yearly Averages
1840: to 30 April 25,059 7,206 (a) 156,690
   to 30 Oct. 26,592 4,207 (a) 122,086
Single-day Figures
1840: 31 December 22,152
1841: 31 December 15,451 101,534
1842: 31 December 18,391 85,031
1843: 31 December 17,698 100,682
1844: 31 December 18,440 116,762
1845: 31 December 16,577 123,616
1846: 31 March 17,598 2,709 125,001
   30 June 16,497 1,266 136,829
   30 September 16,875 523 142,030
   31 December 16,871 1,830 129,561
1847: 31 March 18,572 559 126,308
   30 June 16,528 313 129,873
   30 September 18,209 1,766 142,246
   31 December 18,908 916 153,860
1848: 31 March 20,366 1,093 127,343
   30 June 16,764 392 103,658
   30 September 16,788 336 111,459
   31 December 16,056 450 105,560
1849: 31 March 17,087 1,195 107,576
   30 June 16,591 480 101,590
   30 September 16,387 1,039 94,123
   31 December 16,190 896 117,183
1850: 31 March 18,799 1,801 117,525
   30 June 16,316 1,050 124,672
   30 September 17,392 2,037 119,051
   31 December 17,354 1,303 121,466
1851: 31 March 20,323 2,878 140,186
   30 June 19,211 3,398 155,443
   30 September 20,428 6,165 149,391
   31 December 23,525 3,304 173,664
Source: 1840–5: Legislative Council Papers 18 Remainder: Hobart Town Gazette. 
Table 25 (b) UNION BANK OF AUSTRALIA TASMANIAN ASSETS (£) 
     
   Source: As for Liabilities.  
Table 26 COLONIAL BANK LIABILITIES AND ASSETS Figures in £ 
     
Date or period Coin Discounts, etc. Premises
Half-yearly Averages
1840: to 30 April 42,975 303,686 3,790
   to 30 October 50,204 333,313 3,919
Single-day Figures
1840: 31 December 34,986
1841: 31 December 52,052 348,977
1842: 31 December 39,531 342,035
1843: 31 December 41,394 373,985
1844: 31 December 37,687 302,177
1845: 31 December 153,251 214,850
1846: 31 March 163,011 202,722 7,616
   30 June 175,048 191,417 7,247
   30 September 182,607 208,719 10,247
   31 December 155,132 205,948 10,265
1847: 31 March 139,832 206,358 10,404
   30 June 153,581 218,414 10,700
   30 September 135,161 258,163 10,696
   31 December 126,013 270,655 10,709
1848: 31 March 102,769 309,061 10,711
   30 June 117,722 307,216 10,711
   30 September 86,534 314,146 10,711
   31 December 87,865 315,912 7,902
1849: 31 March 78,098 322,529
   30 June 105,667 293,801
   30 September 95,418 297,941
   31 December 62,735 307,880
1850: 31 March 49,559 283,835
   30 June 62,756 264,197
   30 September 84,617 253,117
   31 December 71,623 238,755
1851: 31 March 67,950 217,722
   30 June 54,572 206,950
   30 September 45,382 195,417
   31 December 53,226 207,033 8,270
31 December Notes in circulation Deposits Coin and bullion Bills discounted, etc.
(a) Not available. 
(b) Closing of bank had been announced. 
     
Source: Legislative Council Papers 1846. 
Table 27—TASMANIAN BANKS—DIVIDEND RATES 
   Rates are expressed per annum, and are half-yearly dividends. For Union 
Bank and Bank of Australasia see New South Wales section.  
     
1840 6,939 (a) 7,135 (a) 
1841 7,681 32,254 4,685 111,318
1842 9,763 36,735 6,624 141,128
1843 (b) 4,485 (b) 20,033 6,839 113,119
Period V.D.L. Derwent Cornwall Commercial Tamar Colonial
1825 I
   II 42 (a) 
1826 I
   II
1827 I
   II
1828 I 20
   II 16
1829 I 16 10
   II 16
1830 I 16 16 £1. 4s.
   II 16 per share
1831 I 16
   II 13
1832 I 26 (b) 
   II
1833 I 14 16
   II 15
1834 I 15
   II 15 10
1835 I 14 15 20
   II
1836 I 15
   II
1837 I 14 15
   II 14
1838 I 15 (c) 14
   II 14 14
1839 I 14
   II 14
(a) Approximate. 
(b) Plus 4 per cent for old shares. 
(c) Plus £10 per share. 
   Note: Later information is not available in precise form.  
   Source: Mainly bank notices in press.  
Table 28 (a) TASMANIA INTEREST ON DEPOSITS RATE PER CENT 
     
(a) 1 September 1838 in Launceston. 
1840 I 14
   II 14 10
1841 I 12
   II 12
1842 I 12 10
   II 10 10
1843 I 8
Fixed 
Deposit
Date 
effective
Bank making 
change
Six months Three months' 
notice
Ten days' 
notice
Current account 
daily balance
Source
1829
29 June Commercial 5 H.T.C. 11/7/1829
1836
1 Jan. Australasia 5 }H.T.C. 20/11/1835 
C.C. 19/12/1835
16 Jan. Tamar 5 C.C. 16/1/1836
1838
23 July Commercial 5 C.C. 14/7/1838
1 Sept. Australasia 7 4 {H.T.C. 17/8/1838 
C.C. 11/8/1838
6 Sept. (a) Union (b) 5 {H.T.C. 14/8/1838 
C.C. 1/9/1838
15 Oct. Commercial 5 (b) H.T.C. 5/10/1838
1840
9 March {Derwent V.D.L. 
Commercial
5 5 5 H.T.C. 6/3/1840
1 August Australasia 7 5 5 C.C. 1/8/1840
5 Oct. Colonial (b) (b) 5 H.T.C. 11/9/1840
1842
12 Sept. All six 5 (b) (b) {H.T.C. 26/8/1842 
C.C. 3/9/1842
11 Oct. {Australasia Union 5 3 (c) C.C. 15/10/1842
1844
6 May {Australasia Union 3 nil C.C. 24/4/1844
(b) Not given; this type of business probably done. 
(c) Provided minimum daily average not less than £100. 
     
Sources: H.T.C.—Hobart Town Courier. 
     
C.C.—Cornwall Chronicle. 
Table 28 (b) TASMANIA—BANK LOAN RATES (PER CENT) 
     
Discount 
Date 
effective
Bank making 
change
To 60 
days
Over 60 
days
To 100 
days
Over 
100 
days
To 3 
months
Over 3 
months
Cash 
credit
Source
1824
15 March V.D.L. — — — — 10 — — H.T.C. 11/7/29
1835
23 
November
{Tamar Cornwall — — — — 8 — — C.C. 21/11/35
1836
1 January Australasia — — — — 8 — 10 {H.T.C. 
20/11/35 C.C.
19/12/35
16 January Tamar — — — — 8 — 10 C.C. 16/1/36
1837
9 January {Derwent V.D.L. — — — — 10 — — H.T.C. 13/1/37
1838
1 
September
Australasia (a) 8 — 10 — — — 12 {H.T.C. 17/8/38 
C.C. 11/8/38
6 
September
Union (b) 8 10 — — — — — {H.T.C. 14/9/38 
C.C. 1/9/38
15 October Commercial — — — — 10 — — H.T.C. 5/10/38
1839
1 July V.D.L. — — — — — 10 (c) 10 H.T.C. 5/7/39
1840
1 January Australasia 8 10 — — — — — C.C. 4/1/40
1 August Australasia — — 10 — — — — C.C. 1/8/40
5 October Colonial — — 10 — — — — H.T.C. 11/9/40
1842
12 
September
All six — — — — 8 10 10 {H.T.C. 26/8/42 
C.C. 3/9/42
11 October {Australasia Union — — 8 10 — — 10 C.C. 15/10/42
1846
29 April {Commercial 
Australasia Union
— — 6 7 — — — H.T.C. 29/4/46
(a) Renewals and overdrawn accounts 12 per cent. 
(b) From 1 September 1838 in Launceston; renewals 10 per cent; overdrawn 
accounts 10 per cent Hobart, 12 per cent Launceston. 
(c) To six months. 
     
Sources: H.T.C.—Hobart Town Courier. 
     
C.C.—Cornwall Chronicle. 
Table 29 (a) TASMANIA—BANK OF VAN DIEMEN'S LAND BANK RATIOS 
     
1852
1 
September
Australasia 6 — 7 8 — — — C.C. 7/9/52
Date or period Coin as percentage of total deposits Discounts as percentage of total deposits
1836: January—June 40.6 128.2
   July—December 35.5 132.5
1837: 30 June 37.2 136.6
   31 December 38.5 154.1
1838: 30 June 35.97 160.4
   31 December 45.2 149.4
1839: 30 June 56.4 129.7
   31 December 29.2 149.5
1840: 30 June 31.7 196.2
   31 December — —
1841: 31 December 27.1 280.6
1842: 31 December 31.0 251.1
1843: 31 December 31.2 296.8
1844: 31 December 45.7 173.2
1845: 31 December 51.4 159.8
1846: 31 March 29.7 161.1
   30 June 36.9 172.96
   30 September 37.1 154.2
   31 December 42.6 152.3
1847: 31 March 25.6 175.7
   30 June 15.3 193.5
   30 September 29.96 176.9
   31 December 12.2 200.3
1848: 31 March 19.2 208.1
   30 June 29.3 206.7
   30 September 32.7 202.1
Table 29 (b) DERWENT BANK BANK RATIOS 
     
Table 29 (c) COMMERCIAL BANK OF TASMANIA BANK RATIOS 
     
   31 December 39.3 203.3
1849: 31 March 26.7 206.4
   30 June 31.5 231.1
   30 September 30.5 238.4
   31 December 46.5 194.7
1850: 31 March 59.2 165.2
   30 June 44.0 211.0
   31 September 27.3 219.3
   31 December 44.8 179.6
1851: 31 March 54.5 155.95
   30 June 64.7 136.1
   30 September 60.8 132.3
   31 December 58.1 130.7
Date or period Coin as percentage of total deposits Discounts as percentage of total deposits
1836: January—June 28.7 164.0
   July—December 21.8 171.7
1837: 30 June 35.04 138.8
   31 December 24.2 158.3
1838: 30 June 24.4 168.5
   31 December 32.3 167.5
1839: 30 June 39.1 156.8
   31 December 40.5 164.3
1840: 30 June 19.7 183.4
   31 December — —
1841: 31 December .11 208.5
1842: 31 December .27 317.5
1843: 31 December .03 301.0
1844: 31 December .03 253.4
1845: 31 December .19 228.7
1846: 30 June .02 168.0
1848: 30 September .39 258.3
   31 December .005 284.6
1849: 31 March .37 287.8
   30 June .89 308.2
   30 September .56 321.2
   31 December .21 563.3
Date Coin as percentage of total deposits Discounts as percentage of total deposits
1837: 30 June 43.4 127.2
Table 29 (d) BANK OF AUSTRALASIA (TASMANIA) BANK RATIOS 
     
   31 December 33.99 144.98
1838: 30 June 50.8 140.1
   31 December 32.8 151.4
1839: 30 June 29.3 153.4
   31 December 27.99 150.3
1840: 30 June 18.9 160.7
   31 December — —
1841: 31 December 20.4 215.2
1842: 31 December 27.7 213.1
1843: 31 December 29.3 254.8
1844: 31 December 46.1 241.8
1845: 31 December 43.1 202.9
1846: 31 March 51.7 156.4
   30 June 46.1 165.3
   30 September 46.9 160.2
   31 December 39.0 175.1
1847: 31 March 36.7 173.1
   30 June 41.1 152.4
   30 September 33.1 170.7
   31 December 32.5 170.1
1848: 31 March 24.0 178.4
   30 June 23.0 185.3
   30 September 30.4 162.0
   31 December 28.3 176.99
1849: 31 March 36.4 175.4
   30 June 35.7 180.8
   30 September 34.6 183.8
   31 December 43.0 165.5
1850: 31 March 51.6 142.6
   30 June 58.2 136.2
   30 September 57.5 139.1
   31 December 56.97 131.6
1851: 31 March 54.4 126.4
   30 June 58.1 119.1
   30 September 53.5 111.4
   31 December 47.3 120.7
Period Coin as percentage of total deposits Discounts as percentage of total deposits
1836 I 63.9 150.9
   II 67.9 179.8
1837 I 42.4 196.3
   II 40.6 188.4
1838 I 47.5 240.2
   II 53.7 303.96
Table 29 (e) UNION BANK OF AUSTRALIA (TASMANIA) BANK RATIOS 
     
1839 I 64.3 293.7
   II 63.5 218.4
1840 I 29.8 246.9
   II 28.8 265.3
1841 I 32.7 295.6
   II 34.1 339.2
1842 I 31.9 342.6
   II 33.2 387.1
1843 I 35.3 395.2
   II 35.7 424.6
1844 I 24.8 390.7
   II 33.3 376.99
1845 I 33.7 333.4
   II 50.5 296.7
1846 I 39.9 295.2
   II 45.9 293.3
1847 I 51.0 267.5
   II 40.2 280.0
1848 I 55.9 308.5
   II 55.6 355.6
1849 I 54.1 382.6
   II 46.4 405.9
1850 I 50.2 375.1
   II 56.8 282.9
1851 I 51.7 236.1
   II 38.2 202.8
Date Coin as percentage of total deposits Discounts as percentage of total deposits
1840: 31 December — —
1841: 31 December 44.5 298.3
1842: 31 December 38.2 330.7
1843: 31 December 34.96 315.9
1844: 31 December 27.9 223.5
1845: 31 December 109.3 153.2
1846: 31 March 114.3 142.2
   30 June 114.2 124.8
   30 September 114.9 131.3
   31 December 105.9 140.6
1847: 31 March 96.5 142.4
   30 June 104.9 149.2
   30 September 84.2 160.9
   31 December 72.9 156.6
1848: 31 March 69.6 209.2
   30 June 97.7 255.1
Table 29 (f) COLONIAL BANK BANK RATIOS 
     
Table 30 (a) LAUNCESTON BANK FOR SAVINGS DEPOSITS 1835–51 
     
   30 September 67.4 244.95
   31 December 72.2 259.8
1849: 31 March 62.6 258.7
   30 June 89.4 248.6
   30 September 86.3 269.6
   31 December 47.0 230.8
1850: 31 March 36.3 208.2
   30 June 44.5 187.4
   30 September 62.0 185.5
   31 December 51.6 171.98
1851: 31 March 42.3 135.6
   30 June 31.2 118.5
   30 September 26.7 115.1
   31 December 26.99 104.99
Date Coin as percentage of total deposits Discounts as percentage of total deposits
31 December
1840
1841 11.7 278.7
1842 14.2 303.5
1843 27.9 461.4
Date Number of accounts Amount of deposits Source
£
(a) 13/8/35 (c) “over 600” (b) Launceston Advertiser
11/5/36 42 561 “Minutes”, 27/6/36
15/6/37 “about 150” “over 1200” (b) Launceston Advertiser
9/11/41 289 3,715 “Minutes”, 9/11/41
12/3/44 (c) 6,419 “Minutes”, 12/3/44
9/10/44 423 6,950} (d) “Half-yearly Balance Book” 1844–62
31/12/44 (c) 7,673
30/6/45 455 7,833
31/12/45 492 8,126
30/6/46 556 9,473
31/12/46 597 10,068
30/6/47 681 12,108
31/12/47 746 13,118
1/7/48 (c) 14,955
1/1/49 838 15,530
(f) 31/8/49 832 16,929
(a) The bank opened for business in March 1835. The precise date is uncertain; 
arrangements for its operation were completed on 9 March (“Minutes”, 9 March 
1835) but some deposits may have been received earlier. 
(b) Reasonably reliable, since the Dowlings, father and son, who edited the 
Advertiser, were closely associated with the bank. Henry Dowling, senior, was a 
founder, and provided the office; his son was Actuary from October 1844 until 
August 1868. 
(c) Not available. 
(d) The “Balance Book” opens at 9 October 1844, when Isaac Sherwin's resignation 
from the post of manager was accepted. Previously all accounts seem to have been 
treated as the private property of managers. No records survive for the period 12 
June 1837 to 9 November 1841. Henry Dowling, senior, “was written to for the 
books and papers relative to this Institution, and promises to look for them as early 
as possible” (“Minutes”, 9 November 1841). He appears to have been unsuccessful, 
and the only records now available for the period covered are the “Balance Book” 
and a “Minute Book” covering 7 January 1835 to 12 June 1837, and 9 November 
1841 to end of 1855. Published data are scanty: Statement at 1 January 1845, 
Launceston Advertiser, 7 February 1845; Statement at 30 June 1846, Hobart Town 
Gazette, 8 September 1846; and Statement at 1 September 1851, ibid., 23 September 
1851. With trivial variations these duplicate the original records. 
(e) After amendment of accounts; originally shown as £23,689, and so printed in 
Hobart Town Gazette. 
(f) Change of period followed application of Savings Bank Act (12 Vic., No. 2) to 
the Bank. (“Minutes”, 8 September 1849.) 
Table 30 (b) LAUNCESTON BANK FOR SAVINGS LOANS, RESERVES, AND 
CASH (£) 1844–51 
     
1/3/50 (c) 18,098
1/9/50 (c) 18,706
1/3/51 (c) 19,594
1/9/51 (c) (e) 23,558
Mortgages (a) Banks
Date No. Amount Managing committee (b) Union Australasia Reserve Cash
9/10/44 4 3,050 3,736 122 33 — —
31/12/44 8 5,250 2,264 50 25 — 19
30/6/45 10 5,868 1,742 7 88 — 129
31/12/45 12 7,321 (d) 500 7 92 — 171
30/6/46 11 6,933 (c) 7 23 — 34
31/12/46 11 8,748 763 7 208 — 307
30/6/47 14 10,209 1,515 7 177 — 153
31/12/47 15 12,661 — 7 275 — 108
(a) From its opening in March 1835, all funds were deposited in the Tamar Bank. 
(“Minutes”, 9 March 1835). When this Bank was absorbed by the Union on 1 May 
1838, the account was transferred to that bank. When Gilles & Co. (later Archers 
Gilles & Co.) opened on 12 June 1840, the new firm held all the bank's funds. When 
the firm got into difficulties in 1843, the funds were transferred to the Union Bank 
(“Minutes”, 23, 29 December 1843), and subsequently divided between the Union 
and Australasia (“Minutes”, 12 March 1844). The bank first lent directly on 22 
August 1844 (“Minutes”, same date), following trading banks' abolition of all 
interest on deposits (“Minutes”, 30 April 1844). Throughout the period covered by 
the table loans were in the form of mortgages (apart from bank deposits recorded), 
the managing committee repeatedly declining to consider discounts or other loans on 
personal security. (Letter to Lieut.-Governor, 25 June 1844, in “Minute Book”; and 
“Minutes”. 29 August 1844; 9 June 1846; 4 June 1852. Launceston Advertiser, 14 
August 1845), 
(b) Until 1850 held in Bank of Australasia, representing unused loanable funds and 
reserve against withdrawals. Only three-fourths of deposits were to be lent on 
mortgages (“Minutes”, 15 August 1844). On 14 April 1845 this was altered to 
reserving £1,000 in cash or deposits with banks. 
(c) Not recorded. 
(d) Following decision to lend all funds except £500, to be held as reserve 
(“Minutes”, 24 October 1845). 
(e) Plus other assets (furniture, interest accruing, etc.), £266. On 30 March 1846 it 
was resolved to reserve £25 per annum as “an accumulating fund”, but there is no 
record of this. 
(f) Plus other assets, £260. 
(g) Plus other assets, £239. 
   Source: Compiled from “Half-yearly Balance Book”, 1844–62.  
Table 30 (c) LAUNCESTON BANK FOR SAVINGS—INTEREST ON DEPOSITS 
1835–52 
     
1/7/48 (c) 11,850 2,810 216 — 132
1/1/49 20 15,295 11 107 — 49
31/8/49 20 15,545 — — 1,333 — 27
1/3/50 (c) 16,795 — 1,060 242 (e) 47 47
1/9/50 (c) 17,795 — 859 126 (f) 113 40
1/3/51 (c) 17,645 — 1,698 291 (g) 129 90
1/9/51 (c) 19,695 — 1,996 2,077 170 90
Date operative Rate per cent Maximum deposit bearing interest Source
(a) March 1835 5 (b) £50 (c) Rules
(d) November 1841 5 (e) £100 “Minutes”, 9 November 1841
(a) See note (a) to table of amount of deposits.
 
(b) Limit applied only to amount to be deposited in any one year. Friendly Societies' 
deposits bore interest without limit. (“Minutes”, April 1835.) 
(c) The Rules were printed; a copy is preserved in the “Minutes”, but they were not 
published in the press. See public notice, Cornwall Chronicle, 18 April 1835. 
(d) No records for intervening period; see note (d) to table of amount of deposits. 
But circumstantial evidence all points to 5 per cent having been maintained without 
break. See “Minutes”, 9 November 1841, and compare interest on deposits paid 
during 1835–41 by Tamar Bank, Union Bank, and Archers Gilles & Co., who in turn 
held the funds. Rate maintained until next entry. 
(e) £100 as total deposits; not more than £50 to be deposited in any one year. The 
subsequent entries in this column are based on the absence of all references to limits 
in later “Minutes”. 
(f) Rate maintained until next entry. (See decisions recorded in “Minutes”.) 
(g) Under Savings Bank Act, £150 of principal and not more than £50 of 
accumulated interest. Applied from September 1849. 
Table 30 (d) LAUNCESTON BANK FOR SAVINGS—MORTGAGE INTEREST 
RATES 1844–52 
     
     
(a) Date of first mortgage loans made by bank. From 1835 to 1844 all money was 
deposited, at 5 per cent per annum, in trading banks. See note (a) to table of loans, 
reserves and cash. 
(b) On new loans, from this date; on existing loans from 1 January 1847. 
   Note: The table is complete; that is, the rates shown were maintained 
until the date of the next entry. See “Minutes” for periodical decisions.  
Table 31 (a) HOBART SAVINGS BANK DEPOSITS 1845–51 
     
(f) 1 January 1844 4 £100 “Minutes”, 29 December 1843
(f) 1 September 1846 3 £100 “Minutes”, 26 August 1846
(f) 5 September 1850 31/2 (g) £200 “Minutes”, 5 September 1850
   4 September 1852 3 £200 “Minutes”, 4 September 1852
Date operative Rate per cent Source
(a) 22 August 1844 7 “Minutes”, 15 and 22 August 1844
(b) 26 August 1846 6 “Minutes”, 26 August 1846
   4 September 1852 5 “Minutes”, 4 September 1852
(a) Not available. 
(b) Rate fixed for preceding half-year except February-August 1846 when 4 per cent 
was promised in advance. 
(c) This rate was promised but bank could in fact only pay 2 per cent (next entry). 
   Source: Bank records, mainly “Minutes”.  
Table 31 (b) HOBART SAVINGS BANK—MORTGAGE LOANS 
     
(a) From 5 May 1845 to 4 June 1845 6 per cent; thereafter 7 per cent. 
(b) Reduced to 6 per cent, 6 October 1852. 
Table 31 (c) HOBART SAVINGS BANK—CASH AND RESERVE FUND (£) 
Date Number Amount (£) (b) Interest per cent per annum
End of:
August 1845 370 2,439 Nil
February 1846 601 5,163 (c) 4
August 1846 817 8,561 2
February 1847 1,065 10,948 3
August 1847 1,288 13,726 3
February 1848 1,132 17,702 4
August 1848 1,238 19,916 4
February 1849 1,427 24,200 4
August 1849 1,540 27,626 4
February 1850 1,911 32,805 4
August 1850 (a) 40,062 4
February 1851 2,349 47,203 4
August 1851 2,456 54,487 4
Date Amount (£) Interest per cent per annum
End of:
August 1845 520 (a) 6 & 7
February 1846 4,170 7
August 1846 6,370 7
February 1847 9,830 7
July 1847 10,110 7
February 1848 15,260 7
July 1848 17,800 7
February 1849 21,850 7
August 1849 26,270 7
February 1850 28,770 7
August 1850 36,300 7
February 1851 42,072 7
August 1851 52,676 (b) 7
     
     
(a) Established 8 September 1847. 
(b) From this date Fund was credited with deposit interest as well as half-yearly 
allocations. 
C. Western Australia 
   Complete sets of banking statistics, so far as they ever took the form of 
official returns, can be obtained from two sources—the Government 
Gazette and “C.S.O. Records”, the latter containing the original MS. 
returns, many of which were not published.  
   One act, that passed in 1837 on the foundation of the Bank of Western 
Australia, regulated the making of official returns throughout the whole 
period.1 Section XII provided for quarterly returns of average weekly note 
issue and deposits, no more; it did not provide for publication or any right 
of access.2 However, from the beginning the Bank of Western Australia, 
fulfilling its prospectus promise, supplied for publication a four-item 
return, the average weekly figures of: notes in circulation; deposits; specie 
and treasury bills; and bills discounted.3 These are less than one might 
hope, but better than the act provided, and all except the final set were 
published in the Government Gazette; the last return was made and can be 
got from “C.S.O. Records”.  
   The Bank of Australasia on opening sought to have defined its obligation 
to furnish returns other than those required by the charter.4 The answer was 
a request to furnish, half-yearly, the return specified in the Bank 
Regulations of 1840, no mention being made of publication.5 Accordingly 
Date In banks and on hand Reserve fund (a)
End of:
August 1845 1,900 —
February 1846 951 —
August 1846 2,173 —
February 1847 1,202 —
July 1847 2,845 —
February 1848 2,433 137
August 1848 1,557 224
February 1849 2,344 267
August 1849 1,203 322
February 1850 3,912 390
August 1850 3,574 (b) 461
February 1851 5,034 593
August 1851 1,805 721
the bank supplied the returns required by its charter, which were identical 
and which it had to make in any case; in other words the answer was read 
as an exemption from the local act which required quarterly data. However, 
publication in the Government Gazette did not follow. The bank supplied 
the newspapers with the first three returns but the next three must be 
sought in MS. in “C.S.O. Records”.  
   The reasons for suspending and resuming publication are clear. The 
Western Australian Bank did the bare minimum required by the act, that is, 
supplied the two-item return, but objected to publication. It is true that at 
half-yearly meetings returns were tabled for the inspection of 
shareholders,6 but these contained little; in any case only a few have 
survived.7 The Australasia naturally ceased to present useful information to 
a rival which did not reciprocate. However, in 1844 the Western Australian 
Bank manager rather impudently demanded access to the Australasia 
returns.8 The governor minuted “may have access for this information to 
the records of the Col. Secy's office”, but the Colonial Secretary recorded 
“informed he may have access to all the returns the act of council requires 
the Australasian Bank to furnish”. Taken with the 1841 decision this 
meant, literally, no returns, which may explain the manager's retort that the 
information offered “is not that required and applied for”. He also 
demanded that all unpublished returns of the Australasia be printed.9 The 
governor minuted that he did “not see with what force such a demand as 
this can be asserted by a bank which refuses to the public the fullest 
necessary information of their own affairs”; a further request was simply 
initialled, and no reply apparently was made. But the thrust about the 
obligations imposed by the charter struck home and publication of 
Australasia returns was resumed in the Government Gazette. From the 
printed and MS. returns a complete set can be recovered.  
   From its commencement in 1841 until late 1848 the Western Australian 
Bank declined to supply more than the returns required by the act and 
would not consent to publication. Directors in the Legislative Council led 
the obstinate resistance to the various bank bills which would have 
required fuller disclosures. Presumably as the price of getting Australasia 
returns published Western Australian Bank returns appeared in the 
Government Gazette during 1845 but disappeared when the Australasia 
closed. For the whole period, however, a full set of MS. returns has 
survived, although they cover only quarterly averages of notes and 
deposits.  
   For no apparent reason publication was resumed with the fourth quarter 
of 1847 and this led to the next development. The Inquirer attacked the 
return as useless and stressed the importance of knowing cash holdings.10 
The governor next day raised the issue with the bank which expostulated at 
length. The full correspondence does not survive,11 but the governor won 
his point and a new form of quarterly return was adopted and regular 
publication in the Government Gazette followed. On the liabilities side the 
only change was disclosure of the division between interest-bearing and 
other deposits; the assets items, all new, were cash, bills, cash credits and 
premises.  
   Apart from official returns, whether published or not, newspapers supply 
useful data. Dividend returns are practically complete;12 discount rates, 
rarely changed, for the whole period are preserved; and some information, 
scanty enough, exists on deposit rates although in the absence of 
competition little publicity was given to rates for business which was of 
slight importance.  
Table 32—BANK OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA ASSETS AND LIABILITIES (£) 
QUARTERLY AVERAGES OF WEEKLY FIGURES 
     
   Note: The return also included “dishonoured bills”. This item was zero 
until first quarter 1839; the highest it ever reached was £55 in second 
quarter 1840.  
     
Source: Western Australian Government Gazette. 
   No return for 1841 (I), the last, was published but the original can be 
found in “C.S.O. Records”.  
1 8 Wm. IV, No. 1, 10 July 1837. 
Quarter Notes in circulation Deposits Specie and Treasury bills Bills discounted
1837 III 1,412 2,145 3,575 1,077
   IV 2,471 2,572 4,849 1,306
1838 I 3,234 3,050 5,054 2,497
   II 2,687 4,131 5,368 2,816
   III 2,410 5,105 5,905 3,452
   IV 2,758 3,622 3,338 5,106
1839 I 2,704 3,111 1,860 6,227
   II 2,315 3,991 2,556 7,413
   III 2,668 4,459 4,384 7,005
   IV 2,849 4,736 4,718 7,175
1840 I 3,118 6,073 4,287 9,202
   II 3,754 5,287 3,406 10,721
   III 4,190 6,417 3,051 12,021
   IV 4,556 7,954 4,156 13,252
1841 I 4,355 7,000 2,689 13,321
2 Section II provided for returns of lists of shareholders, etc. open to anyone on 
payment of 1s. 
3 “Dishonoured bills” was also added, probably as a matter of pride since it was zero 
for two years and always negligible. 
4 MacDermott to Colonial Secretary, 2 June 1841, “C.S.O. Records” 1841. 
5 Minute on preceding. 
6 A regular note in Reports, printed in newspapers. 
7 Now in Perth office of Bank of New South Wales. 
8 Wells to Colonial Secretary, 5 November 1844, “C.S.O. Records”. 
9 Wells to Colonial Secretary, 15 November 1844, “C.S.O. Records”. 
10 18 October 1848. 
11 “C.S.O. Records” 1848 contain two replies from the bank, 20 and 25 October and 
a governor's minute. 
12 One dividend for the Bank of Western Australia cannot be found. 
Table 33 (a) BANK OF AUSTRALASIA—WESTERN AUSTRALIAN BRANCH 
LIABILITIES £ 
     
Returns in accordance with the Charter of half-yearly averages of weekly figures. 
Period I is from October of the preceding year to April of the year indicated; period 
II is from April to October.  
     
   Note: “Balances due from other banks”, £14 in 1842 (II), otherwise zero.  
Table 33 (b) BANK OF AUSTRALASIA—WESTERN AUSTRALIAN BRANCH 
ASSETS (£) 
Deposits
Period Notes in circulation Bills in circulation Not bearing interest Bearing interest Total
1841 II 2,559 360 7,412 25 7,437
1842 I 2,251 1 4,856 49 4,905
   II 1,522 127 3,239 109 3,348
1843 I 1,364 79 2,538 263 2,601
   II 1,451 534 3,542 300 3,842
1844 I 1,397 48 2,624 363 2,987
   II 1,080 34 1,781 403 2,184
1845 I 1,212 — 1,637 516 2,153
   II 1,310 166 1,635 590 2,225
     
   Note: “Balances due to other banks” always zero.  
     
Sources: 1841 (II) to 1842 (II) from Inquirer. Not published in Government Gazette. 
    1843 (I) to 1844 (I) from original MS. returns, never published, in “C.S.O. 
Records”. (Public Library, Perth.)     1844 (II) to 1845 (II) from Western Australian 
Government Gazette.     The returns are complete. 
Table 34 (a) WESTERN AUSTRALIAN BANK—LIABILITIES (£) QUARTERLY 
AVERAGES OF WEEKLY FIGURES 
     
Period Coin Premises Bills discounted
1841 II 7,471 — 12,440
1842 I 4,912 — 16,509
   II 4,814 414 15,061
1843 I 7,321 416 13,642
   II 4,113 419 18,913
1844 I 2,410 426 20,123
   II 1,847 429 19,421
1845 I 1,601 1,493 18,379
   II 1,331 1,500 13,903
Deposits
Quarter Notes in circulation Not bearing interest (a) Bearing interest (b) Total
1841 III 1,024 3,266
   IV 1,800 5,082
1842 I 2,046 5,461
   II 2,261 4,878
   III 2,470 6,857
   IV 2,536 6,747
1843 I 2,403 9,227
   II 2,174 8,466
   III 1,846 7,726
   IV 1,957 8,013
1844 I 2,039 8,707
   II 1,764 7,023
   (c) III 1,560 7,361
   IV 1,680 8,487
1845 I 1,675 7,688
   II 1,878 6,049
   III 2,359 6,517
   IV 3,370 6,867
1846 I 3,183 9,797
   II 3,043 10,269
   III 2,805 10,824
   IV 3,647 10,919
(a) Includes reserve fund. 
(b) “Being funds of charitable institutions”. 
(c) Two returns are preserved in “C.S.O. Records”, one as above, one showing notes 
£1,108 and deposits £2,007. The dates shown for the end of the quarter vary by 
sixteen days but there is no formal evidence for choosing either as correct. The 
possibility that each is correct for its period is ruled out not only by the absence of 
other evidence of a sudden change in liabilities, but quite conclusively by the 
enormous variation in deposits required to produce this difference in averages for 
slightly different periods. These shown in the table are in line with earlier and later 
figures and the other set has been rejected, despite the fact that both returns carry 
sworn declarations of accuracy. 
     
Sources: 1841 (III) from Inquirer, 13 October 1841.     1841 (I) to 1847 (III) from 
original MS. returns in “C.S.O. Records”. Except in 1845 these were not published. 
    1847 (IV) to 1851 (IV), Western Australian Government Gazette. 
Table 34 (b) WESTERN AUSTRALIAN BANK ASSETS (£) QUARTERLY 
AVERAGES OF WEEKLY FIGURES 
     
1847 I 3,953 12,956
   II 3,222 11,595
   III 2,989 12,709
   IV 4,092 13,575
1848 I 4,199 15,740
   II 3,732 13,670
   III 3,319 13,344
   IV 3,093 13,396 150 13,546
1849 I 3,398 13,228 150 13,378
   II 2,652 13,719 150 13,869
   III 2,111 12,672 150 12,822
   IV 2,358 13,778 160 13,938
Total
Quarter Notes in circulation Not bearing interest (a) Bearing interest (b) Total
1850 I 2,825 13,557 160 13,717
   II 2,340 13,299 160 13,459
   III 2,378 13,750 160 13,910
   IV 2,973 16,661 160 16,821
1851 I 4,084 20,247 220 20,467
   II 4,562 20,705 220 20,925
   III 5,084 22,603 220 22,823
   IV 5,863 25,640 220 25,860
Advances
(a) Including Treasury bills, notes of other banks, and cash at agents. 
(b) Including all forms of loan, other than discounts on bills, described as “specialty 
securities”. 
     
The return also included an item for premises, unchanged throughout at 
£1,050.  Source: Western Australian Government Gazette.  MS. returns 
tabled at half-yearly meetings gave data on assets for earlier years, but these 
have not survived. 
Table 35 WESTERN AUSTRALIA BANK DIVIDENDS 
     
Quarter Coin (a) Bills Cash credits (b) Total
1848 IV 7,816 10,231 6,275 16,506
1849 I 6,802 10,809 6,802 17,611
   II 5,918 10,360 7,610 17,970
   III 4,642 9,680 8,168 17,848
   IV 7,992 8,913 6,981 15,894
1850 I 7,350 9,866 6,987 16,853
   II 7,824 8,650 6,978 15,628
   III 7,159 10,165 6,411 16,576
   IV 9,274 11,462 6,662 18,124
1851 I 9,646 14,895 7,684 22,579
   II 10,449 14,371 8,399 22,770
   III 14,865 13,289 7,653 20,942
   IV 17,814 13,639 8,361 21,990
Rates are per cent per annum, as declared each half-year.
BANK OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
1838 I 23
II    17
1839 I 22
   II
1840 I 7
   II 7
WESTERN AUSTRALIAN BANK
1841 II 15
1842 I 16
   II 22
1843 I 15
   II 15
1844 I 121/2
   II 51/2
1845 I 91/2
   II 111/4
1846 I 121/2
     
Sources: Perth Gazette and Inquirer. 
Table 36 WESTERN AUSTRALIA—BANK INTEREST RATESA. 
DISCOUNT RATE (per cent per annum) 
     
     
Originally limited to bills for three months or less; from 1 July 1840 
extended to six months (Perth Gazette, 4 July 1840). Rate constant for 
whole life of Bank. 
     
(a) Date of opening, rate maintained until date of next entry. 
(b) Rate unchanged until bank closed in December, 1845. 
WESTERN AUSTRALIAN BANK (Term of bills in months) 
     
(a) Date of opening. Rates from Perth Gazette, 8 May 1841. Maintained 
until date of next entry. 
(b) From Perth Gazette, 30 March 1844. Maintained throughout remainder 
of period (i.e., to end of 1851). 
   II 121/2
1847 I 121/2
   II 121/2
1848 I 121/2
   II 121/2
1849 I 121/2
   II 121/2
1850 I 121/2
   II 121/2
1851 I 121/2
   II 121/2
BANK OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
From 1/6/37 To 1/5/41 121/2 
BANK OF AUSTRALASIA (Three months bills)
(a) ) 3/5/41 10 Perth Gazette 1/5/41
(b) 26/3/44 8 Perth Gazette 30/3/44
Date To 2 2–3 3–4 4–5 5–6
(a) 23/6/41 9 91/2 10 11 121/2
(b) 28/3/44 7 71/2 8 91/2 11
     
   B. DEPOSIT INTEREST RATES  Information is scanty, interest-bearing 
deposits being of little importance.  (I) BANK OF WESTERN 
AUSTRALIA     1837–41—Savings Deposits 5 per cent per annum  Note: 
Minimum £5. Business of small size.  (II) BANK OF AUSTRALASIA 
    1841-5. Interest-bearing deposits of increasing relative importance, but 
no rate ever announced.  (III) WESTERN AUSTRALIAN BANK 
    1841—Savings deposits 5 per cent per annum 
   Note: Minimum £5. Size unknown, but apparently small, 1841–8. 
From 1848 small being limited to charitable funds.  
Table 37—WESTERN AUSTRALIA—RATIOS (per cent) 
     
Period Cash to notes and deposits Advances to deposits
1. Bank of Western Australia (Quarterly)
1837 III 100.5 50.2
   IV 96.2 50.8
1838 I 80.4 81.9
   II 78.7 68.2
   III 78.6 67.8
   IV 52.3 141.0
1839 I 32.0 200.2
   II 40.5 185.7
   III 61.5 157.1
   IV 62.2 151.5
1840 I 46.6 151.5
   II 37.7 202.8
   III 28.8 187.3
   IV 33.2 166.6
1841 I 23.7 190.3
2. Bank of Australasia (Half-yearly)
1841 II 74.7 167.3
1842 I 68.6 336.6
   II 98.8 449.8
1843 I 184.6 524.5
   II 77.9 492.3
1844 I 55.0 673.7
   II 56.6 889.2
1845 I 47.6 853.6
   II 37.6 624.8
3. Western Australian Bank (Quarterly)
1848 IV 46.9 121.9
1849 I 40.5 131.6
   II 35.8 129.6
D. South Australia 
   Throughout the period no South Australian legislation provided 
for the making of returns or their publication,1 but it nevertheless 
happens that reasonably complete sets of statistics survive. The 
reasons for this are peculiar to each bank.  
   The Bank of South Australia2 supplied no returns until 1841. Data 
are available for end-June 18393 and a statement for end-September 
1840 was supplied by Angas to the Select Committee of 1841.4 The 
Register had urged compulsory returns in 1838 but without 
success,5 and the matter was not raised again until September 1840 
when the Colonial Secretary, having to secure data for the 
Bluebook, asked for returns. The manager, while admitting that 
these were very innocent inquiries, opposed on principle: it was 
“objectionable that local government clerks and other officers 
should be made acquainted with particulars of so confidential a 
nature”. The Australasia having referred a similar request to 
London, he followed the same course.6 London was more used to 
publicity and approved, although Stephens transmitted to the 
Colonial Secretary only a cautious willingness to “answer such 
limited queries as the local government may put to me”.7 However, 
it turned out that all the Colonial Secretary wanted was averages on 
the model of those supplied by the Australasia and Stephens 
thereupon agreed not merely to supply the return but also to 
publication, subject to London's views on that point,8 the London 
board having already told him to supply data requested provided 
they were in the form of averages.9 When in 1842, following 
separation from the South Australian Company, a local board was 
created, the rules for its guidance permitted supply of information 
to the government “at their discretion”.10  
   There the matter rested and the Government Gazette carried from 
   III 31.1 139.2
   IV 49.0 114.0
1850 I 44.4 122.9
   II 49.5 116.1
   III 43.9 119.2
   IV 46.8 107.7
1851 I 39.3 110.3
   II 41.0 108.8
   III 53.3 91.8
   IV 56.2 85.0
1841 a complete series of returns. The “Minutes” have a 
fragmentary series of statements of quarterly averages from 1847–
51 which, as they add little to the picture, are not reproduced.  
   When the Bank secured its charter in 1847,11 it was required to 
publish in the local newspapers and in the London Gazette an 
annual return on the same model as its local returns. These figures, 
again, add nothing to the picture. Fortunately nothing came of a 
proposal to drop the half-yearly return.12  
   For the Bank of Australasia the question was simpler. Its charter 
required publication of returns in a prescribed form and these 
appeared regularly in the Government Gazette from 1839 onwards.  
   For the first savings bank the data available are those given in 
statements to monthly meetings. Many of these were printed in full 
in the press although no paper published them without interruption 
nor over the whole period (1841–47). Up to mid-1845 most of the 
gaps can be filled by piecing together from the various papers, from 
tabulations in Almanacs and in the sixth and seventh Reports of the 
South Australian Company. But after that practically nothing 
survives; it is fairly clear, however, that the figures would show an 
extrapolation of the slow but steady upward trend. For its successor 
annual statements on a much fuller basis appeared regularly in the 
Government Gazette.  
   As in other colonies interest and exchange rates must be collected 
mainly from newspapers. In the later 'forties the South Australian 
Register's detailed commercial column simplifies the task while the 
fortunate survival of “Minute” and “Letter Books” of the Bank of 
South Australia fills many gaps.  
1 First general legislation Act No. 25 of 1863. The Union Bank Act No. 11 
of 1850, required for publication quarterly returns in the form prescribed for 
the Australasia. These are omitted here as belonging only formally to the 
period. 
2 This name is used throughout to avoid confusion. 
3 “Letters to London”, 26 August 1839. 
4 Select Committee on South Australia, “Evidence”, Q 1684. The local 
directors challenged the accuracy of the figures. 
5 22 December 1838. 
6 “Letters to London”, 22 September 1840. 
7 Stephens to Colonial Secretary, 5 October 1841, S.A. Archives, 
787/1841/711. 
8 “Letters to London”, 27 November 1841. Data on exchange rates were 
also supplied for Bluebooks, e.g., Stephens to Colonial Secretary, 14 August 
1843, S.A. Archives, C.S.O. 948/43. 
9 “Letters from London”, 5 May 1841. 
10 “Letters from London”, 31 March 1842. 
11 The original copy sent out to the Adelaide office is now in the Adelaide 
office of the Union Bank. 
12 “Minutes”, 26 May 1848; “Letters to London”, 5 June 1848. 
Table 38 (a) BANK OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA HALF-YEARLY 
AVERAGES OF LIABILITIES (£) 
   Period I is from end November of preceding year to end May of 
year quoted; period II is from end May to end November.  
     
     
Source: South Australian Government Gazette. 
Table 38 (b) BANK OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA HALF-YEARLY 
Deposits
Period Notes in 
circulation
Bills in 
circulation
Due to other 
banks
Not bearing 
interest
Bearing 
interest
Total
1841 I 16,222 3,159 1,554 — 54,065 54,065
   II 10,934 4,202 950 — 42,523 42,523
1842 I 10,011 1,571 553 — 43,669 43,669
   II 8,819 1,200 306 — 38,761 38,761
1843 I 7,991 871 776 — 37,159 37,159
   II 5,710 1,878 811 — 34,130 34,130
1844 I 7,753 546 1,005 — 40,643 40,643
   II 7,474 1,012 569 23,895 12,684 36,579
1845 I 11,094 1,965 448 26,959 16,741 43,700
   II 11,017 1,608 233 32,955 13,716 46,671
1846 I 15,954 2,518 1,380 44,341 15,379 59,720
   II 15,501 2,275 1,523 48,100 12,294 60,394
1847 I 20,188 1,306 2,532 52,751 13,017 65,768
   II 17,085 3,141 948 50,513 13,269 63,782
1848 I 21,574 2,771 89 52,753 16,079 68,832
   II 20,583 1,998 394 57,384 19,641 77,025
1849 I 26,844 2,910 2,264 65,504 22,949 88,453
   II 26,541 5,293 2,095 66,607 20,842 87,449
1850 I 33,413 3,512 516 82,914 19,975 102,889
   II 34,111 1,191 1,847 90,947 20,689 111,636
1851 I 42,406 1,513 6,745 90,242 23,574 113,816
   II 42,214 1,248 2,522 99,100 23,812 122,912
AVERAGES OF ASSETS (£) 
   For explanation of period see note to table of liabilities.  
     
     
Source: South Australian Government Gazette. 
Table 39 (a) BANK OF AUSTRALASIA—SOUTH AUSTRALIAN 
BUSINESS LIABILITIES (£) 
     
Half-yearly averages of weekly figures returned in accordance with the 
charter. Period I is from mid-October of preceding year to mid-April of the 
year quoted; period II is from mid-April to mid-October. 
     
Period Coin Premises Due from other banks Discounts, etc.
1841 I 15,678 2,723 2,905 187,061
   II 15,419 5,522 3,256 183,069
1842 I 12,064 5,834 2,249 167,332
   II 13,763 7,604 2,441 156,517
1843 I 20,491 8,259 1,993 150,781
   II 22,224 8,020 3,896 151,971
1844 I 28,197 7,897 4,464 147,651
   II 25,552 7,839 1,646 143,516
1845 I 20,185 7,645 997 141,600
   II 23,958 7,537 5,992 141,754
1846 I 39,462 7,344 1,000 130,993
   II 49,733 7,108 4,412 154,245
1847 I 77,813 6,896 5,863 163,927
   II 68,024 7,869 12,699 173,339
1848 I 61,658 10,271 7,604 190,955
   II 58,468 10,610 6,785 200,518
1849 I 53,963 10,437 4,065 215,857
   II 58,361 10,117 6,214 233,197
1850 I 65,450 8,152 4,183 223,936
   II 66,376 7,820 4,089 262,257
1851 I 54,045 7,294 1,526 295,228
   II 60,555 7,199 1,644 348,830
Deposits
Period Notes in circulation Bills in circulation Not bearing interest Bearing interest Total
1839 I (a) 1,338 724 — 4,497 4,497
   II 1,764 590 — 10,015 10,015
1840 I 2,377 1,056 — 17,049 17,049
   II 3,221 2,526 — 27,760 27,760
(a) Bank opened 14 January 1839. 
     
Source: South Australian Government Gazette. 
Table 39 (b) BANK OF AUSTRALASIA—SOUTH AUSTRALIAN 
BUSINESS ASSETS (£) 
   For explanation of period see note to table of liabilities.  
     
1841 I 3,357 2,828 — 23,685 23,685
   II 3,122 3,235 — 20,655 20,655
1842 I 3,227 1,609 — 18,234 18,234
   II 2,771 1,872 — 15,793 15,793
1843 I 3,007 1,898 — 15,724 15,724
   II 3,170 1,981 — 16,783 16,783
1844 I 3,562 1,447 — 18,408 18,408
   II 3,265 776 7,783 7,284 15,067
1845 I 4,210 1,879 15,683 3,788 19,471
   II 3,503 1,976 21,105 2,080 23,185
1846 I 6,536 3,154 31,055 1,113 32,168
   II 8,457 2,070 30,220 1,195 31,415
1847 I 13,598 2,239 38,993 461 39,454
   II 13,147 2,902 36,266 — 36,266
1848 I 19,549 1,607 40,521 — 40,521
   II 20,170 5,276 50,748 — 50,748
1849 I 23,611 2,724 56,782 — 56,782
   II 20,973 4,996 44,101 — 44,101
1850 I 25,392 5,721 51,284 — 51,284
   II 25,887 8,235 57,291 — 57,291
1851 I 24,920 3,176 66,667 — 66,667
   II 22,034 2,699 62,340 — 62,340
Period Coin Premises Discounts
1839 I 3,707 — 8,033
   II 7,585 — 16,452
1840 I 8,581 — 26,206
   II 8,240 — 51,877
1841 I 8,640 — 44,256
   II 8,054 — 51,181
1842 I 11,347 — 43,480
   II 8,416 — 36,164
1843 I 5,122 — 34,132
   II 7,925 — 35,250
1844 I 6,329 — 35,755
   II 4,908 — 35,321
1845 I 5,865 — 32,578
     
Source: South Australian Government Gazette. 
Table 40 (a) SOUTH AUSTRALIA—DEPOSIT INTEREST (per cent per 
annum) BANK OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA 
   Rates maintained between entries  
     
(a) Bank open. 
(b) 5 per cent under £50; 7 per cent over £50; three months. 
(c) 5 per cent under £100; 7 per cent £100 to £1,000; three months with ten 
days' notice. 
(e) Under £1,000; three months with ten days' notice. 
(f) 5 per cent for three months with ten days' notice; 7 per cent for twelve 
months. 
(g) Three months, thirty days' notice. Minimum £20. 
(h) Interest paid on deposits for remainder of period. Circumstantial 
evidence, too tedious to cite, suggests these 1846 rates unchanged. 
   II 10,630 — 34,011
1846 I 14,513 — 42,699
   II 34,768 — 65,025
1847 I 35,967 — 128,226
   II 21,933 — 152,704
1848 I 27,858 — 160,056
   II 29,258 — 184,002
1849 I 25,301 — 193,330
   II 24,283 — 201,452
1850 I 29,730 1,318 199,025
   II 32,114 5,362 172,030
1851 I 42,898 7,469 184,453
   II 50,693 9,081 168,889
Rate
Date Current account daily balance Fixed deposit Source
(a) 1837 April — (b) 5 & 7 “L. to L.” 19 May 1837
1838 May — (c) 5 & 7 “L. to L.” 24 May 1838
1841 April 3 4 (e) 7 S.A.R. 10 April 1841
1842 Oct. 17 2 (f) 5 & 7 S.A.R. 8 October 1842
1844 Jan. 1 2 (g) 4 S.A.R. 9 December 1843
June 3 nil (g) 4 S.A.R. 29 May 1844
1845 April 1 nil (g) 2 S.A.R. 22 March 1845
(h) 1846 June 6 nil (i) 11/2 & 3 S.A.R. 6 June 1846
(i) 11/2 per cent if actually left for three months, minimum £10; 3 per cent 
on minimum of £50, on deposits at six months' notice. 
   Sources: “L. to L.”—“Letters to London”.  
     
S.A.R.—South Australian Register. 
BANK OF AUSTRALASIA—ADELAIDE 
   Rates maintained between entries  
     
(a) Bank open this date. 
(b) 5 per cent on ten days' notice; 7 per cent on three months' notice. 
(c) Possibly earlier. No information as to date of decision. 
     
Source: S.A.R.—South Australian Register. 
Table 40 (b) SOUTH AUSTRALIA DISCOUNT AND LOAN RATES 
(PER CENT PER ANNUM) BANK OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA 
     
(a) No period specified. 
(b) Described as “loans and advances”; other evidence shows this meant 
cash credits; charged on daily balance, with 8 per cent on contra-deposits. 
(c) 3 months. According to “Minutes”, 27 September 1842, no longer bills 
taken. 
Rate
Date Current account daily balance Three months' notice Source
(a) 1839 Jan. 14 4 7 S.A.R. 12 January 1839
   May 1 4 5 S.A.R. 6 April 1839
1840 Aug. 24 4 5 and 7 (b) S.A.R. 5 September 1840
1843 April 5 4 5 S.A.R. 7 January 1843
11 21/2 5 S.A.R. 12 April 1843
1844 April 15 2 4 S.A.R. 24 April 1844
   June 3 nil 4 S.A.R. 29 May 1844
1845 April 1 nil 2 S.A.R. 29 March 1845
(c) 1850 nil nil S.A.R. 31 December 1850
Date Bills Cash credits Source
1837 April (a) 10 (b) 10 “L. to L.” 19/5/37
1842 October 17 (c) 8 10 S.A.R. 8/10/42
No later change during period (various bank notices).
BANK OF AUSTRALASIA ADELAIDE 
     
(a) i.e., equivalent of cash credit. 
(b) Bank open. 
(c) 8 per cent to sixty days, 10 per cent sixty-ninety days. 
(s) To one hundred days. 
(e) No rates published; business no longer sought. 
     
Rates maintained between entries. Bill rate of 8 per cent maintained 
throughout period.  Sources: “L. to L.”—“Letters to London”.  S.A.R.—
South Australian Register.  S.A.—South Australian. 
Table 41 (a) BANK OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA—EXCHANGE RATES (£A FOR 
£100 STERLING) 
   Blank indicates no information.  
     
Bills
Date To three months Over three months (a) Overdrawn accounts Source
(b) 1839 Jan. 14 (c) 8 & 10 12 12 S.A.R. 12/1/39
1840 Aug. 24 (s) 10 12 12 S.A.R. 5/9/40
1843 Apr. 11 8 (e) (e) S.A. 14/4/43
London N.S.W. Tasmania Port 
Phillip
W.A.
Date or 
period
Buy Sell Buy Sell Buy Sell Buy Sell Buy Sell Source (a) 
1838 24 
May
94 100 95 95 1011/2 “L. to L.”
   21 
August
96 101 99 99 1011/2 “L. to L.”
   26 
October
100 101 100 100 101 “L. to L.”
1839 26 
March
100 103 102 1011/2 “L. to L.”
   5 June 105 105 “L. to L.”
1840 14 
January
105 “L. to L.”
   24 
February
98 1021/2 103 103 “L. to L.”
   3 April 102 103 103 103 S.A.R. 4 
April
   7 August 103 103 103 103 “L. to L.”
   26 
December
100 S.A.R.
1841 1st 
Qtr
100 103 103 103 B.B. 1841 & 
S.A.R. 10 
April, 31 
July
   2nd Qtr 1011/2 103 103 103
   3rd Qtr 1021/2 103 103 103
   4th Qtr 102 103 103 103
1842 1st 
Qtr
1001/2 103 103 103 B.B. 1842
   2nd Qtr 1001/2 103 103 103
   3rd Qtr 1001/2 103 103 103
   4th Qtr 100 103 103 103 S.A.R. 
8/10/42
1843 1st 
Qtr
100 103 103 103 B.B. 1843
   2nd Qtr 102 103 103 103
   3rd Qtr 97 102 103 103 103
   3 
November
103 “M.” (b) 
(c) 1844 6 
January
103 S.A.R.
   2 April 102 “M.”
   8 June 99 102 100 103 100 103 100 103 A.O.
   26 
December
99 102 100 103 100 103 100 103 S.A.R.
1845 16 
February
99 102 100 103 100 103 100 103 S.A.R. 
19/2/45
   19 March 97 100 S.A.R. 
19/3/45
   1st Qtr 102 1021/2 1021/2 1021/2 B.B. 1845
   2nd Qtr 100 101 101 101 B.B. 1845
   9 July 97 100 101 101 101 S.A.R.
   3rd Qtr 100 101 101 101 B.B. 1845
   4th Qtr 100 101 101 101 B.B. 1845
1846 1st 
Qtr
100 100 100 100 B.B. 1846
   2nd Qtr 100 101 101 101
   3rd Qtr 100 101 101 101
   4th Qtr 100 101 101 101
   21 
October
96 100 98 101 98 101 97 102 S.A.R.
(d) 1847 1 
January
98 101 “M.”
   16 
February
99 102 100 103 100 103 100 103 100 103 “L. to L.”
   31 May 100 103 100 103 100 103 100 103 97 102 S.A.R. 
29/5/47
   13 
October
99 102 100 103 100 103 100 103 97 102 S.A.R. 
6/10/47
1848 19 100 104 99 102 99 102 99 102 97 102 S.A.R. 
(a) “L. to L.”—“Letters to London”; S.A.R.—South Australian Register; 
B.B.—Bluebooks; “M.”—“Minutes”; A.O.—Adelaide Observer; Unless 
otherwise indicated dates are same as for entry. 
(b) Announced South Australian Register 6 September. [rates are a 
continuous series for the year. 
(c) Bluebook implies that gaps could be filled by assuming London buying 
and all colonial rates constant throughout year. London selling 
(d) Bluebook indicates that the figures are a continuous series for the year. 
(e) Remainder of table is a continuous series to end of 1851. 
Table 41 (b) BANK OF AUSTRALASIA—SOUTH AUSTRALIAN 
EXCHANGE RATES 
     
Rates were published less frequently than for Bank of South Australia. Prior 
to 1841, only one set of rates, that for March 1839, is recorded and that is 
identical with that for Bank of South Australia.  Selling rates different from 
those of the Bank of South Australia are recorded in Bluebooks for 1841 
and 1842: 
     
     
October 21/10/48
(e) 1849 28 
May
99 102 99 102 99 102 99 102 97 102 S.A.R. 
30/5/49
   24 June 99 103 99 102 99 102 99 102 97 102 “M.”
   14 
December
99 103 99 102 99 102 99 102 102 “M.”
1850 26 
January
99 103 99 102 99 102 99 102 99 102 S.A.R.
   3 April 981/2 102 981/2 1011/2 981/2 1011/2 981/2 1011/2 981/2 1011/2 S.A.R.
   17 July 971/2 101 981/2 1011/2 981/2 1011/2 981/2 1011/2 981/2 1011/2 S.A.R.
1851 11 
March
98 1011/2 981/2 1011/2 981/2 1011/2 981/2 1011/2 981/2 1011/2 S.A.R.
   10 
November
97 101 981/2 1011/2 981/2 1011/2 981/2 1011/2 981/2 1011/2 S.A.R.
Period London Other colonies
1841 1st Qtr 103 103
   2nd Qtr 1013/4 103
   3rd Qtr 103 103
   4th Qtr 1011/4 103
1842 1st Qtr 1002/3 103
   2nd Qtr 100 103
   3rd Qtr 100 103
Thereafter, except for minor and temporary differences on a few occasions 
in the middle 'forties, rates are the same as for Bank of South Australia, with 
these qualifications:  (a) No special W.A. rate was quoted. For 1841–5 
presumably the same as for other colonies. After that the business was not 
done.  (b) A special rate, slightly less favourable to the customer, whether 
buyer or seller, was sometimes quoted for business with the Portland 
branch.  (c) Generally, one rate was quoted for branches in the other 
colonies.   For the following dates, rates are available for the Bank of 
Australasia and not for the Bank of South Australia, although it is certain 
both banks had the same rates: 
     
From the beginning of 1850 the Union Bank quoted the same rates as did 
the other two banks.  Sources: S.A.R.—South Australian Register.  A.O.—
Adelaide Observer. 
Table 42 (a) BANK OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA BANK RATIOS 
     
London Colonies
Date Buy Sell Buy Sell Source
1846 16 January 95 100 101 S.A.R. 18/1
   16 April 95 100 101 A.O. 18/4
1848 24 June 99 102 99 101 S.A.R. 28/6
Period Coin as percentage of total deposits Discounts as percentage of total deposits
1841 I 22.3 266.1
   II 28.8 342.5
1842 I 22.5 311.7
   II 28.9 328.95
1843 I 45.4 333.95
   II 55.8 381.45
1844 I 58.3 305.1
   II 58.0 325.8
1845 I 36.8 258.4
   II 41.5 245.7
1846 I 52.1 173.1
   II 65.5 203.2
1847 I 90.5 190.7
   II 84.1 214.35
1848 I 68.2 211.2
   II 59.9 205.4
1849 I 46.8 187.2
   II 51.2 204.6
1850 I 48.0 164.3
   II 45.5 179.9
1851 I 34.6 188.97
Table 42 (b) BANK OF AUSTRALASIA—SOUTH AUSTRALIA BANK 
RATIOS 
     
Table 43 (a) SOUTH AUSTRALIAN SAVINGS BANK—DEPOSITS 
     
   II 36.7 211.2
Period Coin as percentage of total deposits Discounts as percentage of total deposits
1839 I 63.5 137.7
   II 64.4 139.7
1840 I 44.2 134.9
   II 26.6 167.4
1841 I 31.95 163.6
   II 33.9 215.2
1842 I 52.9 202.6
   II 45.3 194.8
1843 I 27.3 182.2
   II 39.7 176.7
1844 I 28.8 162.7
   II 26.8 192.7
1845 I 24.8 137.6
   II 39.8 127.4
1846 I 37.5 110.3
   II 87.2 163.1
1847 I 67.8 241.7
   II 44.4 309.0
1848 I 46.4 266.4
   II 41.2 259.4
1849 I 31.5 240.5
   II 37.3 309.6
1850 I 38.8 259.6
   II 38.6 206.8
1851 I 46.8 201.4
   II 60.1 200.2
Deposits Held in Banks (£)
Date (a) No. (b) Amount (£) South Australia Australasia
F.D. C.A. F.D. C.A.
1841 April 34 130 — —
   May 47 221 — —
   June 52 322 161 — 162 —
   July 51 376 207 — 171 —
   Aug. 55 502 260 — 243 —
   Sept. 55 520 263 — 257 —
   Oct. 54 537 285 — 251 —
   F.D.: Fixed Deposit; C.A.: Current Account.  
   Nov. 57 476 254 — 228 —
   Dec. 57 572 274 — 311 —
1842 Jan. 53 442 245 — 209 —
   Feb. 53 491 245 — 256 —
   March 55 468 240 — 223 —
   April 53 477 223 — 249 —
   May 53 442 235 — 202 —
   June 59 502 249 — 268 —
   July 62 462 242 — 234 —
   Aug. 64 483 253 — 244 —
   Sept. 63 472 245 — 241 —
   Oct. 63 427 221 — 219 —
   Nov. 66 390 218 — 188 —
   Dec. 63 400 219 — 205 —
1843 Jan. 64 445 264 — 205 —
   Feb. 61 484 271 — 236 —
   March 58 500 245 — 259 —
   April 61 523 254 — 272 —
   May 61 575 303 — 276 —
   June 62 547 298 — 271 —
   July 58 515 281 — 256 —
   Aug. 59 530 286 — 265 —
   Sept. 62 580 — —
   Oct. 62 559 318 — 262 —
   Nov. 61 573 331 — 270 —
   Dec. 58 496 290 — 242 —
1844 Jan. 57 517 300 — 254 —
   Feb. 56 527 305 — 258 —
   March 57 560 315 — 256 —
   April 60 513 250 29 250 —
   May 66 542 250 21 250 28
   June 71 554 250 15 250 56
   July 75 600 250 89 250 22
   Aug. 82 676 250 90 250 76
   Sept. 83 650 250 51 250 82
   Oct. 86 669 250 82 250 75
   Nov. 89 692 250 250
   Dec. 93 755 250 132 250 —
1845 Jan. 87 738 259 132 378 —
   Feb. 90 730 259 124 378 —
   March 91 766 259 139 378 —
   April 94 816
   May 95 778
(c) June 98 878 259 253 378 —
1847 March 1102 — 1177 (d) — —
(a) Beginning of month. 
(b) Including accrued interest. 
(c) From June 1845 to July 1846 the bank held £500 in Government 5 per 
cent debentures, bought at 10 per cent discount. 
(d) Entire funds, at March 1, South Australian, 5 March 1847. £75 consisted 
of reserve, Adelaide Observer, 6 March 1847. 
     
Sources: Assembled from reports of monthly meetings in South Australian 
Register, South Australian and Adelaide Observer, and from summaries in 
S.A. Almanacs and sixth and seventh Reports of S.A. Company. 
Table 43 (b) SOUTH AUSTRALIAN SAVINGS BANK INTEREST ON 
DEPOSITS 
   (per cent per annum)  
     
   Business year to 30 March. Rate determined retrospectively.  
(a) From 1 May to closing in December. 
     
(a) To March of latter year. 
(b) Debenture interest. June 1845 to July 1846. 
(c) July to December. 
1841–2 7
1842–3 7
1843–4 7
1844–5 4
1845–6 4
1846–7 4
(a) 1847 nil
INTEREST INCOME (per cent per 
annum) 
(a) 1841–2 7
(a) 1842–3 7
(a) 1843–4 7
(a) 1844–5 5 21/2 on current account
1845, March-June 5 21/2 on current account
(b) 1845–6 5
(c) 1846 3
(d) 1847 nil
(d) Bank in liquidation. 
Table 44 (a) SAVINGS BANK OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA DEPOSITS 
     
Table 44 (b) SAVINGS BANK OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA PROFITS AND 
RESERVES (£) 
     
(a) Interest on mortgages, and (at 3 per cent) on fixed deposit in Bank of 
South Australia. 
(b) Not given. 
(c) Office furniture (£50) written off. 
Table 44 (c) SAVINGS BANK OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA ASSETS 
     
(a) Including interest due. 
Table 44 (d) SAVINGS BANK OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA INTEREST 
RATES PER CENT 
     
Individuals
At 31 December Number Amount Official assignee Total deposits
£ £ £
1848 212 2,185 3,128 5,313
1849 419 4,726 3,128 7,855
1850 670 8,411 3,128 11,539
1851 733 10,213 4,128 14,341
At 31 Dec. Receipts (a) Expenses Net profit Deposit interest Added to reserve Balance of reserve fund
1848 (b) (b) (b) 20 8 8
1849 455 250 205 117 88 96
1850 625 200 (c) 375 237 137 233
1851 840 289 551 340 211 444
Mortgages Bank of South Australia
At 31 Dec. Number Amount (a) Fixed deposit Current account Repayment fund
£ £ £ £
1848 7 3,162 1,411 704 129
1849 12 4,942 1,449 928 581
1850 19 7,575 2,547 1,560 90
1851 26 10,513 3,250 115 908
Date Mortgage Deposit (a)
(a) Maximum deposit bearing interest, £200. 
     
Source: Annual Returns in South Australian Government Gazette. 
1 Enclosures in Darling to Murray, 29 December 1828, H.R.A. I, xiv, 549ff. 
2 “Colonial Secretary In-Letters”, File 29/3412 (M.L.), weekly returns 9 
March to 4 May 1829. 
3 Darling to Murray, 21 September 1830, H.R.A. I, xv, 733. 
4 Goderich to Darling, 30 March 1831, H.R.A. I, xvi, 229. 
5 Bourke to Goderich, 3 January 1832, H.R.A. I, xvi, 501. 
6 The state of these papers is such that some returns may well have escaped 
notice. 
7 Glenelg to Bourke, 9 July 1835, H.R.A. I, xviii, 8–21. 
8 In this appendix referred to as “charter” return. For the same return in 
other colonies see relevant sections below. 
9 Probably the banks were successful in their objections to particular items. 
Thus the Commercial declined to divide deposits, since they did not 
distinguish interest-bearing deposits in their accounts, interest accruing 
automatically after three months. Letter of 18 January 1836, “Colonial 
Secretary In-Letters”, “Banks”, 1837. For agreement by Australia to furnish 
returns, letter of same date, ibid. 
10 Bluebook 1838. In Bluebook 1839 the note issue at 31 December was 
given but this is an isolated item. 
11 Letters, with Bourke's endorsements of 18 April 1836; 13, 16, 25 
February 1837, “Colonial Secretary In-Letters”, “Banks”, 1837; 22 January 
1838, ibid., “Banks” 1838. 
12 Government Gazette, 28 February 1838. 
13 First in 10 August 1836. 
14 Enclosure in Russell to Gipps, 4 May 1840, H.R.A. I, xxi, 765ff. A 
circular despatch to all colonies. 
15 4 Vic., No. 13, 23 September 1840. How far Gipps was aware of the 
Regulations is uncertain. His bill was introduced in August and he did not 
communicate the Regulations to the Legislative Council until 13 August 
1848 10 3
1849 10 5
1850 10 5
1851 10 5
1841. V.P.N.S.W. 1841. See Chapter 15 above. 
16 New Zealand being briefly under New South Wales control, separate 
returns, from any banks operating there (including, e.g., the branch of the 
Union Bank) were to be made to the New Zealand Colonial Secretary. 
17 Petition from bank in V.P.N.S.W., 19 August 1840, Gipps' reply in report 
of Debates, Sydney Herald, 12 August 1840; withdrawal by bank, ibid., 26 
August 1840. The Australasia's protest was a matter of form to emphasize 
its chartered status. Griffiths thought the return was no trouble and the act 
desirable. “Private Letter Book”, 22 October 1840. 
18 Transmitted in Gladstone to FitzRoy, 30 May 1846, H.R.A. I, xxv, 74 ff. 
19 Terms of bill and debate in Sydney Herald, 12 June 1850. A private 
member's bill (Martin). 
20 V.P.N.S.W., 25 June 1850. Debate in Sydney Herald, 26 June 1850. 
21 Report, 11 September 1850, V.P.N.S.W., 1850. The banks resisted all 
changes in the return, even arguing that publicity would encourage robbery 
on which one witness, G.R. Nichols, commented adequately: “People who 
rob banks do not look at the published returns”. Ibid., Evidence. 
22 Letters to Colonial Secretary, 17 May 1841, “Colonial Secretary In-
Letters”, “Banks”, 1841. The corrected figure (£16,946 in place of £34,946) 
appeared in the aggregated returns published in Government Gazette. 
23 The article is well-informed and may be trusted on the point. See p. 60. 
24 W. Fletcher, Inspector Union Bank, in evidence before 1850 Select 
Committee on Banking, V.P.N.S.W., 1850; Moore's 1852 Almanac, p. 60. 
25 See the statistics below and cf. evidence of G. Miller to Select 
Committee on Banking, V.P.N.S.W., 1850. 
26 Bank to Colonial Secretary, 10 February 1840, and minute by Gipps. 
“Colonial Secretary's Papers”, “Banks”, 1840. 
27 Note that the aggregated returns gave only total deposits. For the 
division into interest-bearing and non-interest-bearing it is necessary to 
consult the individual statements published as received in Government 
Gazette. 
28 The returns are in “Colonial Secretary In-Letters”, “Banks”, 1844, File 
44/2349. 
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